Kings Offseason Update: DeMar DeRozan

Well, well, well, the Sacramento Kings offseason does have some sizzle!

The Kings made a splashy move on Saturday night by executing a sign-and-trade for Chicago Bulls wing and six-time All-Star DeMar DeRozan. This was huge news for the Kings, as DeRozan is probably the most accomplished free agent to ever join the Kings (all due respect to the Vlade Divac signing all the way back in 1999).

The Kings were hosting a summer league game against China when the deal was announced in the Golden One Center. Needless to say, the vibes were immaculate:

I talked briefly about the possibility of a sign-and-trade for DeRozan in my last post and it looks like the cost of the deal was roughly around what I expected (although the Kings gave up a bit more draft capital than I would’ve liked in an ideal world). Here are the deal terms:

• Sacramento Kings Receive:

  • DeMar DeRozan

    • DeRozan signed a 3 year, $73.7 million contract—the first two years are guaranteed and the third year is guaranteed for just $10 million

• Chicago Bulls Receive:

  • Two second round draft picks (from Sacramento)

  • Chris Duarte

• San Antonio Spurs Receive:

  • Harrison Barnes

  • Swap rights for Kings 2031 first round pick

How Did This Deal Go Down, and What Does It Mean for the Parties?

I’ll explain briefly what’s happened in this trade from each party’s perspective.

DeRozan was a free agent this offseason and the Bulls could not realistically keep him without going deep into the luxury tax, an unpalatable proposition for an aging team that only won 39 games last season. Rather than risk letting DeRozan walk in free agency with nothing to show for it, the Bulls were heavily incentivized to engage in a sign-and-trade so that they could get something back for him.

Entering his age 35 season, DeRozan was facing a rather limited free agency market. As I wrote about previously, only six or seven teams entered the offseason with substantial cap room: Detroit, Philadelphia, Utah, Oklahoma City, Orlando (Charlotte technically had some room and Toronto theoretically could have created room but chose not to). But only a few of those teams were realistic potential destinations for DeRozan, and that pool became even smaller early on in free agency when Philadelphia signed Paul George, Oklahoma City signed Isaiah Hartenstein, and Orlando signed Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. By looking at sign-and-trade scenarios, DeRozan could open up his list of potential destinations to keep his prospective compensation high and avoid having to join teams in the middle of a rebuild.

As an added challenge, the Bulls and DeRozan needed to find a way to do a sign-and-trade for DeRozan while not forcing the Bulls to take back a lot of salary. The Bulls wanted to avoid the luxury tax, but they also signed Jalen Smith in free agency to a 3 year, $27 million deal that hard-capped them at the first apron (because the Bulls gave Smith a starting salary above the Taxpayer MLE, they got hard capped at the first apron).

While the Bulls and DeRozan both wanted to do a sign-and-trade, they needed to find a trade partner and find a way to keep the Bulls from taking back too much salary in the deal. There weren’t many cap room teams interested, as I mentioned, so they had to focus on finding over-the-cap teams to do a deal.

The Kings were just such a team, over-the-cap but interested in adding DeRozan at a salary level he was comfortable with (roughly $20-25 million per year). But under the CBA rules, over-the-cap teams like the Kings must send out “matching salary” in a trade, which the Bulls didn’t want to (and couldn’t) accept. So it had to be a three team deal.

Enter the Spurs. The Spurs had a relatively quiet free agency start despite having cap space. The only move they’d made in free agency was to sign veteran point guard Chris Paul to a 1 year, $11 million deal. But they had more cap space to use and were willing to use it to facilitate a DeRozan sign-and-trade, especially if they could extract something of value out of the deal.

To make the deal work, the Kings and DeRozan first had to iron out contract details that would work for both sides. They landed on 3 years and $73.7 million, with only a partial guarantee in the final year of the deal to protect the team in case DeRozan’s play declines as he ages (DeRozan will be 37 in the last year of the deal).

As an over-the-cap team, the Kings had to comply with the CBA’s salary matching rules to trade for DeRozan. They also had to consider their own luxury tax and cap situation; the Kings were already close to the luxury tax themselves and by executing a sign-and-trade, they would hard cap themselves at the first apron by rule. To match DeRozan’s $23.4 million incoming salary for the 2024-25 cap year (salary estimate from Spotrac), the Kings chose to trade away Harrison Barnes and Chris Duarte, slated for 2024-25 salaries of $18 million and $5.9 million respectively.

Due to the Bulls lack of room below the tax and hard cap situation, they could only take back Duarte’s $5.9 million salary for this year (Duarte is a restricted free agent at the end of next season). In exchange, the Bulls received two second round draft picks from the Kings. That’s pretty close to the market price this offseason for eating $5-6 million in salary, and if the Bulls can turn Duarte’s shooting around, they may realize some upside from his contract too.

The Spurs took on Harrison Barnes’ contract, which is for $18 million this coming season and $19 million in 2025-26. That’s a significant amount of salary to take on, but the Spurs had some cap space to use and Barnes is a productive player. To get enough cap space for the deal to work, the Spurs actually had to trade away a second round pick to dump Devonte Graham’s contract on the Hornets. Barnes also agreed to waive a 10% trade kicker to make the deal possible. Ultimately, for their trouble, the Spurs added Barnes and received the right to swap first round picks with the Kings in 2031.

By adding Barnes, the Spurs get a productive player who can space the floor effectively (Barnes shoots 38% from three for his career), something the Spurs need around Victor Wembanyama and this year’s #4 overall pick Stephon Castle, both of whom can benefit tremendously from floor spacing the Spurs often lacked last year. Barnes will also bring professionalism, maturity, and availability—traits the Kings benefitted from tremendously during his six seasons with the franchise. While Barnes’ defensive limitations and below average rebounding were issues for a relatively undersized Sacramento team, Wembanyama’s presence in San Antonio should mitigate those concerns. And at the very least, Barnes may be a potential trade chip for San Antonio down the line as other teams search for shooting (everyone always needs shooting) or if they need to matching salary in a trade.

The 2031 swap right has the potential to be extremely valuable, but its value is highly variable and exceptionally difficult to predict at this stage. Prudence would suggest assuming something like a 50/50 chance that the swap right is even exercised at all. The teams also have to consider the relative value (and cost) of the potential for moving a short distance between picks (it’s not that valuable to go from pick #17 to #14, for example). I’ve seen a ton of takes that the swap right is super high value, but they’re over-stated. A lot can change in the next seven years, and in order for the swap right to be exceptionally valuable things have to go both poorly in Sacramento and extremely well in San Antonio. For perspective, seven years is enough time to completely turnover rosters. Plus, the current CBA won’t even be in effect in 2031. And I’ve seen exactly zero people acknowledge the possibility that Wembanyama might actually leave San Antonio in free agency before the swap right even rolls around.

From the Kings perspective, by executing the sign-and-trade for DeRozan, they added a talented player they could not have signed in free agency. They also managed to shed salary this year in the deal, giving them slightly more breathing room below the luxury tax and the first apron hard cap. I’ll talk more about how it effects them on the court next.

DeRozan Boosts the Kings’ Talent, But Questions Remain

There’s quite a bit of good content on DeRozan’s fit with the Kings out there, but it’s worth discussing it a bit anyway. I’m quite optimistic about the Kings adding DeRozan, especially offensively. He brings All-Star level scoring from midrange and on the interior (especially by getting to the line), and he’s a willing passer who still takes care of the ball. Last season, Derozan averaged 24.0 points, 5.3 assists, 4.3 rebounds, and just 1.7 turnovers per game respectable shooting numbers, especially from the field and the free throw line (48% from the field / 33.3% from three / 85.3% from the free throw line on 7.7 attempts per game). Those numbers are roughly in-line with his averages over the last decade across three different teams, so it’s not hard to envision DeRozan having similar production in Sacramento.

DeRozan Will Give the Kings More Options Offensively

DeRozan is an elite shotmaker with serious creation chops, which is something the Kings sorely lacked toward the end of last year. He can create offensive for himself and his teammates in isolation, he can effectively run pick-and-rolls, he’s a truly elite midrange shooter, and he’s not afraid to attack the paint to score and create foul opportunities.

DeRozan’s scoring and creation skills will help the Kings take pressure off of Fox and Monk to generate offense. Over the last couple years, the Kings have needed additional shot creation late in games especially, and DeRozan provides that in spades. While the Sabonis-centric offense that the Kings run can be highly effective, it’s too often bogged down late in games against playoff caliber opponents, and that contributed to several critical Kings losses (including, for example, in the 2023 playoffs versus the Warriors). The issue was even more pronounced at the end of last season after Monk got hurt and the Kings struggled mightily to maintain their offensive firepower. Barnes provided a bit of creation at times, but those times were too few and too far between to comfortably rely on. This shows up in the numbers, as the Kings ranked 26th among all teams in isolation possessions and were in the bottom half of teams in terms of efficiency when they did at 0.9 points per possession. While I’m not suggesting the Kings should lean heavily into iso offense, there are times when it’s helpful to have as an option, and DeRozan will help fill that void easily. Per NBA.com, DeRozan was 17th in the NBA in isolation possessions per game and scored 1.10 points per possession (PPP) out of them—roughly comparable to the PPP figures put up by Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Luka Doncic, albeit on less volume.

DeRozan’s pick and roll effectiveness will also help the Kings maintain efficient offense even with Fox off the floor, as DeRozan and Sabonis could make for an elite pick and roll combo with shooters like Murray, Ellis, Monk, Huerter, and Lyles on the floor with them. This is another area of effective offense that the Kings weren’t always able to go to when needed last season. They ran pick and rolls with the third lowest frequency in the NBA and posted a middle-of-the-pack 0.92 points per possession out of those plays per NBA.com. But adding DeRozan will make the pick and roll game a much more robust option offensively. DeRozan ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game (12th in the NBA) and scored 1.05 PPPs in those situations. To put those figures in perspective, Fox ran 8.2 pick and rolls per game and scored 0.97 PPPs while Tyrese Halliburton ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game and scored 1.06 PPPs. Adding options like an effective pick and roll game for when Fox sits will help keep the Kings offense humming throughout games, which was at times an issue last season.

I’m also optimistic about DeRozan’s ability to generate points off drives. He was the 13th most frequent driver in the NBA last season at roughly 14.8 drives per game (just a bit behind Fox’s 10th-ranked 15.2 drives per game), which really bolstered DeRozan’s scoring efficiency as he shot over 60% inside of 8 feet and got the to free throw line at the fourth highest rate in the league. I’m especially excited about the free throw shooting, as the Kings have struggled to get easy points from the line in the past.

DeRozan should be able to fit in well enough with the Kings’ dribble handoff (DHO) offense. That’s important because the Kings ran handoffs more than 50% more often than any other team in the NBA (roughly 11.4 times per game). You can see from the clip below that DeRozan had some opportunities to run similar sets in Chicago, even though the Bulls ran handoffs less than any other team in the NBA. These kinds of plays should be more efficient for DeRozan when done with Sabonis rather than Nikola Vucecic:

There are two primary concerns with adding DeRozan offensively, but I suspect they’ll both be manageable.

The biggest concern is that adding DeRozan and subtracting Barnes does hurt the Kings’ three point shooting prowess. Barnes was a reliable floor spacer, hitting over 38% of his threes in five of six seasons in Sacramento. While DeRozan can hit some threes, it’s definitely not his forte. He’s a low volume three point shooter and well below average by percentage (he did a bit better on corner threes last year, hitting 39.4% per NBA.com, but that might be an outlier). With Fox’s improved shooting, Huerter and Monk back from injury, and the possibility of a bounce-back shooting year from Keegan Murray, I don’t worry too much about the dip in shooting. I also don’t expect DeRozan’s weaker three point shooting to dramatically affect the Kings’ floor spacing overall. DeRozan still commands attention on the perimeter because of his ability to knock down midrange shots and dribble-drive close-outs. While he’s not a prolific three point shooter, DeRozan has hit over 43% of his midrange shots last year per NBA.com and has been upwards of 45% from that distance repeatedly in recent years. In addition, because DeRozan can handle a good amount of on-ball responsibility, there are ways to mitigate his lack of shooting by letting him bring the ball up and initiate offense, including through pick and rolls.

The other concern that folks have raised is about DeRozan’s supposed “stickiness” with the ball. That concern strikes me as dramatically over-stated. DeRozan played in a Chicago offense that was deliberate and methodical (28th in pace), but DeRozan’s average touch lasted just 4.73 seconds, just a touch longer than Fox’s average of 4.68 seconds per touch. While DeRozan will need to move the ball more quickly at times in the Kings offense, he’s become such a willing distributor that there’s no reason to think he can’t do so.

Ultimately, DeRozan will bring more offensive punch to the Kings easily. He’ll give the team more options for shot creation and easy pick and rolls, and he should be another reliable option for one-on-one scoring when needed late in games. While his lack of three point shooting isn’t ideal, it’s mitigated by the fact that the Kings can still put plenty of shooting on the floor even with DeRozan and Sabonis together.

Defensively, the Trade May Be a Wash

The biggest concern with swapping Barnes (and I suppose Duarte) for DeRozan is the impact on defense, and you see a lot of folks expressing concern about the Kings defense in general. I think those concerns are way overstated for two reasons.

While no one claims that DeRozan is a force on defense, the Kings didn’t actually give up much in terms of defensive contribution in the deal.

Let’s start with Duarte for simplicity. While Duarte was an above average defensive player, his offensive struggles kept him from getting on the floor consistently, and he averaged just 12.2 minutes per game as a result. His propensity for fouling also didn’t help him stay on the court. With Keon Ellis emerging, Monk and Huerter both back with the team, and the Kings selecting Devin Carter in the draft, there was no real path for Duarte to contribute meaningfully this coming season (and he is slated to be a free agent after next season regardless).

But what about losing Barnes? I expect there will be some drawbacks, but probably less pronounced than most folks assume.

At 6’8” and 225 pounds, Barnes has slotted in as an undersized power forward for the Kings for years. While he’s been a solid, well-rounded player during that time, Barnes’ defensive limitations have been a significant issue for the Kings for several years, especially paired with a big like Domantas Sabonis who doesn’t offer a ton of rim protection. DeRozan has also played power forward quite a bit for the last few years in Chicago and at times in San Antonio, but he’s a bit smaller than Barnes at 6’6” and 220 pounds. By moving from Barnes to DeRozan, the Kings will give up a bit of height. And even though Barnes was never a stout defender against stronger power forwards, his strength and size were a bit more suited to matching up against guys like Karl-Anthony Towns and Jaren Jackson Jr. than DeRozan will be.

But in the modern NBA, there just aren’t that many power forwards who are offensively capable of overpowering their opponents with strength. Other than Towns and Jackson, it’s hard to think of any examples of Western Conference forwards that Barnes could handle strength-wise that DeRozan cannot. Arguably Zion Williamson fits the description, but Barnes generally wasn’t able to handle him either (I’m not sure many players can 1 vs. 1). Focusing on the Western Conference, the vast majority of modern power forwards are really perimeter players or at best tertiary offensive threats. Towns, Jackson, Kevin Durant, Zion Williamson, Kawhi Leonard, Jalen Williams, Jerami Grant, and Draymond Green all largely play outside-in. Aaron Gordon, PJ Washington, Rui Hachimura, Jeremy Sochan, John Collins, and Jabari Smith aren't big enough offensive threats to really be a concern on the interior other than as lob threats. It’s just not a huge area of concern.

Of course, Barnes’ size would be theoretically more useful against centers than anything DeRozan has to offer, but if you watched the Kings last season for any significant amount of time, you’d be hard-pressed to find examples of Barnes meaningfully slowing down centers when switched on to them. The Kings were wholly dependent on Sabonis (and to a lesser extent Alex Len, Javale McGee, and Trey Lyles) to hold up against opposing centers.

Aside from size concerns (which were an issue with Barnes too), there isn’t much reason to think that the Kings are losing much on the defensive end.

From an advanced numbers perspective, DeRozan actually graded out comparably to Barnes as a defender. Per DunksandThrees.com, DeRozan posted a 50th percentile Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of -0.6, while Barnes ranked in the 49th percentile (DeRozan outperformed Barnes by this metric in 2021-22 and 2022-23 too, if you’re curious). The all-in defensive metric from Basketball Reference, Defensive Box Plus-Minus, also consistently prefers DeRozan to Barnes. In 2023-24, DeRozan posted a Defensive Box Plus-Minus rating of -0.3 compared to Barnes’ rating of -1.2, and DeRozan has rated better than Barnes each of the last five seasons under the metric. From an on/off points perspective, it also looks like close to a wash. Per Cleaning the Glass, the Kings were about 3.0 points per 100 possessions worse defensively with Barnes on the floor while the Bulls were actually better by about 0.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan on the floor. Even comparing their time at power forward tells a similar story: the Bulls gave up 116.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan at power forward compared to the Kings giving up 117.0 points per 100 possessions with Barnes at power forward.

The defensive counting stats tell the same basic story. Last year, DeRozan averaged 5.7 rebounds, 1.5 steals, and 0.8 blocks per 100 possessions. Barnes averaged 5.1 rebounds, 1.1 steals, and 0.2 blocks per 100 possessions. DeRozan’s steals and blocks rates have also been better than Barnes’ rates every year for the past five seasons, and DeRozan has posted better defensive rebounding rates than Barnes in three of the last five years, per Basketball Reference.

The other thing to consider is that the Kings’ defensive capabilities were based largely around improving their perimeter defense. Once Monk and Huerter went down, the Kings were forced to play Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell more often. The combination of Ellis, Keegan Murray, and De’Aaron Fox in particular performed exceptionally well in terms of perimeter defense, and helped elevate the Kings defense tremendously. Though the Kings finished 14th in defensive rating last season (114.4), they actually were 9th in the NBA after the All Star break (110.9) and ranked 6th over the last 15 games (108.8). Whether Barnes or DeRozan is at power forward isn’t going to materially affect the perimeter guys, and DeRozan’s offensive contributions may, in fact, let Fox focus more effort night-in and night-out on the defensive end.

Sacramento Is Still Going to Miss Harrison Barnes

As a quick aside, I want to acknowledge that losing Harrison Barnes, AKA the Black Falcon, is bittersweet. He’s been a pillar for the Kings for almost six years now, and he’s been super active in the Sacramento community during that time. I wish him the best in San Antonio and hope he can provide the same level of consistency, poise, professionalism, and leadership there that he provided the Kings as they grew throughout his tenure here. It’s going to be sad never seeing this group together again in the Kings uniform:

The Kings Still Have Ways to Fortify Their Roster Long-Term

If I had to guess, I would bet the Kings are probably done with major moves for this offseason. The rumor mill now has the Kings out on Brandon Ingram, which makes sense given his skillset largely overlaps with DeRozan. And at this point, it’s hard to bank on any of the rumored Lauri Markkanen, Kyle Kuzma, or Jerami Grant trades going down, as none of Utah, Washington, or Portland seems all that pressed to make a trade soon. But none of that means they have to be done, and I expect they’ll still look to make a deal at some point (it may have to wait until the season starts).

Let’s start with the trade assets perspective.

The Kings actually didn’t have to use much in the way of trade assets to execute the trade for DeRozan. They gave up a 2031 first round pick swap, but otherwise, all they really lost was Harrison Barnes (whose trade value didn’t seem to be enormous given the two years left on his contract), Duarte’s matching salary, and some cap space. For future trades, the Kings still have some potentially valuable players and draft capital.

On the player side, I feel comfortable saying that Fox, Sabonis, and Murray aren’t going anywhere, and DeRozan and Monk aren’t tradeable for at least six months (plus, having just signed new deals, it’s unlikely they’re going anywhere). That means that if the Kings are to pursue a potential starting level veteran, they’d likely have to put Kevin Huerter (and his $16.8 million salary) in any deal to get the salary matching to work. Huerter is only 25 years old, and though he had a down year last season, he’s a capable scorer and movement shooter. The Kings also have a few other players on the roster that could draw some trade interest, though they have some drawbacks. For example, Sacramento’s first round pick Devin Carter was highly regarded during the draft process, but he’s undergoing shoulder surgery and it’s not clear when he’ll be back playing. Still, the cost control over his contract is potentially very valuable. Keon Ellis similarly has an extremely valuable contract, as he’s shown strong defensive ability and he’s effectively locked up for two years at the minimum salary. Trey Lyles is a quality backup forward on a reasonable (but expiring) $8 million contract, and he could draw some interest as a result. Otherwise, the Kings roster is mostly back-end rotation guys whose biggest value in a trade would be for salary matching.

The draft pick situation is OK but far from pristine. The Kings owe a top 12 protected pick to the Hawks in 2025, the last payment on the Kevin Huerter trade from a couple years ago. If it doesn’t convey next year, it turns into a top 10 protected pick in 2026. The net result is that the Kings can’t actually trade away one of their first round draft picks until 2028 (the Stepien Rule prevents teams from trading away their first round pick in successive seasons). Because teams can also only deal picks seven years out, the most the Kings can offer in a deal today is two firsts (probably in 2028 and 2030, since they traded swap rights to the 2031 pick in to San Antonio as part of getting DeRozan). If the 2025 first ultimately conveys to the Hawks, the Kings will have more flexibility and could trade their 2026, 2028, 2030, and 2032 first rounders in theory (plus swaps in 2027 and 2029).

I’m not sure whether the Kings have the trade assets to seal a deal for an All Star caliber player like Markkanen right now (I’m going to ignore Ingram). Yes, the Jazz have strong incentives to trade him. They owe a top 10 protected to Oklahoma City, so they would benefit from tanking and securing a good pick in a strong draft class; Markkanen is already 27, but most of the Jazz’s core is either really young or not yet on the roster; Markkanen is about to get a huge pay raise from an ultra-affordable $18 million to closer to $45-50 million per year. But at the same time, there should be a competitive trade market for Markkanen’s services and the Jazz don’t need to make a decision right away. Markkanen hasn’t told Utah he wants to leave (he’s arguably indicated the opposite), and the Jazz have until August 6 to decide if they want to give him a raise and an extension, much like the Kings did with Sabonis last year. Alternatively, the Jazz could let Markkanen hit free agency and try to lure him back with Bird rights or try to execute a sign-and-trade then. But if the Kings can pull off a deal for Markkanen, I’m all for it! And if they can do it before Markannen gets a raise/extension, they might be able to get away with losing just Huerter from their current rotation.

One of the most important questions about trading for a guy like Markkanen besides the cost is how he would fit into the Kings’ salary cap. Fortunately, the Kings’ cap situation over the next few years is quite flexible, so they can afford to add a big money guy like Markkanen and still function. While the Kings are up against the salary cap and hard-capped at the first apron this year, things should get a bit better if the salary cap grows as expected (because the NBA’s massive new TV deals are expected to net roughly three times current revenues, it’s probably fair to assume the salary cap, luxury tax line, and aprons to go up by the maximum 10% per year for the next 4-5 years).

Looking at the Kings cap situation over the next five years, there’s clearly some breathing room below the luxury tax lines and the aprons in particular:

Adding a $40-50 million salary in 2025-26, like Markkanen should get, is absolutely feasible while staying below the luxury tax line. For example, say the Kings traded Huerter and picks for Markkanen this offseason and ultimately re-sign Markkanen for 2025-26 and beyond at a starting salary of $45 million in the first year. That would be roughly $27 million in added salary for the 2025-26 season once you account for Huerter’s salary coming off the books—less than the $30.8 million in room the Kings would have below the first apron. While they would be a taxpayer that season, they’d still be able to get below the tax in theory too. Of course, the Kings also have to consider that long-term deals for De’Aaron Fox and Keegan Murray will kick in during the 2026-27 season, assuming the team can get deals done. But there’s $106.4 million in breathing room below the luxury tax line at that point—even factoring in a big deal for Markkanen, they’d easily have over $55 million below the luxury tax that could go toward deals with Fox and Murray, and they could create more space by either trading away DeRozan in the last year of his deal or waiving him (DeRozan’s contract expires after the 2026-27 season, and it’s only partially guaranteed that year anyway).

The Kings could also target trades for players who aren’t quite as good as Markkanen, which may be possible with relatively few draft assets and Huerter’s contract as matching salary. Here’s a few of the other forwards who might be available and attractive:

• Kyle Kuzma (Wizards). Adding Kuzma would give the Kings even more scoring punch and a bit more size and rebounding in the front court. He’s also on a very reasonable $23.5 million contract that actually descends in value over the next three years, so he’d fit into the Kings cap sheet nicely. Kuzma isn’t known for his defense or outside shooting, though, so he’s not a perfect fit. The Kings will have to be wary about price—unless the Wizards come down a bit on their asking price, I’m not sure Kuzma makes the most sense.

• Jerami Grant (Blazers). Grant has a lot of similarities to Kuzma. He’s a solid offensive threat, and a better outside shooter than Kuzma, but he’s probably over-extended at his current volume. He also used to be a pretty strong defensive presence, though that’s waned in recent seasons as he’s taken on a bigger offensive load. The biggest difference between Kuzma and Grant, though, is the salary. While Kuzma is on a team-friendly deal, Grant is slated to make almost $30 million this season, and his salary is going up each of the following three years. The Kings wouldn’t be able to get Grant with just Huerter to match salaries—they’d need to staple other useful players to the deal such as Trey Lyles. That makes trading for Grant much less appealing. And like Washington, Portland’s asking price for Grant has been on the high side of expectation.

• Cam Johnson (Nets). Similar to Kuzma, Johnson provides some more size in the front court (with a bit less rebounding talent). Though Johnson isn’t quite the creative scorer that Kuzma is, he grades out as a slightly better defender and he’s a knock-down three point shooter. He’s also on a reasonable contract ($23.6 million this coming season) that the Kings could easily absorb. With the Nets re-setting after trading away Mikal Bridges, Johnson should be more readily obtainable than he would’ve been in the past.

• Dorian Finney-Smith (Nets). Finney-Smith is probably the most reliable defender out of this group, but he’s a bit older (age 31) and he’s not very versatile offensively, where he can basically hit threes at a respectable, though not elite, 35% clip. He’s on a really cheap contract at just $14.9 million, so it’s possible the Kings could even get him without sending out Huerter as a matching salary (Jalen McDaniels and another player would have to be involved to keep the Kings under the first apron hard cap).

• Grant Williams (Hornets). Williams is similar to Finney-Smith, but he’s younger and a bit shorter and bulkier. He’s been a bit more volatile in terms of his defensive performance, but he’s a better three point shooter too. He’s only getting paid $13 million this year and he’s locked up for three years.

Of course, there are plenty of other deals the Kings could pursue, but we’ll have to see what else comes up. They can (and in my view, should) continue to see if a big swing for Markkanen can get done, but if that doesn’t materialize, they have several less pricey options that they can pursue before the season starts, or even after.