Finding the Value of NBA Draft Picks

As we head into the NBA season later this month, fans are rightfully focused on how their teams will perform on the court this year. A few significant off-season moves have made things interesting heading into the season. Some of the headliners for me are how DeMar DeRozan fits on court with the Kings, how the new-look Knicks will look with Mikal Bridges and Karl-Anthony Towns, whether the Timberwolves get enough out of Donte DiVincenzo and Naz Reid to not miss KAT, how effective the Warriors off-season moves were in replacing Klay Thompson, and how much growth there will be in OKC and Houston, two of the most fun young teams to watch in my personal view.

At the same time, I also want to stay cognizant of what’s on the horizon (as NBA teams must and some fanbases certainly will be). Next June will see an incredibly talented group of young prospects join the league, led by Duke freshman Cooper Flagg and a couple of Rutgers (!) freshmen, Ace Bailey and Dylan Harper. While these players won’t contribute to a team this season, they’re inevitably going to impact what happens on the floor, especially later in the year as teams jockey for lottery odds and draft position.

With that in mind, let’s jump headfirst into a project I’ve been thinking about for some time: analytically assessing the value of different draft picks.

As NFL draft fans may recognize, this is something that’s been done for quite some time in pro football circles. In the 1990s, then Cowboys head coach Jimmy Johnson developed a trade value chart that has become the most widely known trade value chart in football. The concept was simple—assign a value to each draft pick so that front office personnel could evaluate potential trades more easily. While Johnson’s draft value chart was in a sense pioneering, it is now generally considered outdated due to subsequent CBA changes and it wasn’t obviously based on analytical principles. As a result, many teams have developed their own draft value charts (which aren’t public), and some league observers/advisors have developed more analytically driven charts. For example, Chase Stuart developed a stat-based draft value chart using Pro Football Reference’s “Approximate Value” stat, a relatively blunt all-in-one stat designed to capture a player’s contributions to points scored/allowed. Kevin Meers published a draft value chart based on similar analysis. Jason Fitzgerald and Brad Spielberger also developed a draft value chart based on NFL contract values and performance.

Some NBA watchers have developed draft value charts of their own, though they’re not widely referenced. For example, ESPN’s Kevin Pelton put together an NBA draft value chart based on player performance at various draft pick slots over the course of their four seasons in the NBA (roughly, the player’s rookie contract) and the subsequent five year period using his wins above replacement metric. Others have also developed draft value analyses relying on Basketball Reference’s win shares statistic (for example, here, here, and here). I’ve also seen an analyses using value over replacement player (VORP) from a couple years ago. But for a variety of reasons, I wanted to try to tackle this question using one of my preferred all-in-one metrics, Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus (EPM), which no one has used as far as I can tell.

For starters, EPM is arguably the most accurate modern all-in-one metric in terms of its ability to predict team performance. It’s also not solely reliant upon box score statistics (such as points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, and shooting percentages), which may not be sufficiently detailed. I also wanted to look at pick values based on the outcomes that could have happened rather than focusing solely on who was picked in each slot, as many of the draft value analyses I’ve seen were skewed by a great player somehow falling in the draft (Nikola Jokic getting drafted at #41 overall shouldn’t make that pick decidedly more valuable than pick #40 after all, as the team picking #40 could have picked him). In addition, I was looking for an evaluation methodology that could be carried forward without artificially limiting a player’s production based on semi-artificial windows, like the player’s first four or five years. While those kinds of limitations can be defensible—four years is the length of first round rookie contracts when you include team options, and teams can hold restricted free agency over those players in their fifth year, too—a significant proportion of productive players are going to re-sign with the team that drafted them anyway. This dynamic is especially true for players who show All-NBA or All-Star level productivity early on in their careers, such that the value of those players can be underrated.

With a ton of help from my good friend Alex Takakuwa, whose math and programming experience far surpass mine, I set out to try to pull together a draft value chart.

Just so it’s easier to visualize from the start, I’ve included the draft value chart we developed below. The next few sections of the post will go into (gory) detail on how we created the chart, the rationale for our analytical decisions, and the potential issues with our approach. Then, I’ll follow up with some observations from the chart and our analysis that stood out.

[Figure 1]

Creating the Draft Value Chart

This section details the process we went through to develop the draft value chart above. If anything is unclear or unexplained, feel free to reach out to me for more details.

The Data & Why We Chose EPM

To conduct the analysis, I first needed to identify sources of information for past NBA draft picks and EPM. The draft pick history was easy—Basketball Reference has downloadable spreadsheets with picks by year. EPM, on the other hand, is a relatively new metric developed by Dunks & Threes (dunksandthrees.com) that incorporates possession-based stats derived from play-by-play data and player-tracking stats from stats.NBA.com. That modern data has not always been available, so we could only obtain league-wide EPM data from 2014 through last season (2023-24).

There are, of course, numerous all-in-one metrics available for assessing player performance, such as PER and its derivatives; Box Plus/Minus (BPM) and its derivatives like Value Over Replacement Player (VORP); Win Shares; RAPTOR; and net rating to name some. They all have advantages and disadvantages, but I personally favor EPM for a few reasons: it’s been shown to be the most predictive (as I mentioned), it attempts to account for teammate/opponent quality, it’s not wholly reliant on counting stats that can’t really capture defensive performance with precision, and, subjectively, it seems to have fewer inexplicable outliers than most of the other metrics.

With that said, the major trade-offs for using EPM data for this analysis are several. It is very time-limited (just 11 seasons of data), there’s no easy way for me to completely understand how the metric is determined given it’s based on a proprietary regression model, and a handful of players—especially on the lower minutes end—don’t have EPM data available. I’m also not aware of EPM data existing for playoff games, which is a bummer. Regardless, it’s still worth using in my view. The time limitations aren’t that problematic for this exercise, and it’s not obvious that draft tendencies from 30+ years ago—or even 20+ years ago—are all that relevant. I’m not realistically able to verify every metric anyway, and most other all-in-one metrics have missing data, use different approaches to different time periods, or are subject to major swings for players with few minutes played. Sufficient playoff data is also not going to be available for a huge proportion of players to draw meaningful conclusions, though that problem may not be evenly distributed amongst all types of players. But ultimately we can live with the concerns either way.

Initial Approach & Process

This section describes the process that Alex and I used to create the draft value chart. Where we made significant process decisions, I’ll flag them and explain why. For those that want just a cursory understanding of the process, I’ve bolded the major points below.

First, we chose to convert EPM—which is, in effect, a rate-based efficiency statistic—into a new metric that could be summed. We called these “EPM units” and I’ll describe the process further below. The decision and process for this warrant explanation.

To start, EPM as a metric can be positive or negative. Positive values are generally associated with better players, but because of the way the metric is designed, most players will have a negative value EPM. For example, the median EPM last season—which describes a middle of the pack player—was about -1.7 (Kris Murray or Haywood Highsmith). At the same time, Coby White’s EPM of 0.0 was in the 70th percentile of all players. In other words, you can be a pretty good player and still throw up an EPM that’s around 0 or slightly negative. We wanted to avoid having players with negative EPMs show up as negative contributors, though. This was for two reasons: first, below average players still contribute to a team, and two, roughly half the players on the court at any given time will have a negative EPM by the nature of the stat—yet they are on the court presumably because they are better than whomever potential replacement players are.

The second issue is one that affects all NBA metrics that describe efficiency: EPM does not directly account for how much a player actually plays. Said another way, a guy who plays with high efficiency over just a handful of games can appear to be a “better” player than someone who wasn’t quite as efficient but played 10 seasons in the NBA. For example, Josh Hart (Knicks) played 81 games and 2,707 minutes last season with an EPM of -0.7, putting him in the top 40% of all players last season by EPM. Without considering minutes played, it could appear that Hart had a worse season than looks like he had a worse season than Neemias Queta (Celtics), whose +1.5 EPM was in the 84th percentile of all players last year. But Queta only played in 28 games though, a total of 333 minutes, against mostly backups. Nobody would seriously argue he was “better” than Hart, and we agree! Thus, we wanted to ensure that our analysis captured the performance “value” of players who routinely saw the court and attribute value to their contributions.

Dunks & Threes has a metric called Estimated Wins that attempts to convert EPM into a summable stat. We could’ve relied on it, but we chose not to for a few reasons. There’s no robust public description of how the Estimated Wins metric is derived, so we weren’t sure exactly what it represents. Estimated Wins also can go negative, which is one of the things we wanted to avoid. We also built a quick tool to consider a draft value chart based on Estimated Wins, and the results weren’t as sensible—but I’ll be the first to admit that picking between stats becomes a subjective exercise, and we debated the question.

With that said, by making our EPM units metric positive, we credit some level of contribution to any minute played even if the player is bad. That makes some intuitive sense, as the minute must be played by somebody and if a team thought they could fill the minute with a better player, they had the opportunity to do so in theory. Of course, the consequence is that we mask the possibility that a player is so bad that they’re truly a negative contributor on the court and could easily be replaced, which we can also intuit is a real possibility. Imagine a player who is getting minutes solely for development purposes. The team knows he isn’t good enough to play now, but they want him to play for the potential long-term benefit. That player’s performance could actually be replaced by a better player, but the team is specifically choosing not to do so. Our choice to make EPM units positive hides that possibility somewhat, but the masking effect is mitigated by the likelihood that the player would have a noticeably poor negative EPM, which our calculation methodology will illustrate.

Calculating EPM Units

To calculate EPM units, we started by taking a player’s EPM for a given season, applying a scaling function, and then multiplying the result by the player’s number of minutes played for that year. Although could have used possession data, it’s trickier to obtain reliably and minutes function as a reasonable, consistent proxy. Regardless, for each season, we can calculate a player’s EPM units, and we can find the player’s career EPM units by adding the cumulative total for all seasons played. In simple conceptual terms, you can think of the equation below:

EPM Units for a Season =

(Scaling Function [EPM]) x (Minutes Played) x 1000

[Note: the 1000 is just so we have easier to read numbers—you can basically disregard it from a conceptual standpoint]

Obviously, the scaling function we applied is fundamental to the result, so I’ll explain our approach below.

To determine what scaling function to apply, we decided to look at the general relationship between player performance and player salaries as a guide. The idea here is straightforward: presumably, NBA teams pay players more if they think they’re better performers and playing often enough to be worth the financial commitment, so we could use a similar relationship to scale EPM to our EPM unit metric. While this is probably not a perfect comparison, it seemed more sensible than using an arbitrary scaling relationship that we might otherwise have conceived of.

So, we pulled data on the salary cap charges for all 449 players league-wide for the 2023-24 season from Spotrac and ranked them by percentiles, with the 100th percentile being the highest salary cap charge (we opted for cap charges over cash salaries because they aren’t as likely to fluctuate based on players receiving performance/trade/other bonuses, which could create some odd spikes). We also ranked Dunks & Threes’ EPMs for all players by percentile, again with the 100th percentile being the highest positive EPM. We then plotted these two datasets (salary cap charge vs. EPM) against one another to see what type of relationship there was between them, such as linear or exponential, to inform our scaling approach. You can see the curve below in Figure 2:

[Figure 2]

We plotted the same curves using salary cap charges and EPMs from 2023 and 2022 to make sure that 2024 wasn’t some odd outlier. As you can see from Figure 3 below, the curves look largely similar.

[Figure 3]

A few things stood out from reviewing these curves, keeping in mind the potential effects of the NBA salary cap.

• At the low end, player salaries are clustered around the same values even as EPMs improve. You can see this based illustrated by the relative flatness of the curve between for lower EPMs (roughly in the -10 to -5 range). This is likely due to a few factors:

  • player salary cap charges can’t go below $0 (duh);

  • players on rookie deals have specified salary amounts based on the NBA CBA, which may be artificially low; and

  • A lot of salary cap charges cluster around the two-year veteran’s minimum, which was just over $2 million last season.

• At the top end of the salary range, player salaries are artificially depressed by the CBA, so you see a clear flattening. Generally, no player’s maximum salary can’t exceed 35% of the salary cap (other than for in-contract raises), and whether players are even eligible to receive that maximum 35% depends on how long they’ve been in the league. [Note: 2023 looks a little wonky, but that looks like a spike specifically from Stephen Curry’s new deal before that season.]

• In the middle, there appears to be a roughly exponential curve, with salaries staying relatively flat between EPMs of about -5 and -3 before quickly rising. The exponential nature of the curve is even easier to pick out if you look at the graphs below in Figure 4. The left-hand side shows just the 10th to 90th percentiles of salaries vs. EPMs, which looks like an exponential curve. The right-hand side shows the 5th to 95th percentiles, which starts to show some of the flattening at the top end of salary cap amounts (likely resulting from CBA-imposed maximums).

[Figure 4]

Based on our review of the above charts, we opted to use an exponential scaling function and fit the scaling curve to specific points along the 2024 Cap Charge vs. EPM curve (Figure 2). Use of an exponential scaling function may come as a surprise to those of you familiar with the Wins Above Replacement (WAR) metric often used in baseball and some other win-value metrics, but we found that an exponential function makes more sense for the NBA as it better tracks how teams are valuing players in the open segments of the market (e.g., without as many rule-based boundaries) and results in a more sensible valuation of draft picks, which I’ll discuss more later.

To create the exponential, we fit an exponential curve to the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile points on Figure 2 to avoid the “flattened” areas of the curve that happen at the high- and low-ends of the distribution that were likely due to maximum and minimum salary rules in the CBA. We did not expect those tail results to be relevant to the calculation of EPM units, which aren’t artificially capped at either end.

We also calculated each player’s salary cap charge as a percentage of the total cap allocations across the league (over $4.54 billion in 2024). The players who are the most valuable “accrue” a greater proportion of the value allotted to all players.

Once that was done, we pulled the results for 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile players (by salary cap charge) to fit the scaling function.

We used this function to convert EPM to EPM units for each player drafted from 2013 through 2023 and summed each player’s career EPM units (meaning the sum of the player’s EPM units accrued between the 2013-14 through 2023-24 seasons, the years for which we found complete EPM data).

Building the Draft Chart

To create the draft chart itself, we performed a few different steps.

First, we ranked the players in each draft class in order of career EPM units, best to worst, and we divided the EPM unit totals by the number of seasons that draft class was eligible to be in the NBA (up to a maximum of 11 seasons for the 2013 draft class). That gave us EPM units per season for each player, which was a bit more useful for comparison purposes.

[Note: There is some risk that we lowered the per-year performance of certain players who weren’t able to play the full number of seasons they were eligible for. That could be an issue for some players, such as those who suffered career-ending injuries or missed significant chunks of time due to injury. Given the nature of our project, though, it seems appropriate to knock down the values of players who missed time due to injury, and it’s reasonable to set and outside window around 10-12 years. We’ll have to think further about how to address this as EPM data becomes available over a longer window, however. For example, it would be a bit crazy to expect players to be playing 20+ seasons after they’re drafted.]

Second, we matched players up to their “theoretical” draft slots if they had been drafted in order of best (#1) to worst (#60) as if they’d in fact been drafted in order of ultimate performance. In other words, we slotted the player with the most EPM units in a draft as pick #1, the player with the second most EPM units was slotted as pick #2, and so forth until each of the 60* picks in a given draft year was matched up to a particular EPM unit score. [*The 2022 and 2023 drafts each had only 58 picks, as some picks were forfeited.] I’ll explain why we took this approach in a bit more detail later.

Third, we found the average of EPM units produced per year for each draft slot across the 11 draft classes with complete EPM data and normalized each value to a scale of 1000 (for convenience). To illustrate, let’s look at an example. Between 2013 and 2023, the average best player in a given draft class produced about 1,127 EPM units per season and the average second best player produced about 758 EPM units—about 67.2% of the EPM units produced by the average #1 pick. Accordingly, on our normalized scale, the #1 pick is worth 1,000 points and the #2 pick is worth 672 points.

You can see the full draft value chart (again) below:

[Figure 1 (repeated)]

What Jumps Out?

Let’s start with the draft value chart itself (Figure 1). There are a few things that jump out that are worth flagging, in my view.

The first two picks are incredibly valuable.

Just looking at the chart itself, it’s evident that the first and second pick are tremendously valuable relative to other picks, even other early first round picks. There are a few ways we can see this.

The #1 pick (1000 points) is worth roughly 1.5 times more than the #2 pick (684 points), and the #2 pick in turn is about twice as valuable as the #3 pick (336 points). But the changes in pick values start to smooth out quickly after the second pick. For example, the #3 pick is only about 1.2 times more valuable than the #4 pick (276 points); the #4 pick is only about 1.2 times more valuable than the #5 pick (234 points); and the #5 pick is only about 1.1 times more valuable than the #6 pick (205 points). That general trend remains true through about pick #34 (in the second round), when we finally again start to see bigger changes in pick value as we move down the draft order.

This is illustrated by Figure 5 (below). The bars show, for each pick, how many times more valuable it is than the immediately subsequent pick (e.g., pick #1 is 1.5x the value of pick #2, and pick #2 is 2.0x the value of pick #3, etc.). Bigger bars show bigger changes in value as you move down the draft board.

[Figure 5]

For the most part, there aren’t huge drops in draft pick value when you go down a pick, other than jumping from pick #1 to pick #2 or pick #2 to pick #3. For the bigger changes from pick to pick toward the end of the draft, it’s important to keep in mind that these are small in absolute terms. While pick #54 may appear to be 2.4 times more valuable than pick #55, that’s because the actual values are so very low that small changes can have a big impact. For example, a player who makes an NBA roster and plays 5-10 minutes per game for a few seasons has many times more value than a player who did not even make a roster after being drafted, but in real terms, neither player has a big impact.

You can also see why picks #1 and #2 are so valuable when you look at the data another way. Check out the graph below:

[Figure 6]

Figure 6 shows the range of potential outcomes for the top 5 players in every draft from 2013 through 2023 in terms of EPM units generated per season (like with the draft value chart, I’ve treated the top five players as if they were picked with picks #1 to #5). The curves were generated using ChatGPT to perform a Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) to estimate the distribution of particular picks. The “density” here represents the frequency with which a particular pick value will land at a particular EPM units per season value—the higher the peak, the more likely that pick will land at that value. Alternatively, you can think of the area below the line for any given pick as the distribution of outcomes for that pick.

[Note: If you’re curious, I’m happy to share the KDE method used. I used a Gaussian kernel, a bandwidth spread of 1.0, and boundaries of 0 and 2,840.8 EPM units per season (the maximum EPM units per season generated by any player in our dataset, Nikola Jokic).]

For example, look at the red line for pick #1. Assuming you actually pick the best player in the draft, pick #1’s most likely outcome appears at roughly 600-700 EPM units per season, meaning the team with an average first pick in the draft has a chance to draft a player who generates about 600-700 EPM units per season—a really strong player. But the pick also has another huge benefit: it’s also quite likely to allow the team to draft a player who generates 1,000 EPM units or more per season (up to the bounded maximum of ~2,840). While those 1,000+ EPM unit per season players aren’t common—only 7 of 656 players drafted since 2013 have hit that mark, some in the same draft—having the #1 pick gives a team a reasonably good shot of landing that good of a player.

Let’s look at Pick #2 next. Pick #2 has a similar curve shape to pick #1, but you can see that the distribution of outcomes has a peak somewhere around 450 EPM units per season—quite a bit lower. The distribution also swings heavily toward the lower end of the spectrum, even though there are some outlier instances when the #2 pick ought to be worth 1,000+ EPM units per season. This occurred in drafts like the 2014 draft, where Joel Embiid was extremely productive but still the second most productive player in the draft class on a EPM unit per season basis.

Unfortunately picks #3, #4, and #5 skew much more heavily toward the left of the chart. The players available with those picks (the third, fourth, and fifth best players in a given draft) are likely to be less productive than the best and second-best players, and they are much less likely to generate seriously outsized performances in the 1,000+ EPM unit per season range (none of them have gotten there in the past 11 draft classes).

The combination of these curves helps illustrate why the #1 pick and #2 pick carry so much value in our draft values chart (Figure 1).

If you’re curious about the rest of the lottery picks, I’ve also included that graph below (Figure 7). I’m not going to provide curves for all 60 picks though because it would be visually impossible to decipher.

[Figure 7]

The value of picks in the middle of the first round flattens out quickly and substantially.

Let’s go back to Figure 1 and Figure 5 again.

[Figure 1 (repeated)]

[Figure 5 (repeated)]

Looking at Figure 1, between pick #9 and pick #21, there’s only about a 93-point drop in pick value (from approximately 135 to 41), and the drop-off for each pick slot is never more than about 14 points.

Looking at Figure 5, there’s a noticeable flat trend between picks #7 and #21 for pick value relative to the subsequent draft slot—each pick is worth between about 7% and 15% more than the pick that follows (there’s rounding going on).

If we look again at Figure 7, too, you can see a clustering of the distributions for picks #9 to #14 around the same EPM units per season outcomes.

Taken together, these charts strongly suggest that once teams are picking in the middle of the first round, there probably isn’t a ton of difference moving around in pick location—at least within a few slots. There’s little to suggest that picking the 10th best player in a draft class is meaningfully different than selecting the 12th best player (assuming the “correct” picks are made), so there’s little reason to value those picks much differently from one another.

Second round picks probably don’t have much value—and late second round picks aren’t worth much more than replacement players.

Let’s look at another graph, Figure 8.

[Figure 8]

Figure 8 was actually the basis for the draft value chart itself before we normalized everything to an easier scale. Specifically, Figure 8 shows the average EPM units per season generated by players drafted over the last 11 years (from best to worst). It shows that the average “best” player in a draft produces a little over 1,100 EPM units per season; the average second-best player generates just over 750 EPM units per season; and so forth.

You can see the bars start to get quite small when we’re talking about the 30th to 60th best players in a draft class who could be available at those pick slots. Many of those players essentially produce no value.

There are some jarring facts from the data. On average, the bottom 24 players in each draft class produce less than 5.0 EPM units per season, while a staggering 15 players (!) produce less than 1.0 EPM unit per season. Compare that to the over 1,100 EPM units per season generated by the average best player in a draft class and the 750 EPM units per season generated by the average second best player. Or even the roughly 134 EPM units per season generated by the average 10th best player in a draft, or the nearly 50 EPM units per season generated by the average 20th best player. It’s hard to conclude anything other than those last 15-24 picks are near worthless. Ultimately,, about 40% of the average draft class of 60 players is producing basically no value on the court.

If you map those 40% of players onto draft picks, that means that picks outside the top 36 aren’t worth much in terms of production, and as you get even further in the round (toward picks #50 to #60), those players aren’t likely to produce anything.

Potential Pitfalls

In my view, we took a fair, reasonable approach to our analysis and we followed a good process in creating the draft value chart. With that said, I think it’s important to acknowledge that there are some areas where we made judgment calls and it’s fair to wonder about the impact of those decisions. Let’s go through the most important ones.

#1: Re-Ordering the Draft

As I noted previously, we opted to sort draft pick values based on the best performing player from each class rather than the specific draft slot players were in fact drafted into. The basic rationale is that the team with the #1 overall pick, by definition, has the chance to pick the best player, the team with the #2 overall pick has the chance to pick the second-best player, and so forth. If teams miss their picks, that’s on them.

Of course, there are several real-world problems with this approach. I won’t go through a laundry list, but the most evident issues are that teams won’t always pick the “best” player and players may develop more if the team that drafts them has better coaching/player development or is simply a better fit (on and off the court). Using larger sample sizes and averages can mitigate these concerns, especially if you believe—as I do—that NBA teams tend to do a good job of identifying the best players through scouting.

But the biggest justification for sorting draft pick values based on the best performing player rather than actual draft slot is easier to show than explain with words alone.

Check out the graph below.

[Figure 9]

Figure 9 shows the average EPM Units generated by the 11 players drafted in each draft slot from the 2013 to 2023 drafts as though they were drafted in their actual draft position. In other words, the actual eleven players drafted with #1 picks in the eleven drafts from 2013 to 2023 are all averaged, the actual eleven #2 picks are all averaged, the actual eleven #3 picks are all averaged, etc.

You can see the trend here is quite lumpy and hard to predict. On top of that, some immediate absurdities leap off the screen.

The average #3 pick is about 75% more valuable than the average #1 pick and more than three times as valuable as the average #2 pick. The average #41 pick also appears to be insanely valuable—it’s the third highest pick in terms of average value overall, and over 10 times more valuable than the average pick on either side of it (#40 and #42).

If that seems wild to you, it’s because it probably is.

The chart below of top 3 picks over the last 11 years. Green is the best pick of the three draft slots, yellow is the second best, and red is the worst.

[Figure 10]

Glancing at Figure 10, you couldn’t be faulted for thinking the #1 pick is the best here. It produced the best pick of the three picks in 4 of 11 drafts, and only produced the worst pick two times. But the #3 pick has produced the best player of the three slots five different times, and when you look a bit closer you see that a few guys who were drafted at pick #3 have been truly stellar players.

The home-run picks really distort the numbers in an 11 year sample. Specifically, the outsize performances of Joel Embiid, Luka Doncic, and Jayson Tatum dramatically improve the average value of the #3 pick. Embiid and Doncic have produced by far the most value in terms of overall EPM units among top 3 picks (with the caveat that Embiid is one of the longest tenured players in the sample), and Tatum is only matched by the two of them and Karl-Anthony Towns. Conversely, the lack of outsized performances for #1 picks other than Towns, coupled with the bust picks of Markelle Fultz and Anthony Bennett, really affect the average value of the #1 pick. The #2 pick, meanwhile, hasn’t yielded a truly great player in the last eleven drafts, and several of the better performers from that pick slot have had injuries (Oladipo, Parker, Ball) or other issues (Morant) limit their performance.

We can also easily explain the apparently absurd value of the average #41 pick—it’s basically driven by one guy. Nikola Jokic has generated a staggering 2,840 EPM Units per season since he was drafted with the 41st pick in 2014, despite missing a full year playing overseas. The only other players who even clear 1,000 EPM Units per season are regularly All-NBA contenders like Joel Embiid (~2,129), Giannis Antetokounmpo (~2,098), Luka Doncic (~1,855), Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (~1,590), Rudy Gobert (~1,238), and Jayson Tatum (~1,107).

The mere fact that a later pick ultimately yielded a better player should not make that selection inherently more valuable than an earlier pick. Though Marvin Bailey III was selected #2 ahead of Luka Doncic in 2018, for example, doesn’t mean the #3 pick was actually “better” despite the outcome. The Kings picking at #2 had the opportunity to select Doncic but chose not to, as did the Hawks, who traded out of the #3 pick—that those teams made the wrong selection at the end of the day says little about the pick’s value.

Moreover, when we sort draft position based on player performance—essentially, what should have happened with the benefit of hindsight—you get much more sensible results. Check out the graph below:

[Figure 8 (repeated)]

Figure 8 shows the average EPM Units per season that would have been generated by the #1 pick had the eleven best players in each draft instead been drafted #1 overall, the eleven second-best players been drafted #2 overall, etc. In other words, when you assume that in an average year the best player available is drafted in each slot, this is the curve you get.

While the result here is obviously somewhat artificial, the smoothed curve makes a lot more sense when trying to estimate the value of a given pick compared to the exceptionally spiky chart shown in Figure 8. Thus, we thought this was a much more sensible sorting methodology to use for creating our draft value chart.

#2: No Time Limits On Value Accrual

The number of years you count toward a player’s draft value is also incredibly important. In this exercise, we did not limit the years of value that a draft pick could accrue, so based on our EPM dataset, draft picks could accrue EPM Units for up to 11 seasons. Some of the other analyses I’ve seen have capped the amount of value they credit to a draft pick at 4 or 5 seasons, which is certainly defensible. However, I strongly suspect that 4 and 5 season caps on value dramatically understates the value of getting a top player through the draft, as most elite players will stay with the team that drafted them far beyond the first 4-5 seasons of formal “team control.” For example, out of the five players drafted since 2013 with the highest career EPM Units, four players have spent their careers with the team that drafted them (Nikola Jokic, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Joel Embiid, and Luka Doncic), and the fifth player (Rudy Gobert) spent nine seasons with the team that drafted him before he was eventually traded, garnering additional value for the team. Still, there probably is some value in trying to nail down a more accurate timeframe to use for value accretion of each draft pick, and that’s something we may look at down the road.

#3: Choosing EPM

We chose to use EPM for several reasons that I covered earlier, but it essentially boils down to the fact that I think it’s one of (if not the) most accurate all-in-one metrics available. You could create this type of chart based other all-in-one metrics like Box Plus/Minus (which I may try at some point for comparison), RAPTOR, or other advanced stats, and people have. A draft value chart that incorporates several stats could, in theory, be even better if the other metrics used are also reliable.

We did, however, run a sanity check using another metric, which I describe in the next section.

#4: Exponential Scaling

Picking the scaling function used to calculate EPM units from Dunks & Threes’ EPM stat is, inherently, a subjective exercise. As I discussed above, we chose to use an exponential scaling function based on how NBA salaries go up, but we basically tossed out the high-end and low-end to do so. There are good reasons for that, but we certainly had alternative options. For example, the salary scale curves (figures 2 and 3) actually look a lot like Sigmoid curves when you include the extremes. We think that’s probably attributable to the CBA rules for maximum and minimum salaries rather than a true reflection of market values, so we didn’t use a Sigmoid scaling function, but that hypothesis may not actually be true. We also could have opted to use a linear scaling function, but that doesn’t seem to match with how the NBA distributes salaries as well, either.

As a check, we decided to also develop a rough draft value analysis based on Estimated Wins from Dunks and Threes [Note: it looks like Dunks and Threes recently removed Estimated Wins from its public site, but we had previously downloaded the data for the 2014 through 2024 seasons.] While we don’t have an exact understanding of how Dunks and Threes calculates Estimated Wins, we understand that it’s a function of EPM and playing time (probably in terms of minutes, but possibly based on non-public possession data). Regardless, based on the distribution of Estimated Wins, it appears to scale in a more linear fashion than our EPM units metric. Estimated Wins can also be negative, which introduces some challenges.

Doing this analysis was useful because it yielded results that quickly showed obvious issues.

First, in an average draft year, 23 players were expected to produce negative Estimated Wins. Not only did those players show up as being worse than players who never played, but their negative performance also suggests that more than two-thirds of second round picks in an average draft somehow carried negative value. That doesn’t track with logic or reality, as NBA teams routinely make trades for those picks.

Second, creating draft values based on Estimated Wins led to apparent under-valuation of early first-round picks vis-a-vis middle first-round picks.

For easy comparison, I’ve put side-by-side charts of the normalized values for EPM units and Estimated Wins below (Figure 11) and a graph showing how picks decrease in value using each metric (Figure 12).

[Figure 11]

[Figure 12]

You can see from Figures 11 and 12 is that draft values based on Estimated Wins run negative for pick #38 and higher in an average draft, which doesn’t make any sense.

You can also see the Estimated Wins-based draft values are significantly higher than EPM unit-based draft values for certain picks, specifically in the range of pick #3 to about pick #21. It’s difficult to assess the value of very high picks in the NBA based on past trades, but nonetheless, the Estimated Wins values seem too tightly packed between top picks. For instance, the Estimated Wins draft values suggest that teams should be willing to trade a #1 overall pick for two #5 picks or three #8 picks, both of which are virtually impossible to imagine for normal drafts (not to mention drafts with truly coveted prospects available at pick #1, such as Wembanyama last year or potentially Cooper Flagg in 2025). That said, it is possible that draft values that are more evenly distributed amongst the top picks (as occurs when we used Estimated Wins) would make more sense in an environment where you are less certain which players will be best.

Wrap-Up

That’s it for now! We hope this post was informative and valuable. If you want to see the script we used, feel free to email me and I’ll share it with you (duncan@thesportsappeal.com). Unfortunately, however, I am not going to be able to publish the EPM dataset from Dunks & Threes since they have it behind a paywall (it’s not that pricey). If you can’t find another way to get the data, let me know via email and I can try to point you in the right direction at least.

Also, we’re probably going to play around with some of the future projects like looking at better ways to determine how many years of value to attribute to a given draft pick. I am not sure when but stay tuned if you’re interested.

As always, really appreciate any feedback folks have—so if there’s anything you think we missed or did wrong, please don’t hesitate to let us know! Another special shout-out once again to Alex Takakuwa, who was fundamental to making this analysis possible.

The Biggest Questions Facing the Chargers Before the 2024 Opener

Football season is finally back, and I am so excited for the opening week. This year, we’re getting two early games in Ravens versus Chiefs on Thursday and Packers versus Eagles on Friday, both of which should be great match ups. But as a Chargers fan, you know I’m most excited for the Bolts to open their season against the Raiders this Sunday at 1:05 pm—you’ve got to love a rivalry game to get the season going!

Some of my favorite football pundits haven’t been high on the Chargers much this offseason and Las Vegas prognosticators seem to have them as a mid-tier team, with sites like BetMGM pegging the team’s win total at 8.5 (albeit with a pedestrian payout if they hit the over of just -160). Having gone 5-12 last season, it’s hard to get too up in arms about the lack of hype. But with Jim Harbaugh at the helm, Justin Herbert leading the offense, and some talented defensive players hopefully returning to form, the Chargers should be a fun team to watch, and hopefully one that can contend for a wild card berth.

In this post, I’m raising the key questions for the Chargers heading into the season, and I’ll predict how I think things will shake out.

Will Anyone Besides Herbert Threaten Offensively?

Justin Herbert is a monster. If you haven’t figured that out yet, you haven’t watched enough football, so here are two options to begin your education (or just enjoy crazy plays)—8 minutes of crazy throws or an hour of highlights, have at it.

But the Chargers lost some serious offensive talent this offseason, and they’re going to have to find a way to replace it. Most notably, the Bolts traded Pro Bowl wide receiver Keenan Allen to the Bears; cut starting wide receiver Mike Williams; let starting running back Austin Ekeler and starting tight end Gerald Everett walk in free agency; and lost former All-Pro center Corey Linsley to retirement. Losing some of those guys won’t change much from last year, as Williams and Linsley each played just three games last season before injuries. Moving on from Ekeler and Everett also isn’t a huge concern given Ekeler struggled with efficiency and took a step backward as both a rusher and a receiver and Everett never really blossomed into a plus-player in Los Angeles.

But losing Keenan Allen is a gut punch. Allen was only guy on the offense who really threatened defenses last year. He was also the Chargers’ primary chain mover and Herbert’s favorite target by far. Allen was targeted on over 31% of the Chargers’ passing attempts during the 13 games he played (averaging over 11.5 targets per game), and despite missing 4 games at the end of the season, he was responsible for almost 29% of the Chargers total receiving yards. That’s a lot of production to lose, despite Allen turning 32 this offseason.

While Allen is by far the most meaningful piece to depart this offseason, the Chargers need to replace over 70% of both their rushing and receiving production from last year (in terms of yards). They also are replacing players who scored 28 of their 35 offensive touch downs last season (excluding passing TDs).

Who’s going to step up?

The Bolts are returning four wide receivers in Josh Palmer, Quentin Johnston, Derius Davis, and Simi Fehoko, but none of them are sure things. Palmer, a third-round pick in 2021, has filled in as the Chargers third WR behind Keenan Allen and Mike Williams the past two seasons. He’s a quality receiver, but he’s never shouldered a huge load offensively for more than a game or two at a time. He will have to step up and play like a consistent starter—I’m optimistic he can do so. Johnston is a wild card. Though he was taken #21 overall in last year’s draft, he struggled mightily to catch the ball and create separation. His most painful highlight from last year cost the Chargers a win against the Packers (there were other drops that were almost as bad) and he was dead last in separation score. Simply put, he needs to be better. Davis and Fehoko aren’t likely to make huge contributions in terms of receiving numbers, as Davis is a return specialist/special package player and Fehoko has mostly been a practice squad player. At running back and tight end, there’s been a huge degree of turnover. Only tight end Stone Smartt is back on the active roster this year, and he’s mostly been a backup.

With so few guys returning, the Chargers have instead looked to new roster additions to fill in their skill position needs on offense. They drafted wide receiver Ladd McConkey in the second round, running back Kimani Vidal in the sixth round, and wide receiver Brenden Rice in the seventh round. They signed free agent running backs Gus Edwards, JK Dobbins, and Hassan Haskins; free agent wide receiver DJ Chark; and free agent tight ends Will Dissly and Hayden Hurst.

While that’s a lot of players to bring in, the only truly significant investments the Chargers made in were for McConkey (second round pick) and Dissly (3 year deal with $10 million guaranteed). The other players the Chargers brought in were essentially available at discount deal prices, not usually an indicator that a lot of production can be expected from them. For example, Vidal and Rice were picked toward the end of the 2024 draft. And the Chargers’ other free agency additions (besides Dissly) were signed for relatively small deals worth under $3.5 million in guaranteed money, usually for just one season.

But some of these guys could end up being huge values, especially given the cost to get them.

At receiver, I’m most excited about McConkey. He’s shifty with the ball in his hands, he’s got speed to burn (4.38 second 40 yard dash), and he’s capable of playing out of a bunch of different alignments. I’m hopeful he can become the Chargers’ best receiver at some point this year given what he flashed in college and the high draft pick the Chargers invested in drafting him. But it’s unfair to expect him to fill Keenan Allen’s shoes as a rookie and he’s got a history of leg and back injuries that limited his production in college.

At the same time, Josh Palmer should be a reliable contributor. DJ Chark has a 1,000 yard season under his belt and should at least provide some speed on the outside, which the Chargers desperately need—if he pops back to his early career form, signing him for cheap will be a huge win. Quentin Johnston has the physical tools to succeed at the NFL level if the new coaching staff can help him develop as a receiver, but he’ll have to improve dramatically to be a plus player this season. And anything the team can get from Brenden Rice, Derius Davis, and Simi Fehoko in terms of receiving production will be a win.

The Chargers’ new running game will also be interesting. Incoming OC Greg Roman has a long history of leading effective rushing teams. Roman’s offenses have finished amongst the top five teams in total rushing yards nine times in his 10 seasons as an offensive coordinator. The roster moves also should bolster the ground game. Gus Edwards and JK Dobbins have significant injury risks, but they’ve been very effective when they have been healthy. Edwards is a strong down-hill runner who routinely breaks tackles. He’s averaged 5.0 yards per carry or better four times in five NFL seasons and, for his career, averages 3.17 yards after contact per carry according to Pro Football Focus. Dobbins has a limited track record due to his extensive injury history, but he’s been impressive as a runner and receiver when he plays. In (somewhat) healthy seasons in 2020 and 2022, Dobbins averaged 6.0 yards per carry and 5.7 yards per carry respectively. Rookie Kimani Vidal was extremely productive at Troy, rushing for over 1600 yards and 14 touchdowns last year—but he’s untested and taking a big leap to NFL competition. The blocking additions should help, too. The Chargers spent the fifth overall pick in this year’s draft on top offensive tackle Joe Alt and Dissly, their big free agency acquisition at tight end, is a quality blocker.

Ultimately, there are a ton of question marks outside of Herbert, many of which center on injuries. If Roman can spur a strong running game, if guys stay healthy, and if someone can emerge as a credible receiving threat, Herbert is good enough to propel this team to a top 10-12 offense. If nobody emerges as a receiving threat, though, it may be slower going.

Can the Defensive Stars Show Out Again?

The Chargers have been reliant on a few highly paid, big name players on defense for the past few years. That’s true again this season, as the team’s three highest paid players other than Herbert are all on defense: Joey Bosa ($26.1 million), Khalil Mack ($25.4 million), and Derwin James ($19.9 million).

We know Bosa, Mack, and James are capable players—combined for 15 Pro Bowls, four All-Pro selections, a Defensive Player of the Year award, and a Defensive Rookie of the Year award—so the Chargers will need these three guys to both play at a high-level and be available on season to succeed on defense.

Mack is on the back-end of his career at age 33, but he’s coming off a stellar year in which he posted a career-high 17 sacks and generated a whopping 88 total pressures. He’s also still an elite run defender, receiving a 90.8 run defense grade last season from PFF. Perhaps most impressively, Mack has suited up for every game for the Chargers over the last two seasons and played 80%+ of the team’s defensive snaps, an incredible record of availability and consistency from the 10-year veteran. While he probably can’t reproduce the same sack totals as last year, having Mack available and playing at a near-Pro Bowl level (especially against the run) is going to be critical for the Chargers defense.

Mack’s partner on the edge, Joey Bosa, hasn’t been nearly as available the last two years in particular. As a result of numerous different injuries, Bosa has played in just 14 of a possible 34 regular season games over the last two seasons. In the games he has played in during that time, he’s been on the field for well under 60% of the total snaps played and has totaled just nine sacks. While Bosa’s pass rushing production has been solid on a per snap basis and he’s graded out well, his lack of availability on the field has been an enormous concern. Bosa will need to play a lot for the Chargers defense to reach its highest levels, but he’s already fighting the injury bug again this year: Bosa needed surgery less than a month ago for a broken hand suffered in a joint practice with the Rams in early August. Fortunately, and unlike prior years, the Chargers have decent depth on the edge in second year Tuli Tuipulotu and veteran edge rusher Bud Dupree, who signed in free agency. If Bosa misses games again, they should be able to survive—but they aren’t likely to be an above average unit without him.

Derwin James, for his part, is a do-it-all safety and the key player in the Chargers’ secondary. He’s been one of the most productive safeties in the NFL since entering the league in 2018, with first and second team All Pro selections and multiple Pro Bowl appearances. The Chargers have used James all over the field, including as a 1-on-1 defender for tight ends and slot receivers, as an in-the-box thumper, as a blitzer, and even as a deep third defender. His incredible versatility has been a tremendous asset for the Chargers in the past. Unfortunately, James struggled a bit in coverage last season. He posted by far the lowest coverage grade of his career at 57.0, far below his prior low of 74.4, per PFF. James has been relatively healthy and is still in his prime at 28 years old, so the dramatic drop-off may be an outlier. There are reasons to think so, too. James lost his counterpart at safety, Alohi Gilman, to injury last year and had to shoulder a ton of additional responsibility as a result. The Chargers defense also severely underperformed with Brandon Staley calling plays, and they cratered as a unit toward the end of last season, which ultimately led to Staley being fired. With Harbaugh and DC Jesse Minter now in town, James will need to play like a stud again for things to go well.

Will the Interior of the Lines Hold Up?

The Chargers have some incredibly talented players on both the offensive and defensive lines, but that talent is highly concentrated on the edges for both sides of the football.

On offense, Rashawn Slater is a top-tier young talent at left tackle who’s already made a Pro Bowl (though he had a bit of a down year last year) and right tackle Joe Alt has the tools to be a star. But the Chargers have real questions on the interior. Zion Johnson was a first-round pick in 2022, but his first two seasons have been truly mediocre as a pass blocker and his awe-inspiring physical tools haven’t translated to consistent, quality run blocking either. Johnson took a bit of a step back as a run blocker last year, but given his age and pedigree, there’s reason to believe he can continue to improve. Hopefully the new coaching staff, including OL Coach Mike Devlin and Assistant OL Coach Nick Hardwick (a former Charger’s star lineman) and Greg Roman’s offensive scheme can help Johnson unlock his potential. He certainly looks the part of an athletic freak, so we hope to see him play like it!

The Chargers other two starters are longer-term NFL veterans, but they’re in new situations. Trey Pipkins is entering his sixth season and started at right tackle the past two seasons, but he will kick inline to right guard with Joe Alt’s arrival. Pipkins has been a solid pass blocker for most of his career, but his lack of quickness has shown up at times on the edge, so moving inside may better suit his talents. That said, he’s been subpar as a run blocker and the Chargers will need him to perform better than he has in the past (Pipkins has never graded out higher than a 64 in PFF’s run blocking grade). Center Bradley Bozeman started for the Baltimore Ravens when Greg Roman was OC there, but he’s a new arrival in Los Angeles by way of a two-year stint with the Carolina Panthers. Bozeman is a solid run blocker, which should be an immediate improvement over Will Clapp, last year’s starting center. But Bozeman has never been particularly adept at pass blocking, so he’ll need to hold up well enough there to keep Justin Herbert from getting early pressure up the middle.

The Chargers do have reasonable offensive line depth for the first time in years, with guys like Jaramee Salyer and Foster Sarrell as backups. Those guys will be important, too, given you cannot expect the full line to be healthy all season.

I have a hard time seeing the Chargers sporting one of the best O-Lines in the NFL unless they can shore up the interior. I’m optimistic about Slater and Alt, but they really need one or two other guys to take a step forward to really have a strong unit as a whole.

I’m less optimistic about the defensive line, which could really be a struggle this season. The Bolts didn’t do much to shore up the unit that struggled the last couple of seasons. The Chargers brought back rotation D-Lineman Morgan Fox, Otito Ogbonnia, and Scott Matlock. They added free agents Poona Ford and Teair Tart on near-minimum deals and drafted Justin Eboigbe in the fourth round out of Alabama. At the same time, they lost guys who ate a lot of snaps last year, including Sebastian Joseph-Day, Austin Johnson, and Nick Williams—while none of those players provided much more than replacement-level play, they were a bit better in 2023 than 2022 and will inevitably be missed.

Ford, and to a lesser extent Tart, have been productive in the past, so there’s some hope they can return to their previous highs. Fox is a pass rush specialist and should fill that role well, but he has size limitations that prevent him from being an every-down DT. Eboigbe, Ogbonnia, and Matlock are all young and there’s a chance they could become contributors as they take on bigger roles, but none of them come with significant draft pedigree as they were all fourth round draft picks or later. One of those three guys will have to perform well above expectation for the interior D-Line to be average. More likely, the Chargers are going to have to rely heavily on solid linebacker play, with support from James at safety, and their edge rushers to contribute a ton in run defense.

How Big Is the Leap from Staley to Harbaugh?

I’ll be the first to admit that I was comfortable with the Brandon Staley hire when it happened. The hope was that Staley would come in and help shore up a Chargers defense that had been middle-of-the-pack despite having a number of really good players. The early returns on the team’s performance were good, too, as Staley went 9-8 and 10-7 in his first two seasons as head coach. Yet despite the team’s relative success, the defense never really came together. During Staley’s tenure as defensive play caller in 2021, 2022, and 2023, the Chargers finished 29th, 22nd, and 24th in points allowed and 23rd, 20th, and 28th in yards allowed respectively. Other team metrics were equally unkind: the Bolts were 26th, 20th, and 26th in Defensive DVOA according to FTN Fantasy.

More importantly, even with Herbert authoring 11 game winning drives in three seasons, the Chargers still lost 14 games (27% of their total games!) by 3 or fewer points, including a gut-wrenching loss to the Jaguars in the 2022 Wild Card round. That’s insane by any measure, but it’s infuriating when most of those losses happened simply because the Chargers defense couldn’t stop teams when it mattered.

Staley obviously knows football and there’s little reason to question his schematic acumen (the 49ers recently hired him as an assistant head coach to help their defense). Still, his tenure as head coach was defined by inexplicable collapses and ineffective defense overall. We may never know whether that was due to Staley’s lack of experience as a head coach, leadership, or just bad luck, but we do know that it was time for the Chargers to move on.

Bringing in a big-time coach like Jim Harbaugh is a welcome step up. There’s no real question Harbaugh has what it takes to win at a high level, as he’s done so at every stop. Harbaugh is fresh off a 15-0, national championship season at the University of Michigan. During Harbaugh’s nine seasons in Ann Arbor, the Wolverines went 89-25 (0.781). Before that, Harbaugh had a highly successful stint with the San Francisco 49ers where his teams went 44-19-1 and made a Super Bowl. Harbaugh also led the Stanford Cardinal out of the doldrums and into an Orange Bowl win in 2010, his tenure starting off a decade of phenomenal success for the Cardinal football program. And Harbaugh’s first stint as a head coach was a tremendous success, too, as he took the University of San Diego Toreros to a 29-6 record from 2004 to 2006.

Harbaugh won’t be the offensive or defensive play caller for the Chargers this year, but his influence on the team is unquestionable. If he can create the same culture of professionalism, competitive fire, and enthusiasm within the Bolts’ locker room that he has at every other stop, it’s going to be a huge step forward.

I mean, just listen to this guy—what a gem!

Something Doing in Charlotte: Hornets on the Right Track

This July, I had the fantastic opportunity to spend a week in Las Vegas for the NBA Summer League to participate in a Basketball Immersive program put together by Sports Business Classroom. The program included dozens of talks by NBA front office executives, coaches, scouts, and agents on topics ranging from high-level concepts like leadership and building successful organizations to granular details on building scouting reports and front office organizational roles. Program instructors—including some well-known names like Bobby Marks, J.A. Adande and Howard Beck, Steve Jones and Nekias Duncan from The Dunker’s Spot podcast, and Seth Partnow, among others—also hosted sessions on salary cap management, film breakdowns and scouting, effective use of basketball analytics, and media strategies for writing and broadcasting. In all respects, the Basketball Immersive was a near-unparalleled chance to learn from experienced pros about all aspects of the industry.

Students like me were also put into teams to participate in a mock NBA trade deadline exercise. I was assigned the Charlotte Hornets along with three other SBC students. Our task was to assess the team’s current standing, come up with a strategy for improving it, and then identify, negotiate, and complete permissible transactions under the NBA CBA’s rules to actually fulfill our strategy.

I’ll be the first to admit that I hadn’t spent a ton of time thinking deeply about the Hornets before the mock trade deadline exercise. The Hornets are a young team that has been largely outside the national NBA discourse in recent years as they’ve struggled to win many games (one could argue that Michael Jordan selling the team last year was the only truly national news about the team in the last couple seasons). Like a lot of NBA observers, I was familiar with the team’s best players LaMelo Ball and Brandon Miller, and I was aware of the team’s recent roster moves to obtain players like Josh Green and Grant Williams—and, controversially, re-sign Miles Bridges. I also knew the team had recently hired a lot of new front office staff, led by first-time GM Jeff Peterson (from the Brooklyn Nets), and a young new coaching staff under first-time Head Coach Charles Lee (from the Boston Celtics). But I hadn’t spent much time thinking about how the roster fit together, what their cap situation looked like, or what kind of draft capital they still had in the cupboard. I also didn’t have much of a sense going in as to how I felt about the team. Going through the mock trade deadline exercise made me think a lot more about how I view the Hornets and what I think they should try to do next, rightly or wrongly.

Having looked at the Hornets circumstances with more focus, I have to say that I am much more optimistic on the Hornets now than I was going in. I’ll explain why below (check the end to see what trades we made in the mock exercise, too)!

More Talent Than We’ve Seen the Last Two Years

The Hornets have won just 48 games over the last two seasons, good for a winning percentage of only about 29% and the third-worst record in the NBA over the period. With such a terrible record, it would be easy to assume the Hornets have been listlessly moving through the last couple years with little talent on the roster. But focusing on just the last two seasons misses the bigger picture. In fact, just a few years ago, a fun Hornets team led by All-Star LaMelo Ball won 43 games before losing in the Play-In to the Atlanta Hawks.

Talented Players Have Missed Too Much Time to Injury and Self-Inflicted Off-the-Court Issues

Since that promising season, the Hornets have suffered setback after setback, which has dramatically affected their ability to compete meaningfully during the regular season and stunted their team’s overall development.

• Since making an All-Star team in just his second season, point guard LaMelo Ball has suffered a rash of ankle injuries that have prevented him from regularly seeing the floor the last two years. Ball has played just 22 games last season and 36 games in 2022-23.

• At the time part of the Hornets core, small forward Miles Bridges was charged with multiple felonies in connection with an alleged domestic violence assault against his then-girlfriend in front of their children. Bridges pleaded no contest to a single felony count, missed the entire 2022-23 season, and missed the first 10 games of the 2023-24 season as a result of a league-imposed suspension relating to the allegations.

• Mark Williams, Charlotte’s promising first round pick from the 2022 draft, played just 19 games last year due to lingering back issues.

• Gordon Hayward struggled to stay healthy across multiple seasons after being brought to the Hornets from Boston. Hayward never played more than 50 games in a season while he was in Charlotte (he finally hit 51 games played this season after being traded to the Thunder in February).

• Similarly, significant role-players like Cody Martin have missed big chunks of time. Martin played just 7 games in 2022-23 and just 28 games last season due to various leg injuries.

All the players above will be back with the Hornets next year except Hayward, which should make for a significant talent-infusion for the Hornets next season.

Let’s start with the guys coming back from injuries. If LaMelo Ball and Mark Williams can stay healthy and return to form, the Hornets should get back an All-Star caliber guard and a young starting center. A healthy Cody Martin would also give the Hornets back a quality rotation player.

Ball’s unique talent is well-known to basketball fans. Sporting elite size for a point guard at 6’7”, Ball is an adept offensive engine capable of creating for himself and others. He’s averaged at least 29 points and 11 assists per 100 possessions for each of the last three seasons on solid shooting efficiency, knocking down 37.4% of threes and 83.4% of free throws for his career. Advanced metrics also reflect Ball’s offensive skill. For example, his Offensive Estimated Plus-Minus (EPM) has been in the 94th percentile or higher amongst all players in each of the last 3 seasons, too (per Dunks and Threes). While he could stand to improve his finishing around the basket, up his free throw attempt rate, and take care of the ball a bit more, there’s little question in my mind that Ball is a tremendous offensive player. That’s especially notable given Ball is still just 22 years old.

Mark Williams isn’t the same level talent as Ball, but he’s been a pretty strong player in his own right despite his young age. He’s shown the ability to score around the basket effectively, operate as a pick and roll screener, and perform reasonably well as a defensive big. Though he’s played in just 62 games, for his career to date Williams is averaging 22.7 points, 17.6 rebounds, 2.3 blocks, and just 2.1 turnovers per 100 possessions, while shooting 64.2% from the field. Healthy numbers for a 22-year-old. The rebounding numbers deserve special attention, too. Williams’ career offensive rebounding percentage is 13.5% and his career defensive rebounding percentage is 26.5%, both of which compare favorably to All-Star-caliber centers like Jarrett Allen (career 11.3% and 24.2%) and Anthony Davis (career 8.6% and 25.2%). Williams probably isn’t the same level of defensive player as those guys, nor is he the offensive weapon that Davis is, but that’s nice company for a young big.

Martin, for his part, is a solid wing defender and capable rotation player. While Cody Martin isn’t the same player as his twin brother Caleb (less shooting has held back Cody Martin’s offense), he has flashed the ability to play above-average defense. In three of five NBA seasons, Martin has played better than average defense based on Defensive EPM per Dunks and Threes (last season’s 97th percentile rating for Defensive EPM is an outlier as Martin played only 28 games, but so was his 6th percentile rating in 2023 when he played only 7 games).

The situation for Miles Bridges is obviously quite a bit different. Even though he played most of last season, it was obvious that missing more than a year of basketball meaningfully hampered his game. Of course, Bridges bears responsibility for the time he missed and the repercussions to his play, but the impact to the Hornets was significant. Even though his counting stats stayed mostly consistent compared to his break-out season in 2022, Bridges took a huge step backward by the advanced numbers. He fell from an 88th percentile +2.2 EPM in 2021-22 to a 66th percentile -0.5 EPM in 2023-24 per Dunks and Threes. The drop-off was largely driven by a notable drop-off in two-point shooting efficiency, as Bridges was less efficient in the paint without Ball on the court as often to generate quality looks.

[Quick aside. Despite a drop in productivity, Charlotte’s new front office gave Bridges a new 3 year, $75 million deal this off-season. I was not in favor of giving him that deal based on Bridges pleading no contest to a serious domestic violence assault and allegations of subsequent domestic violence assaults involving the same person. That said, Charlotte certainly should have more information than I do as an outside observer, and I believe in second chances. Accordingly, I won’t be overly harsh on the deal for now. But if Bridges is ever involved in violent conduct again, the Hornets should be held to account for the decision to bring him back.]

Charlotte Has Talent Upside from Several Recent Draft Picks

Over the course of the last few drafts, the Hornets have managed to find some quality players. I’ll go through them quickly.

Brandon Miller, taken #2 overall in the 2023 draft, is the obvious headliner, as he put together a very productive rookie season despite the team’s big roster changes. Miller, who finished third in Rookie of the Year voting behind Victor Wembanyama and Chet Holmgren, is a 6’9” wing with great length, solid athletic attributes, and a penchant for scoring. He averaged over 17 points per game on robust shooting numbers of 44.0% from the field, 37.3% from three, and 82.7% from the line. Though Miller is really a secondary creator and perimeter shooter, he bore a substantial offensive load for a rookie—his 23.6% usage rate was second on the team to LaMelo Ball. Still, Miller finished in the 70th percentile of players league-wide in Offensive EPM. That’s very impressive for a rookie thrown into a tough situation, particularly when you consider that the Hornets didn’t get much consistency out of the point guard position (Ball was injured, and Terry Rozier and Vasilije Micić were only on the team for 30 games each). With a year of experience under his belt and an elite passer like Ball in the backcourt, there’s potential for Miller to thrive in his second season as he shifts to a role more focused on movement shooting and second side shot creation.

Charlotte also hit on the Mark Williams pick (taken #15 in 2022) if he can stay healthy. I’ve already talked about what Williams brings on both ends of the floor, and if he can stay healthy, he’ll have a chance to get even better in coming years.

The Hornets’ two other first round picks are less certain, but there’s reason for some optimism. Let’s start with this year’s #6 overall pick, forward Tidjane Salaün.

Because he’s only 18 years old, Salaün’s future is fundamentally based on projection right now. Physically, the French forward already looks the part of a prototypical modern NBA four. He’s 6’9” (without shoes), 217 pounds, and sports a 7’2” wingspan, and he demonstrated good athleticism and consistent, tremendous effort while playing for Cholet Basket in the French pro league. He’s also quite raw right now, and his production wasn’t all that impressive (Salaün averaged just 9.2 points and 4.0 rebounds per game last season). Given the physical tools and effort, it’s fair to project him as a strong defender. He also projects as a solid three-point shooter. While he only hit 33% of threes last season, he’s a willing shooter at 4.2 threes per game, his form looks good, and his 77% shooting mark from the free throw line suggests there’s some potential. While it may take Salaün a bit of time to develop, the raw tools look promising.

Like Salaün, Nick Smith Jr. (taken #27 in 2023) is a big question mark, too. Smith Jr. has decent physical tools for a 2-guard, but he struggled quite a bit to generate his quality offense both during his freshman season at Arkansas and his rookie year with the Hornets last season. Given his pedestrian play last year and his late first round pedigree, it’s tough to project Smith for the same type of future gains as a guy like Salaün, but Smith did show some things last year. Most notably, Smith knocked down over 43% of his 146 three-point attempts last season—if he can keep that up and find a way to league-average defense (possible given his 6’5” size), he’ll have a role on the Hornets for sure.

Recent Trades Shed Quality Veterans, But Charlotte Got Back Younger Potential and Important Draft Capital

With the team struggling on the court the past two seasons, the Hornets opted to enter several different trades designed to get back younger players and accrue future draft capital. Check out the deals below from the past two years:

• At the 2023 trade deadline, the Hornets traded Mason Plumlee to the Clippers for Reggie Jackson and a future second round pick, waiving Jackson just a few days later.

• The Hornets traded Terry Rozier to Miami for a future first round pick and Kyle Lowry, who was bought out by the Hornets shortly afterward and never played for the team.

• The Hornets traded PJ Washington and a pair of second round picks to Dallas in exchange for a future first round pick, Grant Williams, and Seth Curry.

• The Hornets traded Gordon Hayward to the Thunder, receiving back Vasilije Micić, Tre Mann, Davis Bertans, a pair of second round picks, and cash.

• This offseason, the Hornets got in on the NBA’s first-ever six team trade and acquired 23-year-old guard Josh Green, Reggie Jackson (again), and a couple future second round picks in exchange for Philadelphia’s 2025 second round pick and cash.

Through the five trades, the Hornets managed to snag three young players in Josh Green (23), Grant Williams (25), and Tre Mann (23) who still haven’t maximized their potential despite multiple years in the league, two future first rounders from Dallas and Miami, and a couple future second rounders. To do so, they gave up PJ Washington (25), who never really moved the needle in 5 years with the Hornets, Charlotte; and several players whose timelines didn’t match the rest of the roster in Terry Rozier (30), Mason Plumlee (34), and Gordon Hayward (34), who just retired the other day.

It’s hard to argue against the logic. In effect, the Hornets gave themselves looks at three younger guys with more upside plus snagged two future firsts, and they didn’t give up any core players to do it.

While Josh Green and Grant Williams haven’t performed consistently enough throughout their careers to date, they’ve both shown the capability to be strong 3-and-D players that should fit nicely with the team’s talented offensive core of LaMelo Ball and Brandon Miller.

Grant Williams has proven he can be a plus defender capable of guarding wings and bigs, or even switching onto guards at times. During his first two years in Boston, Williams posted excellent Defensive EPMs of 1.2 and 0.7, good for 80th percentile league-wide in both years. While he hasn’t performed to that level since then (last year was a bit of a mess in particular), he still posted a solid Defensive EPM of 0.5 (72nd percentile) as recently as 2023. On the other end of the floor, Williams isn’t a world-beater offensively, but he can at least fill a clear role as a spacer. He’s hit almost 38% of his threes for his career and managed to put up a respectable 13.9 points per game in his 29 games with the Hornets last year. He’s under contract for the next 3 years for just $40.9 million, too.

Green has never shown the same defensive chops as Grant Williams, but he’s been a respectable wing defender at times in his own right. Green is smaller than Williams, but he’s shown the ability to cover attacking guards and wings on the perimeter, even if he’s not a top tier point of attack defender. He’s also much more of a threat with the ball in his hands, a bit more versatile in general offensively than Williams, and willing to get up the floor quickly in transition, an important skill when playing with a point guard like Ball. He’s also a capable outside shooter, having knocked down about 38% of his threes for his career. Green is also on a very reasonable medium-term deal with 3 years and $41 million remaining—almost a mirror image of the Williams contract.

Tre Mann was also a nice get for the Hornets, though he fills a slightly different role. Drafted by OKC with #18 pick in the 2021 draft, Mann didn’t have many opportunities to shine behind elite young talents like Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, but after joining the Hornets last year, he put up the best numbers of his short career. In 28 games with Charlotte last season, Mann averaged 11.9 points, 5.2 assists, and 4.5 rebounds per game (18.9/8.2/7.1 per 100 possessions) and managed respectable shooting numbers of 45.3% from the field, 36.4% from three, and 75.9% from the line. While Mann’s numbers last year won’t blow anyone away at a glance, they do help show that he has some untapped potential, which makes sense for a player his age. Getting Mann, Vasilije Micić, multiple future seconds, and cash for Gordon Hayward, who retired roughly 5 months later, is incredible value—and the Hornets will get the chance to see if Mann can continue to take strides next year at the bargain price of $4.9 million in salary as a result.

There Are Paths Here to Long-Term Success and Contention

Charlotte has two high-potential talents already on the roster in LaMelo Ball and Brandon Miller. The most important question to whether the Hornets will get to contention with this roster is how high of a ceiling they can hit. That’s pretty much always the case for young teams, though, especially in small markets.

Ball has already shown he can be an All-Star level offensive hub. Whether Ball can elevate himself to an All-NBA level player who can anchor a future contender remains to be seen, but he only turns 24 this month. There’s room for growth. Ball needs to stay healthy and give more consistent effort defensively. You also hope he can play with just a touch more structure offensively to help the guys around him be more consistent. The development seems well within reach if he’s able to stay on the court.

Miller may not have quite the same ceiling as Ball, but he’s already proven himself to be a capable scorer. His outside shooting is already exceptional for a wing with his size, and he can get to his shots off the bounce or off movement effectively. If he can improve his playmaking, he could easily be an All-Star. Continued defensive development is critical, too. He’ll need to be a two-way contributor to reach his highest potential, but he’s got the physical tools to do it. He’s also just 21, so like with Ball, there’s plenty of growth potential.

The rest of the roster is in solid shape, too. In terms of on-the-court fit, they’ve got youth, defense and hustle, and upside potential in guys like Mark Williams, Tidjane Salaün, Grant Williams, Tre Mann, and Josh Green. They have capable rotation players in Nick Richards, Cody Martin, and Vasilije Micić. They have Miles Bridges, too—and it’s possible he can get his career back on track after a self-inflicted step backward.

The Cap Sheet Is Clean, Which Gives the Hornets Options

The Hornets roster construction and cap situation also means the Hornets aren’t locked into bad deals for basically anyone. While not as important as on-court performance, it’s easy to overlook the importance of roster and cap management. The team has tremendous flexibility to experiment, see who fits and how, and give playing time to the guys who can best complement Ball and Miller. Guys who work, they can keep on fair (or even team friendly) deals. Guys who don’t can get traded, and probably for solid return.

Look at the cap sheet below, which shows the year-by-year contract amounts for each player on Charlotte’s roster and the estimated percentage of the cap each player takes up to see what I mean:

[Based on data from Spotrac and assumes maximum 10% growth of salary cap, luxury tax line, and aprons each season due to new NBA TV deals]

Several things jump out from the Hornet’s cap sheet for the next five years.

1. Other than LaMelo Ball, the Hornets have few long-term contracts that take up significant cap space. Even LaMelo’s contract looks quite reasonable as a percentage of the cap going forward (assuming health), he will be worth between 22-25% of the cap only. For comparison, that’s a bit less cap space than what OG Anunoby will use; players like Trae Young and Zach Lavine will each command about 30.6% of the cap this year.

2. The Hornets have five guys on rookie deals (Brandon Miller, Tidjane Salaün, Mark Williams, Nick Smith Jr., and Tre Mann). Rookie contracts are hugely valuable both because they are relatively cheap and give the team significant control.

   • That means they don’t take up a ton of cap space (Brandon Miller is the most expensive, but only takes up 8-9% of the cap in any given season).

   • It also means the Hornets have an advantage to re-signing them through restricted free agency if they want to bring them back. Tre Mann is the most obvious candidate here, as his RFA status in the 2025 off-season is likely going to tamp down his market for potential deals even if he plays well next season.

3. The other veteran contracts make sense.

   • Miles Bridges is getting starter money, but his salary declines each season. His contract should get more valuable over time if he plays even at the lower 2023-24 levels. The contract makes him more trade-able down the line if the Hornets want to move on.

   • Grant Williams and Josh Green’s salaries are less than 10% of the cap each year. That’s good for the Hornets, as both are rotation players who could develop into starters. The player/contract combos for both are also potentially attractive to other teams, who might offer the Hornets something valuable in trade down the line.

   • Martin and Micić take up just 5-6% of the cap over the next couple seasons, but the Hornets can move on from either one if they want to create cap space for free agents next season. Martin’s deal non-guaranteed after this season, and the team will have the option to bring back Micić or not. Nick Richards’ contract takes up even less cap space and is also not guaranteed.

4. The Hornets can create significant cap space next summer if they want to. By waiving the non-guaranteed contracts for Martin and Richards and declining the team option for Micić, the Hornets can create over $35 million in cap room next offseason. They could get over $41 million in cap room by also declining the team option for Mark Williams.

5. The Hornets have a bunch of players on tradable contracts.

   • The varying salary levels for Bridges ($23-27 million), Green/Grant Williams ($13-15 million), and Martin/Micić ($7-9 million) are all at salary levels that could make them attractive to a team looking to add pieces. That gives them trade value.

   • In addition, the varied salary levels of those players gives the Hornets lots of options for salary matching in a trade if needed. Combined with draft capital, that can be a powerful trade tool.

   • Even at his bigger salary, if the Hornets ever wanted to trade Ball, there would probably be a decent market for him. All-Star-level talents don’t always become available, and Ball is locked in long-term at a reasonable cap number.

   • The players on rookie deals could draw a significant interest because they are cost controlled. Miller could net a particularly large haul if the Hornets for some reason needed to deal him (not that they should).

Lots of Future Draft Assets Make Big Swings Possible

By default, before trades, NBA teams each have 7 first round picks available to trade (one in each draft). A few teams have an absurd number of future picks—for example, the Thunder and Jazz have 15 or more. But the Hornets are in a pretty good spot, with 9 future first round picks available assuming they keep their 2025 pick. The chart below summarizes their draft pick situation:

Charlotte controls most of their own first round picks here, except 2025. If the Hornets surprise and actually make the playoffs this season, they’d lose their 2025 first round pick but presumably be happy with the result. More likely, they aren’t yet ready to win a playoff berth and hold onto their 2025 first rounder (they’d lose second rounders in 2026 and 2027 but that’s fine, incoming seconds from the Sixers in 2025 and Blazers or Pelicans in 2027 offset that mostly).

They also have incoming picks from Dallas and Miami. The Dallas pick has very light protections (top 2), so it’s probably going to wind up in Charlotte even if Dallas were to take a step backward. The Miami pick has more protections at first, as it’s lottery protected, and only conveyable if Miami’s 2025 first rounder actually conveys to the Thunder next year. But, Charlotte will eventually end up with a first rounder from Miami no matter what—they may just have to wait until 2028.

The fact that Charlotte has these nine future first round picks matters quite a bit. Because they have enough picks, they can theoretically trade up to six first round picks to bolster their roster. Combined with the young players on trade-matchable contracts (Miles Bridges, Josh Green, and Grant Williams specifically), the Hornets can make a big swing for an All-Star level talent if one comes available and they want to. For a small-market team that may not have a chance to attract top-tier free agents, that’s an important option to have on the table.

They could also use their bevy of future firsts in other ways, like taking smaller swings on pieces that fit with their core as it develops or (GASP) actually using their picks in future drafts. The point isn’t so much that they will do anything in particular, it’s that they have the option to make decisions based on whether they want to make a deal—not whether they have to make a deal because of a roster or cap crunch.

In a Good Place

Ultimately, I think the Hornets are in a nice spot. Like any non-playoff team, they have big questions to answer. The most critical question is how high the ceiling is for talent they have when healthy, but that question is true for almost every non-contender. There are narrower, more discrete questions they need to answer first. Health for Ball and Mark Williams, the continued development of young guys like Miller and Salaün, and getting past Miles Bridges’ off-the-court issues are the most apparent, and I believe the team has positioned itself well to answer those questions and be able to pivot if they don’t like how the results come back.

In all, I’m excited to see what’s next for the Hornets. If the team can stay healthy, they should be fun to watch on the court, and they’ve got a ton of room to improve quickly.

How Did the SBC Mock Trade Deadline Go?

I mentioned that my SBC team was assigned the Hornets for a mock trade deadline exercise. We considered a crazy number of deals, but we really liked a few that came available when other teams decided to make moves. We made three notable trades:

Traded for Alperen Şengün

To get this deal done, we had to trade Mark Williams, Charlotte’s 2027 first round pick, Dallas’ 2027 first round pick (top 2 protected), and 3 second round picks to Houston in exchange for Şengün. Şengün is only 22 and already an offensive wizard. Though he has some defensive limitations and is going to get a big contract starting next year, it’s hard to find this kind of young talent. I was happy we could get him without giving up a ton of future draft capital.

Traded for De’Anthony Melton

This was my favorite deal, though it was a smaller swing. We traded away Seth Curry and Reggie Jackson (at the time of the exercise, he hadn’t been bought out by Charlotte yet) to the Warriors in exchange for Melton. Melton is a strong defender and good shooter who would fit nicely will Ball and Miller. With Green on the roster, we felt OK with Melton’s injury risk from back issues.

Recouped Draft Capital

We somehow also managed to snag an unprotected first round pick by trading away Nick Richards and taking on some salary. We traded Nick Richards to the Suns in exchange for Cleveland’s 2027 first (unprotected), which the Suns acquired in a separate deal during the mock exercise, 3 second round picks, and Nasir Little. While this left us thin in the front court, it was hard to say no to replenishing almost all our draft assets from the Şengün deal.

Let me know what you think in the comments of the deals!

And here are some photos from SBC just for fun:

Kings Offseason Update: DeMar DeRozan

Well, well, well, the Sacramento Kings offseason does have some sizzle!

The Kings made a splashy move on Saturday night by executing a sign-and-trade for Chicago Bulls wing and six-time All-Star DeMar DeRozan. This was huge news for the Kings, as DeRozan is probably the most accomplished free agent to ever join the Kings (all due respect to the Vlade Divac signing all the way back in 1999).

The Kings were hosting a summer league game against China when the deal was announced in the Golden One Center. Needless to say, the vibes were immaculate:

I talked briefly about the possibility of a sign-and-trade for DeRozan in my last post and it looks like the cost of the deal was roughly around what I expected (although the Kings gave up a bit more draft capital than I would’ve liked in an ideal world). Here are the deal terms:

• Sacramento Kings Receive:

  • DeMar DeRozan

    • DeRozan signed a 3 year, $73.7 million contract—the first two years are guaranteed and the third year is guaranteed for just $10 million

• Chicago Bulls Receive:

  • Two second round draft picks (from Sacramento)

  • Chris Duarte

• San Antonio Spurs Receive:

  • Harrison Barnes

  • Swap rights for Kings 2031 first round pick

How Did This Deal Go Down, and What Does It Mean for the Parties?

I’ll explain briefly what’s happened in this trade from each party’s perspective.

DeRozan was a free agent this offseason and the Bulls could not realistically keep him without going deep into the luxury tax, an unpalatable proposition for an aging team that only won 39 games last season. Rather than risk letting DeRozan walk in free agency with nothing to show for it, the Bulls were heavily incentivized to engage in a sign-and-trade so that they could get something back for him.

Entering his age 35 season, DeRozan was facing a rather limited free agency market. As I wrote about previously, only six or seven teams entered the offseason with substantial cap room: Detroit, Philadelphia, Utah, Oklahoma City, Orlando (Charlotte technically had some room and Toronto theoretically could have created room but chose not to). But only a few of those teams were realistic potential destinations for DeRozan, and that pool became even smaller early on in free agency when Philadelphia signed Paul George, Oklahoma City signed Isaiah Hartenstein, and Orlando signed Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. By looking at sign-and-trade scenarios, DeRozan could open up his list of potential destinations to keep his prospective compensation high and avoid having to join teams in the middle of a rebuild.

As an added challenge, the Bulls and DeRozan needed to find a way to do a sign-and-trade for DeRozan while not forcing the Bulls to take back a lot of salary. The Bulls wanted to avoid the luxury tax, but they also signed Jalen Smith in free agency to a 3 year, $27 million deal that hard-capped them at the first apron (because the Bulls gave Smith a starting salary above the Taxpayer MLE, they got hard capped at the first apron).

While the Bulls and DeRozan both wanted to do a sign-and-trade, they needed to find a trade partner and find a way to keep the Bulls from taking back too much salary in the deal. There weren’t many cap room teams interested, as I mentioned, so they had to focus on finding over-the-cap teams to do a deal.

The Kings were just such a team, over-the-cap but interested in adding DeRozan at a salary level he was comfortable with (roughly $20-25 million per year). But under the CBA rules, over-the-cap teams like the Kings must send out “matching salary” in a trade, which the Bulls didn’t want to (and couldn’t) accept. So it had to be a three team deal.

Enter the Spurs. The Spurs had a relatively quiet free agency start despite having cap space. The only move they’d made in free agency was to sign veteran point guard Chris Paul to a 1 year, $11 million deal. But they had more cap space to use and were willing to use it to facilitate a DeRozan sign-and-trade, especially if they could extract something of value out of the deal.

To make the deal work, the Kings and DeRozan first had to iron out contract details that would work for both sides. They landed on 3 years and $73.7 million, with only a partial guarantee in the final year of the deal to protect the team in case DeRozan’s play declines as he ages (DeRozan will be 37 in the last year of the deal).

As an over-the-cap team, the Kings had to comply with the CBA’s salary matching rules to trade for DeRozan. They also had to consider their own luxury tax and cap situation; the Kings were already close to the luxury tax themselves and by executing a sign-and-trade, they would hard cap themselves at the first apron by rule. To match DeRozan’s $23.4 million incoming salary for the 2024-25 cap year (salary estimate from Spotrac), the Kings chose to trade away Harrison Barnes and Chris Duarte, slated for 2024-25 salaries of $18 million and $5.9 million respectively.

Due to the Bulls lack of room below the tax and hard cap situation, they could only take back Duarte’s $5.9 million salary for this year (Duarte is a restricted free agent at the end of next season). In exchange, the Bulls received two second round draft picks from the Kings. That’s pretty close to the market price this offseason for eating $5-6 million in salary, and if the Bulls can turn Duarte’s shooting around, they may realize some upside from his contract too.

The Spurs took on Harrison Barnes’ contract, which is for $18 million this coming season and $19 million in 2025-26. That’s a significant amount of salary to take on, but the Spurs had some cap space to use and Barnes is a productive player. To get enough cap space for the deal to work, the Spurs actually had to trade away a second round pick to dump Devonte Graham’s contract on the Hornets. Barnes also agreed to waive a 10% trade kicker to make the deal possible. Ultimately, for their trouble, the Spurs added Barnes and received the right to swap first round picks with the Kings in 2031.

By adding Barnes, the Spurs get a productive player who can space the floor effectively (Barnes shoots 38% from three for his career), something the Spurs need around Victor Wembanyama and this year’s #4 overall pick Stephon Castle, both of whom can benefit tremendously from floor spacing the Spurs often lacked last year. Barnes will also bring professionalism, maturity, and availability—traits the Kings benefitted from tremendously during his six seasons with the franchise. While Barnes’ defensive limitations and below average rebounding were issues for a relatively undersized Sacramento team, Wembanyama’s presence in San Antonio should mitigate those concerns. And at the very least, Barnes may be a potential trade chip for San Antonio down the line as other teams search for shooting (everyone always needs shooting) or if they need to matching salary in a trade.

The 2031 swap right has the potential to be extremely valuable, but its value is highly variable and exceptionally difficult to predict at this stage. Prudence would suggest assuming something like a 50/50 chance that the swap right is even exercised at all. The teams also have to consider the relative value (and cost) of the potential for moving a short distance between picks (it’s not that valuable to go from pick #17 to #14, for example). I’ve seen a ton of takes that the swap right is super high value, but they’re over-stated. A lot can change in the next seven years, and in order for the swap right to be exceptionally valuable things have to go both poorly in Sacramento and extremely well in San Antonio. For perspective, seven years is enough time to completely turnover rosters. Plus, the current CBA won’t even be in effect in 2031. And I’ve seen exactly zero people acknowledge the possibility that Wembanyama might actually leave San Antonio in free agency before the swap right even rolls around.

From the Kings perspective, by executing the sign-and-trade for DeRozan, they added a talented player they could not have signed in free agency. They also managed to shed salary this year in the deal, giving them slightly more breathing room below the luxury tax and the first apron hard cap. I’ll talk more about how it effects them on the court next.

DeRozan Boosts the Kings’ Talent, But Questions Remain

There’s quite a bit of good content on DeRozan’s fit with the Kings out there, but it’s worth discussing it a bit anyway. I’m quite optimistic about the Kings adding DeRozan, especially offensively. He brings All-Star level scoring from midrange and on the interior (especially by getting to the line), and he’s a willing passer who still takes care of the ball. Last season, Derozan averaged 24.0 points, 5.3 assists, 4.3 rebounds, and just 1.7 turnovers per game respectable shooting numbers, especially from the field and the free throw line (48% from the field / 33.3% from three / 85.3% from the free throw line on 7.7 attempts per game). Those numbers are roughly in-line with his averages over the last decade across three different teams, so it’s not hard to envision DeRozan having similar production in Sacramento.

DeRozan Will Give the Kings More Options Offensively

DeRozan is an elite shotmaker with serious creation chops, which is something the Kings sorely lacked toward the end of last year. He can create offensive for himself and his teammates in isolation, he can effectively run pick-and-rolls, he’s a truly elite midrange shooter, and he’s not afraid to attack the paint to score and create foul opportunities.

DeRozan’s scoring and creation skills will help the Kings take pressure off of Fox and Monk to generate offense. Over the last couple years, the Kings have needed additional shot creation late in games especially, and DeRozan provides that in spades. While the Sabonis-centric offense that the Kings run can be highly effective, it’s too often bogged down late in games against playoff caliber opponents, and that contributed to several critical Kings losses (including, for example, in the 2023 playoffs versus the Warriors). The issue was even more pronounced at the end of last season after Monk got hurt and the Kings struggled mightily to maintain their offensive firepower. Barnes provided a bit of creation at times, but those times were too few and too far between to comfortably rely on. This shows up in the numbers, as the Kings ranked 26th among all teams in isolation possessions and were in the bottom half of teams in terms of efficiency when they did at 0.9 points per possession. While I’m not suggesting the Kings should lean heavily into iso offense, there are times when it’s helpful to have as an option, and DeRozan will help fill that void easily. Per NBA.com, DeRozan was 17th in the NBA in isolation possessions per game and scored 1.10 points per possession (PPP) out of them—roughly comparable to the PPP figures put up by Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Luka Doncic, albeit on less volume.

DeRozan’s pick and roll effectiveness will also help the Kings maintain efficient offense even with Fox off the floor, as DeRozan and Sabonis could make for an elite pick and roll combo with shooters like Murray, Ellis, Monk, Huerter, and Lyles on the floor with them. This is another area of effective offense that the Kings weren’t always able to go to when needed last season. They ran pick and rolls with the third lowest frequency in the NBA and posted a middle-of-the-pack 0.92 points per possession out of those plays per NBA.com. But adding DeRozan will make the pick and roll game a much more robust option offensively. DeRozan ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game (12th in the NBA) and scored 1.05 PPPs in those situations. To put those figures in perspective, Fox ran 8.2 pick and rolls per game and scored 0.97 PPPs while Tyrese Halliburton ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game and scored 1.06 PPPs. Adding options like an effective pick and roll game for when Fox sits will help keep the Kings offense humming throughout games, which was at times an issue last season.

I’m also optimistic about DeRozan’s ability to generate points off drives. He was the 13th most frequent driver in the NBA last season at roughly 14.8 drives per game (just a bit behind Fox’s 10th-ranked 15.2 drives per game), which really bolstered DeRozan’s scoring efficiency as he shot over 60% inside of 8 feet and got the to free throw line at the fourth highest rate in the league. I’m especially excited about the free throw shooting, as the Kings have struggled to get easy points from the line in the past.

DeRozan should be able to fit in well enough with the Kings’ dribble handoff (DHO) offense. That’s important because the Kings ran handoffs more than 50% more often than any other team in the NBA (roughly 11.4 times per game). You can see from the clip below that DeRozan had some opportunities to run similar sets in Chicago, even though the Bulls ran handoffs less than any other team in the NBA. These kinds of plays should be more efficient for DeRozan when done with Sabonis rather than Nikola Vucecic:

There are two primary concerns with adding DeRozan offensively, but I suspect they’ll both be manageable.

The biggest concern is that adding DeRozan and subtracting Barnes does hurt the Kings’ three point shooting prowess. Barnes was a reliable floor spacer, hitting over 38% of his threes in five of six seasons in Sacramento. While DeRozan can hit some threes, it’s definitely not his forte. He’s a low volume three point shooter and well below average by percentage (he did a bit better on corner threes last year, hitting 39.4% per NBA.com, but that might be an outlier). With Fox’s improved shooting, Huerter and Monk back from injury, and the possibility of a bounce-back shooting year from Keegan Murray, I don’t worry too much about the dip in shooting. I also don’t expect DeRozan’s weaker three point shooting to dramatically affect the Kings’ floor spacing overall. DeRozan still commands attention on the perimeter because of his ability to knock down midrange shots and dribble-drive close-outs. While he’s not a prolific three point shooter, DeRozan has hit over 43% of his midrange shots last year per NBA.com and has been upwards of 45% from that distance repeatedly in recent years. In addition, because DeRozan can handle a good amount of on-ball responsibility, there are ways to mitigate his lack of shooting by letting him bring the ball up and initiate offense, including through pick and rolls.

The other concern that folks have raised is about DeRozan’s supposed “stickiness” with the ball. That concern strikes me as dramatically over-stated. DeRozan played in a Chicago offense that was deliberate and methodical (28th in pace), but DeRozan’s average touch lasted just 4.73 seconds, just a touch longer than Fox’s average of 4.68 seconds per touch. While DeRozan will need to move the ball more quickly at times in the Kings offense, he’s become such a willing distributor that there’s no reason to think he can’t do so.

Ultimately, DeRozan will bring more offensive punch to the Kings easily. He’ll give the team more options for shot creation and easy pick and rolls, and he should be another reliable option for one-on-one scoring when needed late in games. While his lack of three point shooting isn’t ideal, it’s mitigated by the fact that the Kings can still put plenty of shooting on the floor even with DeRozan and Sabonis together.

Defensively, the Trade May Be a Wash

The biggest concern with swapping Barnes (and I suppose Duarte) for DeRozan is the impact on defense, and you see a lot of folks expressing concern about the Kings defense in general. I think those concerns are way overstated for two reasons.

While no one claims that DeRozan is a force on defense, the Kings didn’t actually give up much in terms of defensive contribution in the deal.

Let’s start with Duarte for simplicity. While Duarte was an above average defensive player, his offensive struggles kept him from getting on the floor consistently, and he averaged just 12.2 minutes per game as a result. His propensity for fouling also didn’t help him stay on the court. With Keon Ellis emerging, Monk and Huerter both back with the team, and the Kings selecting Devin Carter in the draft, there was no real path for Duarte to contribute meaningfully this coming season (and he is slated to be a free agent after next season regardless).

But what about losing Barnes? I expect there will be some drawbacks, but probably less pronounced than most folks assume.

At 6’8” and 225 pounds, Barnes has slotted in as an undersized power forward for the Kings for years. While he’s been a solid, well-rounded player during that time, Barnes’ defensive limitations have been a significant issue for the Kings for several years, especially paired with a big like Domantas Sabonis who doesn’t offer a ton of rim protection. DeRozan has also played power forward quite a bit for the last few years in Chicago and at times in San Antonio, but he’s a bit smaller than Barnes at 6’6” and 220 pounds. By moving from Barnes to DeRozan, the Kings will give up a bit of height. And even though Barnes was never a stout defender against stronger power forwards, his strength and size were a bit more suited to matching up against guys like Karl-Anthony Towns and Jaren Jackson Jr. than DeRozan will be.

But in the modern NBA, there just aren’t that many power forwards who are offensively capable of overpowering their opponents with strength. Other than Towns and Jackson, it’s hard to think of any examples of Western Conference forwards that Barnes could handle strength-wise that DeRozan cannot. Arguably Zion Williamson fits the description, but Barnes generally wasn’t able to handle him either (I’m not sure many players can 1 vs. 1). Focusing on the Western Conference, the vast majority of modern power forwards are really perimeter players or at best tertiary offensive threats. Towns, Jackson, Kevin Durant, Zion Williamson, Kawhi Leonard, Jalen Williams, Jerami Grant, and Draymond Green all largely play outside-in. Aaron Gordon, PJ Washington, Rui Hachimura, Jeremy Sochan, John Collins, and Jabari Smith aren't big enough offensive threats to really be a concern on the interior other than as lob threats. It’s just not a huge area of concern.

Of course, Barnes’ size would be theoretically more useful against centers than anything DeRozan has to offer, but if you watched the Kings last season for any significant amount of time, you’d be hard-pressed to find examples of Barnes meaningfully slowing down centers when switched on to them. The Kings were wholly dependent on Sabonis (and to a lesser extent Alex Len, Javale McGee, and Trey Lyles) to hold up against opposing centers.

Aside from size concerns (which were an issue with Barnes too), there isn’t much reason to think that the Kings are losing much on the defensive end.

From an advanced numbers perspective, DeRozan actually graded out comparably to Barnes as a defender. Per DunksandThrees.com, DeRozan posted a 50th percentile Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of -0.6, while Barnes ranked in the 49th percentile (DeRozan outperformed Barnes by this metric in 2021-22 and 2022-23 too, if you’re curious). The all-in defensive metric from Basketball Reference, Defensive Box Plus-Minus, also consistently prefers DeRozan to Barnes. In 2023-24, DeRozan posted a Defensive Box Plus-Minus rating of -0.3 compared to Barnes’ rating of -1.2, and DeRozan has rated better than Barnes each of the last five seasons under the metric. From an on/off points perspective, it also looks like close to a wash. Per Cleaning the Glass, the Kings were about 3.0 points per 100 possessions worse defensively with Barnes on the floor while the Bulls were actually better by about 0.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan on the floor. Even comparing their time at power forward tells a similar story: the Bulls gave up 116.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan at power forward compared to the Kings giving up 117.0 points per 100 possessions with Barnes at power forward.

The defensive counting stats tell the same basic story. Last year, DeRozan averaged 5.7 rebounds, 1.5 steals, and 0.8 blocks per 100 possessions. Barnes averaged 5.1 rebounds, 1.1 steals, and 0.2 blocks per 100 possessions. DeRozan’s steals and blocks rates have also been better than Barnes’ rates every year for the past five seasons, and DeRozan has posted better defensive rebounding rates than Barnes in three of the last five years, per Basketball Reference.

The other thing to consider is that the Kings’ defensive capabilities were based largely around improving their perimeter defense. Once Monk and Huerter went down, the Kings were forced to play Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell more often. The combination of Ellis, Keegan Murray, and De’Aaron Fox in particular performed exceptionally well in terms of perimeter defense, and helped elevate the Kings defense tremendously. Though the Kings finished 14th in defensive rating last season (114.4), they actually were 9th in the NBA after the All Star break (110.9) and ranked 6th over the last 15 games (108.8). Whether Barnes or DeRozan is at power forward isn’t going to materially affect the perimeter guys, and DeRozan’s offensive contributions may, in fact, let Fox focus more effort night-in and night-out on the defensive end.

Sacramento Is Still Going to Miss Harrison Barnes

As a quick aside, I want to acknowledge that losing Harrison Barnes, AKA the Black Falcon, is bittersweet. He’s been a pillar for the Kings for almost six years now, and he’s been super active in the Sacramento community during that time. I wish him the best in San Antonio and hope he can provide the same level of consistency, poise, professionalism, and leadership there that he provided the Kings as they grew throughout his tenure here. It’s going to be sad never seeing this group together again in the Kings uniform:

The Kings Still Have Ways to Fortify Their Roster Long-Term

If I had to guess, I would bet the Kings are probably done with major moves for this offseason. The rumor mill now has the Kings out on Brandon Ingram, which makes sense given his skillset largely overlaps with DeRozan. And at this point, it’s hard to bank on any of the rumored Lauri Markkanen, Kyle Kuzma, or Jerami Grant trades going down, as none of Utah, Washington, or Portland seems all that pressed to make a trade soon. But none of that means they have to be done, and I expect they’ll still look to make a deal at some point (it may have to wait until the season starts).

Let’s start with the trade assets perspective.

The Kings actually didn’t have to use much in the way of trade assets to execute the trade for DeRozan. They gave up a 2031 first round pick swap, but otherwise, all they really lost was Harrison Barnes (whose trade value didn’t seem to be enormous given the two years left on his contract), Duarte’s matching salary, and some cap space. For future trades, the Kings still have some potentially valuable players and draft capital.

On the player side, I feel comfortable saying that Fox, Sabonis, and Murray aren’t going anywhere, and DeRozan and Monk aren’t tradeable for at least six months (plus, having just signed new deals, it’s unlikely they’re going anywhere). That means that if the Kings are to pursue a potential starting level veteran, they’d likely have to put Kevin Huerter (and his $16.8 million salary) in any deal to get the salary matching to work. Huerter is only 25 years old, and though he had a down year last season, he’s a capable scorer and movement shooter. The Kings also have a few other players on the roster that could draw some trade interest, though they have some drawbacks. For example, Sacramento’s first round pick Devin Carter was highly regarded during the draft process, but he’s undergoing shoulder surgery and it’s not clear when he’ll be back playing. Still, the cost control over his contract is potentially very valuable. Keon Ellis similarly has an extremely valuable contract, as he’s shown strong defensive ability and he’s effectively locked up for two years at the minimum salary. Trey Lyles is a quality backup forward on a reasonable (but expiring) $8 million contract, and he could draw some interest as a result. Otherwise, the Kings roster is mostly back-end rotation guys whose biggest value in a trade would be for salary matching.

The draft pick situation is OK but far from pristine. The Kings owe a top 12 protected pick to the Hawks in 2025, the last payment on the Kevin Huerter trade from a couple years ago. If it doesn’t convey next year, it turns into a top 10 protected pick in 2026. The net result is that the Kings can’t actually trade away one of their first round draft picks until 2028 (the Stepien Rule prevents teams from trading away their first round pick in successive seasons). Because teams can also only deal picks seven years out, the most the Kings can offer in a deal today is two firsts (probably in 2028 and 2030, since they traded swap rights to the 2031 pick in to San Antonio as part of getting DeRozan). If the 2025 first ultimately conveys to the Hawks, the Kings will have more flexibility and could trade their 2026, 2028, 2030, and 2032 first rounders in theory (plus swaps in 2027 and 2029).

I’m not sure whether the Kings have the trade assets to seal a deal for an All Star caliber player like Markkanen right now (I’m going to ignore Ingram). Yes, the Jazz have strong incentives to trade him. They owe a top 10 protected to Oklahoma City, so they would benefit from tanking and securing a good pick in a strong draft class; Markkanen is already 27, but most of the Jazz’s core is either really young or not yet on the roster; Markkanen is about to get a huge pay raise from an ultra-affordable $18 million to closer to $45-50 million per year. But at the same time, there should be a competitive trade market for Markkanen’s services and the Jazz don’t need to make a decision right away. Markkanen hasn’t told Utah he wants to leave (he’s arguably indicated the opposite), and the Jazz have until August 6 to decide if they want to give him a raise and an extension, much like the Kings did with Sabonis last year. Alternatively, the Jazz could let Markkanen hit free agency and try to lure him back with Bird rights or try to execute a sign-and-trade then. But if the Kings can pull off a deal for Markkanen, I’m all for it! And if they can do it before Markannen gets a raise/extension, they might be able to get away with losing just Huerter from their current rotation.

One of the most important questions about trading for a guy like Markkanen besides the cost is how he would fit into the Kings’ salary cap. Fortunately, the Kings’ cap situation over the next few years is quite flexible, so they can afford to add a big money guy like Markkanen and still function. While the Kings are up against the salary cap and hard-capped at the first apron this year, things should get a bit better if the salary cap grows as expected (because the NBA’s massive new TV deals are expected to net roughly three times current revenues, it’s probably fair to assume the salary cap, luxury tax line, and aprons to go up by the maximum 10% per year for the next 4-5 years).

Looking at the Kings cap situation over the next five years, there’s clearly some breathing room below the luxury tax lines and the aprons in particular:

Adding a $40-50 million salary in 2025-26, like Markkanen should get, is absolutely feasible while staying below the luxury tax line. For example, say the Kings traded Huerter and picks for Markkanen this offseason and ultimately re-sign Markkanen for 2025-26 and beyond at a starting salary of $45 million in the first year. That would be roughly $27 million in added salary for the 2025-26 season once you account for Huerter’s salary coming off the books—less than the $30.8 million in room the Kings would have below the first apron. While they would be a taxpayer that season, they’d still be able to get below the tax in theory too. Of course, the Kings also have to consider that long-term deals for De’Aaron Fox and Keegan Murray will kick in during the 2026-27 season, assuming the team can get deals done. But there’s $106.4 million in breathing room below the luxury tax line at that point—even factoring in a big deal for Markkanen, they’d easily have over $55 million below the luxury tax that could go toward deals with Fox and Murray, and they could create more space by either trading away DeRozan in the last year of his deal or waiving him (DeRozan’s contract expires after the 2026-27 season, and it’s only partially guaranteed that year anyway).

The Kings could also target trades for players who aren’t quite as good as Markkanen, which may be possible with relatively few draft assets and Huerter’s contract as matching salary. Here’s a few of the other forwards who might be available and attractive:

• Kyle Kuzma (Wizards). Adding Kuzma would give the Kings even more scoring punch and a bit more size and rebounding in the front court. He’s also on a very reasonable $23.5 million contract that actually descends in value over the next three years, so he’d fit into the Kings cap sheet nicely. Kuzma isn’t known for his defense or outside shooting, though, so he’s not a perfect fit. The Kings will have to be wary about price—unless the Wizards come down a bit on their asking price, I’m not sure Kuzma makes the most sense.

• Jerami Grant (Blazers). Grant has a lot of similarities to Kuzma. He’s a solid offensive threat, and a better outside shooter than Kuzma, but he’s probably over-extended at his current volume. He also used to be a pretty strong defensive presence, though that’s waned in recent seasons as he’s taken on a bigger offensive load. The biggest difference between Kuzma and Grant, though, is the salary. While Kuzma is on a team-friendly deal, Grant is slated to make almost $30 million this season, and his salary is going up each of the following three years. The Kings wouldn’t be able to get Grant with just Huerter to match salaries—they’d need to staple other useful players to the deal such as Trey Lyles. That makes trading for Grant much less appealing. And like Washington, Portland’s asking price for Grant has been on the high side of expectation.

• Cam Johnson (Nets). Similar to Kuzma, Johnson provides some more size in the front court (with a bit less rebounding talent). Though Johnson isn’t quite the creative scorer that Kuzma is, he grades out as a slightly better defender and he’s a knock-down three point shooter. He’s also on a reasonable contract ($23.6 million this coming season) that the Kings could easily absorb. With the Nets re-setting after trading away Mikal Bridges, Johnson should be more readily obtainable than he would’ve been in the past.

• Dorian Finney-Smith (Nets). Finney-Smith is probably the most reliable defender out of this group, but he’s a bit older (age 31) and he’s not very versatile offensively, where he can basically hit threes at a respectable, though not elite, 35% clip. He’s on a really cheap contract at just $14.9 million, so it’s possible the Kings could even get him without sending out Huerter as a matching salary (Jalen McDaniels and another player would have to be involved to keep the Kings under the first apron hard cap).

• Grant Williams (Hornets). Williams is similar to Finney-Smith, but he’s younger and a bit shorter and bulkier. He’s been a bit more volatile in terms of his defensive performance, but he’s a better three point shooter too. He’s only getting paid $13 million this year and he’s locked up for three years.

Of course, there are plenty of other deals the Kings could pursue, but we’ll have to see what else comes up. They can (and in my view, should) continue to see if a big swing for Markkanen can get done, but if that doesn’t materialize, they have several less pricey options that they can pursue before the season starts, or even after.

Reacting to the Kings Draft & Free Agency

With the NBA draft done and the early wave of free agency now over, I wanted to take a quick look at how the Kings have done so far. They sowed up their biggest need early, but there’s been plethora of rumors about potential trades for months now. Those rumors may be warranted, as so far the Kings’ off-season has mostly been about positioning for potential transactions rather than actually making major changes from last season. Let’s check out what’s happened so far!

Key Transactions:

• Re-signed Malik Monk to a 4 year, $78 million contract

• Drafted point guard Devin Carter (Providence) in the first round (pick #13)

• Traded point guard Davion Mitchell, forward Sasha Vezenkov, and two second round picks (#45 this year and Portland’s second round pick in 2025) to the Toronto Raptors in exchange for forward Jalen McDaniels

• Re-signed Alex Len to a 1 year contract for the veteran’s minimum

Monk Comes Back, Answering the Biggest Question Early

The Kings wrapped up their most important piece of off-season business relatively early this year. Ten days before free agency even opened up, ESPN reported that sixth man Malik Monk would return to the team on a 4 year deal worth $78 million, the maximum offer that the Kings could make under the NBA’s CBA (the Kings held Monk’s Early Bird rights, a cap exception that allowed the team to offer Monk up to a 4 year contract with a starting salary of about $17.4 million—equal to 175% of Monk’s $9.95 million salary from last season—and 8% raises per year).

Keeping Monk was by far the Kings’ biggest priority for the off-season, as he’d clearly established himself as a core piece of the roster. Monk’s ability to score and create offense himself was critical for the Kings during the 2023 playoff series against the Warriors, and he’d elevated his play even further during the 2023-24 season by posting career highs in points per game (15.4) and assists per game (5.1). The Kings’ offensive struggles after Monk injured his knee in late March also made his value pretty obvious, as the team averaged just 111.3 points per game in its final 11 games (including two play-in games) despite a season average of 116.6 points per game. On top of that, had Monk left in free agency, the Kings would have had no obvious way of replacing Monk’s microwave scoring off the bench and ball-handling responsibilities. They would have been limited to the #13 draft pick and whatever they could find in free agency—where the team would’ve been limited to using the Non-taxpayer MLE (about $12.8 million) and the Bi-Annual exception (about $4.7 million)—to find replacement scoring.

Kings Snag Top-Tier Guard Depth In Draft

With Monk’s return secured, the Kings headed into the NBA Draft on June 25-26 with the flexibility to fill other needs. Going into the draft, my personal hope was that one of two players from my Five Favorites from this year’s draft might fall to the Kings at pick #13: forward Cody Williams (Colorado) or point guard Devin Carter (Providence). I fully expected both players to be off-the-board by the time the Kings’ pick came around. Fortunately, Carter made it down to pick #13 and the Kings snatched him up!

Although Williams probably would have fit the Kings’ positional needs a bit better (they desperately need help at forward), Devin Carter brings high-level defensive chops, superb length, and elite rebounding skills that should readily compliment De’Aaron Fox and Malik Monk in the Kings’ backcourt. He also showed a knack for scoring and improved three-point shooting in his final season at Providence, which the Kings will hopefully benefit from. I talked about Carter extensively in my Five Favorites post the other week, so I won’t dwell on his talent and fit, but I think he will be a tremendous addition to the Kings’ backcourt and I was happy to see the Kings scoop him up.

I also applaud the Kings decision to draft Carter over some of the younger prospects available, and certainly over reaching for a forward. Carter has the tools to contribute immediately at areas of need, and he’s got enough upside to warrant a high draft pick even though he’s already 22 years old. The younger guard prospects available—Jared McCain (whose game I like a lot), Ja’Kobe Walter, and Bub Carrington—weren’t necessarily better fits. McCain is a younger and a better shooter today than Carter, but he doesn’t have the same physical tools as Carter and lacks the same defensive prowess. With Monk back, Carter’s probably the better fit. Walter and Carrington, meanwhile, both have lots of potential, but it’s subject to a lot of projection. Walter profiles as a strong 3-and-D player, with strong physical tools and a clean stroke, but he didn’t shoot it well during his lone season at Baylor and has a ways to go to develop his handle. Bub Carrington is just 18 years old and did a fantastic job as a freshman in a lead-guard role at Pitt this year, but he’s still growing into his body, he’s not yet a floor spacer (he hit just 32% from three), and his long-term development depends on him having opportunities to play with the ball in his hands. With Fox, Monk, and Sabonis already on the roster, I’m not sure he was going to fit well with this Kings team.

At the same time, by the time the Kings #13 pick rolled around, the draft’s forward depth had already been largely depleted. Cody Williams, Ron Holland, Tidjane Salaun, and Matas Buzelis were already off the board (and I like Carter more as a prospect than several of them anyway). The Kings could’ve gone after older forwards with limited positional size and defensive question like Dalton Knecht, Tristan Da Silva, or Jaylon Tyson, but I’m not sure how that would’ve helped them more than Carter. DaRon Holmes (also one of my Five Favorites) would’ve been a stretch at pick 13. Same for high-potential prospects like Pacome Diadem.

Carter made sense as the pick to me, and I’m happy he fell to the Kings.

Drafting Carter Leads to Immediate Changes

Between re-signing Monk and drafting Carter, the Kings were looking at a team salary that would exceed the luxury tax line. In fact, the Kings were slated for just over $172.3 million in team salary at a minimum, before adding any depth to their front court. That would’ve been about $2.5 million over the NBA’s 2024 luxury tax line of $170.8 million. Obviously, that would' have bene a big deal because, as I’ve written before, luxury tax penalties can be onerous, and teams over the luxury tax aren’t eligible to receive luxury tax distributions from other teams, which can be worth more than $10 million per year. In addition, teams while teams below the luxury tax line can use the Non-taxpayer MLE of about $12.8 million to sign free agents, teams above the luxury tax line can only use the Taxpayer MLE worth under $5.2 million to sign free agents (there are other restrictions, too). Ultimately, getting under the tax line would save the Kings quite a bit of money and make it feasible to add more talent in free agency if they could find targets.

On top of the luxury tax issues, the Kings were staring at a potential log-jam in the backcourt. Presumably, the front office planned for Fox, Monk, Carter, and Ellis to be the main backcourt rotation following the draft, but the Kings also had several other guards returning in Davion Mitchell, Colby Jones, and Chris Duarte (and even though Kevin Huerter is 6’7”, he arguably plays more of a guard-style game).

To alleviate luxury tax concerns and make space for Devin Carter in the backcourt rotation, the Kings made a trade with the Raptors on the second night of the draft that can be accurately described as a “salary dump.” The Kings sent out Davion Mitchell (owed $6.5 million next season), Sasha Vezenkov (owed $6.7 million next season), the #45 pick in the 2024 draft, and a future 2025 second round pick from Portland to the Toronto Raptors in exchange for Jalen McDaniels (owed $4.7 million next season).

By making the deal, the Kings also saved a little under $8.5 million in salary, bringing their team salary number down to just under $164 million (including Devin Carter’s cap hold).

At the time of the deal, I understood the rationale pretty clearly. By drafting Devin Carter, the Kings added a guard who can play defense at a similar level to Davion Mitchell, but with more size, rebounding, and hopefully better offensive production and three-point shooting at a lower cost. Mitchell’s role was likely to shrink (again), and the Kings weren’t likely to bring him back after next season anyway. Similarly, Vezenkov reportedly was unhappy with his role in Sacramento, but his lack of athleticism and quickness on defense meant he wasn’t likely to ever be a significant rotation piece. Both guys were expendable. The cap savings also made it easy for the Kings to re-sign Alex Len at the veteran’s minimum to provide depth at center.

The Kings roster after the trade (and re-signing Len) looks a little more balanced, especially if Kevin Huerter, Chris Duarte, or Colby Jones can fill minutes at small forward:

For better or worse, getting off salary usually requires teams to give up something of value—usually draft picks—so it’s no surprise that the Kings had to give up a couple second rounders to get a small salary dump done. But the price here was a tad high given the Kings shed just under $8.5 million in salary.

Giving up pick #45 in the 2024 draft is fine, but the 2025 Portland second round pick could end up valuable. Portland’s second round pick this year landed at #33, and it’s not obvious they’re going to be much better next season. Jalen McDaniels also has some size and athleticism (he’s the older brother of star Timberwolves defender Jaden McDaniels), but he’s already 26 and just posted by far the worst season of his career, averaging just 3.4 points per game on terrible shooting splits (34.4% / 16.9% / 73.0%). For comparison, the Dallas Mavericks dumped about $11.9 million in salary from Tim Hardaway Jr., about 40% more salary than the Kings dumped, and gave up a 2025 Toronto second rounder plus two 2028 second round picks (Dallas also got Quentin Grimes back, who, like Jalen McDaniels, just posted a career worst season but could be useful in theory). These trades aren’t wildly disparate, but I do think the Kings could have found a way to keep Portland’s 2025 pick given they were already giving up a 2024 second rounder. Though it’s not the end of the world, keeping Portland’s pick would have been nice since the Kings owe a top-12 protected first round pick next year to Atlanta.

I’m also going to miss having Davion on the team in particular. Though his tenure with the Kings was up and down offensively, he brought intensity and effort on defense every time he stepped on the court. His lack of size limited the impact he could actually have defensively at times, but you never questioned his effort. In the right match ups, he was a force defensively—and his dogged effort against Steph Curry in the 2023 playoffs really put him on the map. I hope he can continue to develop his outside shooting to open things up on offense in Toronto. If he can do that, he can be an effective player, especially in a bench role.

What Can the Kings Do Next With the Cap “Flexibility”?

To date, the Kings haven’t made splashy moves with the cap space they created by dumping the salary for Mitchell and Vezenkov, though they did re-sign Len. Accounting for Len’s new deal and Carter’s cap hold, the Kings’ expected team salary should be about $166.1 million, still below the luxury tax line. As a result, the Kings will technically have the full Non-taxpayer MLE available to use to sign free agents if they want to, plus the smaller Bi-Annual exception. But at this point, the best-fitting free agency targets are pretty much all off the table. Some of my preferred free agency targets for the Kings—front court players who can shoot and/or defend reasonably well—have already agreed to deals with other teams:

• Obi Toppin agreed to a big 4 year, $60 million contract to return to the Pacers

• Naji Marshall agreed to a 3 year, $27 million deal with the Mavericks

• Nic Batum agreed to a 2 year, $9.6 million deal with the Clippers

• Jalen Smith signed a 3 year, $27 million contract with the Bulls

• Kelly Oubre signed a 2 year, $16.3 million contract to stay with the Sixers

• Kyle Anderson agreed to a 3 year, $27 million deal with the Warriors

At this point, the front-court free agency market is reed-thin. LeBron James was never actually going to leave LA, and the Kings didn’t have the money to sign him regardless. Miles Bridges is still floating around, but that’s because of off-the-court issues I wouldn’t want to bring into the team anyway. Saddiq Bey is coming off an ACL tear and likely won’t be ready to start next season. Caleb Martin and Haywood Highsmith could be decent fits as defensive wings (Martin more as a perimeter player, Highsmith with more ability to guard power forwards), but they’re probably not worth chasing for more than about $5-6 million per season. Isaac Okoro could be a solid addition in theory, but he’s a restricted free agent and the Cavs could match any offer the Kings extend to him. Simone Fontecchio is also a restricted free agent, but you’ve got to assume Detroit will match any remotely reasonable offer for him given they just traded for him last season.

The net result is that the Kings may not even want to use the Non-taxpayer MLE ($12.82 million) or the Bi-Annual exception ($4.7 million) to sign any of the remaining free agents because doing so would carry them over the luxury tax and hard-cap them at the first apron ($178.1 million). If the Kings use only the smaller Taxpayer MLE ($5.17 million) to add someone, they would only be hard-capped at the second apron ($188.9 million).

The Current Cap Picture

After accounting for drafting Devin Carter re-signing Malik Monk and Alex Len, the Kings will have 13 players on the NBA roster, with an obvious need for more firepower at the small forward and power forward positions.

• PG: De’Aaron Fox, Devin Carter

• SG: Kevin Huerter (SG/SF), Malik Monk, Keon Ellis, Chris Duarte, Colby Jones

• SF: Keegan Murray, Jalen McDaniels

• PF: Harrison Barnes, Trey Lyles

• C: Domantas Sabonis, Alex Len

With this roster, the Kings’ team salary should be just under $167 million when you account for Devin Carter’s expected rookie deal and the $1.3 million in likely incentives that Sabonis can earn in 2024. That’s well over the salary cap and about $3.8 million below the luxury tax line.

[Note that I’m using an estimated $5.63 million for Devin Carter’s salary because he hasn’t yet signed his rookie contract. The NBA has a “rookie scale” that sets salaries for each first round draft slot, but under the CBA, players can sign contracts for up to 120% of that amount—which they typically do (the rookie scale amount for pick #13 is $4.69 million, 120% of that is about $5.63 million). Regardless of what permissible first year salary you assign to Carter, the Kings will be well over the salary cap and safely below the luxury tax line.]

The Kings should also safely below the first apron and the second apron, but it’s a bit complicated. The NBA actually uses different accounting when calculating a team’s “apron salary,” as they require teams to account for even unlikely incentives too. Sabonis and Lyles have $2.5 million in possible unlikely incentives for 2024, so for apron salary purposes, the Kings number will be a tad higher at about $169.5 million. With the current roster, the team will have about $8.6 million of breathing room below the first apron and $19.4 million of room below the second apron.

I’ve tried to lay this all out in an eas(ier) to read chart below:

[Based on data from Spotrac]

Shedding the salaries for Davion Mitchell and Sasha Vezenkov (about $8.5 million salary in total) made sure the Kings were safely below the first apron line—if they hadn’t done that deal, there would be a real risk of the Kings exceeding the first apron. That would’ve prevented them from even having the option to use their Non-taxpayer MLE. It also would’ve brought the Kings closer to the second apron, which comes with additional restrictions.

What Can the Kings Do?

Since the Kings are safely below the first apron, they have some added lee-way to do transactions that might trigger the first apron hard cap, and even more safety to perform transactions that will trigger the second apron hard cap, both this year and going forward. The flexibility is most important when thinking about potential trades, especially if the Kings want to consider trading for some of the marquee names that might be on the market.

If the Kings want to take back more salary in a trade than they send out (which is permitted, subject to certain restrictions, under he NBA’s salary matching rules for trades), they would trigger a hard cap at the first apron—so having some breathing room there is important. This could be relevant for a couple potential trade targets in particular like Brandon Ingram, Kyle Kuzma, or Lauri Markannen.

Ingram will make just over $36 million this year, so the Kings would probably need to trade away both Harrison Barnes ($18 million) and Kevin Huerter ($16.8 million) to make the salary matching work, in addition to whatever draft capital they might send out. Even then, the Kings would be taking back about $1.2 million more salary then they send out, which would trigger the hard cap at the first apron. Having some breathing room makes that feasible—if the Kings were instead right up against the first apron hard cap, the trade would probably need to involve another player (such as Chris Duarte), which would complicate things further.

Kuzma’s salary is $23.5 million. Under the NBA’s trade salary matching rules, the Kings could theoretically send just Kevin Huerter plus draft capital and make the deal work. The Kings would take back an extra $6.7 million in salary (the difference between Kuzma’s salary and Huerter’s salary for next year) and trigger the first apron hard cap, but they could absorb the difference into the $8.6 million in space they have below the first apron.

Markannen will make just over $18 million this season. Sending out Huerter or Barnes plus picks is feasible given the Kings have room below the first apron hard cap. While it’s hard to imagine the Kings winning the bidding war for Markannen (the Jazz’s asking price seems wild at the moment), he’s going to be a free agent at the end of the year and I can see why the Kings want to maintain the ability to deal for him if the price changes over the course of the year.

Other potential trade targets with bigger salaries like Zach Lavine (personally not interested) and Jimmy Butler (very skeptical he moves) would also only be realistically possible if the Kings stay far enough below the first apron to take back more salary than they send out. Lavine will make $43 million this year and Butler will make $48.8 million, but it’s going to be tough for the Kings to get to that kind of outgoing salary—especially if they were already up against the first apron. Barnes + Huerter gets you to about $34.8 million, but the Kings would need to add players like Lyles ($8 million) and/or Duarte ($5.9 million) if they wanted to get high enough to not take back more salary than they send out.

For this off-season and through the upcoming season, the Kings are far enough below the second apron that it probably won’t affect them much. That means they can aggregate salaries in trade, trade cash, and use the Taxpayer MLE if they want to (including during the season). The second apron will eventually become a concern if/when De’Aaron Fox signs a new deal and Keegan Murray gets extended, but they’re pretty safely away from it for now.

What’s Next?

In the short term, I am hoping the Kings find a way to snag some depth at forward in free agency. I’m not looking for them to sign a big name (at this point, there aren’t really any), just someone who can help shore up the rotation behind Keegan Murray and Harrison Barnes, even if they’re coming in at the veteran’s minimum. If you’re curious, here are some names that interest me from who’s left:

• Probably Too Pricey:

  • Isaac Okoro

  • Precious Achiuwa

  • Simone Fontecchio

  • Caleb Martin

• More Realistic Targets:

  • Haywood Highsmith

  • Reggie Bullock

  • Robert Covington

  • Cedi Osman

  • Oshae Brissett

• Maybe They’ve Got Something Left?

  • Jae Crowder

  • Gordon Hayward

  • Markieff Morris

There are a number of trade targets, too. The big names are obvious, but the ones I’d be most excited about—assuming the Kings don’t need to wildly over-pay to get them (a big assumption)—are below:

• Probably Too Pricey:

  • Lauri Markannen (anything short of Keegan seems palatable)

  • Jimmy Butler (he’s not actually moving)

• More Realistic Targets:

  • Brandon Ingram (not my favorite fit and may be better slotted in the “too pricey” category)

  • Kyle Kuzma (two firsts seems like too much?)

  • Jerami Grant (two firsts seems like definitely too much given his contract)

  • Bobby Portis (maybe Milwaukee would move him? I’m skeptical—same thing for Brook Lopez)

  • De’Andre Hunter (probably not available)

  • Tari Eason (sadly, the Rockets ain’t giving him up)

• Smaller Swings, But Do They Move the Needle?

  • Dorian Finney-Smith

  • Cam Johnson

  • Grant Williams

You’ll notice I didn’t list a couple names, most notably Zach Lavine and Demar Derozan. Both Bulls players have been in a lot of rumors lately, and some folks would like the Kings to trade for them. I’m not as interested in Lavine particularly.

Lavine’s contract is too big for his availability and production, plus his skillset overlaps too much with Fox, Monk, and now Devin Carter to make him the highest use of cap space and trade capital. If the team has any concerns about the first or second apron being a hindrance to future deals, Lavine’s contract is going to be an issue. You can swallow that kind of deal for someone like Markannen, who fits a clear need role and is younger and less injury prone, but it’s tough to do for Lavine.

Derozan’s fit would be better since he’s a bit bigger and can (I think?) slot in at small forward in some line-ups. Plus, Derozan’s end of game shot creation in particular is incredibly valuable. But he’ll be 35 at the start of next season, he’s never been a prolific three point shooter, and his defense isn’t particularly notable at this point in his career. He could be a value add to the Kings even with Monk and Fox, though, and because he’d probably only be available in a sign-and-trade, it’s possible he might come cheaply. I’d be happy to add Derozan in a sign-and-trade if he signs a 2-3 year deal worth about $20 million per season, so long as the Kings don’t have to give up a ton to get him (perhaps Huerter and second round draft capital).

That’s it for now! We’ll have to wait and see what the Kings do next—I’m certainly eager to know. Thanks for reading!

Five Favorites: 2024 NBA Draft

I’ve been out on vacation so I’m sorry this post is a bit delayed. But with the NBA Draft coming up on June 26, it’s about time to talk about some of the prospects I’m interested in ahead of draft night.

The 2024 NBA Draft class has been panned as relatively weak compared to prior years, but a lot of that criticism is really pointed toward the top of the draft. In general, draft observers don’t seem to think there’s much in the way of clear All-Star level talent and there really isn’t consensus on who the top players even are. Forward Zaccharie Risacher (JL Bourg) and center Alex Sarr (Perth Wildcats) seem to top most big boards, but you’ll also see Stephon Castle (UConn), Donovan Clingan (UConn), Reed Sheppard (Kentucky), and even Nikola Topic (Mega) near the top of some rankings. G League Ignite prospects Ron Holland and Matas Buzelis have even spent time atop the rankings.

The lack of clarity at the top of the draft makes for some interesting potential draft scenarios. Without consensus around who the best players are, it’s likely we’ll see teams with really substantially different draft boards. That can always be the case of course, but in a year where projection and preferences for particular skills will likely trump pure talent, it’s much more likely. Combine that with the fact that some teams will value traits or potential upside while others will try to find established players with a definite NBA skill that can contribute immediately, and we may see a fair number of trades on draft night as teams get a feel for how the rest of the league views the draft class.

Still, the lack of obvious high-end talent doesn’t mean there won’t be quality players available, particularly for teams looking to fill specific roles. The dearth of clear future All-Stars is a big concern for teams that in the rebuilding phase who are near the top of the draft—for example, the Wizards and Hornets probably just need to stack talent—but teams that are looking to supplement their rosters or fill particular needs to support a playoff push can still find those players. For example, teams like the Rockets, Grizzlies, Thunder, Bulls, and Kings all have lottery picks, but they’re (mostly) not so desperate for talent that they need to take big swings on high-upside players. Instead, most of those teams probably will (and probably should) focus on bolstering their existing cores with players who bring specific skills they need on cost-controlled rookie contracts.

With all that said, I want to talk about five players from this draft that I’m high on. These aren’t necessarily the “best” players in the draft, rather they’re players that I’ve come to like a lot relative to how they’re being discussed. Some of these guys bring high upside while others will fill important roles even if they never become stars—something that’s more and more as the 2023 CBA rules kick in and encourage teams to focus on rounding out their rosters with cheaper role players.

Let’s get started!

Stephon Castle (PG/SG, UConn)

Expected Draft Range: #2 to #8

I’m not certain Stephon Castle is the highest ceiling player in this year’s draft, but if you asked me to bet on one player to be high-level contributor in the NBA, he’s the guy I’m picking. At just 19 years old, Castle helped lead the UConn Huskies through a dominating National Title run this past March as a freshman. Not only is he a reliable contributor with a varied skillset, he’s a top-tier competitor who's willing to embrace all challenges leaps off the screen when you watch him play. He may not be a perfect prospect, but I’ll take a guy like Castle who works his tail off and stays attuned the details any day of the week.

What Caught My Eye: Competitiveness on Defense

While Castle wasn’t necessarily UConn’s best player or even its most important defender (both honors probably go to Donovan Clingan), Castle quickly established himself as a strong defensive presence during his lone season at UConn. At 6’6” (with a 6’9” wingspan) and 210 pounds, he has the size, strength, and length to guard a huge range of perimeter players, and he’s also got solid quickness and athleticism for his size.

The physical tools are apparent when you watch Castle play, but his competitiveness really stands out. Even on a UConn team chock full of quality defenders, Castle stood out for his effort on the perimeter. That was apparent than in UConn’s championship game against Purdue, where Castle basically ran a 1-man full court press against Purdue point guards for the entire game (except a stretch in the first where Castle instead was tasked with guarding Purdue’s starting power forward). Seriously, go back and watch the game—Castle was picking up defensively at 75 feet after every made basket. By the time the second half rolled around, Purdue’s guards could barely initiate their offense until 15 seconds had run off the shot clock. Castle’s dogged effort helped the Huskies hold Purdue’s starting backcourt to just 6-20 shooting (30%), paving the way for an easy Connecticut win despite a stand-out performance by All-American center Zach Edey.

Castle isn’t yet a perfect defensive player, but you can see his want-to and consistent effort all over the tape. He does a great job of staying in front of drivers and using his hands to slow movement without fouling too much. He consistently keeps his hands up on-ball to contest passing lanes. He routinely makes second efforts to contest shots and does a great job with verticality, using his length to bother shooters without risking fouling. He also will anticipate passes to create turnovers and get out in transition, though this something I’d like to see him do a bit more often. Check out the quick cut up below for some examples:

The areas Castle needs to improve on defensively are also relatively minor. The only substantial “concern” is that Castle didn’t quite have the steals numbers you’d expect from a player of his defensive caliber (just 0.8 steals per game). He also will need to refine some aspects of his positioning defensively. He can occasionally lose sight of screeners, which can result in him sometimes getting caught on screens he’s athletic enough to avoid. He also can sometimes get too vertical in his stance, forcing him to lose out on a first step and recover. He’s not as consistent about keeping his hands up in passing lanes when guarding off-ball. But these are nit-picky points, and areas he can certainly improve upon as a pro. The key is that Castle’s defensive effort was consistent, obvious, and critical to his team’s success.

I see a bit of Marcus Smart at Oklahoma State in Castle’s defensive style (physical strength with long arms) and consistent effort. If Castle can turn his effort and relentlessness on defense into the type of high-level defense that Smart displayed in Boston, he’s going to have a long career in the league.

Offensive Development Will Set the Ceiling

I don’t worry about Castle on defense given his college track record, but whether he turns into a high-level starter or future All-Star will turn based on whether he can continue to develop offensively. Castle played mostly a secondary offensive role for UConn last season, as his 11.1 points and 2.9 assists per game ranked fifth and third on the team respectively. Still, Castle flashed a lot of upside in a variety of ways, and there’s no question in my mind that he has the tools to develop into a solid down-hill scorer and secondary playmaker (it’s possible he’ll eventually become a primary ball handler, but I think that may be a stretch).

Castle’s best offensive weapon is his ability to get into the paint and finish, where his size and strength allows him to finish at and around the rim in a bunch of different ways. When he drives, Castle does a great job of getting all the way to the rim, and he’s strong enough to consistently finish through contact. He can also hit runners when he needs to, and he’s shown some ability to finish with floaters, baby-hooks, and up-and-unders when needed. You’ll often see Castle attack defenders aggressively off the dribble, and he can go to both to his strong-hand and weak-hand side, though he has a tendency to go back to his right hand when trying to finish. But he has shown the ability to stop and pop going left and spin back into half-hooks, though, so he isn’t without options if defenders cut off his strong hand.

Unlike most 19 year olds, Castle effectively recognizes how to play to his strengths. I already mentioned his ability to drive the lane, but he also creates paint touches by weaving in frequent basket cuts and by getting out quickly into transition. In those situations, Castle is able to capitalize on his strong finishing at the rim lets to get easy opportunities. His willingness to cut also contributes to his offensive rebounding rate of 7.8% per Sports Reference, outstanding for a guard, and creates opportunities for him to get to the free throw line, where he took a respectable 7.3 free throw attempts per 100 possessions and hit over 75% his attempts. I also like that Castle will, at times, look to take advantage of his physical size by posting up smaller players. He’s comfortable playing with his back to the basket and can dribble or pass out of the mid-post effectively, which is uncommon for young guards.

I also love that, despite never being the primary offensive option at UConn, Castle bought into the system fully and never become a sticking point offensively. A lot of young guards tend to hold the ball too long, as they’re used to being the central offensive player—but that’s not Castle. He’s a willing passer who gets off the ball quickly, even if the pass isn’t likely to lead to a direct scoring opportunity. He also has good vision, consistently finding open cutters and three point shooters, and even flashing the ability to make some creative passes in traffic or off of dribble-drives. He didn’t run a ton of pick and rolls at UConn, but you can see flashes of his talent there too, as he looks to find good angles to get the ball into rolling bigs. Castle’s passing is going to be effectively early in an off-ball role, but if he can continue to develop his passing skills and court vision, he’s got a chance to reach much higher levels as a player. Since Castle is focusing on playing point guard in the NBA, developing those skills is going to be critical.

The biggest question mark I have for Castle offensively is whether he’s ever going to develop a credible outside jumper. Though he’s far from a finished product as a shooter, he hit just under 27% of his threes on a low volume of 4.9 attempts per 100 possessions. That’s not going to cut it, and NBA teams will sag off of him aggressively and gum up the interior if he can’t improve his outside shooting. He’ll also struggle with attracting enough attention during ball screens/pick and rolls if he can’t be a threat to score outside. With that said, Castle’s form isn’t broken and his solid free throw shooting gives some hope that he’ll be able to make strides and become at least an average outside shooter in time.

Ultimately, Castle’s defensive talent and physical traits are going to ensure he’s a high lottery pick and ensure he gets playing time early on in his career. He’s also already got enough offensive talent to find ways to be a solid contributor on that end for years to come. But if Castle can continue to build on his passing game, improve his outside shooting, and tighten his handle, he’s got a good chance to become an effective scorer and playmaker. Lead guard potential is definitely there. And if Castle can find a way to marry his downhill attack skills with plus outside shooting, his ceiling is as high as anyone else’s in the draft.

Devin Carter (PG/SG, Providence)

Expected Draft Range: #8 to to #15

Devin Carter (age 22) is a 6’3”, 193 pound point guard from Providence and the son of former NBA player Anthony Carter. Despite having relatively little height for a guard, Carter has really long arms that give him a tremendous 6’9” wingspan. He’s also a premier athlete, even amongst NBA prospects—he posted a 42” max vertical jump (including a 35” standing vertical jump) and a 2.87 second 3/4-court sprint, all of which led all participants in the 2024 NBA Combine. Carter won Big East Player of the Year this past season and has a ton of quality playing experience; plus, he’s made major strides in virtually every facet of his game during his three seasons in college (first at South Carolina, before he transferred to Providence for his sophomore and junior seasons).

What Caught My Eye: Elite Defense

You may be able to sense a bit of a theme in what I like to see traits-wise between Castle and Carter. They’re both absolute dogs on defense, and they will compete hard on every possession regardless of what’s happening on the offensive side of the court. They both also have the physical traits to hold up on the defensive end as players get bigger, faster, and stronger moving up to the NBA game. For most draft prospects (few of whom profile as potential All-Stars), defense and physical traits are really critical as they can be brought to bear immediately. Few teams are going to give rookies the freedom to dominate the ball offensively unless (A) the rookie profiles as a future All Star and/or (B) the team isn’t trying to compete.

Even though he’s not quite as big and strong as Stephon Castle, Carter still looks the part of a stellar perimeter defender, especially against guards. Though he’s only 6’3”, Carter’s incredible wingspan helps make him a tremendous contributor defensively. Most notably, he’s an elite rebounder for a guard, averaging over 14 rebounds per 100 possessions last year with a staggering 23.7% defensive rebounding rate, tops in the entire Big East per Sports Reference (Carter was 10th in the conference in rebounding rate overall). On top of the rebounding, Carter generates a ton of steals and blocks despite his smaller stature. Across his entire collegiate career, Carter has averaged 3 steals and 1.6 blocks per 100 possessions, outstanding figures for any player—much less a smaller guard.

Carter has very good lateral agility and moves his feet well, but what sets him apart as an on-ball defender is his anticipation and recovery. He does a fantastic job of navigating screens, identifying when opposing players are looking to shoot, and finding his way into passing lanes. A huge portion of Carter’s “stocks” (steals and blocks) happen as a result of his elite anticipation, high-level athleticism, and unexpected length—he seems to regularly get near balls that offensive players don’t anticipate him getting to. Take a look at a few examples below:

Carter’s defense is going to be his calling card in the NBA and will be the skill that gets him time on the court early. He’s got great instincts, timing, and anticipation, plus the physical tools to match up better with NBA guards than recent defensive-oriented point guards like Davion Mitchell and Tre Jones.

How Real Is the Shot?

Carter averaged 19.7 points per game last year for the Friars as a junior. He’s got the ability to score in a variety of different ways despite not necessarily having a single offensive skill that is dominant. He does a good job of touching the paint regularly, and when he gets in the lane he can score with either hand and off one or two feet, which will give him good flexibility against NBA defenders. He also took advantage of his high usage rate by getting to the line frequently (he averaged 9.2 free throws per 100 possessions for his collegiate career) and hits them at a solid rate.

But Carter’s offensive explosion this past season was driven principally by a dramatic increase in his long-range shooting. As a freshman, Carter hit 26.7% of his threes on 5.9 attempts per 100 possessions. That improved slightly his sophomore year, where he shot 29.9% from three on 6.5 attempts per 100 possessions. This last season, though, Carter’s average jumped all the way to 37.7% on 11.2 attempts per 100 possessions, a dramatic increase. That kind of jump isn’t unprecedented, but it’s definitely notable—especially when considering Carter’s shooting mechanics are a bit unorthodox. Still, throw on any game from the 2023-24 season and you’ll regularly see Carter pulling from distance, sometimes as a spot up shooter but often off the dribble. It’s hard to be the primary offensive option and still take/make so many threes from a variety of floor positions as well as off the dribble, and Carter did so reliably this past year. I’m inclined to buy the improvement as real, but that’s really the key question.

If Carter’s three point shooting is real, he’s going to have an immediate role for NBA teams as a 3-and-D option. Given his age and experience, I don’t see Carter as having the same offensive ceiling as Stephon Castle—he’s has fewer tools for finishing around the rim given his lack of size, and Carter’s playmaking for others doesn’t stand out as much. But Carter’s shown, for at least a year, that he can be a real threat to score on the perimeter, which is incredibly valuable for someone with his defensive talents. I’d love to see Carter paired with a reliable shot-creator so that he can really develop into an elite 3-and-D guard in the mold of Derrick White.

Cody Williams (SF, Colorado)

Expected Draft Range: #5 to #15

Of the players in my Five Favorites, Cody Williams’ NBA future probably involves the most projection. The younger brother of Oklahoma City star Jalen Williams, Cody played just one season for the Colorado Buffaloes before opting to enter the NBA draft. He played in just 24 games as a freshman this season due to several injuries (including wrist and ankle injuries and a fractured orbital bone), and his numbers when he played were a bit of a mixed bag. Williams averaged just 11.9 points, 3.0 rebounds, and 1.6 assists per game, and he turned the ball over too often at an average of 2.0 times per game. But his shooting numbers were well above average, though they came on limited volume—Williams shot 55.2% from the field (16.5 field goal attempts per 100 possessions) and 41.5% from three (3.5 three point attempts per 100 possessions); he shot a more lackluster 71.4% from the free throw line (6.6 free throw attempts per 100 possessions).

Physically, Williams has some pretty interesting traits, although he will need to continue to add strength and bulk to be most effective. At 6’7”, Cody is a bit taller than older brother Jalen, and he also has an impressive wingspan just like his brother (7’1” for Cody versus 7’2” for Jalen). But while Jalen came into the league weighing almost 210 pounds, Cody still has a long way to go to bulk up—he weighed just under 180 pounds at the NBA Combine, quite light for someone his height. Of course, Cody is only 19 years old (Jalen was 21 when he was drafted), so it’s fair to expect the younger Williams brother to add weight and strength after joining the NBA. Cody Williams also showed solid-but-not spectacular athleticism numbers at the combine, notably posting a top-10 time for the 3/4 court sprint and a respectable max vertical of 35”. The jumping numbers in particular could improve as he adds strength, but at his height and with his length, he doesn’t need to improve much. While Cody may never boast the same strength and bulk as older brother Jalen, there’s no real question that Jalen has the physical tools to play at the NBA level. If Cody can develop enough physically to be in the same ballpark as his brother, which I think is likely, he’s going to have more than adequate physical tools to succeed in the NBA.

What Caught My Eye: Amazing Touch

As a true freshman, Cody Williams didn’t always stand out on the court. His defense was generally respectable, but it’s obvious he needs to add strength. And while his offense numbers were decent, they didn’t stand out. He was more of a facilitator and secondary option for Colorado than a pillar of their offensive sets. But Williams showed flashes of high-level NBA talent working around the rim and in the paint, especially before he suffered his several injuries.

Take a look at the wide variety of finishing moves that Williams has in the clip below:

Williams has a bag around the rim, with floaters, half hooks, and scoop shots to get up quality looks even when he can’t quite get to the rim. These are tough shots that most guys don’t even attempt. Williams tries them regularly, and he still managed to hit nearly 59% of his two point shots during an injury-plauged season. That’s seriously impressive stuff that you don’t often see, especially when you consider how much strength he’s giving up at this stage of his career. It also seems repeatable at the NBA level. While Williams will need to add strength to get past NBA defenders, if/when that strength comes, he’s going to have enough size and length to get these kinds of looks even against NBA wings—there just aren’t many guys who can keep up with wing players and contest shots against a 6’7” wing player with great length like Williams.

Jalen Williams entered the NBA a stronger player and better playmaker than Cody will, but we can’t forget Cody’s just 19. If he can develop at all as a ball-handler and push up his three point volume (while maintaining a respectable percentage), he’s going to be able to generate looks going toward the rim—and with his finishing touch, he’s a good bet to be an effective scorer.

Can Williams Be a Playmaker?

Williams has a solid feel for the game, but right now his playmaking is ability is still quite limited. That’s generally not a huge deal for a young, developing wing player, but it would be nice to see Williams improve his court vision and ball-handling skills sooner than later. Last season, he posted an assist-to-turnover ratio below 1.0, which is pretty poor even for a pure wing. Better play-making would substantially improve Williams’ overall offensive value and likely open up scoring lanes for him as well.

Williams does flash the ability to pass effectively. In transition and when in the open-court, he does a good job of keeping his head up when advancing via the dribble, so he can make some nice hit-ahead passes to rim-runners or shooters in the corner. In the few occasions where he was the pick and roll ball handler, he was able to keep his eyes up pretty well for some nice passes to the roller or a weak side cutter. If he can make those types of reads more consistently and avoid turnovers, it’s possible he could become a solid secondary playmaker.

Ultimately, the most likely scenario is that Williams turns into a third or fourth option on the wing, so he’s not likely to have the ball in his hands incredibly frequently. That kind of role would mitigate any concerns about his lack of elite play-making ability, but if he’s truly going to hit his ceiling, he needs to have effective alternatives for when teams cut off his scoring opportunities.

Developing Strength Will Maximize the Defense

Based on his physical traits, you’d like to project Williams as a solid wing defender in time (his brother has certainly turned similar physical traits into plus perimeter defense in OKC). As expected, Cody’s length lets him contest shots even when he’s out of position, and he posted a respectable block rate of 2.4% last year. He also shows good lateral agility and the ability to mirror and slide with wings and most guards. Unfortunately, the lack of strength is a real issue. I hate to sound like a broken record, but unless and until Cody Williams can add weight and strength, he’s not going to live up to his defensive potential in the NBA. It’s far too easy for players to get into Williams’ chest and bump him off his spot, and there are a number of guards and wings in the NBA who are going to exploit that weakness routinely. Plus, until he bulks up, Williams is going to be extremely over-matched against NBA power forwards, which will prevent teams from taking advantage of the positional versatility his height might otherwise offer.

The lack of strength also hurts Williams enormously on the glass. He pulled down just 2.3 rebounds per game, which is poor for a forward, much less one with a 7’1” wingspan (Devin Carter averaged more than 3 times as many rebounds at just 6’3, for reference). That kind of poor rebounding is borderline unacceptable for an NBA wing, so Williams will have to find a way to address it.

If Williams had shown more aggression and physicality on defense during the season, I’d be very comfortable penciling him in as a plus defender. But unfortunately he didn’t always do that, so his defensive projection depends heavily on whether he can build up his physical strength. If he gets stronger, you see enough other defensive traits on tape (length, movement skills, and awareness) that you can imagine him becoming a plus perimeter defender.

Jared McCain (PG/SG, Duke)

Expected Draft Range: #10 to #20

As a freshman, Jared McCain played a central role for a quality Duke team, averaging 14.3 points, 5.0 rebounds, 1.9 assists, and 1.1 steals with high-level shooting splits (46.2% from the field / 41.1% from three / 88.5% from the free throw line) and just 1.3 turnovers per game. At 6’2” (without shoes) and 203 pounds, he’s got adequate size if he can play point guard, but he would be undersized if he’s really a shooting guard. His wingspan isn’t ideal at just 6’3.5”, but he has a respectable 8’2” standing reach.

While McCain is projected to go in the late lottery or shortly afterward, his position, production, on-court strengths/weaknesses, shooting, age, and physical traits look eerily similar to Kentucky guard Reed Sheppard, who is expected to go in the top 5. Sheppard is a better passer, a bit bouncier, and generated more STOCKs than McCain, but it wouldn’t shock me if McCain ends up the better value given his likely draft position.

What Caught My Eye: Shooting, Shooting, Shooting

McCain’s shooting is really what sets him apart from most other prospects—other than Sheppard, you’d be hard pressed to find as good of a shooter in this year’s draft. McCain hit over 41% from three last season on high volume (11.0 three point attempts per 100 possessions). It’s basically impossible for a starter to reach that kind of three point volume without taking some tough threes, and McCain didn’t disappoint in that respect—throw on almost any Duke game from last season and you’ll see McCain hitting an assortment of difficult threes off movement, in transition, and off the dribble. Check out the clip below, you’ll see McCain hit just about every kind of three imaginable, including in high-leverage situations:

That kind of shooting talent can really stretch a defense. You see defenders routinely panic and rush at McCain, and the gravity his three point shot creates is key to McCain’s ability to win off the dribble. He doesn’t have the quickest first step around and he’s not an Uber-athlete, so McCain has to leverage close-outs to consistently beat defenders to the paint. He’s pretty good at that, and he deploys several different finishes off two feet to help mitigate his size limitations.

Can He Be More Than a Scorer?

As with other small guards in the draft class like Reed Sheppard and Rob Dillignham, it would be unfair to expect McCain to develop into a force defensively given his lack of length, size, or top tier athleticism. But I think McCain nonetheless has a good chance to be a competent NBA defender if he can work on his foot speed and anticipation. At 203 pounds, McCain is actually a lot sturdier than most guards his size—he’s strong and doesn’t shy away from contact. He also plays sound defense in general. He communicates, slides his feet, sees man and ball, plays passing lanes, and has a good feel when to help off his responsibility. He tends to get a little too upright at times and can do a better job navigating screens, but those things are teachable things. Although McCain’s probably never going have the quickness to match up well with speedy point guards like Ja Morant or De’Aaron Fox, if he can pair his elite shooting with even slightly above average defense, he’s going to have a long career.

Another way for McCain to secure a place in NBA rotations would be to develop himself more as a traditional point guard. I’m not convinced that’s his natural position, but he’ll get more time on the floor if he can take on secondary ball-handling and playmaking duties like an Andrew Nembhard or Reggie Jackson (or at least be good enough to play a backup role). McCain wasn’t asked to run the offense frequently at Duke—Jeremy Roach and Tyrese Proctor handled much more of that responsibility—instead, he was given more of a scoring and spacing role. Whether that was because McCain isn’t good at handling point guard duties or because Duke preferred to have him in an off-ball role given his shooting isn’t clear, but either way, McCain needs to show more. 1.9 assists per game isn’t going to cut it for him at the NBA level, even if he maintains low turnover rate. The good news is that you can find instances of McCain making good reads off of screens and hitting tight-window pocket passes, and he does a good job of keeping his head up in the half-court to find cutters, so there’s no doubt he has tools to develop. He’ll just need to do it.

DaRon Holmes II

Expected Draft Range: #15 to #30

DaRon Holmes II (age 21), a center from Dayton, started 102 games for the Flyers over his three college seasons.  Last year, Holmes’ statistical production reached elite levels as averaged 20.4 points, 8.5 rebounds, 2.6 assists, and 2.1 blocks per game—nice numbers for anyone even though Dayton was in a relatively weak conference.  Like most bigs, Holmes put up strong shooting numbers from two-point range, hitting 58.5% of those shots (61.4% for his career).  He also showed he can step out and hit threes, where he shot 38.6% on about 2.5 attempts per game.  If the three-point shooting is sticks, he fills a role that many NBA teams covet: a floor-spacing big who can protect the basket and rebound.

Though Holmes played the vast majority of his minutes at center, he’s on the smaller side for the position at the NBA level.  At 6’9” with a 7’1” wingspan, he lacks the height and length of first round center prospects like Donovan Clingan and Zach Edey (who are admittedly gigantic), as well as guys with more traditional center size like Kel’el Ware and Yves Missi.  Holmes’ build is actually closer to that of a taller power forward, similar to prospects like Tidjane Salaun and Tyler Smith.  Holmes is bulkier than those guys, weighing in at 235+ pounds, but he’s also older than them so he’s had more time to develop.  As a result, Holmes may need to show some positional flexibility to maximize his value in the NBA.  With that said, he can play rotational/backup center minutes now, and if he can survive at the power forward position, he has the tools to have a long, successful career. 

What Caught My Eye:  Rare Combo of Size, Skill, and Movement

I’m not sure that Holmes has a single attribute that leaps out when you watch him play, but if you throw on footage of his game, it’s hard to miss his nice blend of good size, skill in all facets of offense, and his ability to move smoothly around the court.  Holmes has the post-up skills of a traditional big man from the 90s or early 2000s, but he’s also a natural pick-and-pop shooter, too.  He also has a pretty good handle for a big guy, so he can attack aggressive close-outs off the dribble, get into the paint, and finish over rotating defenders.  You even see him blend in step-back jumpers, push the ball in transition, and run inverted pick and rolls.  He’s also a good passer with solid court vision.  He gets the ball out to shooters and cutters out of double-teams and he’s even shown that he can make nice passes when playing in the high-post and at the top of the key, which lots of big men struggle with.  Seriously—check out the clip below, you see him do a bit of everything:

Holmes is a big man with guard skills rather than a guard in a big man’s body, but that versatility is still incredibly valuable.  He doesn’t need to win any one way, which will make it hard for defenses to ignore him even though he won’t have a discrete offensive advantage nightly.  Plus, Holmes absolutely has enough size, shot-blocking, and rebounding potential to be useful even if he’s not a primary or secondary offensive threat.

You just don’t see a ton of guys with this blend of size, skill, and movement ability—typically at least one of those areas is lacking for prospects—so when you do, you notice.  That said, most high-level NBA prospects (like guys who go in the lottery) either have at least one skill that they can win with regularly at the NBA level or are young and have a ton of upside.  Holmes doesn’t necessarily fit that mold.  It’s possible his outside shooting will become the skill that gives him an “NBA edge” if he can sustain hitting nearly 40% of threes at the NBA level, but he’s only hit threes at that rate once and his 71% free throw percentage is a little bit of a concern.  And at 21, it’s hard to confidently project Holmes for a ton of physical development—he’s not at his ceiling, but teams can’t reasonably expect him to grow as much as younger prospects like Tidjane Salaun.

Can He Handle NBA Forwards?

In today’s NBA, teams roll out a fair number of smaller power forwards who either attack defenses outside-in, like Julius Randle and Paolo Banchero, or are real threats to score on the perimeter, like Lauri Markannen and Jaren Jackson.  Whether Holmes can defend those kinds of players—most of whom are going to be faster than Holmes and stronger than guys he played in college—is going to be a critical question for his ceiling in the NBA.

Holmes played very good defense at Dayton, but that as a center and his size limitations weren’t a big issue in the Atlantic 10.  There’s a lot of great tape of Holmes swatting soft interior shots from smaller players left and right—those kinds of plays made up a huge portion of his rim protection.  While he should be able to block shots at the NBA level, it’s not going to be as easy for him and he won’t be able to take as many chances.  Against A-10 competition, Holmes’ tendency to hunt blocks and get jumpy didn’t hurt him too much, as he could usually recover and at least get off a good contest.  Guarding NBA power forwards, those habits are going to be a problem—biting on pump fakes, losing defensive leverage, and getting too high in his defensive stance is going to lead to a lot of fouls, missed rebounding opportunities, and blown assignments.  While Holmes is a good athlete, he won’t stand out amongst NBA bigs—especially against power forwards.  Building the right tendencies and minimizing positioning mistakes is going to be a huge factor in his success on defense.  He won’t generate the same number of STOCKs as at Dayton, but he’s got enough size, strength, and movement skills defensively to do a good job of containing NBA forwards.  And of course, when he’s on the weak side, he’ll still get chances to use his rim protection and anticipation skills to get blocks and create turnovers.

Conclusion

That’s it for this Five Favorites.  If it’s not obvious, I’m a big fan of all these prospects and expect that they’ll get drafted at the high end of their ranges and out-perform their draft slots.  As a Kings fan, I’d be happy to draft any of them at pick #13—even Holmes, who isn’t necessarily projected as a lottery pick.  I’m really looking forward to seeing what’s in store for them next week!

As always, thanks for reading!

The Warriors 2024 Offseason: Getting Out of Cap Jail

The Golden State Warriors have been one of the most interesting teams to watch in the NBA over the last decade. Their core of Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, and Draymond Green have been together since 2012, and in that time they’ve made the playoffs nine times, made the finals six times, and won four championships—as strong of a run as any team since Michael Jordan’s Bulls in the 1990s.

Yet despite going 46-36 this season, two wins better than their 2022-23 record, it seemed like the Warriors had taken a step back this year. That feeling turned into a reality when the Warriors got dismantled by the Kings in their lone play-in game, missing the playoffs for just the third time since their core unit first came together (the other two playoff misses could be excused, too as both resulted from serious injuries to Curry and Thompson).

Everyone recognizes that the Warriors now have an aging core and an exceptionally expensive roster.

On the age front, there’s little question the Warriors’ core is past its prime despite still playing at a high level Curry is 36 while Thompson and Green are both 34. Backup point guard Chris Paul is 39 and played the sixth most minutes per game (MPG) on the team. Even starting small forward Andrew Wiggins (fourth on the team in MPG) is now 29, and core rotation players like Gary Payton (31) and Kevon Looney (28) aren’t young bucks anymore.

The Dubs also had the most expensive roster in the NBA last season, with over $206.8 million allocated to their roster according to Spotrac (their total cap allocations were over $224.8 million after accounting for cap holds). As a result of that spending and years of operating over the cap, the Warriors are expected to incur a luxury tax bill of almost $177 million on top of their roster salary. When the dust settles, the Warriors will have paid over $380 million this season for a roster that missed the playoffs.

Yes, the Warriors have spent extravagantly for years; they have been above the salary cap every year but one since 2017 and they’ve paid luxury tax in six of the last eight seasons. But the price tag has gotten exorbitant. Since 2020 (and excluding this year), the Warriors have spent over $530 million in team salary and paid over $400 million in luxury tax—about $930 million in total. For context, that far outpaces big spending teams like the Clippers and Nets, who have respectively paid about $730 million and $650 million for their rosters during the same time period (including salary and luxury tax payments).

Add it all up and the Warriors will have spent about $1.3 billion on their roster since 2020. That’s untenable for an NBA team. They are going to find a way to drive spending down.

So what should we expect the Warriors to do? Let’s take a look at their roster needs going into the off-season and how the NBA’s new CBA will affect their strategy going forward.

The Roster

Most of the Warriors from last season are still going to be under contract next year. Stephen Curry and head coach Steve Kerr are under contract for two more years (through 2025-26), Draymond Green signed a 4-year deal last off-season (with a player option in 2026-27), and Andrew Wiggins is under contract through at least 2025-26 (with a player option in 2026-27). Jonathan Kuminga and Moses Moody are both on rookie deals for next season and will only hit restricted free agency afterward, so the Warriors will have a chance to re-sign them both. Last season’s rookies Brandin Podziemski and Trayce Jackson-Davis are tied up through at least 2026-27 at the team’s option.

The big question marks are Klay Thompson, Chris Paul, Kevon Looney, and Gary Payton II. Dario Saric, Usman Garuba, Lester Quinones, and Jerome Robinson are also free agents, but by the end of the season none were really part of the regular rotation (Saric played a lot early on but his minutes dropped precipitously in the last few months of the season).

Klay Thompson

Thompson is an unrestricted free agent this off-season, so the Dubs will have to decide whether to bring him back next season or split apart the Splash Brothers.

Though Thompson had an up-and-down season, he was still productive, ranking second on the team in scoring and minutes played. Per Basketball Reference, Thompson averaged 17.9 points, 3.3 rebounds, 2.3 assists, and 1.5 turnovers in about 30 minutes per game—largely in line with his career averages. His shooting dipped slightly from three point range, but he still posted solid shooting numbers at 43.2% from the field, 38.7% from three, and at 92.7% from the free throw line.

Despite posting solid counting stats, Thompson got benched for a stretch during the season, a first time since his rookie season. At the time, the Warriors were looking to get young players involved and find working line-ups. Though it’s not clear benching Thompson made much difference—the Warriors were 8-6 in games Thompson came off the bench and 33-30 in games he started—the reasons for it aren’t that tough to parse. Offensively, Thompson shot the second lowest percentage from three point range of his career. He also slumped quite a bit in February, when he was moved to the bench role.

But Thompson’s defense was really the issue. Per Cleaning the Glass, the Warriors were 4.8 points per 100 possessions worse on defense when Thompson was on the court—worst on the team amongst players with over 500 minutes played. That 4.8 figure is also by far the worst mark of Thompson’s career, and a severe drop-off from 2022-23 when the Warriors were 1.5 points per 100 possessions better defensively with Thompson on the floor. Other advanced metrics tell a similar story. Per Dunks and Threes, Thompson posted a Defensive Estimated Plus/Minus of -0.7, putting him in the bottom half of NBA players this past season. Basketball Reference pegged him at -1.5 in its Defensive BPM metric. Of course Thompson’s age and injury history make his defensive struggles a bit more understandable. He’s also never been much of a steals or blocks generator. Still, it’s hard to deny there’s been a drop-off since Thompson was regarded as a high-level defensive player in the mid-2010s, and that’s significantly impacted Thompson’s on-court value.

Chris Paul

Entering his age 39 season, Chris Paul is on the books for one more season at $30 million, but his salary is not guaranteed. The Warriors can waive Paul before June 28 and avoid paying him, but he would become an unrestricted free agent (assuming he clears waivers, which would be likely).

Paul mostly played a bench role for the Warriors, which makes sense given his age. He was still a solid contributor despite his age. Per Dunks and Threes, Paul graded out as a top quartile defender (Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of 0.7, in the 78th percentile) and an above average offensive player (Offensive Estimated Plus-Minus of 0.0, good enough for the 71st percentile). The Warriors also gave up about 3.5 fewer points per 100 possessions with Paul on the court per Cleaning the Glass, a very respectable number for an aging point guard. Of course, Paul isn’t the offensive engine and efficiency wizard that he’d been through the prime of his career, but you’d be hard pressed to find many backup point guards with more reliable production.

Kevon Looney

Looney is on the books for 2024-25 at a salary of $8 million ($3 million of which is guaranteed), a relatively small salary even for a backup center. Even though he will be just 28 years old to start next season, it’s possible Looney is already past his physical peak. Looney’s had a long history of lower body issues, particularly with his hips, but he’s also had to deal with neuropathy and gastrointestinal issues that have impacted his ability to be on the court. He’s been able to get on the court consistently (playing all but 8 games in the last three seasons), but his minutes declined significantly this year (he averaged just over 16 minutes per game) and started only 36 games this season (after starting 70 last year and 80 the year before).

Looney’s advanced metrics took a bit of a hit this year, which could partly explain the lower playtime. His Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus dropped to -1.3 this season from 1.4 in 2022-23. Per Cleaning the Glass, Looney also had a negative efficiency differential for the first time since the 2019-20, driven largely by the fact that the Warriors were about 1.6 points worse defensively per 100 possessions with him on the floor. While his rebounding, steals, and block rates stayed relatively flat, Looney turned the ball over too frequently (his turnover percentage of 15.6% was the highest of his career) and started fouling more. And though he’s never been known as a perimeter defender, Looney also struggled to effectively contest midrange shots; with Looney on the court, opponents shot 5.3% better on two-pointers between 4 and 14 feet. In all, Looney was a reasonable backup center option—but not as productive as he was from 2021 to 2023 when he was starting consistently.

Gary Payton II

Whether Payton returns to the Warriors next year is really up to Payton—he holds a 1-year player option at just over $9.1 million for next season, and the deadline for his decision is June 19.

Payton is a useful situational defender who's had meaningful impact over his past few seasons with the Warriors. He posted a stellar Defensive Box Plus-Minus of 2.0 (94th percentile) per Dunks and Threes and had the third-highest efficiency differential, 6.0 points per 100 possessions, of any player on the team per Cleaning the Glass. At the same time, he’s played in just 44 games, averaging a little over 15 minutes per game, so it’s hard to say he is truly a core piece of the team going forward.

The CBA’s Effect on the Future

As a result of the team’s expensive roster, Golden State will in all likelihood enter 2024 over the salary cap. And without substantial changes to the roster, they’re likely going to remain over the luxury tax as well. For reference, based on projections for the 2024-25 season, the salary cap will be set at $141 million, the luxury tax line at $171.315 million, the first apron at $178.655 million, and the second apron at $189.486 million. Under the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA), these thresholds are critical for teams to consider as part of roster construction.

With that in mind, let’s take a quick look at the Warriors salary cap situation as their roster stands today:

[Chart 1 - salary data from Spotrac]

As you can tell from the chart above, without waiving anyone or Gary Payton II opting out of his deal, the Warriors will be well above the salary cap and even a bit above the luxury tax line before re-signing free agents Klay Thompson (or anyone else). The Dubs will, however, be below the first apron and the second apron—which means they won’t necessarily be subject to the harshest restrictions under the CBA unless they continue to add salary.

The Impact of Luxury Tax

Being over the luxury tax alone probably isn’t a huge deal for the Warriors. As I noted above, they’ve frequently been in the luxury tax in the past and generally haven’t hesitated to build out an expensive roster.

Generally, teams in the luxury tax pay penalties based on how far above the tax line they are. The chart below shows how the tax penalties work for a standard luxury tax teams:

[Chart 2]

* I am using the 2023-24 “tax brackets” as a reference only—they won’t apply for the 2024-25 season.  Instead, each “tax bracket” will increase by a percentage equal to the change in salary cap from the 2023-24 season to the 2024-25 season, which is expected to be about 3.66% (a $136.021 million salary cap for 2023-24 versus a projected $141.0 million cap for 2024-25).

** Tax rates increase by $0.50 for each additional $5 million increment above $20,000,000

As you can see from the chart above, the amount of luxury tax teams pay increases depending on how far above the luxury tax line they go. Teams barely above the luxury tax line don’t really face onerous luxury tax penalties—teams less than $10 million* over the luxury tax line don’t have to pay more than $1.75 in penalties for every dollar they go over. Conversely, teams that are $10 million* or more over the luxury tax line face increasingly stiffer fines. The point here is pretty simple: discourage teams from over-spending in the first instance, but if they do, throw more and more hurdles in front of them to encourage teams to tamp down their spending. You can also see from the chart that the CBA actually contemplates making this point even more explicit going forward in the 2025-26 season and beyond—teams just over the luxury tax (less than $10 million*) will be penalized less harshly than under the current regime, while teams well above the luxury tax ($10 million* or more) are going to face even more onerous penalties.

If they were a standard luxury tax team, the 2024-25 Warriors probably aren’t looking at huge luxury tax payments for their current roster: their active cap is projected to be about $174 million, only about $3.7 million over the luxury tax line (the actual amounts charged under the luxury tax calculation vary a bit based on CBA nuance that isn’t relevant here).

But the Warriors aren’t a standard luxury tax team. The NBA CBA imposes even stiffer “repeater tax” penalties for teams that are too often above the luxury tax line. Teams that pay the luxury tax in four of the five previous seasons are subject to the “repeater tax” rates, which are much higher:

[Chart 3]

* See note from Chart 2 (above)

** See note from Chart 2 (above)

As Chart 3 shows, the repeater tax rates are meaningfully higher—teams like the Warriors in the repeater tax essentially pay an extra $1 penalty per $1 in salary above the luxury tax line compared to non-repeater teams. And you can also see that the repeater tax penalty is going to get even worse in 2025-26 and beyond, as repeater tax teams are going to be paying an extra $2 penalty compared to non-repeater teams. The message from the NBA’s CBA is pretty clear here, too: even if you are a luxury tax team, you better not stay a luxury tax team year after year, or you are going to pay handsomely for it.

These luxury tax rules are critical for the Warriors going forward—as much or more than any other team (arguably, the rules were made specifically to stop the Warriors and Clippers from doing exactly what they were doing under the old CBA).

• The Warriors will be heavily incentivized to avoid going far over the luxury tax line, as the repeater tax penalties are significant (even in 2024-25);

• The Warriors will be thinking about how to structure their roster so that they aren’t facing the more onerous repeater tax penalties in 2025-26 and beyond; and

• The Warriors will be heavily incentivized to find a way out of the luxury tax soon to avoid the repeater tax penalties all together in the next few years (though that may have to wait until after Stephen Curry's contract expires following the 2025-26 season).

With about $174 million in salary on the books for 2024-25 (their tax charges will differ slightly, but it’s not material for our purposes here), the Warriors would be only a small ways into the luxury tax. Still, it’s hard to overstate the significance the points above will have on the Warriors’ roster decisions this off-season, especially when it comes to re-signing Klay Thompson and how to handle Chris Paul and Kevon Looney, who carry significant salary. I’ll dive into the players more later, but I also want to look a couple other CBA-imposed items the Warriors will need to consider: the tax aprons.

The Tax Aprons

The tax aprons have taken on new meaning in the NBA’s latest CBA. Teams over the first apron face a number of restrictions on roster moves they can make, and teams above the second apron face even more onerous restrictions.

The First Apron

The first apron is projected to be $178.655 million next season. Since we are now past the 2023-24 regular season, the following restrictions apply to teams that are above the first apron:

• First apron teams cannot take back more salary in a trade than they send out;

• First apron teams cannot acquire players via sign-and-trades;

• First apron teams cannot use the Biannual Exception;

  • [The Biannual Exception allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $4.74 million]

• First apron teams cannot use the Non-taxpayer Midlevel Exception (Non-taxpayer MLE);

  • [The Non-taxpayer MLE allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $13.03 million]

• First apron teams cannot use pre-existing traded player exceptions (as of the end of the 2023-24 regular season), however, they can still create and use new TPEs generated from trades in the off-season or during future seasons, provided the TPE gets used within the same season;

• During the season, first apron teams cannot sign players off waivers whose salary for that season is greater than the Non-taxpayer MLE;

• First apron teams can sign players using the Taxpayer Midlevel Exception (Taxpayer MLE), provided that if they use the Taxpayer MLE, the team is “hard capped” at the second apron—meaning they cannot exceed the second apron for any reason; and

  • [The Taxpayer MLE allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $5.25 million]

• First apron teams can aggregate salaries in trades—meaning they can trade away multiple players with lower salaries to get back a player with a higher salary (as non-apron teams can)—but if they do aggregate players in a trade, they are hard capped at the second apron;

• First apron teams can send out cash considerations in trades, but if they do so, they are hard capped at the second apron.

Some of the first apron restrictions above are pretty meaningful, as they really limit the strategies that teams can use to acquire new players. It can be tough for first apron teams to successfully add talent via trade because they’re prohibited from taking back more salary than they send out (as usually higher paid players are better), they lose access to their existing trade exceptions, and they’re prohibited from engaging in sign-and-trades. It’s also hard to add back-end rotation talent since first apron teams lose some cap exceptions (like the Biannual Exception) and face a hard cap at the second apron if they use even the relatively small Taxpayer MLE. Similarly, the inability to sign players off waivers with bigger salaries limits the team’s options to add talent during the season if they need to.

The Second Apron

The second apron is projected to be $189.486 million next season, and it comes with additional restrictions on top of the restrictions imposed on first apron teams.

The following restrictions now apply to second apron teams (they are also subject to the first apron restrictions):

• Second apron teams cannot use the Taxpayer MLE;

• Second apron teams cannot aggregate salaries in trades;

• Second apron teams cannot send out cash considerations in any trade;

In addition, if a team is over the second apron for the 2024-25 season (or any season thereafter), that team will face significant penalties for its future draft picks.

• A future second apron team will have its first round draft pick in the seventh draft following that salary cap year frozen (the “Frozen Pick”). In other words, going forward, second apron teams won’t be allowed to trade draft picks 7 years into the future, as other teams can.

• In addition, a future second apron team in two of the four previous seasons may have its Frozen Pick moved to the very end of the first round.

In all, the second apron restrictions are pretty significant. In addition to facing all the restrictions of the first apron, second apron teams can’t use even the Taxpayer MLE to add players, they can’t combine salaries in trade, they can’t trade cash, and they could face restrictions on trading future draft picks and have those picks knocked down to the end of the first round. Those are severe penalties that can materially affect short- and long-term roster construction, and teams will try hard to avoid them.

Where Will the Warriors’ Salary Land Next Year?

For the remainder of the 2023-24 salary cap year, the Warriors are a second apron team, which means they’re subject to the most stringent restrictions on roster moves until the cap year rolls over on June 30 and new contract numbers take effect. Without making any moves, the Warriors will have about $174 million in team salary. That would put them slightly above the luxury tax line, but comfortably below the first apron. The roster would be the same as this past year, except the Warriors would no longer have Klay Thompson and Dario Saric (as well as back-end players like Lester Quinones, Jerome Robinson, and Usman Garuba).

Losing Thompson in particular would leave a major hole on the roster. They wouldn’t be able to replace him easily. If the Warriors want to replace Thompson and stay below the first apron, they can only spend about $4 million on Thompson’s replacement. In theory, they could sign a free agent for more money (up to $4.7 million using the Biannual Exception or $5.25 million using the Taxpayer MLE), but that would be somewhat impractical as using either the Taxpayer MLE or Biannual Exception would hard cap the Warriors at the second apron (about $189 million in total salary), without without materially changing the quality of player they could sign—after all, you’re not talking about hugely different calibers of free agents at $4 million in salary versus $5.25 million in salary.

A Roster Shake-Up Is Coming

The Warriors finished 10th in the Western Conference this season, which on its own may suggest roster change is warranted. But the CBA rules—specifically the luxury tax and apron restrictions—are likely to drive the Warriors to significant roster changes anyway. It’s obvious the Warriors’ leadership thinks so, as owner Joe Lacob made abundantly clear:

“Our Plan 1, or 1A, is that we'd like to be out of the tax, and we think that we have a way to do that.” “That kind of is the plan, not just under the second apron. I’ll tell you why that’s important, because the truth is that we need to be out of the tax two years out of the next four, below the tax line, in order to get this repeater thing off our books. We don’t want to be a repeater. It’s just so prohibitive, not to say we wouldn’t do it if we had to, but you’ve gotta look at what the downside is to doing that.”

Getting out of the luxury tax entirely certainly seems plausible for the Warriors. As I mentioned, they’ll be a little around $4 million over the luxury tax line if they don’t do anything. But if the Warriors want to keep Klay Thompson, getting the team’s salary down under the luxury tax will require other meaningful moves.

Bringing Back Klay Won’t Be Cheap—Will the Dubs Try to Keep Him?

I can’t speak for the Warriors’ front office, but I find it hard to believe the Warriors would let future Hall of Famer Klay Thompson walk without making a competitive bid to keep him in town. Thompson is beloved in the Bay Area and one of three players centrally responsible for pulling the Warriors out of decades of disappointment to win multiple championships. Franchise pillars often leave at the end of their careers—but it’s still hard to fathom for Klay. He’s still a useful player on any team, and probably has the chops to start for a number of playoff teams despite his waning defensive talents.

Thompson made $43.2 million last season and has a cap hold for just over $48.5 million this offseason. He will not see salaries near that range given his age, injury history, and defensive limitations, especially in a potentially cool free agency market. As I detailed in my last post, only a handful of teams project to have meaningful cap space this off-season: Detroit, Philadelphia, Utah, Oklahoma City, Orlando, San Antonio, Charlotte, and potentially Toronto. Of those teams, Orlando, Philadelphia, and OKC may be interested in Thompson—but they have other options as well (Detroit or Toronto could try to sign him to add shooting, but their rosters are probably too young and too far away to match well with Thompson’s timeline).

With even a few bidders, it’s probably safe to say that the low-end for Thompson’s services is a 3-4 year deal worth well over the Non-Taxpayer MLE if he wants to—think 3 or 4 seasons at $15 million+ per year. The Warriors gave Draymond Green a 4 year contract worth $25 million per year last off-season, so you could see them offering Thompson a similar deal (perhaps a bit less given Green doesn’t have the same injury history and has been more productive the past few seasons). That’s probably around the high-end of the range other teams might offer for Thompson based on recent comps, too. For example, Brook Lopez, another older but productive player, got a 2 year deal worth $24 million per season last off-season, while younger but less consistently productive players like Cam Johnson, Kyle Kuzma, and Dillon Brooks received 4 year deals worth $21.5 million to $23.7 million per year on average (per Spotrac).

There have also been a couple recent examples of teams giving players “balloon” contracts with shorter terms but high salaries to lure them away from teams facing big potential luxury tax bills—that’s exactly what happened with the Pacers signing Bruce Brown Jr. away from the Nuggets (2 years, $45 million) and the Rockets signing Fred VanVleet away from the Raptors (3 years, $128.5 million). A team like the Magic or Sixers could make a similar offer to Thompson and potentially price the Warriors out of making a competitive offer. Detroit and Utah could conceivably do the same if they wanted to go for a quick turn-around like the Rockets did last season, but they don’t seem like obvious candidates (Detroit is too far away, Utah doesn’t really need to add Thompson). Regardless, while Thompson may prefer to stay with the Warriors if all else is equal—he’s spent his entire career there—there’s always a price that could lure him away.

With that said, I expect the Warriors will have to spend something like $15-25 million next year to keep Thompson around. That’s a pretty conservative range obviously, but it’s good enough for my purposes here. For simplicity, I’ll use $20 million (the midpoint) as the cost to keep Thompson with Golden State for 2024-25 and beyond. I’ll also assume the Warriors in fact opt to keep him at that price (for the record, I think they should do so—it would be a shame to break up the Splash Brothers this far into their careers).

Getting Under the Tax With Thompson Returning

So, what can Golden State do to get under the luxury tax if they bring Klay Thompson back? There are a few possibilities, but one is most obvious.

Waive Chris Paul.

Like Thompson, Chris Paul is a clear future Hall of Famer. But he’s going to be 39 to start next season, he has little historical connection to the Warriors (last year is the only season he’s played with the club), and he’s almost certain to make more than Thompson would if he stays on the team.

Paul is slated to make $30 million next season with the Warriors if they don’t waive him. Under the CBA, the Warriors can’t negotiate that amount downward either (the NBA Players’ Association negotiated for provisions preventing teams from doing so for aging players). But Paul’s 2024-25 salary is non-guaranteed, meaning the Warriors can waive him and they’re not on the hook for his salary. His salary will fully guarantee on June 28, so whatever happens will happen soon.

Paul is still productive, especially for his age. He remains a good perimeter shooter (37.1% from three), an incredibly efficient passer (Paul’s assist-to-turnover ratio has been other-worldly throughout his career, and it’s still one of the tops in the NBA), and a decent defender (at least for an undersized guard). Advanced metrics also point to Paul’s productivity—his Estimated Plus-Minus is in the 78th percentile per Dunks and Threes and he sports a positive efficiency differential per Cleaning the Glass. Yet, Paul’s stats (traditional and advanced) have been trending downward for a few years, and there’s no serious question he’s approaching the end of his productive career on the floor.

If the Warriors want to re-sign Thompson and have a chance of getting below the luxury tax line, waiving Paul is a no-brainer. If the Dubs waive Paul and re-sign Thompson at $20 million (for 2024-25), they would end up with a team salary of about $165 million after filling out their roster, comfortably below the luxury tax.

The Warriors could alternatively try to trade Paul, but it’s hard to see much of a market given other team’s aren’t going to pay handsomely for a 39 year old point guard and will be fully aware of the Warriors’ salary cap situation.

Make a Trade?

Other than Paul, the only players with non-guaranteed salary on the 2024-25 Dubs’ roster are Gary Payton II and Kevon Looney.

Payton has a single-season player option worth about $9.1 million. Given there aren’t a ton of teams with cap space that need a non-shooting guard, it’s hard to see a major market for him materializing in free agency—so more likely than not, he will pick up the player option and try again next year. We’ll know by June 19 what Payton chooses to do, but it’s out of the Warriors’ control regardless.

Looney is under contract for one more year, but his contract is only partially guaranteed ($3 million guaranteed out of his $8 million total salary) until June 24, when it becomes fully guaranteed. Waiving Looney before his salary fully guarantees would clear $5 million in cap space for the team.

If (A) the Warriors keep Thompson (estimated $20 million) and Paul ($30 million), (B) Payton opts out, and (C) the Warriors waive Looney, the team would have a little over $181 million on the books for 2024-25 after filling out their roster. In other words, they’d be above the luxury tax line (est. $171.3 million) and above the first apron (est. $178.7 million), but still below the second apron (est. $189.5 million).

To get under the luxury tax line, Lacob’s stated goal, they would need to trade away one or more players to clear just over $10 million in salary (keep in mind, they’d need to add back at least a minimum salary player to fill out their roster).

If the Warriors were to go that route, Curry and Green presumably wouldn’t be trade options. And obviously the need for a trade would be driven by a desire to keep Thompson and Paul, so they’re not going to figure in either. That would leave the Dubs with the following possibilities:

1. Trade Andrew Wiggins ($26.3 million in salary for next season); and

2. Trade some combination of Jonathan Kuminga ($7.6 million), Moses Moody ($5.8 million), Brandin Podziemski ($3.5 million), and Trayce Jackson-Davis ($1.9 million).

None of those options make much sense at all.

Wiggins had a rough season, which I won’t detail here. He’s under contract for 3 more years and has almost $85 million left owed to him. Trading Wiggins now would get off his salary, but it’s impossible to envision the Warriors getting good value for him—in fact, he may be at his lowest value ever. He’s also probably the single best candidate on the roster for improvement next season given the inexplicable fall-off in his level of play; in two prior seasons with the Warriors, Wiggins has been stellar.

Kuminga, Moody, Podziemski, and Jackson-Davis are the Warriors youth. None are perfect players, but they are all meaningful contributors on cost-controlled contracts. Moving on from them now to save salary makes no sense. The Warriors would have virtually no chance of replacing their production at similar cost next season. And if the Warriors were open to trading Kuminga in particular, they could actually see meaningful returns in terms of on-court production (Kuminga is a bit polarizing as a player, but he made huge strides this season and would be coveted by numerous other teams). Why would the Warriors want to send him away in a salary dump?

So What Will the Dubs Do?

Given Joe Lacob’s comments, it’s clear that the Warriors are going to try to find a way to get under the luxury tax. The financial outlays they’ve made in the past just don’t seem justifiable given the current state of their roster, even though a true re-build doesn’t seem to be in the works any time soon.

Moving on from Chris Paul is a no-brainer. His age and declining production aren’t worth $30 million next season, and letting him walk will dramatically increase the Warriors’ flexibility whether they can re-sign Thompson or not.

I would like to see the Warriors re-sign Thompson and keep their historic core together for at least another couple of seasons. I strongly suspect they’re going to make him a competitive offer in the $18-24 million range per season (I’m less confident they will offer him four years given his age and the trajectory of his production). If some team comes in over the top of that, we’ll have to see what Klay wants to do, though there’s no reason to think he’s aiming to leave.

Ultimately, I see Paul leaving and Klay staying. The Warriors (mostly) run it back next season and hope that improved play from Wiggins and the young guys (Kuminga, Moody, and Podziemski especially) can propel them back to the playoffs.

Thanks for reading, and as always, me know what you think!

Sacramento Kings: 2024 Off-Season Strategy

Now that it’s mid-May, the NBA playoffs are in full swing and only a handful of teams are still competing. The Kings find themselves on the outside, looking in, after finishing with a 46-36 record and losing their second play-in tournament game to the Pelicans (that loss was their sixth of the season to the Pelicans).

Missing the playoffs is disappointing for any team, but it’s especially tough for a Kings team that finished third in the Western Conference in 2022-23 while breaking a 16-year playoff drought before eventually losing to the Golden State Warriors in seven games.

Last offseason, the Kings’ front office seemed to choose continuity over big changes to follow up their success, as most of the roster changes were really on the fringes. They re-signed forward Harrison Barnes and agreed to an extension with All-NBA center Domantas Sabonis with cap space freed up by trading away backup center Richaun Holmes (along with their 2023 first-round pick). They brought in a handful of rotation players in Sasha Venzenkov, Chris Duarte, and Javale McGee, and made just two second round draft selections in Colby Jones and Jalen Slawson, both of whom played limited minutes this season. They let a handful of back-end rotation and bench players walk through the Holmes trade and departures of Terence Davis, Matthew Dellavedova, Chimezie Metu, Neemias Queta, and PJ Dozier. The theme was clear: run it back with the same core, rely on internal development, and try to make upgrades on the edges.

The strategy from last offseason helped the Kings stay relevant and continue to develop despite late-season injuries to key players like Kevin Huerter (torn labrum on March 18) and Malik Monk (sprained right MCL on March 29). While the Kings finished ninth in the West, they were just 5 wins behind the fourth seeded LA Clippers. They also managed to improve their defensive significantly over the 2022-23 season, jumping up to a defensive rating of 114.4 (14th in the NBA) from a poor defensive rating of 116.0 (24th in the NBA) per NBA.com. That was a meaningful jump defensively, especially given there was a pronounced increase in offensive output league wide. Unfortunately, the Kings’ strides on defense were offset by a bit of a dip offensively, as the Kings fell from 1st in the NBA in offensive rating (118.6) to 13th (116.2). And of course, the Kings won two fewer games in 2023-24 than the previous season even as the Western Conference continued to improve—for context, 10 of the 11 top teams in the West this season improved on their record from 2022-23.

So, things may look very different this time around.

The Kings have some big questions to answer this offseason. The most pressing question is whether the Kings can retain guard Malik Monk, who is set to hit unrestricted free agency. The team also needs to think about how to improve the roster—with an eye toward maintaining the defensive improvements from this past season while getting back to 2022-23 form on offense—with free agency options, a late lottery first round pick, and restrictions on its tradable assets.

I’ll dive into what the Kings should look to do.

The Big Picture

To get a lay of the land, I want to set out the big picture overview. The Kings have eleven full-time players on the roster headed into next season and one two-way player. The team’s core is De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray. As of today, some combination of Harrison Barnes, Kevin Huerter, and Keon Ellis will fill out the starting line-up and be core rotation players, with other returning players like Davion Mitchell, Trey Lyles, Chris Duarte, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones likely to fill out the backend of the rotation. They also have two-way player Mason Jones under contract, though he’s less likely to play meaningful minutes.

The Kings also hold the #13 and #45 overall picks in the upcoming 2024 draft, meaning the team could add two new players to the roster.

On the flip side, some meaningful players from last year will not be on the roster barring some action in free agency. Malik Monk, Javale McGee, and Alex Len are slated to be unrestricted free agents (meaning they can sign elsewhere once free agency starts), while Kessler Edwards and two-way players Jordan Ford and Jalen Slawson will enter restricted free agency (meaning the Kings can potentially match offers they get from other teams).

Based on data from Spotrac, with just the players currently on the roster (excluding two-way contracts), the Kings will have just shy of $151.6 million in salary on the books—about $10.6 million above the projected salary cap of $141.0 million. They will, however, be well shy of Spotrac’s projected luxury tax line (est. $171,315,000) as well as the first apron (est. $178,655,000) and second apron (est. $189,486,000).

As an over the cap team, the Kings will have three ways to add to their roster: (1) signing free agents (or re-signing their own free agents) using cap exceptions, (2) drafting players, or (3) trading for players. But the salary cap and luxury tax rules are going to be play a huge role in how the Kings go about roster construction as they think about next season.

I’ve written extensively before on the NBA salary cap, cap exceptions, and how the luxury tax line and aprons work, so I won’t cover them in detail here. That said, at a high level, teams over the luxury tax line get hit with additional taxes for each dollar they go over line (how much varies based on how far over they are and how often they exceed the luxury tax threshold) while teams under the tax can receive substantial payments. HoopsHype estimates that non-tax teams will receive about $11.8 million in payouts from luxury tax teams after the 2023-24 season, so going over the luxury tax line can be costly directly and indirectly. And teams that go over the first apron (or second apron) face increasingly onerous restrictions on the types of roster moves they can make.

Having won 48 and 46 games the last two years with a roster centered around stars Fox and Sabonis, who are both in their physical primes, the Kings are in position to compete now. But they will be (and should be) cognizant of how any off-season moves they make impacts the team’s salary cap/luxury tax situation, and they’ll undoubtedly also be thinking about any impacts on the team’s financial bottom line. They also will have to think about the long-term impacts of the moves they make now. Even as the team looks to be more competitive in the short-term, they also have to be mindful of the team’s medium-term and long-term future.

What should the Kings do first? I’ll start with the obvious.

Re-Sign the Sixth Man!

Of the Kings’ six free agents, one stands out above the rest. The Kings should do all they can to re-sign sixth man Malik Monk.

Monk has been the soul of the Kings bench unit for his two years in Sacramento. In just 26 minutes per game off the bench, Monk averaged 15.4 points and 5.1 assists per game, both career highs, with a solid shooting slash line of 44.3% / 35.0% / 82.9% (percentages for twos / threes / free throws). He also finished second in Sixth Man of the Year voting despite missing virtually all of the Kings’ last 10 games of the season and both play-in games due to an MCL injury (he might have won the award if he’d stayed healthy).

Monk was also one of the team’s very best ball-handlers and the only player on the roster other than Fox who consistently create shots for himself and others. This was readily apparent toward the end of the season as the Kings often struggled to create offense in the half-court against set defenses, especially without Fox on the court. The Kings sorely missed Monk’s ability to run pick-and-rolls with Sabonis and Len, drive the lane, and create space through step-backs, instead having to rely too much on creation from players who were over-extended. Fox already had a full plate offensively. Sabonis and Murray aren’t yet adept at creating shots for themselves. Barnes couldn’t absorb Monk’s shot-creation volume. Without Monk to bolster the offense, the Kings ended up losing several key games down the stretch because they simply couldn’t score enough despite strong defensive performances. The Kings scored 103 points in the game against Dallas where Monk got hurt, and they scored under 110 points against the Knicks, Celtics, Thunder, Suns, and the play-in game versus New Orleans. They ended up losing all those games.

There’s no real question that the Kings players and coaches want to bring Monk back. Star players De’Aaron Fox and Domantas Sabonis made clear how important they think Monk is to the team’s success at the end of the season. Brown called it a “no brainer” that the Kings try to bring Monk back. But whether he returns will ultimately be a decision for Monk and the team’s front office, and that is going to inevitably come down to dollars and options.

Since the Kings will be over the salary cap this off-season, they need to find a cap exception to re-sign Monk. The best exception they can use to re-sign Monk is one of the “Bird rights” exceptions, which generally allow teams to re-sign their own free agents. There are several kinds of Bird rights—Full Bird rights, Early Bird rights, and Non-Bird rights—and they allow teams to re-sign free agents up to different dollar amounts over the cap (to over-simplify, if a player has been under the same contract with the team for longer, they can offer him more money). Monk is wrapping up a two-year contract with the Kings after signing as a free agent in 2022, so the team holds his Early Bird rights. As a result, even though the Kings are over the salary cap, they can offer Monk a four-year contract with a starting first year salary of up to 175% of his 2023-24 salary with 8% raises per year.

Monk’s 2023-24 salary was about $9.95 million, so the most the Kings can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $78 million total (an average of about $19.5 million per year). [Note: if you’re curious, the actual salary amounts would be 17,405,203 in 2024-25; 18,797,619 in 2025-26, 20,190,035 in 2026-27, and 21,582,451 in 2027-28.]

There’s also no reason Monk and the Kings have to agree to a 4-year deal. The Kings could offer him a two year deal for about $36.2 million or a 2+1 deal (two years plus a player option in year three) for about $56.4 million. These could be attractive for the Kings and Monk, as this sort of deal structure would eventually lead to the Kings having Monk’s Full Bird rights, so they could re-sign him for more money on a future contract, while at the same time giving Monk enough short-term financial security to make a contract renewal palatable. He’d also still be able to re-enter free agency during his prime with either structure. For purposes of this article, I’ll stick with assuming a framework offer from the Kings at 4 years for $78 million because I’m a little skeptical that Monk would forego the certainty of added years.

Making such a big offer for Monk would be a big deal for the Kings. Regardless of whether they do a 4-year deal, a 2-year deal, or 2+1 deal, adding Monk to the 2024-25 roster at $17.4 million would push the Kings’ team salary to about $169.9 million. Combined with the approximately $4.7 million the team will need to sign its first-round pick after the draft, the Kings would be about $3.3 million over the projected luxury tax line of $171.3 million. In that case, the Kings would have to pay almost $5 million in luxury tax. And as a luxury tax payor, the Kings wouldn’t be eligible to receive luxury tax payments from other teams, which in recent years have often been over $10 million. The Kings could effectively end up spending an extra $15 million (or more) in taxes and lost tax revenue to re-sign Monk, on top of Monk’s new salary. In a very real sense, re-signing Monk could cost the team closer to $30 million than Monk’s $17.4 million salary next year.

The Kings could try to avoid the tax by trying to get a smaller deal done with Monk or by trading away another player such as Barnes, Huerter, Lyles, Vezenkov, Duarte, or Mitchell. Either approach involves some risk. If the Kings don’t give Monk the biggest offer they possibly can, they’ll make it more likely he walks in free agency. And if they want to trade away salary, they will have to give up something of value (such as draft capital). By way of example, the Kings had to give up their 2023 first round pick to clear Richaun Holmes’ contract off the books last offseason, creating about $12 million in cap space in the process.

Re-signing Monk could also present issues for the Kings in trying to sign other free agents. As an over-the-cap team, they can only sign free agents with cap exceptions—most notably the midlevel exception (“MLE”) or biannual exception. The MLE, which I’ve written about previously, would allow the Kings to sign players up to about $12.9 million or $5.2 million depending on if the team’s salary is under or above the luxury tax line; the biannual exception, meanwhile, is worth $4.7 million. If re-signing Monk takes the Kings over the luxury tax line, the Kings wouldn’t be able to use the non-taxpayer MLE—they’d be stuck at the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE. And if the Kings use the non-taxpayer MLE or the biannual exception at all, they would trigger the NBA’s hard cap rule, which would restrict them from having a team salary higher than the first apron, which projected to be $178.7 million. That probably doesn’t matter a lot for free agency purposes, but it would affect the Kings’ future trade decisions.

And of course, Monk would have to accept the Kings offer, which isn’t a given.

I’ve seen a lot of NBA free agency watchers claim that it’s unlikely Monk stays, presumably because they think some other team will throw a ton of money at Monk in free agency (this year’s free agency class is generally not considered to be elite). That’s certainly a real possibility, though I think it’s less likely than many people assume, and I want to take a little bit of time to explain why.

Free agency is a two-way market. And while Monk and his agent will certainly shop around for the best deal (as they absolutely should), the market this year is likely not going to have a ton of potential bidders for his services.

According to Spotrac, only seven teams are projected to have cap space this offseason. The other 23 teams, including the Kings, are all probably limited to using salary cap exceptions to sign free agents unless they make major changes to their rosters to create meaningful cap space (and remember, getting salary off the books often comes at a price itself).

For the over-the-cap teams, the biggest cap exception they can use to sign Monk is the Non-taxpayer MLE, which is projected to be about $12.9 million and can be used for contracts up to 4 years, with up to 5% annual raises. In other words, the most such teams can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $55.7 million. That’s substantially less than the Kings can offer him, and it’s even well below what the Kings could offer Monk while staying below the luxury tax. This built-in advantage for the Kings is by design, as the NBA CBA gives teams advantages in re-signing their own free agents in the form of Bird rights. Obviously, teams without cap space could make moves to clear up room to sign Monk, but clearing $15+ million in cap space isn’t all that easy to do and it usually involves giving up valuable draft picks. It’s hard to envision over-the-cap teams making such big swings to sign Monk, who is a really good player but not necessarily a set-it-and-forget-it starter for every team.

What about the other seven teams with cap space? Well, some are obvious potential suitors for Monk—but it’s fewer than you might think for a variety of reasons. We’ll go through each of them below.

Detroit Pistons

[up to $64.4 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Pistons can easily create enough cap room to make an offer to Monk that exceeds 4 years/$78 million, but there’s a serious question as to whether they would make a push for him. To get the space, the Pistons could free up over $50 million in cap space by renouncing some their free agency rights over several players. The Pistons will likely match offers for restricted free agent Simone Fontecchio, and the Pistons may want to hold onto a flier in James Wiseman, who still has potential at just 22 years old despite the very rocky start to his career, but they can easily do both of those things and still free up enough cap space to make a big offer for Monk if they want to.

But fit questions could slow Detroit down. The Pistons have three young guards who need the ball to develop in Cade Cunningham, Jaden Ivey, and Marcus Sasser. While Monk would provide them additional outside shooting, the Pistons wouldn’t be able to develop their young guards and fully utilize Monk’s shot creation and burgeoning pick and roll game. They’re also not particularly close to competing, so paying up for Monk, whose skillset overlaps a lot with guys they need to play a lot, isn’t a particularly effective use of cap space. It’s not obvious that the Pistons would want to use their cap space on a player whose skillset is duplicative of what they already have when they could either keep the space or use on alternative free agency options like wing players or off-ball shooters (there are other free agency options with better three point percentages than Monk like Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., or even Klay Thompson).

Philadephia 76ers

[up to $55.5 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Sixers could theoretically create over $60 million in cap room this offseason by renouncing all of their free agents and making a few ancillary moves. They’d effectively be rolling forward with a roster of just Joel Embiid, Tyrese Maxey, whoever they can sign in free agency, and minimum guys, but it’s certainly possible. The thing is, if the Sixers choose to go that route, they’re also very clearly signaling that they are going after a top tier free agent—the biggest names being Paul George and (theoretically) LeBron James. They’re not clearly that space to target Monk. It’s hard to imagine the Sixers letting all their rotation guys walk with the goal of adding Monk, whose pairing with Maxey is arguably duplicative anyway. The Sixers could split up their cap space among multiple players and go after Monk at $20 million+ per year, but that’s far from an obvious move for them.

Utah Jazz

[up to $38.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Per Spotrac, the Jazz can create about $38 million in cap space, principally by moving on from Kira Lewis Jr. and Talen Horton-Tucker. The real question is why they would clear that space for Monk. The Jazz already have Collin Sexton, Keyonte George, and Jordan Clarkson on the roster, all of whom share similar skillsets with Monk as score-first small guards. The Jazz also need to consider how to save money to pay Lauri Markannen, who will become a free agent after the 2024-25 season if he’s not extended or traded first. Monk doesn’t fill an obvious need for them.

Oklahoma City Thunder

[up to $35.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Thunder are deep into the playoffs and could make the Finals this season, but amazingly they still have a lot of cap flexibility. They can create over $35 million in cap space (per Spotrac) this offseason if they want to without losing any of their core players. But they’re unlikely to be bidders for Monk as they already have capable primary ball handlers in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, plus quality 3-D guards like Lu Dort, Cason Wallace, and Isaiah Joe. If they clear cap space or deal Josh Giddey, the Thunder are likely to target a bigger fish than Monk or someone who can bolster their front court and rebounding, which have been issues for them against the Mavs.

Orlando Magic

[up to $25.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Spotrac projects the Magic to have over $25 million in cap space this offseason, but they can easily push that number up over $35 million by renouncing their free agency rights to non-core rotation players like Markelle Fultz and Gary Harris. They could also free up even more money by letting more important role-players like Jonathan Isaac ($17.4 million), Mo Wagner ($8 million), and Joe Ingles ($11 million) walk. In fact, they can theoretically create over $55 million in cap space if they want to, though it’s pretty unlikely they actually let Isaac in particular move on, so that’s a bit of a fake number. Regardless, it’s meaningful cap space. And the Magic have a clear and obvious need for shooting and ball-handling.

The net result is that the Magic are a serious player in the bidding for Monk next season—and they may be his best bet for a huge contract.

The big questions are how much the Magic want to shake up their roster to create cap space and whether they want to use that cap space to out-bid the Kings for Monk rather than on other free agents. They’ve already been linked to Klay Thompson, who presumably would only leave the Warriors for a significant salary. They also already have Cole Anthony on the roster, who profiles similarly to Monk as a score-first guard with solid-but-not-spectacular shooting, playmaking skills, and below average defense. They could also look at other alternatives to paying up for Monk in free agency, including players who can offer shooting (Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., Malik Beasley), scoring (D’Angelo Russell, Demar Derozan, Alec Burks), and ball handling (Tyus Jones, Monte Morris). And there’s always the trade market.

I could absolutely see the Magic targeting Monk in free agency, and if they want him, they have the firepower to make him a bigger offer than the Kings can. If they throw $20-25 million at Monk per season, that will probably be enough to get him. But given the many options they have on the table, it’s hard to see the Magic dramatically over-paying for Monk’s services—if they’re going to overpay, they’ll probably target somebody higher in the NBA player hierarchy. But they are the team to watch most closely for the Kings.

San Antonio Spurs

[up to $21.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Spurs can also create a meaningful amount of cap space and need to get some help at guard. Assuming they keep their two first round picks this year and let their free agents walk, they would only have about $7.2 million in cap space, but they can free up another $18 million by letting go of Devonte Graham ($12.7 million), Julian Champagnie ($3 million), and Charles Bassey ($2.5 million), which would give them over $25 million in cap space.

The Spurs have a decent pass-first point guard on the roster in Tre Jones, but rumors are swirling that they want to pair phenom Victor Wembanyama with better perimeter play. Monk could certainly be an option for them, but are they really willing to give him a 4-year deal at $20 million+ per year? Certainly Wemby could make up for Monk’s defensive limitations, but the same could be said for superior offensive players who could become available like Trae Young or Anfernee Simons, both of whom could be obtainable on the trade market. The Spurs also have the #4 and #8 picks in the upcoming draft, so they’ll have at least a chance to add a guard like Nikola Topic, Rob Dillingham, or Reed Sheppard if they want to.

While the Spurs could theoretically make a push for Monk, it’s hard to see them paying up for him when they already have Jones on the roster, they have options in the draft this year, and they can go add a star via trade if they want to. They are probably second to the Magic in terms of potential Monk suitors, but they also have a ton of flexibility and don’t need to rush into getting Monk when better players could become available down the line.

Charlotte Hornets

[up to $5.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Hornets are the last team with projected cap space this offseason and they’re basically not in play for Monk. If they keep their free agency rights over Miles Bridges (which seems inevitable, given they didn’t trade him at the deadline this year) and their #6 draft pick, they’ll have only about $8.4 million in cap space—not enough to get into the bidding for Monk. They may even choose to operate as an over-the-cap team, in which case they’d be limited to giving Monk the Non-taxpayer MLE.

Toronto Raptors

The Raptors are likely to operate as an over-the-cap team, but I want to talk about them briefly because they are the only over-the-cap team that could reasonably make enough room to sign Monk to a big deal without having to totally overhaul their roster.

Toronto has $117.7 million in team salary next year. With a $27.8 million cap hold for Gary Trent Jr. and a $12.5 million cap hold for Immanuel Quickley, they are over the cap (they also have a random assortment of other free agent cap holds, but none are really for critical players). In theory, by (A) renouncing their Bird rights for Trent Jr. and their other free agents, excluding Quickley, (B) declining their team option for Bruce Brown Jr. ($23 million in salary), and (C) letting go of Javon Freeman-Liberty ($1.8 million in salary), Toronto can free up about $30 million in cap space. That would be more than enough to sign Monk.

That’s a pretty enormous opportunity cost to sign Monk, whose skillset overlaps with a player Toronto just traded for in Immanuel Quickley. Presumably Toronto likes Quickley more than Monk, otherwise OG Anunoby might be on the Kings right now. Also, giving up Bruce Brown Jr. in particular seems quite costly—Brown can be an effective player on a playoff team (he won a title with Denver in 2023), he’s got an expiring deal, and his salary would be useful as a trade chip and in salary matching if needed. It seems unlikely Toronto would give up all that for Monk when they could find a true point guard or floor spacer elsewhere in the free agency market.

So what does that all mean?

It all boils down to a pretty simple reality: Monk probably won’t have a ton of suitors in free agency. Aside from Sacramento, there’s a good chance only 1 or 2 teams show serious interest in Monk, at least at salaries in the $15-25 million range. If the Magic or Spurs decide to go another direction—and there are lots of options for them in free agency and the trade market—it’s possible Monk doesn’t end up with the frothy free agency market that many people seem to assume. The Kings should know this, Monk’s agent should know this, and other potential bidders like the Magic and the Spurs should know this. As a result, it’s hard to see anyone coming in over the top with a “blow out the competition” style offer.

Of course, if Monk gets an offer above the 4-year/$78 million contract the Kings can offer, there’s a good chance he takes it. Nobody should blame him either—he’s a free agent, and he’s absolutely earned the right to pick his destination and maximize his earnings. But Monk himself has said “I can go somewhere else with a lot more money and be in a worse situation,” so he’s going to think about the decision from at least a few different angles.

There’s one other thing I want to address.

It’s also possible the 4 years/$78 million the Kings can offer as actually above market for a player like Monk. Grayson Allen just signed for 4 years and $70 million to stay with the Suns. You can quibble about which player is better (Monk is the better ball handler and one-on-one scorer, but Allen shoots better from three and is a better defender), but it’s hard to argue that Monk and Allen are in different tiers as players. And while you can never assume one deal sets the market, obviously Allen and his representatives didn’t think he was going to see a ton more money if he hit free agency, otherwise he wouldn’t have signed the deal when he did.

You can also look at the list below of guard contracts/extensions signed in the last couple of years to get a better sense of where Monk’s eventual deal may fall. What jumps out is that only six deals (in red) have average annual salaries higher than the $19.5 million per year the Kings can offer.

• Dejounte Murray - 4 years, $114.1 million (starting in 2024)

• Devin Vassell - 5 years, $135 million (starting in 2024)

• Jalen Brunson - 4 years, $104 million (starting in 2022)

• Anfernee Simons - 4 years, $100 million (starting in 2022)

• Terry Rozier - 4 years, $96.3 million (starting in 2022)

• Josh Hart - 4 years, $80.9 million (starting in 2023)

• [Theoretical Kings Offer for Monk - 4 years, $78 million]

• Marcus Smart - 4 years, $76.5 million (starting in 2022)

• Keldon Johnson - 4 years, $74 million (starting in 2023)

• D’Angelo Russell - 2 years, $36 million (starting in 2023)

• Grayson Allen - 4 years, $70 million (starting in 2024)

• Bogdan Bogdanovic - 4 years, $68 million (starting in 2023)

• Lu Dort - 5 years, $82 million (starting in 2022)

• Caris Lavert - 2 years, $32 million (starting in 2023)

• Max Strus - 4 years, $62.3 million (starting in 2023)

• Kentavious Caldwell-Pope - 2 years, $30.1 million (starting in 2023)

• Tyus Jones - 2 years, $29 million (starting in 2023)

• Jordan Clarkson - 2 years, $28.4 million (starting in 2024)

• Josh Green - 3 years, $41 million (starting in 2024)

• Austin Reaves - 3 years, $53.8 million (starting in 2023)

• Cole Anthony - 3 years, $39.1 million (starting in 2024)

There are different circumstances for each of the contracts above, but the message is pretty clear—a lot of scoring guards on the starter/sixth man line aren’t getting contracts worth $19.5 million per season or that even go 4 years. With a potentially thin list of bidders, you have to wonder how likely it is that Monk ends up getting offers toward the top of the list.

The Kings can negotiate a new deal with Monk starting the day after the NBA Finals (June 24 at the latest). Monk can start negotiating with other teams on June 30. We’ll have to wait and see, but at least for now there’s good vibes.

What About the Other Kings Free Agents?

Of the Kings remaining free agents, Kessler Edwards and Alex Len should warrant a re-signing look, but it depends a lot on cost and what the Kings do elsewhere in free agency and the draft. I also expect the Kings to sign Jalen Slawson to another two-way contract.

The two remaining free agents—Javale McGee and Jordan Ford (two-way)—aren’t as likely to be back with the team. McGee pretty much lost the backup minutes to Len and will turn 37 next year; McGee theoretically could come back on a minimum deal, but there’s a good chance he’s replaced. Ford won’t be eligible for another two-way contract next year because he’ll be past his fourth NBA season, and he’s not likely to make the NBA roster.

Kessler Edwards

Edwards is a restricted free agent, meaning the Kings will have the chance to match competing offers for him from other teams (assuming they give him a small qualifying offer, which is likely). Edwards still has some intriguing upside as a 3-and-D wing. He’s only 23 years old and has great physical attributes (6’8”, 215 pounds, solid athleticism). He’s also flashed quality defense for stretches and posted decent, though slightly below average, three-point shooting numbers (35% last year on limited volume).

If the Kings re-sign Monk, keeping Edwards could get expensive because of the luxury tax. It’s hard to say exactly what he’d be offered by another team, but it’s unlikely to be much—most RFAs never get offer sheets from other teams, and Edwards really hasn’t done enough in the NBA to warrant another team offering him anything substantial. Still, if Monk is back and the Kings are flirting with the second apron, there’s a decent chance Edwards would end up a cap casualty if he’s offered anything much over the minimum by another team.

If the Kings don’t re-sign Monk, they have a bit more leeway. In that case, they could reasonably match offers for Edwards for a bit more money—think something in the $2-5 million range per season, probably on a 2- or 3-year deal. Anything beyond that starts to get expensive for a back-end rotation player that you’re hoping will develop.

Alex Len

There’s no real question at this point what Alex Len’s role in the NBA is—he’s a reasonable backup center option who has limitations on offense and in handling pick and rolls. He’s probably a minimum player, but he can contribute in that role. Regardless of whether the Kings re-sign Monk, someone needs to fill the backup center role on the roster. If the Kings don’t draft a reasonable back-up center option, Len can fill that role fine for his relatively low cost. And because finding a better backup center than Len in free agency is likely an expensive proposition, I wouldn’t expect the Kings to look at pricier options if they do end up re-signing Monk, even though they could theoretically offer free agents contracts worth up to the midlevel exception or bi-annual exception.

Ultimately, I think there’s a good chance Len is back with the Kings next season. He’s unlikely to get big money elsewhere, so unless he’s offered a clearly better opportunity to play elsewhere, the Kings are probably a good fit.

Jalen Slawson

Slawson is one of the Kings’ two second round picks from last season, as he was selected #54 overall out of Furman. He spent the 2023-24 season on a two-way contract with the Kings and spent most of the year playing for the G League Stockton Kings (he only played 37 minutes across 12 games with the NBA squad). Slawson is again eligible for a two-way contract, so it’s likely the Kings bring him back on another deal.

Find Help In the 2024 Draft, But Where Depends on Monk

The 2024 NBA draft will take place on June 27, less than a week after the Finals end and, importantly, after the Kings can start negotiating a new deal with Malik Monk. As a result, the Kings should have at least some indication of whether Monk is likely to re-sign or not by the time draft night rolls around, though they may not know for sure.

The final draft order is now set and the Kings will be picking twice at #13 (first round) and #45 (second round). What the Kings do with those picks—especially the valuable first rounder—will depend heavily on what happens with Monk.

[Note: It’s also worth flagging that the Kings have a cap hold for the #13 pick—basically a CBA-mandated placeholder for the eventual salary the player will earn (there aren’t mandated cap holds for second round picks). So, the Kings will have to carry a cap charge of about $4.7 million until they actually draft and sign the 13th pick. It’ll come up later.]

If Monk Re-Signs, The Kings Should Focus on Forwards at Pick #13

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, the Kings will have credible ball-handling and scoring support for lead-guard De’Aaron Fox in the backcourt already. They’ll also have decent shooting (Kevin Huerter) and defensive versatility (Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell). In that scenario, the Kings biggest need would be to find help at power forward or small forward.

Harrison Barnes has been a reliable starter for the Kings since arriving by trade in 2018, but he will be 32 next season and he is not the perfect fit as the team’s starting power forward. While Barnes is a very strong shooter and capable scorer (including off the dribble), he’s been an imperfect fit with Sabonis on the defensive end. Barnes is undersized as 4 and provides limited rebounding and almost no rim protection. He also doesn’t have the quickness, athleticism, or length to stay with forwards who can play on the perimeter or athletic rim runners. In all, it makes for a tough pairing with Sabonis defensively because they can both struggle with similar types of players and can’t rely too much on the other for help.

Drafting a younger, more athletic player to bolster the power forward slot would be nice for the Kings, whether Barnes comes off the bench or not. Without going into detail on draft prospects, there are several players who could fit the role likely to be available at pick #13 in Tristan Da Silva (Colorado), Tidjane Salaun (France), Tyler Smith (G League Ignite), and DaRon Holmes (Dayton). None of them are perfect prospects, but they’d provide help athletically without totally compromising shooting.

The Kings could also look to draft help on the wing at small forward. Keegan Murray has a firm hold on the starting 3 position, but the Kings could use depth behind him. Fox, Monk, Ellis, and Mitchell are all undersized to truly guard wings, and Huerter, not a particularly strong defensive presence to begin with, too often plays than his 6’7” size. Again, there should be a number of options in the draft for support at pick #13, including Da Silva, his college teammate Cody Williams (Colorado), and Dalton Knecht (Tennessee). There could also be options available at the Kings second round pick, though they may have to move up a bit and it’s always risky to project those players as contributors: for example, Ryan Dunn (Virginia), Dillon Jones (Weber State), Baylor Scheierman (Creighton), Alex Karaban (Connecticut).

If Monk Leaves, the Kings Should Also Look for Perimeter Scoring

Losing Monk would be tough for the Kings offensively, as the end of the season showed pretty clearly. They’re unlikely to find a player who can contribute at Monk’s level right away at pick #13, but there are a handful of players who can provide some scoring punch. While the Kings would still have needs at power forward and small forward (and it would be fair to draft those positions even if Monk leaves), finding more perimeter scoring punch and ball-handling would become a bigger team need without Monk.

By pick #13, I’m assuming that top options like Stephon Castle (Connecticut), Nikola Topic (International), Reed Sheppard (Kentucky), and Rob Dillingham (Kentucky) will be off the board. Obviously one of them could fall (don’t forget Tyrese Haliburton dropped way further than expected in the 2020 draft before the Kings picked him at #12), but I’m not banking on it. Still, several guards should be available that can bring scoring, shooting, or defense at varying levels.

Several freshmen—Jared McCain (Duke), Isaiah Collier (USC), and Ja’Kobe Walter (Baylor)—and junior Devin Carter (Providence) could still be on the board by the time the Kings pick. Each brings a slightly different flavor of player, but they’re all capable scorers. McCain, a Sacramento native, can really shoot the ball and scored effectively for a solid Duke team last year, but he has some size limitations. Collier has scoring chops and stellar physical traits for a point guard (he’s 6’5”, 210 pounds), but his shooting was inconsistent, and he had a fair number of defensive lapses. Walter also has a good physical profile and looks to be a quality scorer, but he was a little inconsistent and doesn’t offer much ball-handling right now. Carter is older than the others, but he was more productive last season and plays hounding defense despite being just 6’3”; but he had an outlier year from 3-point range last year, hitting 37.7% from deep, so it’s unclear whether his shooting will sustain going forward.

All these guys (and a few other options) could be solid picks if Monk is on the team, as they could help take some pressure off of Fox to score and handle the ball. Without Monk on the roster, they’d have a pretty clear role on the team.

Finding Free Agency Fits

The Kings will be looking to the free agency market to bolster the roster, but who they can target will be hugely impacted by whether Monk re-signs or leaves. They’ll also need to consider draft strategy and other re-signings like Len and Kessler Edwards before solidifying a free agency strategy. The trade market is a little distinct, but it’s also going to affect how the Kings address free agency generally.

For this post, I want to focus on strategy and the Kings needs rather than specific free agency targets.

Let’s start with laying out what I see as the most significant team needs (before re-signing any of the Kings own free agents and before the draft). The below are in no particular order:

1. Secondary ball-handling

2. Secondary shot creation / one-on-one scoring

3. Additional wing defense and rebounding

4. Improved rebounding, defense, and rim protection at power forward

5. Backup center minutes

Ideally, the Kings can find all of that without compromising too much shooting.

But what should the Kings’ strategy be? As I’ve mentioned, that largely depends on what happens with Monk.

What If Monk Re-Signs?

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they will basically have addressed their secondary ball-handling and shot creation needs (#1 and #2 from the list above). As I’ve talked about already, this would be financially expensive and likely push the Kings into the luxury tax if they can’t move off another player—but that’s something most teams must do to compete meaningfully in the playoffs.

But re-signing Monk would have a huge impact on how the Kings can play the rest of the free agency market. You have to know some of the cap rules to understand why.

Over-the-cap teams like the Kings can only sign players using cap exceptions. While the Kings can re-sign their own players with Bird rights, the midlevel exception (or MLE) and biannual exception are the two primary ways they can sign other free agents to the roster.

Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Non-taxpayer MLE to sign one or more players to contracts with starting salaries worth up to about $12.9 million (projected) in total. Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Taxpayer MLE, which is similar but projected to worth only about $5.2 million. But whether the Kings are in the luxury tax won’t be assessed until the end of next season. As a result, they can technically still use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE even though re-signing Monk and signing the #13 pick would put their team salary above the projected luxury tax line. If this seems like a loophole, that’s because it is, and it’s one the NBA CBA has already addressed. Thus, under the CBA, if the Kings were to use more than the Taxpayer MLE (e.g., more than $5.2 million) to sign players, they would trigger the hard cap rules, which prohibits the team’s total team salary from exceeding the first apron, projected to be about $178.6 million. Unlike the regular NBA salary cap, there are no exceptions to the hard cap—the Kings wouldn’t be allowed to exceed $178.6 million in team salary.

The bi-annual exception can also be used every other year to sign free agents. It’s a smaller exception, projected to be worth around $4.7 million, and it’s only available to teams below the first apron.

For simplicity, you can refer to the chart below, which lists the exceptions and how the Kings could trigger the hard cap (they could also trigger the hard cap through trades, but that’s not relevant for now):

[Projections from Spotrac]

I’ll also list the salary cap, luxury tax, and aprons for easy reference:

[Projections from Spotrac]

So, the net effect of re-signing Monk would mean the Kings have a few options for other free agents:

• Option 1: Use the Non-taxpayer MLE and/or Biannual Exception to sign free agents, but trigger the hard cap at the first apron, OR

• Option 2: Use only the Taxpayer MLE to sign free agents

Option 1 would give the Kings a chance to bring in better free agents in theory. They’d have a bigger exception to use (up to $12.9 million for a player) and more exceptions available. But because they would be triggering the hard cap, their team salary couldn’t go above $178.7 million, and they’d already be dangerously close with just their current roster, plus Monk at $17.4 million, and their first-round pick—their team salary would be about $173.6 million from those things alone. In other words, even though they would have access to the bigger exceptions, they wouldn’t have a practical way to actually use those exceptions without trading away someone on the roster—potentially important role players Davion Mitchell or Trey Lyles, or even bigger salaries for players like Harrison Barnes or Kevin Huerter. Using Option 1 would also restrict the Kings in other ways. Most meaningfully, they couldn’t take back more than 100% of the salary they send out in a trade—in other words, they couldn’t take advantage of the typical salary matching rules (which I’ve written about before).

Option 2 would be less restrictive, since it wouldn’t trigger the hard cap (the Kings could still theoretically trigger the hard cap with trades), and the Kings probably wouldn’t have to trade any existing players away to maintain flexibility. But the most they could pay a free agent in starting salary would be $5.2 million—probably not enough to lure a significant free agent.

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they are practically going to be stuck with Option 2 unless they also make a salary cutting trade.

Monk would address needs #1 (secondary ball handling) and #2 (secondary shot creation), and they could re-sign Len to address need #5 (backup center). The team could use its draft picks and the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE to try to address issue #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding).

I won’t go into detail on free agency targets for needs #3 and #4, but some players I wouldn’t mind considering that could be available for the Taxpayer MLE are below (unfortunately, none are really game changers):

• Royce O’Neale (he may be too expensive)

• Gordon Hayward

• Jae Crowder

• PJ Tucker

• Kyle Anderson

• Jeff Green

• Taurean Prince

What If Monk Leaves?

Monk leaving in free agency means more needs to fill, but the Kings have a bit more flexibility in who they can target.

Specifically, the Kings will likely be able to use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE and the Biannual exception without worrying about the hard cap. Their team salary would only be about $156.2 million, far enough away from the first apron that triggering the hard cap wouldn’t be a practical concern.

Of course, with Monk out the door, the Kings would have to address all five of the needs I listed before: #1 (secondary ball handling); #2 (secondary shot creation); #3 (wing defense/rebounding); #4 (power forward defense/rebounding); and #5 (backup center). They could still probably re-sign Alex Len to address need #5, but the other four needs would need to be addressed.

With the Biannual exception, the Kings could basically target the same list of players as they could for the Taxpayer MLE. After all, the exceptions are only about $500,000 apart, and most free agent targets in that range won’t have a ton of high-salary options. But they could also try to use the Biannual exception to address other needs like #1 (secondary ball handling) or #2 (secondary shot creation) with players like Reggie Jackson, Spencer Dinwiddie, or Kris Dunn.

The Non-taxpayer MLE would also open up a host of potential free agency options, as the team could look at players who will command much larger starting salaries (up to $12.9 million). This is particularly important to addressing needs #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding), as those needs might be harder to fill in the draft or with the smaller Taxpayer MLE. A couple players who could be get-able with the Non-taxpayer MLE stand out as particularly good fits for the Kings.

Naji Marshall. Marshall is an unrestricted free agent and the Pelicans are looking to tamp down salary, so he probably won’t get a huge offer to return to New Orleans. He’s a good defender who can hold up on the wing and has the size and strength to play minutes at power forward. If his improved shooting (38.7% from three this year, the highest of his career) is real, he would be a solid addition to the Kings’ front court. It’s possible Marshall will sign a deal worth less than the full Non-taxpayer MLE, which would be a nice get.

Obi Toppin. Toppin is a solid modern power forward option. He’s competent defensively and his size/length/athleticism would make him a better defensive alternative to Barnes for rim protection and on the glass. He’s also more switchable. He’s a more proven shooter than Marshall, but he also set a career high this year by hitting 40.3% of his threes—which would be stellar if it sticks. Unlike Marshall, Toppin is a restricted free agent. The Pacers would get 24 hours to match any offer the made to him, which means the Kings would be in limbo for a bit at the start of free agency while they wait and see if the Pacers match. That’s a serious risk, as the Pacers might well consider Toppin good enough to warrant matching a contract worth the full Non-taxpayer MLE or more. I’d love to have him on the Kings, but going after him is a bit risky.

There are also a bunch of other potential free agents who may be get-able with the Non-Taxpayer MLE. These include wing options like Nic Batum, Kelly Oubre, Robert Covington, and Royce O’Neale (who may sign for less); guards like De’Anthony Melton, Markelle Fultz, and Malik Beasley; and even some bigs like Isaiah Hartenstein (probably not worth the cost), Jalen Smith, and Mason Plummer. For the Non-taxpayer MLE, I’d advocate focusing on wings, but the Kings would have options.

Be Opportunistic with Trades

The Kings don’t have the biggest war-chest of any team on the trade market, but they’ve held on to enough future draft assets and tradable contracts that they can throw a competitive bid in if the right deal comes along. The Kings owe the Hawks a top 12-protected first round pick in 2025 (which rolls over to top 10-protected in 2026 if it doesn’t convey), but they otherwise control all their own first rounders. I’ve written in detail about the rules governing trades for first round picks, but the important thing to keep in mind is the Kings can feasibly trade a bunch of first round picks if they need to (there are details they’d have to iron out, but it’s workable).

If the Kings want to target an All-Star or near All-Star level player, they’ve got the assets to do so—but they will need to be careful to avoid hard-capping themselves and making a future trade more difficult. They could still theoretically do a big trade if they re-sign Monk, but it’s going to be more difficult if they do because of the hard cap.

I’ll probably do a separate post looking at potential trade scenarios in more depth, but I want to quickly lay out some thoughts on a few high-profile trade names that have been floating around recently.

Paul George

Paul George is everyone’s favorite potential trade target right now, given he has a player option for 2024-25 and hasn’t yet agreed to an extension with the Clippers. He would be a near-perfect fit for a lot of teams, including the Kings. He can provide scoring, ball-handling, shooting, and quality defense for positions 1 to 4.

But getting George is going to be insanely expensive in trade for exactly that reason, and it would be tough for the Kings to put together a winning trade package. To get close, the Kings would probably have to give up as many first rounders as they can—2024 on draft night, plus future picks in 2027 (which they would have to free up from the Hawks), 2029, and 2031 to even make a competitive offer. They would also need to send out Huerter, Barnes, and another player to make the salary match. It’s also a given that the Clippers would ask for Keegan Murray back, although the Kings shouldn’t be willing to trade him away if they’re also sending meaningful draft pick compensation.

On top of the outgoing picks and players, trading for George is practically going to require giving him a max extension that would cover him into his late thirties. The details of the contract are subject to projections and some nuance based on what George actually wants and something called the Over 38 rule, but most likely the Kings would be signing up to pay George over $200 million for the next four seasons at a minimum (as a 10 year veteran, George can get sign a max contract with a starting salary of up to 35% of the salary cap in the first year, just over $49.3 million). That’s real money, but it’s basically table-stakes to get George interested in a deal—the whole reason he hasn’t re-signed with the Clippers yet is because they haven’t offered him that contractual certainty.

In terms of draft capital and dollars, bringing in a player of George’s caliber could be worth it—especially if it allows the Kings to compete for a championship. But it’s an enormous risk for an aging player, and you have to wonder if George is good enough to make that kind of all-in play worthwhile.

Brandon Ingram

The Pelicans are reportedly putting Brandon Ingram on the market. He’s going into the last year of his current contract and slated to make $36 million in 2024-25, so just like with Paul George, any team looking to acquire him should plan to offer him a lucrative new deal quickly.

Even though he is only 26 years old, Ingram is heading into his eighth season in the NBA. He’s been an All Star once before, and throughout his five seasons in New Orleans, he’s put up near-All Star level numbers. Given his age, one might expect him to draw more trade interest than Paul George, but he’s not quite the same seamless fit as George for most teams (the Kings included). On the offensive end, Ingram is a good scorer who can create his own shots, score at all three levels, and distribute effectively when he needs to. But he’s not the same level of knock-down three point shooter that George is, and at times his shot diet can weight a little too much toward midrange shots and isolations. And defensively, Ingram is just a bit above average—he doesn’t provide the same elite wing defense that a player like George can. Ingram also has a pretty consistent injury track record lately, as he’s played 65 games or more only once in his career as a rookie (for the record, George has had plenty of injuries too).

Still, Ingram is likely to attract a fair amount of interest if he’s really on the trade block, and it won’t be cheap to acquire him. The package of four first round picks that the Kings would need to give up for George would likely be too much for Ingram, but the price could get close. New Orleans may also be unwilling to take back a lot of salary either, since money is part of the reason they’re looking to move on from Ingram. Would they take back both Huerter and Barnes in a deal to make the salaries match, or would they insist on getting a third team involved?

The Kings could probably absorb the hit of draft picks and matching salary needed to bring in Ingram. He would also fill the team’s need for another scorer and ball handler, while offering better defense on the wing than Huerter or Barnes (he may not fare much better at power forward defensively, but Keegan Murray could guard up if needed). But I'm still wary of taking a swing on Ingram because of how hard it would be on the Kings’ salary cap situation. Ingram won’t be eligible for the same maximum salary as George because he’ll only have 9 years of NBA service by the time his free agency rolls around, which means a max contract for him would be capped at 30% of the salary cap at a projected starting salary of $42.3 million. But he can sign a 5-year extension that carries him through the 2028-29 season, too, for a total contract value of over $245 million. While that’s less dollars per year than George, it’s a longer commitment with even more total dollars. Regardless, it has the same practical effect on the Kings’ long-term cap situation: the team would be above the salary cap, in the luxury tax, and potentially above the first apron (or even the second apron) with Fox, Sabonis, and Ingram on the roster for the foreseeable future.

Fox, Sabonis, Ingram, and Murray would be a solid team for sure. The floor spacing offensively would be a bit worrisome and the team wouldn’t really scare anyone defensively either, but they’d have a ton of weapons and varied skillsets. But is it enough to make this the one big shot they take? If they do make a move for Ingram, it’ll basically lock them into the roster, with little ability to improve on the margins and few future draft picks available to supplement the roster.

Ultimately, a trade for Ingram is something the Kings front office will have to consider, but whether it’s worth it depends a lot on the trade cost in particular. Smaller deals could improve the team and maintain more future flexibility, while waiting to take a big swing on a better fit would also be a viable strategy.

Jerami Grant

Portland is in a seriously rough salary cap situation given the fact that their team isn’t all that close to competing for the playoffs yet. They have four players under contract with over $20 million in salary, and two of them—Jerami Grant and Malcolm Brogan—are over 30. Just a year ago, Portland signed Grant to a 5 year, $160 million deal, so they don’t need to trade him immediately, but they may be willing to part with him for the right price.

From the Kings perspective, Grant would bring helpful length, athleticism, and scoring on the wing. Though he’s only slightly above average in scoring efficiency, Grant does have scoring chops (he’s averaged over 19 points per game for the last four seasons) and shoots it well from deep at over 40% for the last two years. He does a good job of drawing fouls, too. With that said, he’s not as talented of a scorer as George and Ingram, and his defensive impact is often less than you’d expect from an athletic wing with Grant’s length. Per Dunks and Threes, Grant was in the 38th percentile of defenders last season in terms of Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, and he’s posted negative numbers in terms of Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus stat for the last five seasons. His rebounding is also surprisingly lacking—in terms of rebounding rate, he’s less effective than incumbent power forward Harrison Barnes on the glass.

Grant comes with a salary cap charge of $29.8 million next year, so if the Kings take him on, they’ll likely be in the luxury tax (especially if they can re-sign Monk). But because the Kings would have to send out matching salary (probably in the form of Barnes and Huerter), they can find ways to avoid the hard cap and stay below the first apron. That makes Grant a bit more attractive as a trade candidate compared to George and Ingram since the lower contract value is useful for the team’s roster construction.

But Grant may not really move the needle much at all. Adding Grant would give the Kings’ secondary scoring and a slight defensive improvement on the wing, but it wouldn’t really help with rebounding or ball handling.

If Portland is looking for a couple first rounders for Grant, the Kings ought to consider whether he’s worth the price. I would personally look to other options for that level of compensation, especially given the Kings would probably have to ship out Barnes and Huerter, but there’s at least a solid argument for snagging Grant at that price. But if Portland has an asking price is any higher, it’s not an obvious win—it would make more sense to hold onto the draft equity for the future.

Wrap Up

That’s all I’ve got for this round. I will try to take a deeper look at individual draft targets, free agency targets, and trade candidates down the line. Let me know if you want to hear about anyone in particular!

What I’m Watching For: Nuggets v. Timberwolves

The second round of the NBA Playoffs starts this weekend in the Western Conference with the Denver Nuggets squaring off against the Minnesota Timberwolves. This figures to be a fun series, with the NBA’s best player Nikola Jokic and ascendant star Anthony Edwards headlining.

By the numbers, the Wolves and Nuggets are pretty evenly matched this year. The Nuggets went 57-25 with a +5.3 point differential for the season compared to the Wolves 56-26 record with a +6.5 point differential. Minnesota is the stronger team defensively, as their 108.4 defensive rating was best in the league per NBA.com, compared to the Nuggets’ 112.3 defensive rating (8th). The Pups were more middling offensively, though, especially when compared to the Nuggets—Minnesota’s 114.6 offensive rating ranked just 17th overall, while the Nuggets’ 117.8 offensive rating was good for 5th.

In the head-to-head matchups, the teams went 2-2 against one another, but it’s hard to read too much into that record as a few stars missed games, including Karl-Anthony Towns (3 games), Rudy Gobert (1 game), and Jamal Murray (1 game).

The relative parity this year contrasts a bit with last year’s playoffs, however, as the Nuggets completed a Gentleman’s Sweep (4-1) of the Timberwolves in the first round, with the Wolves managing to pull out their one win at home in overtime. While the comparatively young T-Wolves squad did put up a good showing despite missing key contributors Jaden McDaniels and Naz Reid, the series was never really competitive as the Timberwolves struggled to pull through in late-game situations, where the Nuggets have thrived for years.

With more experience under their belts, a healthy roster, and a much stronger defensive identity in year two following the trade for Rudy Gobert, it’s reasonable to expect the Timberwolves to put up a much stronger fight this time around.

The Nuggets are the reigning NBA Champs, so it’s not surprising they are (and should be) heavy favorites to take the series. They’re negative -205 to win the series on FanDuel right now, making them roughly a 2-to-1 favorite. Whether Minnesota can pull out the series win will depend on a number of things, but I’m dialed in on a few of them. I’ll dive into them below.

How Is Ant’s Pick & Roll Decision-Making?

Anthony Edwards absolutely roasted the Phoenix Suns for four games in the first round, averaging an efficient 31 points (on 51.2% from the field and 43.8% from three), 8 rebounds, 6.3 assists, 2 steals and 0.8 blocks per game. He also trash-talked Kevin Durant mercilessly and drew lofty comparisons to Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant from some real NBA luminaries.

Ant’s success in the series came as a result of elite outside shooting and fantastic decision-making when running pick and rolls.

It’s not that interesting to focus on the shooting. Edwards shot 35.7% from three this season and has shot 35.3% for his career; if he’s draining 43%+ of his threes, he’s going to be a huge problem. We’ll see if that continues—he’s getting mostly good looks, but I’m wary of the numbers coming back down a bit.

But how Ant has handled the pick and roll more generally feels different. It’s been a staple of Minnesota’s half court offense, especially in the playoffs, but he seems to be making superb reads quicker than he has in the past.

Take a look at these clips from the Wolves-Nuggets game on April 10. In a high-leverage game that had huge impact on seeding, Edwards was a bit hesitant coming off picks. On both plays below, Edwards doesn’t attack the screen with urgency, so the Nuggets never really have to compromise to address his attack.

In this first clip, Edwards does a hesitation dribble that lets the trailer defender Kentavious Caldwell-Pope recover. Jokic also doesn’t have to step up, which lets him stay straddle between cutting off Edwards and preventing an easy pass to Rudy Gobert as he dives.

Here’s a second clip.

You can see in this clip that Wolves intentionally bring Jamal Murray up into the action since he’s a weaker defender than Christian Braun. Because Edwards doesn’t attack the screen forcefully, Murray can just sit back in the driving lane. Edwards again has a slight hesitation before pulling up for a contested three—though it’s a makable shot for him, ideally you’d like to see him get downhill. Murray is too small to prevent Edwards from driving, and even a little bit of space would be enough for Edwards to hit either Mike Conley coming off the weak side flare screen or Gobert if Jokic rotates to cut off the Edwards drive.

On a few occasions, the Nuggets decided to double Edwards off the pick and roll. It’s a common strategy that teams across the league have been trying with ball-dominant guards, as it forces the ball away from the best creators on the opposing team. Edwards has seen this in some games, but it’s not utilized against him as often as with players like Luka Doncic or Jalen Brunson.

Edwards struggled with the double twice here. In the first instance, he didn’t get off the ball soon enough—it should go to Gobert, who should then pass out of it (in fairness to Edwards, Gobert gives up on the screen early, so that action probably wasn’t going anywhere). It’s fine, though, because Minnesota is able to reset. On the second screen, Jokic again moves to trap Edwards. To his credit, Edwards gets on Jokic’s hip, but given where he is on the floor, he’s left with the choice to make a really tough pass to Gobert or Jaden McDaniels in the corner, or to launch a three fading behind the backboard (which he did, and missed).

I want to make clear that these clips aren’t a major issue or anything close to it. Most pick and roll ball-handlers, other than true stars with serious passing chops, can run into these kinds of issues. In each of the clips, the defense was sound, and they even mixed up their approach from time to time. No matter how good he is, Edwards isn’t going to win these actions all the time. But these are the kinds of actions that Edwards needs to win consistently for the T-Wolves offense to be productive enough against elite teams in the half court.

That said, what’s really amazing is how much better Edwards has been at handling these situations in the playoffs this year. Against Phoenix, he was much more consistent about attacking pick and roll defenses aggressively and getting the ball out early when double-teams occurred.

For example, here’s a clip of Edwards dribbling straight past Royce O’Neale when he tries to switch a pick and roll.

What I like about this clip is that Ant attacks O’Neale immediately as soon as he realizes that O’Neale is giving up the middle lane. While Edwards is dribbling into the help defense (Kevin Durant, Eric Gordon, and the remains of Josh Okogie, who got completely wiped out of the play on the screen), his decisive attack puts a lot of pressure on Phoenix. Durant either has to stick to Towns, an elite three point shooter, or try to stop Edwards’ drive. Eric Gordon at the top of the screen similarly has to choose between sticking with Nickeil Alexander-Walker or stepping up to the drive. That puts Edwards at a decided advantage with multiple options, even if he ultimately is good enough to just take an easy lay-in.

This next clip shows Edwards getting off a double-team as soon as it comes. While it’s not off a pick and roll, Edwards does a good job recognizing that the defense is already compromised and will be forced into a tough rotation if he swings the ball.

The result is a clean look from Jaden McDaniels for three.

He also did a good job getting off doubles after a pick and roll. Here’s one where the quick pass out of the double-team leads to an easy shot for Kyle Anderson (nevermind that Anderson misses the bunny):

Edwards, of course, didn’t transform completely in the Suns series. He still has a tendency to hesitate a bit at the top of a pick and roll. That can work against slower defenders, like in the clip below where his hesitation freezes Jusuf Nurkic.

Still, he’ll want to attack these situations directly and with more urgency against the Nuggets, who handle pick and roll defense much better than the Suns. That will help force the Nuggets into difficult compromise situations to open up looks for Edwards or his teammates.

Will KAT Bully Smaller Guys On the Glass?

The Nuggets have tried to play just about everyone on Anthony Edwards for stretches. In their last game, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Jamal Murray, Aaron Gordon, Christian Braun, and Michael Porter Jr. all spent time trying to defend Ant.

In an ideal world, Denver would prefer to park KCP on Edwards for the whole game. He’s a solid perimeter defender, and if he can at least contain Edwards a bit, Denver can let Aaron Gordon focus on Towns. But there’s a good chance that Edwards has become too much for KCP to handle for huge stretches given his strength and height advantage. Edwards roasted everyone the Suns tried to throw at him, including running straight through bigger players like Royce O’Neale, Kevin Durant, and Josh Okogie. If that happens, the Nuggets may need to shift their bigger bodies to Edwards just to hold up better at the point of attack. Even if it doesn’t, the Wolves will look for ways to get guys like Michael Porter Jr. and Jokic on Edwards to take advantage of his lateral quickness.

When the bigger guys are on the perimeter guarding Edwards, Karl-Anthony Towns needs to capitalize big on his extreme height advantage over Denver’s guards and perimeter players that might be switched on to him. Towns should be able to easily shoot over smaller defenders like KCP, Murray, and Braun if they end up on him, but he can also use these mismatches to generate rebounds. Whenever Gordon is off of him, Towns should be looking to take advantage of his size.

The Wolves dominated the Suns in the first round partly off the strength of their rebounding. They averaged 48.2 rebounds per 100 possessions (14.3 offensive rebounds and 33.9 defensive rebounds). That was a dramatic improvement over their season-long averages, particularly on the offensive glass; the Timberwolves averaged 44.3 total rebounds per 100 possessions for the season (11th overall), with 34.7 defensive rebounds and 9.5 offensive rebounds per 100 possessions.

Towns’ size advantage should give the Wolves opportunities to win on the offensive glass in particular, if he wants it. Towns can be inclined to drift around the perimeter to hunt threes, but when he has smaller defenders on him, he should be looking to take advantage. Other than Nikola Jokic, who will frequently be occupied trying to keep Rudy Gobert off the glass, Denver doesn’t have anyone who can out-rebound KAT consistently—especially if Gordon or MPJ is on Edwards.

Offensive rebounds aren’t the core of KAT’s game, but he’s more than capable. Getting second chances will be especially important for a T-Wolves team that sometimes struggles in the half court.

I’m not hoping to see Towns to play like Shaq and try to post up smaller players. That would clog things up too much offensively for the Wolves, especially when Gobert is on the floor. It also risks Towns getting into foul trouble quickly given he’s not a natural post player and can be prone to bowling through defenders too clumsily. But if he can follow drives to the basket and look to crash readily on the glass, he could really generate a lot of extra opportunities for the Wolves.

Can Denver Punish Minnesota For Putting Gobert On Gordon?

A fair number of teams—including the Lakers last series—have concluded that stopping Nikola Jokic is basically impossible, no matter how good the individual defender you throw at him is. Instead, teams that have a good rim protector have often opted to try having another big-ish player guard Jokic while their best help defender (usually a center) matches up man-to-man with Aaron Gordon. The theory is pretty simple and sensible: you can’t stop Jokic one-on-one, so have a quality help defender ready to pounce and risk Aaron Gordon beating you from the perimeter. Gordon shooting isn’t that risky as he shot just 29% from three this year, and he’s a 32.3% shooter from three for his career.

I’m so excited to see how Denver attacks this matchup. If Denver can figure out how to consistently take advantage of Gobert sagging off Gordon to play help defense, it’s going to be difficult for Minnesota to slow Denver’s offense down enough to win.

I’m sure that Denver coach Mike Malone and his staff have cooked up dozens of ways to attack the Gobert-Gordon match up, but I want to tick through a few that I think are potentially interesting.

Perhaps the most obvious option is simply getting Gordon involved in the pick and roll to force Gobert into the action and away from the basket. There are basically four options here: Gordon as the screener for Jokic; Gordon as the screener for another shooter (not Jokic); Jokic as the screener for Gordon; or another shooter (not Jokic) as the screener for Gordon. All of these actions force Gobert into the mix and away from the basket.

• If Gordon screens for Jokic, it’s likely going to be a big-on-big screen since it’s hard to imagine the Wolves trying to stick anyone smaller than Karl-Anthony Towns/Naz Reid/Kyle Anderson on Jokic regularly. Bigs aren’t used to fighting over screens, so Gobert is probably going to have to play at the level of the screen or hedge even higher to prevent Jokic from shooting or getting crystal-clear passing lanes. Jokic doesn’t have blow-by speed, so that’s probably the right call—but the Wolves have to hope that Jokic can’t find an open shooter or cutter out of the action early.

• If Gordon screens for another shooter (think Jamal Murray, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, or even Reggie Jackson), Gobert would still be drawn into the action and away from the basket. Gobert likes to play drop coverage on screens, where he falls back to defend against the drive and roll—but with a good shooter, that drop often has to be slower. That can make time for Jokic to find space on the weak side and get deep position against a weaker defender, with Gobert out of place to provide adequate help.

• Gordon can also act as the primary ball-handler in a screen with Jokic or another shooter, but there’s a good chance that both defenders would still with the screener (Jokic or the shooter) rather than try to follow Gordon over the screen. Obviously, Gordon could shoot from there since he’d be wide open. He could also try to get downhill quickly and put pressure on the paint, but that’s not really his game. I don’t expect the Nuggets to rely Gordon as the ball-handler (and I can’t think of times they’ve used it regularly) because it puts Gordon in positions he isn’t really used to.

Another option is getting Gordon to set off-ball screens for a better shooter like Michael Porter Jr. or Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. With Gobert looking to help on Jokic, Gordon can sit in the weak side corner and opportunistically look to set back-picks or flare-picks for Denver’s stronger shooters. Here’s a really crude example (sorry my artwork sucks):

Denver can also let Jokic go to work on the opposite side of the paint from Gordon, especially further down the block. Jokic is really comfortable one-on-one in this area, and he’s going up against a below average defender in Towns here (because Gobert is on Gordon). For Minnesota, this is a tough look to deal with. Jaden McDaniels and Mike Conley can’t help out easily or they will leave quality shooters. Gobert has a lot of ground to cover between Gordon and helping Towns. And if he moves too far toward Jokic, Gordon will be able to operate from the dunker’s spot, where he has a variety of moves to finish and can comfortably cut into the middle of the paint. Again, here’s another crude drawing to show how difficult Gobert’s responsibility gets—the shaded area is basically what he has to cover even if Gordon opts not to extend to the three point line:

The last thing I’ll address is that Gordon can just shoot it better, too. Denver might just let him shoot! Though his shooting was down a bit this year, in 2021-22 and 2022-23, Gordon shot 33.5% and 34.7% from three point range. He also shot 39% from three in the playoffs last season, and Gordon’s shooting was a big part of what let Denver win the Western Conference and the title last season. If Gordon can shoot closer to 35% from three (which is certainly possible), Minnesota’s strategy of helping on Jokic is going to be much less effective.

I had to cut myself off rather than dream up new things that Denver hasn’t shown much yet. But needless to say, this is going to be interesting—I’m super excited to see how the series will go.

Who’s Gonna Win?

Just in case folks are curious, I’m picking Denver to pull the series out in six games. Their offense is exceptionally versatile and their long playoff experience will probably come into play at some point. With that said, Minnesota is absolutely capable of pulling out the series. I suspect the T-Wolves to figure out the best ways to slow down Denver’s offense (to the extent that’s even possible), and their size and length should give them as good of a chance as anyone to win. If Anthony Edwards can reprise his pick and roll efficiency and three point shooting and Karl-Anthony Towns makes his presence known on the boards (Minnesota would benefit from Jaden McDaniels doing the same), the Pups could generate enough half-court scoring to win the series—but they’ll need to be more consistent than they’ve been in the past to do so.

NFL Draft First Round Reactions

The first round of the 2024 NFL Draft wrapped up last night. There were a fair number of expected picks and also some truly surprising developments.

In all, 32 players were drafted: nine offensive linemen, seven wide receivers, six quarterbacks, five edge rushers, three cornerbacks, one defensive tackle, and one tight end (no running backs, linebackers, or safeties were taken in the first round).

Let’s jump in with reactions to each pick.

Pick #1: Chicago Bears

With the first pick, the Chicago Bears select Caleb Williams, quarterback from University of Southern California.

No surprise here. For weeks, everyone has expected the Bears to take Caleb Williams, and this was a no brainer pick in my view. Williams showed incredible skill at USC, with a strong arm, accuracy, and a remarkable ability to make throws from odd angles and off-platform. Williams will join a Chicago Bears offense with a ton of talent at the skill positions, led by veteran Pro Bowl wide receivers like DJ Moore and the newly acquired Keenan Allen (we’ll talk about who else they added to the receiver room later).

Given the value of quarterback, there’s nothing to critique about this pick. The Bears will still have to develop Williams into a star, but they filled their most important position with the consensus top talent in the draft at the position. This is the right pick that was only made possible by the Bears trading away last year’s #1 overall pick to the Panthers (who selected Bryce Young) for Moore and a haul of draft picks.

Pick #2: Washington Commanders

With the second pick, the Washington Commanders select Jayden Daniels, quarterback from Louisiana State.

Like the Bears, the Commanders needed to find a quarterback in this draft. Daniels had a tremendous year at LSU, leading the country in passing yards and throwing for 40 touchdowns. Obviously, the Commanders liked Daniels the best of the remaining quarterbacks, and I agree. He gets the ball out quickly even though he was asked to make full field reads in college and he has elite touch throwing to the deep part of the field. He also has world class speed for the quarterback position, which may come into play if Washington doesn’t find a way to improve its offensive line play. I expect them to look for offensive line help on Day 2 of the draft so they can protect Daniels—he’s on the slim side, so they’ll want to avoid having him take too many hits.

Really great pick by the Commanders. They’ve got a ceiling raiser in their building.

Pick #3: New England Patriots

With the third pick, New England Patriots select Drake Maye, quarterback from North Carolina.

Maye has elite tools for a quarterback prospect. He’s big, strong, fast, and throws the ball well. He’s not as consistently accurate as Caleb Williams and Jayden Daniels at this point in his career, which is part of the reason he goes third here.

From the Patriots perspective, this pick makes perfect sense. The team let Hall of Fame coach Bill Belichick go this offseason, effectively hitting the reset button (he won six Super Bowls with the team over the last 23 years as head coach). They had no clear long-term option for quarterback on the roster. With a toolsy player like Maye still on the board, it’s a great opportunity for the team and quarterback to develop together. The Pats also have veteran quarterback Jacoby Brissett on the roster, so to the extent they need to give Maye some time to develop and work on his decision-making and consistency, they can do so.

The Pats opted not to trade out of pick #3 to accrue more draft capital. The roster needs an overall talent infusion, so I’m sure there was some appeal to the idea of trading back for more picks. That said, I think it’s the right call to snag your franchise quarterback if you believe in the guy available—and clearly the Patriots do. Plus, at this point it’s still unclear whether a good offer was ever made by other quarterback needy teams like the Vikings or Broncos, so there’s no reason to assume trading back would make sense.

The Pats have an answer to their biggest open question, and they rightfully should be happy about that. Maye’s ceiling is incredibly high—they’ll have to find a way to help him maximize his talents.

Pick #4: Arizona Cardinals

With the fourth pick, the Arizona Cardinals select Marvin Harrison Jr., wide receiver from Ohio State.

Pick #4 was a potential pivot point in the draft, but it turned out pretty chalky as the Cardinals opt to keep their pick and select Marvin Harrison Jr. There’s nothing to criticize about this pick—the Cardinals had a huge need at wide receiver, a premium position, and they filled it with a player who has been atop many draft watchers’ boards for almost two years. Harrison Jr. will be the most talented receiver on the Cardinals the first time he steps on the field, and he gives Kyler Murray a go-to receiver who can work at all three levels of the field.

I wonder whether the Cardinals would have taken a godfather offer for this pick if they’d received one (given how the rest of the draft went, it seems doubtful they did). They have enough needs on the roster that I would’ve probably moved back. But without knowing they got such an offer, they made a strong choice, even though my personal receiver of choice in the draft was Malik Nabers.

Pick #5: Los Angeles Chargers

With the fifth pick, the Los Angeles Chargers select Joe Alt, offensive tackle from Notre Dame.

Chargers head coach Jim Harbaugh and his staff have said repeatedly they want to strengthen the Chargers’ offensive line, so it makes sense that they would use their biggest draft asset on an offensive lineman. Joe Alt is, by consensus, the most complete offensive tackle prospect in the draft. He’s a fantastic pass blocker and sturdy in the run game and he does a good job avoiding penalties. Most importantly, he almost never misses an assignment, which an invaluable trait for offensive lineman (and one that is surprisingly often missing). He’s also allowed just two sacks in the last two years.

Alt played his entire collegiate career at left tackle and the Chargers already have a Pro Bowl left tackle on the roster in Rashawn Slater. That means one of the two will be playing another position next season. I’m guessing Alt at right tackle, but we’ll see. As a consequence, it’s hard to say this pick is the highest use of value even if it fits the team’s philosophy. Still, offensive tackle (on either side) is a high-value position, and the Chargers clearly weren’t content with their current options. Last year’s right tackle Trey Pipkins did not have a strong season and has struggled with blocking downhill in the run game for a couple years. Right guard Jamaree Salyer also struggled last season, though he had success as a rookie at left tackle filling in for an injured Slater.

It’s clear the Chargers are committing to an organization-wide philosophy that centers on high-level offensive line play. That makes a ton of sense given some of the most successful teams in football have rolled out top-5 offensive lines regularly (think the Philadelphia Eagles in recent years). There’s also some benefit to zigging while other teams zag, and as team’s league-wide have built defensive rosters to combat the pass, they’ve gotten smaller and potentially more susceptible to run-oriented teams with size up front. Drafting Alt isn’t going to automatically turn the Chargers into a dominant running team (there were probably better downhill run blockers in this draft for power/gap schemes, though we’ll have to see what the Bolts ultimately run), but he will improve the Chargers’ offensive line in that area. It will also help them protect their most valuable player, quarterback Justin Herbert, who has taken a few too many unnecessary hits in the past couple years.

I would have loved to see the Chargers take Malik Nabers here because wide receiver is the Chargers single biggest need and I think he’s an elite talent. Tackle, to me, was a situation where they were looking for an upgrade and not in dire straits. There are, however, a number of talented wide receivers that are still available following Round 1, and Joe Alt is probably the most complete offensive tackle in the draft class. All in, I like the pick and see the offensive philosophy underpinning it, but it hurts to pass on a guy like Nabers who would run wild with Herbert behind center.

Pick #6: New York Giants

With the sixth pick, the New York Giants select Malik Nabers, wide receiver from Louisiana State.

The Giants got my guy! Nabers was one of my Five Favorites in the draft overall.

This is a home run pick in my view, as the Giants offense has lacked a true #1 receiver for the last few years. Nabers’ speed and talent will give quarterback Daniel Jones an elite option who can slice through secondaries, catch deep balls (Jones has a very strong arm), and make house calls off easy completions like short slants. Adding Nabers will also let the other Giants’ receivers slot into their natural roles. Darius Slayton and Wan’Dale Robinson operate much better in the short- to intermediate-part of the field, and Hyatt can operate as a field stretcher alongside Nabers.

There was a legitimate debate as to whether the Giants should have taken a quarterback here given Daniel Jones hasn’t firmly established himself as the long-term answer. They can’t expect to draft at #6 often and this is a talented (and pretty deep) class at quarterback. But they are committed to Daniel Jones in 2024 to the tune of $36 million guaranteed (though they can move on afterward if needed) and he’s still only 27 years old. If he can stay healthy, Jones has a chance of recovering the form he found a couple years ago when he led the Giants to a playoff win over Minnesota, especially with the addition of Nabers. And there’s no guarantee that the quarterbacks left in this draft will outperform Jones in the short or even medium term, so sticking and picking Nabers here is a pretty solid move in my view.

Pick #7: Tennessee Titans

With the seventh pick, the Tennessee Titans select JC Latham, offensive tackle from Alabama.

JC Latham is big and powerful. He’s 6’6” and 342 pounds, and he is the definition of a “people mover” in the run game. He played right tackle at Alabama and started 27 games, so he’s got a lot of experience against some of the best competition in college football, so it’s easy to assume his skills will translate well to the NFL, especially run blocking.

I suspect Tennessee would’ve taken Alt if he was available here. Alt is a natural left tackle, and that was the biggest hole on the Titans line last year (it’s also the most expensive position on the offensive line to fill, so you get a ton of value drafting a left tackle that is good). Latham has only really played right tackle, though Alabama reportedly moved offensive linemen around during practice to get them experience. The Titans could slot Latham in at right tackle immediately, but they’d have to find where to put Dillon Radunz, who is probably their most effective returning offensive lineman. They could also move Latham to the left side to protect quarterback Will Levis’ blindside—Latham is likely capable of making the switch even if he has to push through a slight learning curve.

I do have a few concerns with Latham’s pass protection, as he’s a little prone to holding (especially against quicker D-Linemen) and can sometimes make mental mistakes. It’s all stuff that is fixable, but Latham has had years of top-notch college coaching at Alabama under Saban—you have to wonder a little bit how quickly he will clean it up. With that said, there’s no doubt Latham has talent and offensive tackle is a clear need for the Titans. Hard to complain about the pick with Alt off the table.

Pick #8: Atlanta Falcons

With the eighth pick, the Atlanta Falcons select Michael Penix Jr., quarterback from Washington.

This is where things got wild.

WHAT?! The Falcons actually took a quarterback?

In case you don’t remember (it literally just happened a month ago), the Falcons signed quarterback Kirk Cousins in free agency to a four year, $180 million contract with $100 million in guarantees. Let that sink in: $100 million in guarantees. When they signed that deal, it’s impossible to think that the Falcons expected to draft a quarterback in April—they effectively tied themselves to the 36-year-old Cousins through at least the 2025 season.

Apparently it was impossible for Cousins to think the Falcons would take a QB either, he was reportedly “a bit stunned” by the move. How can you blame him?

The Falcons signing Kirk Cousins with the money they did was a clear signal that they intend to compete now. They had obvious needs on the defensive line, both at edge and on the interior, and also could’ve benefited from adding a wide receiver or cornerback. No defensive players had been drafted to this point, so the Falcons could have had their choice between Byron Murphy, Laiatu Latu, Dallas Turner, or Quinyon Mitchell. Rome Odunze, a top 3 receiver in what’s been called an “all time” receiver class, was still on the board. They passed on all of them to take Penix.

I want to be clear here: Penix is a great player and a really good NFL prospect. He’s a great deep thrower, he’s got a live arm, he’s athletic, and he’s obviously a high-level competitor (he just led Washington to the National Title game). He has some injury history that’s a bit concerning, and he turns 24 in about two weeks. But this isn’t really about him.

By picking any quarterback, the Falcons basically undermined their entire offseason strategy. If they thought they would take a quarterback in the draft, they should never have handed Cousins the contract they did. If Cousins is good, they don’t need Penix. If Cousins is bad, they’ll never actually realize one of the biggest benefits of having a quarterback on a rookie deal—extra cap space—because they paid Cousins so much that his contract would eat it all up anyway. And that assumes that Penix can come in and play well if Kirk Cousins can’t. That’ll be hard to even determine given that either way, Cousins is going to get the nod at the starting job and Penix won’t have many chances to see live game action.

There is quite literally no way for the Falcons to find value at quarterback now for more than maybe a season or two (2026-27 by the way). Cousins will eat up $40 million in cap space in 2025, basically no matter what, and $25 million in dead cap for 2026 if the Falcons did decide to move on from him and let Penix take over the reins. They’re basically stuck in a world where the best they can do is a single from a value standpoint. That’s simply not a good use of resources.

The cost for this baffling move is a top 10 pick at a high value position of need (edge, DT, CB, or WR are all key positions that are hard to fill cheaply). Most teams hope that such a pick turns into Pro Bowl caliber player and expect at least a quality starter. That possibility is gone. The Falcons will also have to find another way to fill those positions either through the draft or with leaps from guys like Lorenzo Carter already on the roster.

If Penix becomes a high-end starter, there’s a way to make this pick look okay. But if the Falcons believe that has a good chance of happening (as they should if they drafted him at #8), it naturally raises the question of why they went after Cousins in free agency instead of lower cost, short-term bridge options at QB like the Raiders did with Gardner Minshew and the Patriots did with Jacoby Brissett. Penix wasn’t seen as a top 10 pick for most of the draft process, so presumably they could have known, or at least expected, there would be a path to drafting him even early in free agency. It’s hard to square the two decisions.

Pick #9: Chicago Bears

With the ninth pick, the Chicago Bears select Rome Odunze, wide receiver from Washington.

Chicago did the thing they didn’t do for Justin Fields, where they pair their young quarterback with a star receiver in the hopes it pops. That’s sensible, and a lot of teams have found success by making sure their young quarterback has weapons (Bengals drafting Ja’Marr Chase, Dolphins trading for Tyreek Hill, Bills getting Stefon Diggs). Rome Odunze is a stud and could absolutely become a high-caliber receiver in the league.

The only sort of funky thing is that Chicago already has star receivers. DJ Moore might be the most under-hyped receiver in the NFL, he is a dude. The Bears also just traded real draft capital (and committed real cap space at $23 million) to Keenan Allen, who was one of the most effective receivers in the NFL last season. Adding Odunze to the Bears’ wide receiver room gives them an embarrassment of riches at the position, and it’s fair to wonder whether the Bears could’ve used their second pick of the night on defense.

I love it. Odunze is going to be a stud at the NFL level—he’s big, fast, and an elite contested catch player. Odunze and Moore can man the boundary roles while Allen feasts out of the slot (where he’s at his best, particularly at this point in his career). Odunze will also have the opportunity to learn from two elite wide receivers with a ton of experience and benefit from their gravity in the short term. More importantly, Caleb Williams is going to have more than enough tools to hit the ground running. He’ll have guys who can beat 1 vs. 1 matchups at three different spots and guys who can operate effectively in different parts of the field. He might be able to challenge rookie passing records as a result.

The Bears will want to find a way to bolster their pass rush and add depth to their offensive line later in the draft, but they’ll have at least some chance to do so with picks in the third and fourth round.

Pick #10: Minnesota Vikings (from New York Jets)

With the tenth pick, the Minnesota Vikings select J.J. McCarthy, quarterback from Michigan.

The Vikings made the first trade of the night, but it was a bit later than expected. Rather than moving way up the board to get ahead of the Giants, the Vikes stayed patient and ultimately traded picks #11, #129 (4th round), and #157 (5th round) to the Jets for picks #10 and #203 (6th round). They still got their quarterback, J.J. McCarthy.

By waiting, the Vikings saved a ton of draft capital. The starting price to get a deal done with the Cardinals at #4 or Chargers at #5 probably would’ve been at least the Vikings’ two first rounders (#11 and #23). It’s hard to argue with getting that kind of bargain and still landing your guy. [Sure, it’s possible the Vikings could’ve paid up even more to get Drake Maye…but that seems both costly and unlikely given the Pats needed a QB.]

From a projection standpoint, McCarthy has all the tools you could want in a quarterback. He led Michigan to National Championship by playing efficient ball, making plays on third town, and avoiding negative plays. He’s also clearly got good physical tools, as he’s shown a strong arm, accuracy, and athleticism inside the pocket and breaking out when he needs to. The only real knocks are that McCarthy hasn’t had as many reps as other QBs in the draft and that Michigan’s roster was dominant overall, but those things aren’t actually negatives—they just point to some unknowns. Head Coach Kevin O’Connell and the Vikings offensive staff can figure out how to develop him, and he’ll have an elite weapon in Justin Jefferson on the outside to lean on too.

This was a masterful job of managing the board by Minnesota (who knows whether they had intel on what the Giants and Falcons would do) and holding on to as much draft capital as possible, even if it maybe got a little risky when Atlanta opted to take a quarterback.

Pick #11: New York Jets (from Minnesota Vikings)

With the eleventh pick, the New York Jets select Olu Fashanu, offensive tackle from Penn State.

The flip side of the first trade was the Jets getting pick #11. They moved back just one spot to pick up an extra fourth round pick and move up from the sixth round to the fifth. They presumably didn’t want a quarterback (long-term, that may be an issue), so that was a good piece of business.

They also made a prudent move by snagging offensive tackle prospect Olu Fashanu. Fashanu has elite physical traits, especially his movement skills, and it’s possible he could turn into the best tackle in the draft. While the Jets filled their tackle slots in free agency, they did so with short-term deals for Tyron Smith, who is 33 and has a lengthy injury history, and Morgan Moses, who’s also 33 and coming off surgery for a torn pec. Fashanu is the long term answer at tackle for the Jets, especially since former first round pick Mekhi Becton is no longer on the team. Fashanu needs to get stronger and still has plenty of development to do, but he should be a long-term player for the Jets.

I’ll admit I’m a bit surprised the Jets didn’t go for another weapon for Aaron Rodgers. Tight end Brock Bowers was still on the board and would’ve helped their receiving game. They’re going to have to rely on Mike Williams staying healthy (he’s coming of a torn ACL), star Garrett Wilson, and wizardry from Rodgers to keep the passing game going. They can do it, and that might be a better bet than relying on Smith and Moses to stay healthy all year. Ultimately, I see the Jets’ selection of Fashanu as the wiser move over the next 2-5 years, even if it’s unlikely to provide them as much of an immediate return this year.

Pick #12: Denver Broncos

With the twelfth pick, the Denver Broncos select Bo Nix, quarterback from Oregon.

In the words of one of my idols Tony Kornheiser, “I believe I had that.”

Bo Nix to the Broncos just made so much sense. Nix is a really good quarterback who routinely makes sound decisions quickly. He’s not a live arm like Michael Penix, but he’s got enough juice to make throws in the NFL. With Sean Payton at the helm, the Broncos will be able to roll out an offensive that accentuates Nix’s strengths and puts pressure on defenses if they can get enough out of their skill guys. I would like to see the Broncos get a little more help on the outside to aid Courtland Sutton (I hope the trade rumors quiet down for the sake of Broncos fans) and Marvin Mims.

Overall, I like this pick a lot. The NFL was high on this crop of quarterbacks—a record six QBs went in the first 12 picks—but the Broncos were able to find their guy without moving up the board, which is important given they’re already low on draft capital from the Russell Wilson trade. If Nix hits, it won’t matter that draft prognosticators had a late first or second round grade on him—the surplus value from getting a starting QB on a rookie contract is big enough to warrant slight overpays in draft value. The Broncos might not be able to take advantage of that surplus value given they’re still paying Russell Wilson, but that money is already spent, so I don’t think this pick can be reasonably docked for that.

Pick #13: Las Vegas Raiders

With the thirteenth pick, the Las Vegas Raiders select Brock Bowers, tight end from Georgia.

I really love Bowers as a player. He’s a stud with the ball in his hands and seemed to always make plays when Georgia needed them on the brightest stage. He’s got great balance and hands, and he’s got enough speed and feel to find ways to get open underneath all the time. While he’s more of a receiving threat than an elite blocker, Bowers also isn’t afraid to get his hands dirty as a blocker (there are some tight ends who basically “ole” when they block…I won’t name names). Ultimately, he’s going to be a good player for the Raiders from Day 1, which alone is a reason to like this pick.

I have a few small quibbles around the edges that really have nothing to do with Bowers as a player. The Raiders just used premium draft capital on tight end Michael Mayer last year, he was pick #35 in last year’s draft. While Mayer didn’t necessarily pop last season, he’s definitely got some talent and will need reps to unlock his potential. Adding Bowers to the mix also means the Raiders will probably want to roll out two tight ends relatively frequently. That would normally be fine, except it probably also means the Raiders use both their premier wide receivers, Davante Adams and Jacoby Myers, together with their tight ends less frequently than you’d want. It’s not a huge deal, but it’ll take some managing.

Picking Bowers also means the Raiders are committing serious draft assets and salary to one of the least valuable positions on the field in tight end. Bowers is set to make roughly $18 million over the four years of his rookie contract with a $3.3 million cap number for 2024 per Over the Cap. Mayer will make around $9.3 million and has a 2024 cap number of $2.1 million. That means the Raiders will have used early first and early second round picks and roughly $27 million on a lower value position. That’s kind of a lot.

I don’t want to overstate this. Taking Bowers at pick #13 is fine—unlike taking him in the top 5 picks, he doesn’t have to perform like a top 10 player at the position right away to return excess value. He’s also going to make their team better quickly. And the Raiders couldn’t have known they’d be taking Bowers at #13 this year when they drafted Mayer. It’s just a lot of assets to throw at tight end, and the Raiders had some needs elsewhere. With the six highest rated QB prospects off the board, though, I’m not sure any of the other needs were so high that they demanded a Day 1 pick.

Pick #14: New Orleans Saints Select

With the fourteenth pick, the New Orleans Saints select Taliese Fuaga, offensive tackle from Oregon State.

This will be short and sweet: I love Fuaga, and I love this pick. The Saints needed a tackle given the issues they’ve had with Trevor Penning’s development and injury concerns for starting right tackle Ryan Ramcyzk. I’m not sure they had a bigger need and tackle is a really valuable position to fill. That’s super important for a Saints team that has to find excess value in the draft given they don’t have a ton of cap space for the next 2-3 years. Fuaga is also a hoss and should be able to step in right away. And even if the Saints don’t need Fuaga to start at tackle, he can slot in at guard and be effective early. No question their offensive line improved substantially.

Pick #15: Indianapolis Colts

With the fifteenth pick, the Indianapolis Colts select Laiatu Latu, defensive end from UCLA.

This pick is really exciting. Latu is a fantastic football player that is ready to play in the league right away, even on a good defense. And while the Colts already roster a solid set of outside pass rushers in Samson Ebukam, Kwity Paye, and Dayo, Latu is more talented than all of them. You’re also never gonna go broke by drafting elite pass rushers. After quarterback, it’s the highest value position in the NFL, and having a rotation of good pass rushers has been a staple for a lot of successful teams in the past like the 2012 Super Bowl Champion Giants or the 2018 Super Bowl Champion Eagles.

Latu has some significant health questions, but to draft him this high, the Colts must have gotten comfortable with the risk. I have about as much medical knowledge as a rock, so I’ll assume they know what they’re doing. On the field, Latu doesn’t have many questions.

The Colts do pass on a cornerback here, which was a big position of need, and also a high value position. Some will question the decision to pass on their choice CB, but I think it boils down to defensive philosophy. You can absolutely build a defensive juggernaut by focusing on pass rushers, and that appears to be the Colts’ approach in terms of resource allocation. There are also decent corners still available for Round 2 and 3, so they can go back to that position later. Overall, I think this is a great pick.

Pick #16: Seattle Seahawks

With the sixteenth pick, the Seattle Seahawks select Byron Murphy II, defensive tackle from Texas.

The Seahawks got another one of my Five Favorites, so you can probably guess how I feel about this pick. I love it!

Seattle was a solid team last year, but they moved on from long-time head coach Pete Carroll in favor of hiring a modern defensive guru in Mike Macdonald. With a new head coach in town, it’s not a surprise Seattle would want to invest on that side of the ball. While the Seahawks have already invested quite a few resources into their defensive line, they’re their best interior pass rusher Jarran Reed is set to hit free agency after 2024. Murphy can add to the Seahawks interior pass rush right away and take over for Reed once he leaves. Defensive tackles who can create pressure are gaining traction as extremely high-value players in a league dominated by passing—just look at how much money Chris Jones and Christian Wilkins got this off-season.

The Seahawks could have picked an offensive lineman instead to shore up that side of the football. I’d picked Troy Fautanu for them in my mock draft the other day, and I still think that would have made sense too (don’t forget the low cost of moving). But I didn’t expect Murphy to still be on the board here, and he’s a big enough talent at a high-value position that I think he’s worth going for. Seattle will need to do something to shore up its offensive line next year, but they can go after positions like center and guard later in the draft.

Pick #17: Minnesota Vikings (from Jacksonville Jaguars)

With the seventeenth pick, the Minnesota Vikings select Dallas Turner, defensive end from Alabama.

The Vikings trade up again! This time, to move up six spots, the Vikings traded pick #23 and #167 (5th round), plus future third- and fourth-round picks in 2025, to obtain pick #17 from the Jaguars. [The Vikings had previously traded up to #23 with the Texans in March.]. With the upgraded pick, the Vikings took talented edge rusher Dallas Turner, a physical freak who has all the talent in the world to become an elite NFL pass rusher.

The Vikings lost star defensive end Danielle Hunter in free agency this offseason. While they were able to bring back younger, talented edge rushers in Jonathan Greenard and Andrew Van Ginkel, they weren’t set at the position. Van Ginkel in particular has never played a full season at edge, and he’s only under contract through 2025. Because edge rusher is so important, it’s hard to argue with adding a talented prospect like Turner to the mix.

Turner has some work to do on refining his pass rush skills. He’s drawn comparisons to elite talents like Von Miller, which shows how incredible his physical ability is, but he will only reach those heights if he can develop more consistent pass rush moves. That said, talents like this at defensive end are rarely available in the middle- or late- first round unless there are huge question marks in terms of injury history, off the field issues, or other non-football issues, and Turner doesn’t seem to have those. It’s a big swing, but one that I think is worth taking for the Vikings.

Pick #18: Cincinnati Bengals Select

With the eighteenth pick, the Cincinnati Bengals select Amarius Mims, offensive tackle from Georgia.

I had the Bengals going offensive tackle in my mock draft, so with four already off the board, it makes sense that they went for talented prospect Amarius Mims. My pick for them, JC Latham, was already off the board. I love the fit with Mims here. He’s raw but toolsy, and the Bengals can bring him along slowly if they need to because they already have two solid tackle options on the roster in Orlando Brown Jr. and Trent Brown. But Brown in particular is not a long-term solution, so having the ability to replace him full-time with Mims after the 2024 season is nice. I also like the Mims fit over other quality offensive line options like Troy Fautanu for the Bengals. Mims probably has a higher ceiling than Fautanu, and he’s a more natural fit at right tackle; Mims played on the right side in college, while Fautanu played left tackle. If the Bengals needed to slot someone in immediately Fautanu may have been a better bet, but given their circumstances, I think they went the right direction.

The Bengals also have potential needs at wide receiver and edge with two of their best players at those positions (Tee Higgins at WR and Trey Hendrickson at edge) reportedly seeking trades. But those needs aren’t really immediate, as both Higgins and Hendrickson are under contract for at least another year, and the Bengals may be able to re-build those relationships over the course of the next season. Even if they can’t, the Bengals will have other opportunities to address those positions if they need to.

Pick #19: Los Angeles Rams

With the nineteenth pick, the Los Angeles Rams select Jared Verse, defensive end from Florida State.

I’m a bit bummed that the Rams didn’t end up with Latu (who I mocked to the Rams), but sometimes great players go earlier than you expect. Verse is a high-quality alternative, though, and fills the same positional need for LA. Verse can rush the passer and probably plays the run better than Latu, and he will immediately boost the Rams’ defensive line talent. Verse has produced everywhere he has been, and he brings high-level disruption and toughness too.

A lot of folks think there’s a bit of a drop-off after Verse in terms of production at edge rusher for this class. I’m not 100% sure that’s true, but I also don’t think it really matters. Pass rush is something the Rams need to keep building after the loss of Aaron Donald, and Verse does it as well as anyone left in the draft. I don’t think he has the upside of Turner or the refined skills of Latu, but he’s got plenty of ways to be successful at the NFL level and I suspect the Rams will get the most out of him that they can.

Pick #20: Pittsburgh Steelers

With the twentieth pick, the Pittsburgh Steelers select Troy Fautanu, offensive tackle from Washington.

Fautanu is an AWESOME get for the Steelers. He’s plug-and-play at left tackle for them, which will let 2023 first round pick Broderick Jones stick on the right side while he continues to develop. Between the two young players, the Steelers have solidified their bookends on the offensive line. You’ve also got to feel good about the left side of the Steelers offensive line, with Fautanu slotting in next to left guard Isaac Seumalo.

I have no notes for this pick, it’s a great fit. The Steelers will need to find a way to address cornerback later in the draft, and I’d like to see them add a wide receiver and pass rushing depth too. But they filled the bigger need at a position of extreme importance with a really good player in Fautanu.

Pick #21: Miami Dolphins

With the twenty-first pick, the Miami Dolphins select Chop Robinson, edge rusher from Penn State.

This was a super interesting pick. The Dolphins lost both of their star edge rushers to serious injuries last year when Jaelan Phillips tore his Achilles and Bradley Chubb tore his ACL. While both are expected to play during the 2024 season, you can’t assume they will be back on time or at 100%. The Dolphins also lost their best defensive lineman, Christian Wilkins, to the Raiders in free agency and their best back-up pass rusher Andrew Van Ginkel to the Vikings. So, they’re looking at a tough situation along the defensive line.

Chop Robinson was a combine stand-out after he posted absurd testing numbers, but his lack of stand-out production in college suggests the Dolphins are baking in some projection based on his physical profile. Robinson generated a fair amount of pressure but didn’t get home as often as you’d like to see, and his tape shows he needs to improve his pass rush tool kit. With Latu, Turner, and Verse already off the board though, it’s not clear the Dolphins had better options along the defensive line. They’ll need him to come along quickly if Phillips and Chubb aren’t back to 100% early in the season, but that might be a tough ask.

The Dolphins passed up on O-Line to focus on the D-Line. I’m a bit surprised by that, but there is some logic to it. On the one hand, the Dolphins offensive line struggled after Robert Hunt and Connor Williams got hurt last year, and left tackle Terran Armstead has battled injuries for years. Hunt and Williams aren’t with the team anymore and Armstead is a year older. Shoring up the O-Line would’ve been nice to do, especially given how important it’s been to keep quarterback Tua Tagovailoa upright and healthy. On the other hand, the Dolphins whole offense is predicated upon getting the ball out of Tua’s hands quickly and stressing defenses laterally and vertically with speed at their skill positions. When that’s clicking, offensive line is a little less important for them than it may be for other teams.

Ultimately both OL and DL were big needs for the Dolphins, so I don’t want to fault them for going with Robinson. I probably would’ve leaned toward the offensive side of the trench, but it really comes down to what they think their odds are of landing an impact player at O-Line or D-Line in subsequent rounds of the draft.

Pick #22: Philadelphia Eagles

With the twenty-second pick, the Philadelphia Eagles select Quinyon Mitchell, cornerback from Toledo.

Howie Roseman seems to always get a steal, hats off! Mitchell is the best cornerback in this class (and one of my Five Favorites) and he’s going to be a stud in Philadelphia right away.

I’m stunned that Philly was able to sit at pick #22 and snag Mitchell. That’s amazing value, and they filled perhaps their biggest need with a great player at a key position. There’s nothing much else to say, this pick is a 10 of 10.

Pick #23: Jacksonville Jaguars (from Minnesota Vikings)

With the twenty-third pick, the Jacksonville Jaguars select Brian Thomas Jr., wide receiver from Louisiana State.

Jacksonville traded back with Minnesota to land this pick. For their trouble, they added a solid amount of additional draft capital in the #167 pick this year and future third- and fourth-round picks next year. That’s pretty good business, so I have to applaud them for making the move.

They land a really talented prospect in wide receiver Brian Thomas Jr., who has a rare combination of size and speed for the position. Long term, his physical tools could make him the best receiver in this class (though I’d still bet on his teammate from LSU Malik Nabers). Adding a wide receiver with Thomas Jr.’s vertical receiving game chops is also really important for the Jags. Quarterback Trevor Lawrence needs weapons to hit his hoped-for ceiling and the Jags lost wide receiver Calvin Ridley to free agency. Christian Kirk, Zay Jones, and Evan Engram will give Lawrence plenty of options in the short and intermediate passing game, and Thomas can be the true vertical threat. I think he’s probably going to be better than Ridley was last year, so the Jags should be able to get better and cheaper at the position, a nice combination.

The only real downside of moving back is that the Jaguars don’t pick up cornerback or pass rushing help in the first round. With the way the board fell, adding a pass rusher probably didn’t make sense. But Terrion Arnold and Nate Wiggins were both still available and would’ve been nice options.

But adding key weapons for your franchise quarterback is rarely a bad thing. You can’t be mad at the decision to take Thomas Jr. over Arnold/Wiggins here.

Pick #24: Detroit Lions (from Dallas Cowboys)

With the twenty-fourth pick, the Detroit Lions select Terrion Arnold, cornerback from Alabama.

The Lions trade up with the Dallas Cowboys, sending picks #29 and #73 (3rd round) to Dallas in exchange for pick #24 and a future seventh rounder. Doing so allowed the Lions to snag Arnold, a top cornerback prospect, before teams like Tampa Bay or Arizona might have taken him.

Detroit came into this draft primarily needing to strengthen its defense. Last season, they gave up 5.5 yards per play (6th worst in the NFL). Most of the damage against Detroit came through the air, so finding a way to add talent to the pass defense in particular was key coming in. Personally, I favor doing so by adding pass rushers—it’s a more valuable position in terms of free agency dollars and you can’t just throw away from good pass rushers like you can with corners. But with the board as it fell, there weren’t elite pass rushing prospects available at value in the draft at this point of the first round. And Arnold had fallen a bit lower than expectations, so I can see why Detroit felt compelled to pounce.

Arnold is a tough, physical corner who will bring aggression and attitude to the Detroit secondary. He fits a need, and he’ll get on the field early and provide immediate value. From that perspective, this pick is a clear win. Detroit did give up a hefty amount to get him by shelling out its third round pick this year, but they have few enough needs right now that I don’t mind the slight overpay to move up.

Pick #25: Green Bay Packers

With the twenty-fifth pick, the Green Bay Packers select Jordan Morgan, offensive tackle from Arizona.

Green Bay has a ton of young talent on its roster and has already filled most of its key positions, so trying to figure out the direction they would go in the draft was tougher than for most other teams. They settled on the athletic offensive lineman Jordan Morgan, who has the ability to play guard or tackle at the NFL level (some analysts peg him as more of a guard due to shorter arm length, but he held up fine in college and should at least get a look at tackle). That versatility will be valuable in helping the Packers find the best combination of five O-Linemen on their roster to compete next season. The Packers could’ve gotten that same kind of versatility from the player drafted immediately afterward, Graham Barton, but it’s fair for them to prefer Morgan’s movement skills and dexterity.

Cooper DeJean was still available here and a lot of folks (me included) had the Packers taking him. But if the Packers see DeJean as more of a safety than a corner though, as many teams reportedly do, it’s hard to argue with preferring a potential offensive tackle from a positional value standpoint.

Pick #26: Tampa Bay Buccaneers

With the twenty-sixth pick, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers select Graham Barton, offensive tackle from Duke.

This is a really solid piece of drafting by the Bucs. They have needs all along their interior offensive line and Barton has the positional flexibility to play either guard position or center (he also played tackle in college, but the Bucs are more set at that position with Tristan Wirfs and Luke Goedecke in place). Plug Barton in for the biggest hole and go, it’s as simple as that.

The Buccaneers also could have used pass rush and corner help, but given how the draft board fell, this looks like a really solid outcome for them.

Pick #27: Arizona Cardinals

With the twenty-seventh pick, the Arizona Cardinals select Darius Robinson, defensive end from Missouri.

After snagging Marvin Harrison Jr. with pick #4, Arizona had two really big areas of need: defensive line and cornerback. They opted to go defensive line, taking defensive end Darius Robinson.

Robinson is a fantastic all-around player who straight up bodies people along the offensive line. Watch some tape from his college days—he is an ox that doubles as a school-yard bully on every play. It’s wild and fun to watch.

At 6’5” and 295+ pounds, Robinson doesn’t have the speed to really press the edge like some the edge rushers taken before him. He wins more with power, so he’s probably most valuable from a 5-tech alignment and down. That suits Arizona nicely as they run a base 3-4 scheme. Having a big body like Robinson who can also get after the quarterback is super valuable for them, and he’s versatile enough to stick on the field when they go to 2- or 4-down looks too.

This is a really solid pick that fits a high-value need. I would’ve liked to see them take Wiggins too, but I can’t fault the choice here.

Pick #28: Kansas City Chiefs (from Buffalo Bills)

With the twenty-eighth pick, the Kansas City Chiefs select Xavier Worthy, wide receiver from Texas.

I’ll be honest, this shocked me. The Bills traded back with the Chiefs—a team that has dominated them in the playoffs—when both teams are presumably targeting the same position: wide receiver. The trade details: Chiefs get pick #28, #133 (4th round), and #248 (7th round) and the Bills get pick #32, #95 (3rd round), and #221 (7th round).

In essence, the Bills gave the Chiefs the right to pick their remaining wide receiver of choice in exchange for moving up one of their picks about a round and a largely irrelevant 27 pick move up in the 7th round. That seems…risky? Crazy?

The Bills wide receiver corps rivals the Chargers for least proven in the NFL. Why are they moving back when they have their pick of the litter? They must like somebody later in the draft, but unless you know that player is going to be around, this is a crazy gamble. And to make that sort of gamble with one of your biggest playoff rivals is WIIIIILD! If Worthy hits for the Chiefs (who just won the Super Bowl with issues at wide receiver, by the way), the Bills will probably regret this. As a Chargers fan, I already regret it.

Let’s get to this from the Chiefs perspective. They needed a wide receiver, especially with looming criminal charges and a potential suspension for Rashee Rice, and they got the fastest dude in the draft—maybe in the history of the NFL. I am not a huge fan of small, speedy receivers in Worthy’s mold (nothing really against him personally), but I am terrified of how Andy Reid and Patrick Mahomes will take advantage of his skills. We all remember Tyreek Hill on that team, and they’re substantially better now. Combined with Marquise Brown, the Chiefs are going to have some serious speed on the outside. I don’t know how defenses are going to handle those two and TRAVIS KELCE in the middle…it’s going to be really, really annoying for everyone outside Missouri (or Kansas? Whatever, I don’t even care anymore).

Pick #29: Dallas Cowboys (from Detroit Lions)

With the twenty-ninth pick, the Dallas Cowboys select Tyler Guyton, offensive tackle from Oklahoma.

Dallas moved back to #29 and snagged an extra third rounder in the process. They still landed Tyler Guyton, the offensive tackle that I mocked to them at pick #24. Clap, clap, clap—that’s just good business. Kudos to Jerry Jones and the crew for great work in the first round.

I already talked about why Guyton makes sense for the Cowboys in my mock draft, so I won’t belabor the point. This is really solid work for Dallas.

Pick #30: Baltimore Ravens

With the thirtieth pick, the Baltimore Ravens select Nate Wiggins, cornerback from Clemson.

The Ravens have to be ecstatic that Wiggins was still around by pick #30. Cornerback is a clear need for them, and they managed to snag one of the best prospects in the draft at the position. While Wiggins needs to add strength and put on some weight, nobody questions his talent or want-to (or his speed, which is elite). The guy is a really good cover corner and a high-effort player. He’s going to thrive in Baltimore.

Excellent pick.

Pick #31: San Francisco 49ers

With the thirty-first pick, the San Francisco 49ers select Ricky Pearsall, wide receiver from Florida.

Now this is interesting.

Pearsall is a quality receiver who projects best as a slot player. He’s quick, shifty, and has a knack for finding space. And as you can see from the clip below, he can make some absurd catches:

Pearsall makes a lot of sense for the Niners. Brandon Aiyuk is looking for a new long-term deal and it’s not clear whether he’ll be back with the Niners long-term. Deebo Samuel is also expensive and will turn 29 during next season. We’re starting to hear rumors that one of them might be moved soon.

There’s also the question of Christian McCaffrey. Right now, CMC is a virtually unparalleled player out of the backfield that can fill a lot of the functions of a typical slot receiver. But he’s getting older and has missed time in the past due to injury. Adding Pearsall gives the Niners a more traditional slot option, which offensive wizard Kyle Shanahan could put to good use either alongside CMC or in the event that he’s out for a period of games.

Pearsall gives the Niners options. While they might have liked to add a tackle or corner, the way the draft shook out, there weren’t obvious first round locks that dropped to them. They obviously know more about their plans for Samuel and Aiyuk than we do as observers, but I presume the possibility of a trade involving one of them makes the Pearsall pick valuable insurance. We’ll have to see what happens before making any concrete conclusions.

Pearsall wasn’t my personal favorite of the wide receivers available at this point in the draft, but he probably fills the slot role as well or better than anyone else, and there’s no question he’s a good player. He’s also faster than a lot of people think, which will be useful for the Niners.

I’d still like to see the Niners find a corner or offensive tackle with their second rounder, and I think options will be available to them at one of those positions.

Pick #32: Carolina Panthers (from Buffalo Bills via Kansas City Chiefs)

With the thirty-second pick, the Carolina Panthers select Xavier Legette, wide receiver from South Carolina.

Another trade for Buffalo and, again, it’s a little perplexing. The Bills traded pick #32 and #200 (6th round) to the Panthers in exchange for pick #33 (2nd round) and #141 (5th round).

The Bills had to know the Panthers were likely to take a wide receiver (the Bills top need), otherwise why would they pay to move up just one slot? So, in effect, the Bills gave away their option to pick the receiver they liked (again), but this time in exchange for even less draft capital—59 draft spots towards the back of the draft.

If the Bills got some assurance from the Panthers about who they would pick, they might have felt comfortable switching slots for that kind of return. I find it hard to believe the Panthers would give that info up (or that the Bills could trust it was 100% reliable), but you never know. We’ll see what they end up doing at #33.

For the Panthers, they get their choice of the remaining wide receivers and take Legette. He’s a physical specimen and has really amazing speed when he gets in space. Without a first round pick heading into Thursday night, the Panthers realistically weren’t candidates for the top 3 or 4 receivers in the draft, but they should be happy to land Legette regardless. He’ll add speed to their offense and a different element than newly acquired Diontae Johnson.

I might have preferred Adonai Mitchell for them given his longer history of production and proven ability to score touchdowns, but Legette plays with far more consistency from down-to-down. I also like Troy Franklin, but his deep ball tracking skills probably pair best with quarterbacks that tend to throw deep more often. Wide receiver was the position of need for the Panthers heading in and they filled it with a good player—you’ve got to like that.

Wrap Up

That’s it for now! Let me know if you have thoughts in the comments or via email, I love to chat about this stuff.

I’ll probably do some sort of write up to cover the whole draft, but this was a ton of work on a short turnaround so I’m going to skip write ups after each day.

Thanks!

The Sports Appeal’s First Ever NFL Mock Draft!

The NFL Draft starts on Thursday, April 25. It’s a hopeful time for NFL fans, especially those who’ve been waiting tirelessly for good news since Week 14 when Justin Herbert’s finger broke and sidelined him for the rest of the season.

It’s also a time for Mock Drafts!

I’ve never tried one, but thought it would be fun to give it a shot. I had no idea how much time this would involve when I started, and holy smokes did I underestimate the effort involved. So here’s my first ever attempt at a real mock draft—I welcome any and all critiques (although I may never do this again if you’re too mean!).

Here’s the basics of how I approached it:

• I only went through four rounds because it gets pretty weedy after that. If you’re familiar with Round 5-7 prospects like I am, you’re potentially suffering from a serious illness and should seek help.

• I projected some trades in the first and second rounds, but shied away from trades after that as there’s just too much variability and guesswork involved at that point.

• For any trades I made, I tried to ensure that the team moving back recouped meaningful draft capital. I used the Fitzgerald-Spielberger draft value chart for guidance.

• I tried to be faithful to what I think teams will do given their current roster, salary cap situation, and philosophy. But I’m not a reporter, so I won’t pretend to have perfect insight into what they might be thinking (that said, no one does).

That’s it. Let me know what you think of your team’s results, whether you like the picks or I missed a player you’d love or I got the team needs wrong. It helps me learn for sure.

In the immortal words of Dak Prescott, here we go!

Round 1

Pick 1 - Chicago Bears: Caleb Williams (QB, USC)

There’s not a whole lot of drama here. As I guessed back in January, Bears moved on from Justin Fields to make way for a new quarterback. Caleb Williams is the not-so-secret choice. The USC quarterback has been the gem of the draft for almost two years. He can play inside and outside the pocket and make every throw in the book. Don’t overthink this.

Pick 2 - Washington Commanders: Jayden Daniels (QB, LSU)

Jayden Daniels had a meteoritic rise up draft charts this season after throwing for 3800+ yards and 40 touchdowns against just 4 interceptions. Daniels led the Tigers to a nation-leading 543.5 yards of offense per game. Daniels has two elite attributes in his deep passing and speed. He averaged 11.7 yards per pass attempt, highest in the country amongst quarterbacks with at least 500 yards passing, and run sub-4.5 seconds in the 40 yard dash—elite for a quarterback. Despite an awkward meeting with the Commanders these week, Daniels should be the second QB off the board.

Pick 3 - New England Patriots: Drake Maye (QB, UNC)

The Patriots don’t have a future QB on their roster, but they’ve got lots of other holes too. I wanted to have the Pats trade back and pick up more draft capital, but I just can’t see them opting out of a potential long-term solution at quarterback given the value of a franchise player. They’ll get any offer made available to Arizona or the Chargers, but it would take some serious cajones for the Patriots to pull the trigger on a deal to move back.

Maye needs to work on his accuracy and mechanics, but he’s got prototypical tools for an NFL quarterback with great size and arm talent. He’s also flashed a lot of talent at times, especially in 2022. He could take longer to develop but the potential upside is obvious.

Pick 4 - Minnesota Vikings: JJ McCarthy (QB, Michigan)

Trade: Minnesota sends three first round picks (#11, #23, and a 2025 first rounder) to Arizona in exchange for pick #4. Arizona gets excess value equivalent to an extra top-5 first round pick in exchange for moving down.

Our first projected trade, and it’s a massive haul for the Cardinals!

Minnesota lost Captain Kirk Cousins to the Atlanta Falcons this offseason and the quarterback room looks a little bleak (with due respect to Nick Mullens, and Sam Darnold too I suppose). The Vikings signaled pretty clearly they wanted to move up when the snagged pick #23 from Houston earlier this spring, so a trade up shouldn’t come as a surprise. But moving up is expensive, especially with teams like the Giants, Broncos, and Raiders all potentially vying for a quarterback. Although Arizona will miss out on Marvin Harrison Jr. by making this trade, the return is too good to forgo. [As an aside, I see lots of mocks suggesting that Minnesota would make a deal with the Chargers. That’s possible, but it wouldn’t make a ton of sense from the Vikings’ perspective—why wait and risk somebody else leapfrogging you at 4? The price isn’t going to change much between #4 and #5.]

McCarthy is coming off a story-book season after leading Michigan to a National Championship. Though he wasn’t asked to carry the team himself (Michigan was loaded with talent), he’s accurate, poised, athletic, and sports a good arm. He also did a great job avoiding mistakes and playing within himself. Given he’s just 21 years old, there’s plenty of room for McCarthy to continue to develop, and putting him with an elite talent in Justin Jefferson and a strong offensive mind in Kevin O’Connell will help him succeed quickly at the NFL level.

Pick 5 - LA Chargers: Marvin Harrison Jr. (WR, Ohio State)

There’s a lot of smoke that the Chargers would move down in the draft, but with McCarthy off the board, there isn’t a great trade partner available (while teams get desperate and go HAM to draft quarterbacks, there are rarely huge swings to snag other positions). There’s also a ton of smoke that the Chargers want to build through the trenches, though the actual evidence that either Jim Harbaugh or Joe Hortiz has ever done that in the NFL is scant.

Let’s not get cute. The Chargers receiver corps is both shallow and incredibly inexperienced, and there is elite wide receiver talent at the top of this draft. I’ve got the Chargers sticking and taking the best player on their board, which happens to be at their biggest position of need.

Marvin Harrison Jr. is the son of Hall of Famer Marvin Harrison, who paired with Peyton Manning to be one of the greatest quarterback-receiver duos in league history. At 6’3”, 209 pounds, MHJ is significantly bigger than his father, but he sports the same elite receiver skills that allow him to win at every level of the field. In the last two years as a starter at Ohio State, MHJ racked up 144 catches for 2,474 yards and 28 touchdowns. He also beat up on Harbaugh and arch-rival Michigan to the tune of 119 yards and a touchdown per game (average), so if anybody should be familiar with his talent, it’s Harbaugh.

Personally, I’d love to see the Chargers pick Malik Nabers (my favorite WR in the draft), who has better speed and run-after-catch abilities, but that appears to be the minority position so I’m sticking with MHJ here.

Pick 6 - New York Giants: Malik Nabers (WR, LSU)

Malik Nabers is my favorite receiver in this year’s draft., and I wrote about him extensively in my Five Favorites post last week. Nabers’ defining trait is his speed—he’s the type of receiver that gives DBs nightmares and a threat to score any time he touches the ball, regardless of where he is on the field.

Despite taking a number of receivers in the second and third rounds over the past few years, the Giants haven’t been able to land a bona fide #1 receiver. Nabers can be that guy, and he gives the team one more shot to see if Daniel Jones can succeed as an NFL quarterback when surrounded with more talent.

The Giants could also try to trade up for Maye or McCarthy and secure a future quarterback, but the cost to move up is too high given other needs on the roster and the possibility that Jones can salvage his career in New York.

Pick 7 - Arizona Cardinals: Rome Odunze (WR, Washington)

Trade: Arizona sends a first rounder (#11), a second rounder (#35), and a 2025 fifth rounder to Tennessee in exchange for pick #7. Tennessee gets excess value equivalent to an extra late first round pick in exchange for moving down.

Hold up, another trade! Arizona general manager Monti Ossenfort has shown he’s not afraid of moving around the draft board. Last year, the Cardinals traded out of pick #3 and secured pick #12 and additional draft capital before moving back up the board to #6 to select tackle Paris Johnson Jr. This year, they’re doing something similar. In effect, the Cardinals exchange picks #4 and #35 for picks #7 and #23, plus the Vikings 2025 first rounder, a healthy haul.

The trade down costs the Cardinals their first choice of wide receiver, but they still nab an elite talent in Washington’s Rome Odunze. Odunze helped lead the Huskies to the NCAA National Championship (before eventually falling to Michigan), with production that rivaled anyone in the country: 92 receptions, 1,640 receiving yards, and 13 touchdowns. At 6’3” and 212 pounds, Odunze has great size for an X receiver to go with incredible hands and very good speed (he ran a 4.45 second 40 yard dash). He dominated the college level and should continue to be effective on Sundays.

Pick 8 - Atlanta Falcons: Dallas Turner (Edge, Alabama)

This is a bit chalky, but I’ve got the Falcons picking defensive end Dallas Turner from Alabama. Turner fills a major need for Atlanta, which needs to improve its pass rush, as Grady Jarrett can’t sack the QB on his own every time. Turner has great physical traits—he’s 6’3”, 247 pounds, and has elite explosives (4.46 second 40 with a 1.54 second 10 yard split, 40.5” vertical jump, and 10’7” broad jump)—and he’s managed to rack up 25 sacks in three years at Alabama. He’s still got room to develop his pass rush toolkit (he relies too much on his athleticism now), and he could stand to bring pressure a bit more consistently, but a good coaching staff in Atlanta should be able to unlock his potential.

Pick 9 - Chicago Bears: Byron Murphy II (DT, Texas)

With the three top WRs already off the board, Chicago picks Byron Murphy to supplement its defensive line, and second one of my Five Favorites comes off the board.

Murphy is the type of pass-rusher who can generate incredible pressure from up the middle, and Chicago will greatly benefit from his presence. Murphy and Montez Sweat (who Chicago traded for last year) will give the Bears a strong pass rush to go along with an ascending defense overall. Though the Bears took Zacch Pickens and Gervon Dexter last year, neither is the level of player that Murphy is, so there shouldn’t be much of an issue. Plus, Chicago (somewhat amazingly) doesn’t have many huge needs outside QB, which they’ve already filled here, so they can afford a luxury pick that will raise the level of their defense overall.

Pick 10 - New York Jets: Brock Bowers (TE, Georgia)

I went back and forth on this pick. Should the Jets take an offensive lineman or snag a weapon for Aaron Rodgers? At the end of the day, I can’t shake the idea that the Jets are going to just say YOLO and let Rodgers rock.

Tight end is one of the least valuable positions to draft, but Bowers is an exceptional talent. The Georgia product is fast, strong, and has excellent hands and run-after-catch skills (he was a high school running back in Napa). Playing at the highest levels of college football, Bowers routinely ate up everyone who tried to cover him. He’s going to produce in the league.

Taking Bowers means the Jets will have another quality weapon for Rodgers to go along with receivers Garrett Wilson and Mike Williams (who is coming off an ACL tear). The cost is that they are thin on the offense line, which in part derailed their season last year. The better long-term move is probably opting for an offensive tackle, but Bowers’ appeal is obvious—he’s a safe pick to contribute immediately.

Pick 11 - Tennessee Titans: Joe Alt (OT, Notre Dame)

The Titans traded back with Arizona to pick up #11 and a second rounder (#35). That’s great, because in this scenario they still land their preferred pick, offensive tackle Joe Alt.

Watching Alt play is kind of boring—he just does his job pretty much every time. He’s got great athleticism and size for his position and can hold up against speed and power rushers. He’s not the strongest OT in the class, and he isn’t a mauler in the running game, but he makes up for it through technique and getting quickly to his spots. There’s no secret that Tennessee needed to improve its offensive line, and Alt is a quality tackle prospect that they can expect to play right away.

Pick 12 - Denver Broncos: Bo Nix (QB, Oregon)

Quack, quack, quack.

The Broncos bailed on Russell Wilson early. As a result, they’re left with the memory of a disastrous trade and massive salary cap hits as a result (they’re paying Wilson almost $38 million to play for another team).

Even after trading for Zach Wilson this week, it’s pretty clear that the Broncos need better options at quarterback—and it has to come cheaply. The natural response is to draft a quarterback.

Bo Nix isn’t the sexiest quarterback prospect around, but he’s got a ton of experience (five years as a starter at Auburn and then Oregon). He’s been effective during that time, especially this past season where he threw for 4,508 yards and 45 touchdowns while completing 77.4% of his passes and throwing only three interceptions. Nix wins by making smart decisions and accurate short and intermediate throws; he won’t wow anyone with his arm talent down the field, but that’s not a pre-requisite for being a successful NFL quarterback.

Without a second round pick and with their division rival Las Vegas Raiders also in need of a quarterback, the Broncos are best off taking Nix rather than hoping to get better value by moving down the draft board.

Pick 13 - Las Vegas Raiders: Taliese Fuaga (OT, Oregon State)

We’re sticking with the state of Oregon here as the Raiders take offensive tackle Taliese Fuaga to secure the right side of their offensive line. Fuaga is a massive dude at 6’6”, 324 pounds. While he’s not the most nimble tackle prospect in the draft, he has incredible strength that he uses to absolutely demolish defenders in the run game. If you like offensive linemen to be tone-setters, Fuaga is your guy. The Raiders are building their identity as a tough, physical team, and Fuaga fits that mold to a T. And since their set at left tackle with Kolton Miller, Fuaga can slot in at right tackle or guard and play immediately.

The Raiders forego a quarterback upgrade here, but they’ve got a serviceable option in Gardner Minshew on the roster already for this year. They also don’t get to bolster their interior defensive line, but with Murphy already off the board, there isn’t a good value option available anyway.

Pick 14 - New Orleans Saints: Olu Fashanu (OT, Penn State)

The Saints are in a tough spot in terms of roster construction. They’ve got a number of aging pieces on their roster, some holes to fill, and little cap flexibility to do it. They’ve got to draft with an eye toward finding talent at big money positions like offensive tackle, edge rusher, defensive tackle, and wide receiver (their corners are actually pretty solid). With only two picks in the first four rounds, there’s not a ton of room for error.

Offensive tackle may become the Saints biggest need if right tackle Ryan Ramczyk is forced to miss time with a knee injury (he recently suffered a setback in his recovery and there’s been talk of potential retirement). While the Saints drafted Trevor Penning in 2019, he has struggled mightily during his two years in the NFL and isn’t ideally suited to play left tackle. Fortunately for the Saints, the offensive tackle class this year is pretty strong at the top. I’ve got them taking a high-upside left tackle prospect in Penn State’s Olu Fashanu.

Fashanu has good size and length along with great functional athleticism for his position. At just 21 years old, he still needs to develop strength (he struggled in college with bigger defensive lineman) and master technique, but the ceiling is high. And unlike a number of the high-level tackle prospects, Fashanu profiles naturally as a left tackle.

Pick 15 - Indianapolis Colts: Quinyon Mitchell (CB, Toledo)

The Colts have a solid roster with few glaring holes, but they lack a shutdown outside corner; Kenny Moore got big money this off-season but he primarily lines up in the slot. Enter Quinyon Mitchell, one of the best defensive players in the class (he’s also one of my Five Favorites).

Even though Mitchell didn’t play against the top college competition at Toledo, he shined whenever he took the field. He’s got a great combination of size and speed to match all kinds of NFL receivers, he moves smoothly in coverage, and he has good ball tracking skills. By drafting Mitchell, the Colts snag the best corner available at a position of clear need.

Pick 16 - Seattle Seahawks: Troy Fautanu (OT, Washington)

The Seahawks have talent on the outside but need to find a way to get better in the trenches. They strengthen their O-Line here by taking Washington star left tackle Troy Fautanu, who will only have to move south of downtown Seattle to play on Sundays (low moving costs are obviously a key factor).

Fautanu is a moving wall in pass protection. He’s an incredible athlete for the position, so he can stick with any edge rushers. At 6’4” and 317 pounds, he’s a bit on the short side for a tackle, but a lot of scouts have him projected as a guard where he also has experience, which negates the concern a bit. He’s got great 34.5” arm length to make up for a lack of size. Fautanu can plug in immediately on Seattle’s offensive line, whether at guard or tackle, and offer a significant upgrade right away.

Pick 17 - Jacksonville Jaguars: Terrion Arnold (CB, Alabama)

Jacksonville has spent up in recent years on its offense and just signed star pass rusher Josh Allen to a $150 million five-year deal. Now it’s time for them to find secondary help to pair with Tyson Campbell. Even with Quinyon Mitchell off the board, there are several quality cornerbacks available. The best among them last year was Alabama’s Terrion Arnold, who was tremendous in pass coverage last year under Nick Saban. Arnold came into the year less heralded than his counterpart in the Alabama secondary Kool-Aid McKinstry, but he regularly stood out, as he secured five interceptions and forced a fumble to go with 63 tackles.

Arnold plays aggressive but with discipline, and has smoothness and hand skills to stick with receivers without getting too grabby. He isn’t the fastest cornerback (an issue for several top corners in this class), but he has god size and strength to play press if he needs to.

Pick 18 - Cincinnati Bengals: JC Latham (OT, Alabama)

The Bengals have to protect Joe Burrow to be effective. They recently brought in Trent Brown to play right tackle, but Brown is on a 1 year deal—if he plays well, the Bengals probably won’t be able to afford him in free agency next year. With the offensive tackle talent in the draft, the easy solution is to draft somebody and future-proof the position.

You could do worse than Alabama right tackle JC Latham. Latham is a hulking 6’6” and 342 pounds and shows incredible strength at the point of attack. And given he’s started 25 games at Alabama, there’s no doubt Latham has quality experience. He commits a few too many penalties and spends a little too much time blocking air (especially in pass protection), but there’s talent here in spades. If he doesn’t have to start immediately on the outside, he’s got the tools to develop into a quality tackle.

Pick 19 - LA Rams: Laiatu Latu (Edge, UCLA)

The Rams just lost one of the best pass rushers in history when Aaron Donald retired this past March. There’s no way for them to replace Donald’s production, but they’ll find a quality young pass rusher in their back yard by drafting UCLA’s Laiatau Latu.

Latu’s pass rushing production is miles ahead of anyone else in the class. According to Pro Football Focus, in the last two seasons Latu has had 25 sacks and 81 hurries, and he posted a 2023 pass rush win rate of over 26%. Those figures rival Will Anderson Jr., who burst onto the scene after being drafted #3 overall last year.Latu’s athletic profile doesn’t stand out much, but he’s got a solid combination of size, speed, and strength. Where he shines, though, is in technique. Latu has incredible hands that allow him to keep offensive lineman from getting hold of him, and he has a pass rush arsenal that looks like it belongs to a 10-year NFL veteran. Where a lot of college edge rushers rely on athleticism, Latu’s refined his technique so that he can roll out pass rush moves in combination with counters to keep offensive linemen off balance. He’s incredibly effective as a result.

Latu does have some medical concerns, as a neck injury caused him to temporarily retire from the University of Washington before he transferred to UCLA. That could depress his stock, but the Rams take advantage here and land a high quality prospect at a critical position.

Pick 20 - Pittsburgh Steelers: Amarius Mims (OT, Georgia)

The Steelers drafted an athletic offensive tackle out of the University of Georgia when they took Broderick Jones in 2023, but they still have obvious needs along the offensive line. Why not go back to the well?

The Steelers run it back here and draft Amarius Mims, a physical specimen and mountain of a man who profiles as a future star if he can stay healthy. Mims is mammoth at 6’8” and 340 pounds and he’s built like a super hero:

Seriously, I’m not sure whether this guy is a human or an alien version of Andre the Giant.

Mims has only started 8 games and he’s played only about 800 snaps in his career due to injuries, but the physical talent is wild. You see him move in ways that nobody that big has business moving, and he can push around smaller players with ease. He’ll need to develop of course, but he’s got all the tools you could want in a tackle and more.

Pick 21 - Miami Dolphins: Graham Barton (OL, Duke)

Graham Barton doesn’t scream South Beach and he isn’t the most physically imposing offensive lineman that will go in the first round. But despite going to an obvious basketball school, this guy can play football. He’s an effective player in run blocking and pass protection and has the versatility to play almost any position along the offensive line.

The Dolphins are built around speed and quick passes, but their offensive line needs to be retooled after getting wrecked by the Chiefs and then losing Robert Hunt and Connor Williams as free agents. Barton is good enough to start for the Dolphins immediately, as other than Terran Armstead, I’m not sure there’s a locked in starter on the roster. Plus, Barton’s position flexibility will help the Dolphins find the best five to put on the field.

Pick 22 - Philadelphia Eagles: Jared Verse (Edge, Florida State)

The Eagles have needs at linebacker and in the secondary, but GM Howie Roseman has a philosophy that works: draft for the trenches and figure the rest out later. They haven’t drafted a first round secondary player since Roseman took over the top job in 2010, and linebacker is a low value position, so you can bet they’re not going to fill either hole!

So what about the trenches?

The Eagles have had some changes at edge rusher and could use an infusion of talent soon. Josh Sweat remains the most complete edge rusher on the team, but situational pass rusher Bryce Huff has come in to replace Haasan Reddick. Brandon Graham is also getting up there in age, and we’ve yet to see whether Nolan Smith can produce.

Verse is a high-quality edge who can play the run or pass effectively. At 6’4” and 260 pounds, he’s more stout in run defense than Huff or Smith, so he can find a role even if those two are better pass rushers. The Eagles keep their defensive line fresh, so adding Verse to the rotation will allow them to get younger and cheaper while maintaining and core strength. For another year, the Eagles answer the question of what to do about their secondary with a clear answer: find good lineman.

Pick 23 - Arizona Cardinals: Nate Wiggins (CB, Clemson)

Arizona picked its number 1 offensive option by drafting Rome Odunze at pick #7. Now, with the extra draft capital they received from moving back, they can turn to another need in cornerback.

Nate Wiggins has qualities as a cover corner. He’s fast, fluid, and instinctive—and he gives great effort when he needs to—he’s had several chase-down tackles that saved touchdowns. But Wiggins is rail-thin and there are valid concerns that he can get bodied by bigger receivers and won’t be able to hold up well against the run. Nobody really questions the cover skills though, and he’s getting paid to cover people not tackle them.

Pick 24 - Dallas Cowboys: Tyler Guyton (OT, Oklahoma)

The Cowboys have had a reputation for great offensive line play over the last decade. But last year, they struggled to run the ball—in part because their talent along the O-Line has started to dwindle over the years. Former stalwart left tackle Tyron Smith is now with the Jets, and the Cowboys have three undrafted players holding down starting roles right now. So the Cowboys could use an infusion of younger talent on the line.

Guyton is widely considered to be a bit of a project, but he’s got the traits to be a quality tackle at the NFL level. He’s got size and strength, and he can move quickly for a huge 325+ pound man. Originally a defensive lineman, Guyton lacks experience—especially in run blocking given Oklahoma’s pass-heavy scheme. But there’s talent here and the Cowboys can take advantage of it while filling other needs like wide receiver later in the draft.

Pick 25 - Buffalo Bills: Brian Thomas Jr. (WR, LSU)

Trade: Buffalo sends a first rounder (#28) and a second rounder (#60) to Green Bay in exchange for pick #25. Green Bay gets excess value equivalent to an extra early third round pick in exchange for moving down.

Another trade! Green Bay has oodles of young talent and no obvious draft needs, so they take advantage by trading back with Buffalo. Buffalo is desperate for a receiver after dealing Stefon Diggs for a 2025 draft pick, so they move up to avoid potentially getting leap-frogged for their choice of receiver after the Big 3 (MHJ, Nabers, Odunze).

Brian Thomas Jr. is a rare athlete at 6’3” and 209 pounds with 4.33 speed in the 40. He can absolutely fly down the field put defenders on their heels, which is especially valuable when paired with a quarterback like Josh Allen who can flick the ball 70+ yards with ease. Thomas Jr. lacks polish as he is largely limited to vertical routes, but he’s got the chance to be special. He puts in good effort all the time and can make house-calls regularly; in fact he led the nation in receiving touchdowns last year with 17. Buffalo has some options in the short passing game, so getting a deep threat to really stretch defenses will be critical.

Pick 26 - Tampa Bay Buccaneers: Chop Robinson (Edge, Penn State)

Tampa Bay could go a few different directions here, but one obvious need is their pass rush. Yaya Diaby produced solidly after being drafted in the third round last year, but Joe Tryon-Shoyinka has never quite lived up to his first round pedigree on the other side. The Bucs would benefit from adding talent, and teams can never have too many good pass rushers.

With Turner, Latu, and Verse all off the board, the remaining pass rush prospects all have some flaws. Chop Robinson is the highest upside of those that remain, as he sports elite traits and an ultra-fast get-off. As expected, Robinson smoked the combine, where he ran a 4.48 second 40 yard dash and posted strong jumping and shuttle numbers. But Robinson still needs to develop refined pass rush moves, and his smaller size (6’3” and 254 pounds) can result in him getting pushed off his spot in the run game. He also had relatively middling production in terms of sacks given the physical tools, though his 20.9% pass rush win rate (per Pro Football Focus) was certainly respectable. Regardless, Robinson’s potential is obvious and he could develop into an elite pass rusher over time.

Pick 27 - Carolina Panthers: Adonai Mitchell (WR, Texas)

Trade: Carolina sends second (#33) and third round (#65) picks to Arizona in exchange for moving up to pick #27. Arizona gets excess value equivalent to an extra third round pick in exchange for moving down.

Just like the Bills, the Panthers get a little nervous here and move up to secure the highest ceiling receiver left in the draft in Adonai Mitchell.

The most important thing for the Panthers to do this off-season is give Bryce Young a chance to be successful. They’ve already started on that project, going big in free agency to secure quality interior offensive linemen and trading for former Steelers WR Diontae Johnson. But they still don’t have a big bodied receiver who can operate as a redzone option.

Mitchell fits that bill. At 6’2” and 205 pounds, Mitchell is a big, sure-handed receiver who has dominated in the redzone at both Texas and Georgia. He’s a true redzone threat who has five touchdowns in five College Football Playoff games. He also has elite speed for his size, having run a 4.35 second 40 at the NFL Combine.

You wonder a little bit about Mitchell’s motor. He can give halfhearted efforts at times, and he won’t always go full speed if he doesn’t expect the ball to come his way. If he can find a way to fix that, he’s going to be closer to the top 3 receivers in this draft than anyone else.

Pick 28 - Green Bay Packers: Cooper DeJean (CB/S, Iowa)

Green Bay drops back a few spots by virtue of its trade with the Bills and still secures the same player: Iowa cornerback Cooper DeJean.

The Packers secondary could use some more talent despite adding Xavier McKinney this off-season. DeJean played corner at Iowa but many around the league think he will find his home eventually at safety (I am certain nobody is falling victim to any implicit biases in coming to that conclusion…). Regardless, the Packers will find space for him—he’s got incredible instincts, toughness, and a nose for the ball. He also returned punts for Iowa last season, and would’ve had a game-winning punt return touchdown against Minnesota if it weren’t for some absolute nonsense.

This dude can play football and Green Bay will be glad to have him in the secondary wherever he ultimately ends up.

Pick 29 - Las Vegas Raiders: Michael Penix Jr. (QB, Washington)

Trade: Las Vegas sends second (#44) and third round (#77) picks, plus a 2025 fourth rounder, to Detroit in exchange for moving up to pick #29. For its trouble, Detroit gets excess value equivalent to an extra third round pick in exchange for moving down.

After missing out on the first five quarterbacks taken in the draft, the Raiders move up to pick Michael Penix Jr. from Washington. By moving up into the first round, the Raiders ward off other teams like the Giants and Rams from moving up ahead of them in the second round for a QB.

Penix is a well-known commodity at this point and would be a big upgrade over Gardner Minshew at QB for the Raiders. He’s an elite deep ball thrower and put up electric numbers at Washington, ultimately leading them to the National Title game against Michigan. He led college football with over 4,900 yards passing last year, while tossing 36 touchdowns (against just 11 interceptions). Penix is already 24 years old, needs to work on his ball placement for underneath throws, and has had significant injuries in the past, but his success last year showed that when he puts everything together, he can be a really effective player. He also wowed scouts at his pro day by showing good athleticism, running a sub-4.6 second 40. That wasn’t on display at U-Dub, so there may be more in the cupboard than expected.

Pick 30 - Baltimore Ravens: Kool-Aid McKinstry (CB, Alabama)

The Ravens have had depth issues at cornerback for years. They can fill a need at a high-value position by selecting Alabama’s Kool-Aid McKinstry at pick #30.

McKinstry is a really good corner who has consistently put quality play on film. He plays with fluidity and consistency in coverage, and he doesn’t make a ton of mistakes. Terrion Arnold definitely overtook him as a playmaker this year, but that’s more a reflection of Arnold’s stellar play that it was of McKinstry somehow falling off. He lacks elite athleticism and speed for a corner, which has pushed him down most draft boards, but he’s still got the skills to be a starter on Sundays.

Pick 31 - San Francisco 49ers: Jordan Morgan (OT, Arizona)

That the Niners are picking at the end of the first round again is a testament to the overall quality of their roster; they simply don’t have a ton of needs to fill. Still, San Francisco could stand to improve at tackle opposite of Trent Williams and at cornerback opposite Charvarius Ward.

Jordan Morgan is the best player left at those positions. He’s a really good athlete with good movement skills for a 6’6”, 320-pound man. His lack of natural strength shows up at times in run blocking and pass protection, which makes him more fit for a zone running scheme than a power/gap scheme. That matches well with the 49ers scheme, so Morgan will be a solid fit. Though Morgan’s experience is all at left tackle, he’s a good enough athlete to make the switch to the right side.

Pick 32 - Kansas City Chiefs: Keon Coleman (WR, Florida State)

The Chiefs don’t really have needs because they have Pat Mahomes, who is good enough to render other offensive positions largely irrelevant. But if you had to pick something, it would be wide receiver—especially if Rashee Rice misses time as a result of legal issues stemming from a car crash. Kansas City picked up Marquise Brown, a deep threat with a small body, this off-season, so they can go for a complimentary piece.

Keon Coleman was a beast at Florida State after transferring from Michigan State (where he played football and basketball). He’s got the body to match, at 6’4” and 215 pounds with elite leaping ability. He caught 18 touchdowns in two years at FSU and had some highlight reel plays, including as a punt returner, but it felt like his overall receiving production was a bit lacking. He only averaged about 725 yards per season over the last two years, and he didn’t catch contested passes as often as you’d guess for a guy with his size. But his effort and athleticism were frequently on display, and you can’t teach his size. Speed is a bit of a question after he ran an unexpectedly slow 4.6 second 40 yard dash, but he was also clocked at the NFL Combine running over 20.3 miles per hour in the gauntlet drill (fastest among receivers), which suggests good functional speed despite the slower 40. The Chiefs will find a way to take advantage of his unique skillset.

Round 2

I’m going to cut down on the descriptions for Round 2 (my fingers hurt, too many words typed)—but trust that I put a lot of thought into this!

Pick 33 - Arizona Cardinals: Jerzhan Newton (DT, Illinois)

The embarrassment of riches for the Cardinals continues. They bolster their below-average interior D-Line with Johnny Newton, the best interior pass rusher in college football last year. Newton lacks the strength of Byron Murphy, but he’s a really disruptive player regardless.

Pick 34 - New England Patriots: Xavier Legette (WR, South Carolina)

After drafting Drake Maye, the Pats have to get him a weapon. Legette is a physical specimen who had an incredibly productive year last season with over 1,250 yards and 7 touchdowns. He’s big and has breakaway speed, but drops to the second round because he was a bit of a one-year-wonder (where was this his first four years at South Carolina?). He’ll bolster the Patriots receiving corps regardless.

Pick 35 - Tennessee Titans: Darius Robinson (Edge, Missouri)

Darius Robinson is a bit of a tweeter at 6’5” and 285 pounds, but he’s a disruptive pass rusher with great strength. He’s not as explosive as other NFL pass rushers, but he’s versatile and productive. The Titans have a reputation for developing disruptive defensive linemen with versatility and Robinson absolutely fits that mold. He’s good enough to compete with Sebastien Joseph-Day for a starting role right away.

Pick 36 - Washington Commanders: Ennis Rakestraw Jr. (CB, Missouri)

Rakestraw’s game screams toughness. He’s physical with receivers at the line of scrimmage and doesn’t mind putting his hat on somebody when he needs to. He at his best playing man coverage, though he graded out well in zone per Pro Football Focus. Similar to other CBs in this class, Rakestraw lacks speed compared to the top outside corners at the NFL level, which is part of why he falls to the second round.

Pick 37 - Atlanta Falcons: TJ Tampa (CB, Iowa State)

Trade: Atlanta sends its second round pick (#43) and a fourth round pick (#109) to the Chargers in exchange for pick #37.

Atlanta needs a cornerback to play with AJ Terrell and at this point in the draft, there aren’t a ton of obvious candidates to start right away. The Chargers, meanwhile, have a number of holes to fill and opt to move down rather than take a corner themselves (which they also need).

TJ Tampa has great size for a cornerback and doesn’t give much of that advantage back in terms of fluidity or coverage skills. He can get a little mixed up with shiftier receivers and lacks elite speed and recovery, but he’s got good strength to re-direct guys when he needs to. He’s a willing run defender too.

Pick 38 - Tennessee Titans: Troy Franklin (WR, Oregon)

Franklin specializes in taking the top off the defense. He’s rail thin at 6’2” and 176 pounds, but he’s got good speed that regularly turned into chunk yardage at Oregon. He had over 1,380 yards and 14 touchdowns last year—how’s that for production? Giving Will Levis a deep threat like Franklin to pair with DeAndre Hopkins and Calvin Ridley will help the young QB thrive.

Pick 39 - Carolina Panthers: Zach Frazier (C, West Virginia)

The one part of the offensive line that Carolina hasn’t invested in recently is center. Frazier is coming off an injury but was a three year starting center at West Virginia—his depth of experience gives him a slight edge of Jackson Powers-Johnson from Oregon here despite slightly less athleticism, as Carolina is trying to get Bryce Young as much immediate help as possible.

Pick 40 - Washington Commanders: Chris Braswell (Edge, Alabama)

Washington seems to have traded away all its edge rushers, sending Montez Sweat to the Bears and Chase Young to the 49ers. They take Braswell here to bolster their edge rush. Braswell was super productive last season with 13 sacks and 33 pressures per Pro Football Focus, and he’s got great athleticism. He may not have the same ceiling as the first round guys, though.

Pick 41 - Green Bay Packers: Braden Fiske (DT, Florida State)

The Packers can bolster their defensive line with a situational interior pass rusher in Braden Fiske. Fiske is incredibly explosive (he lit the combine on fire for a defensive tackle) and productive as a pass rusher, but he’s on the smaller end. With Kenny Clark approaching free agency next season, there’s no harm in the Packers giving themselves alternatives at D-Tackle.

Pick 42 - Houston Texans: Kamari Lassiter (CB, Georgia)

Houston moved out of the first round via a trade with Minnesota earlier this spring, so this is their first pick. They’ve already addressed most of their big needs in free agency, but there is a need at cornerback opposite Derek Stingley Jr. Kamari Lassiter is a gamer who showed good instincts, fluidity, and cover skills at Georgia, but he had a disappointing 40 time (reportedly over 4.6 seconds), so there’s some concern about his ability to play on the outside in the NFL. Lassiter’s consistent play at Georgia showed he could hang with top dogs at the college level, though.

Pick 43 - LA Chargers: Kingsley Suamataia (OT, BYU)

Fine, I’ll bow a bit to the crowd here—the Chargers look to bolster their run game by taking BYU tackle Kingsley Suamataia. A cousin of Penei Sewell, Suamataia has great size and athleticism and can over-power defenders as part of a power run scheme. He’s got more upside than tackle prospects outside the first round, but he needs to work a lot on his technique in all areas. I suppose that’s what coaching is for.

Pick 44 - Detroit Lions: Adisa Isaac (Edge, Penn State)

After trading back with the Raiders, the Lions take Adisa Isaac from Penn State to supplement their pass rush. Aidan Hutchinson is a beast, but the Lions need someone to take advantage of the attention he draws. Isaac can join Detroit’s rotation with Marcus Davenport to help bring more pressure from the opposite side. Isaac was productive in college and has the physical tools to play at the NFL level, although he isn’t an elite athlete and has some room to improve his technique.

Pick 45 - New Orleans Saints: Ladd McConkey (WR, Georgia)

The Saints could use help on the defensive line, but they also need an underneath pass catcher to take advantage of the space created by Chris Olave and Rashid Shaheed. They take Ladd McConkey here as he’s the best player available. McConkey projects as a slot receiver, but he’s got good size and speed to pair with nice route running skills. He can also keep the Saints receiver room humming if Shaheed leaves in free agency after next season.

Pick 46 - Indianapolis Colts: Xavier Worthy (WR, Texas)

The Colts filled their biggest defensive need in Round 1 and now turn to the offensive side of the ball. Worthy is absurdly fast—he ran a record 4.21 second 40 yard dash at the combine—and he plays like it. His game-breaking speed will create space for Michael Pittman and Alec Pierce, especially with the threat of Anthony Richardson’s electric arm. Worthy isn’t as shifty as iconic speedsters like DeSean Jackson, but he’s can fill a clear role for the Colts.

Pick 47 - New York Giants: Javon Bullard (S, Georgia)

The Giants have needs all over the field, but after wide receiver, their biggest priority should be their secondary after the departure of safety Xavier McKinney. Bullard has great football instincts and is a willing tackler. He profiles well as a potential nickel corner, but he’s got experience dropping into coverage from the safety position too. He’s physical and will make his presence felt in games—he’s the guy who knocked out Marvin Harrison Jr. in the College Football Playoff game between Ohio State and Georgia in 2023.

Pick 48 - Jacksonville Jaguars: Marshawn Kneeland (Edge, Western Michigan)

The Jags are heavily invested at edge, but Travon Walker’s been a bit disappointing. Adding another pass rusher to the group gives them some insurance in case Walker can’t take a step. It would also give them versatility on clear passing downs. Enter Kneeland, who has great size and strength for the position at 6’3” and 275 pounds. Kneeland relies heavily on his power rush, but he’s strong as hell so it can work. He’ll need to develop a deeper bag of pass rush moves to live up to his potential at the NFL level.

Pick 49 - Cincinnati Bengals: Ja'Lynn Polk (WR, Washington)

The Bengals franchise tagged Tee Higgins this year, but they need a plan to move on from him if they can’t repair the relationship. They also let Tyler Boyd walk in free agency, so they’ve got space in their receiver room. Polk is a really good football player who was highly productive at Washington, racking up 1,159 yards and 9 touchdowns opposite Rome Odunze. Polk isn’t as big as Higgins, but he has good size, never shies away from contact, and routinely pulls down contested balls.

Pick 50 - Philadelphia Eagles: Ricky Pearsall (WR, Florida)

The Eagles also quietly have a need at receiver, even with big money being spent on AJ Brown and Devonta Smith. Pearsall profiles as a really good slot receiver as he excels at working in tight spaces and shows solid short-area quickness. He’s got great hands and enough speed to create a little bit in space too. With defenses focusing on Brown and Smith, Pearsall could eat underneath alongside Dallas Goedert.

Pick 51 - Pittsburgh Steelers: Jackson Powers-Johnson (C, Oregon)

The Steelers are one of many teams that need a center. Although the position has been devalued league-wide, Jackson Powers-Johnson (“JPJ”) has all the tools to be a high-level starter. He’s huge for a center, weighing 330 pounds, but he’s extremely athletic and quick nonetheless. By adding Broderick Jones in 2023 and Amarius Mims and JPJ in 2024, the Steelers are setting their O-Line up to have some of the biggest and best athletes in the trenches across the NFL.

Pick 52 - LA Rams: Max Melton (CB, Rutgers)

Rutgers hasn’t produced a lot of NFL talent lately, but I love Max Melton’s game. At 5’11”, 187 pounds, Melton may fit best on the interior, but he’s athletic enough to warrant a look as an outside corner—he posted solid explosion numbers at the combine compared to a lot of other corners in the class. He’s tough and likes to play physical, which helps him win plays early but can result in some undue grabbiness at times. He’ll have to clean that up to avoid penalties in the NFL.

Pick 53 - Philadelphia Eagles: Edgerrin Cooper (LB, Texas A&M)

The Eagles finally fill a real “position of need” with their third pick of the draft (slot receiver is a bit of a luxury for them). Edgerrin Cooper is a stellar athlete at linebacker and his production last season was off the charts. He’s a really strong athlete who holds up well in pass coverage, which makes him a good fit for the modern NFL. But he can fall off tackles and can run himself out of plays sometimes, and he needs to work on his play recognition skills. Still, with his incredible athletic traits, the Eagles can find a way to get him on the field even if his best skill early on is as a blitzer.

Pick 54 - Cleveland Browns: Payton Wilson (LB, NC State)

The Browns don’t have their first pick until #54 overall thanks to their trade for Deshaun Watson. Linebacker is probably not their highest position of need, but Payton Wilson is a talented linebacker who can find his way into an effective role on an already-elite defense. Wilson has good size and elite athleticism for the position, and he’s got versatility to play inside and outside, or as a pass rusher if he needs to. That kind of versatility can be put to good use immediately by defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz.

Pick 55 - Miami Dolphins: Roman Wilson (WR, Michigan)

Miami loves fast receivers, and Roman Wilson fits the bill. The Dolphins want to get their receivers on the move to stress defenses and Wilson gives them another weapon to do so. And quietly, Tyreke Hill could be done in Miami sooner than later, as he’s got no guarantees on his deal after 2024 and the Fins will have to pay quarterback Tua Tagovailoa soon. Having another speedster on the roster will increase Miami’s flexibility in the off-season after 2024. Michigan’s national title run also showed that Wilson is also a gamer who shows up in big moments—whenever the Wolverines needed a big play, Wilson seemed to break one.

Pick 56 - Dallas Cowboys: Jonathan Brooks (RB, Texas)

The Cowboys need a running back and they don’t need to go far to find one in Jonathan Brooks. Brooks suffered a torn ACL last season, but he’s a talented back who does a little bit of everything—size, speed, agility, vision, balance, and tackle-breaking ability. Brooks is widely considered the best back in the draft and will help elevate the Cowboys’ run game along with first round pick Tyler Guyton.

Pick 57 - Tampa Bay Buccaneers: Mike Sainristil (CB, Michigan)

The Bucs need to bolster their secondary after trading away Carlton Davis. They brought in Bryce Hall on a 1 year deal to build up their depth at outside corner, but they could use some juice in the slot. Sainristil is a Wolverine, both as an alum and in spirit. He’s undersized but tough as nails, never shying away from contact and always willing to play physically. He’s got great instincts for finding the ball, perhaps as a result of time he originally spent at receiver. He would compete for a starting job right away.

Pick 58 - Green Bay Packers: Brandon Coleman (OT, TCU)

Brandon Coleman has all the physical tools necessary to play tackle in the NFL, but his play was inconsistent. He played really well in 2022 as TCU made a run to the National Championship game, but he bounced around between guard and tackle in 2023 and struggled a bit. The Packers don’t need Coleman to start right away, but his upside and positional versatility would bring them some depth on the O-Line and growth prospects.

Pick 59 - Houston Texans: Maason Smith (DT, LSU)

You can’t take Maason Smith this high based on his college production, as Smith struggled to find consistency this season after coming back from an injury that caused him to miss all but one game in 2022. But his physical traits are absolutely tantalizing and Houston can afford to take a big swing on him. Smith is 6’6” and weighs 315 pounds, and he’s shown he has really good power and movement skills. He needs a lot of work on technique and play recognition, but if he can figure it out, he can be a Pro Bowl caliber player.

Pick 60 - Green Bay Packers: Tyler Nubin (S, Minnesota)

The Packers already have Xavier McKinney and Cooper DeJean from the first round, but they snag Nubin here anyway in the hopes that DeJean can work out at corner. Nubin has great play recognition and coverage skills and finds ways to get the ball in his hands. Despite that, he also does a good job playing his run responsibilities, which can be hard to find in modern safeties. Combined with McKinney and DeJean, you’re looking at a safety group that is versatile and can really turn teams over.

Pick 61 - Detroit Lions: Brandon Dorlus (DT, Oregon)

Standing 6’3” and weighing in at 283 pounds, Dorlus is a bit of a tweener who may bounce between roles as an edge rusher and interior lineman. But he brings versatility, strength, and disruption when he’s on the fields (although he could be more consistent). Even if Dorlus can’t bring the every-down consistency that stars like Hutchinson does, adding him to the pass rush group would give the Lions another good player to let throw out different looks, especially on passing downs.

Pick 62 - Baltimore Ravens: Kiran Amegadije (OT, Yale)

I don’t think I’ve ever seen a player drafted from Yale, but I guess if you absolutely dominate the Ivy League you can make it pro. Amegadije won’t be ready to start right away, but the Ravens don’t need him to—they can help him build strength and get experience against NFL-level talent before he steps on the field. With Ronnie Stanley getting older and approaching free agency, the Ravens would benefit from developing another potential tackle prospect. Amegadije also has some experience at guard if they need to play him there.

Pick 63 - San Francisco 49ers: Andru Phillips (CB, Kentucky)

The Niners finally get to take a corner! Phillips is a good athlete who has experience both at outside corner and in the slot. He’s more natural in man coverage than in zone and doesn’t have the ball instincts of some corners who will go later in the draft, but he’s got size, speed, and can swivel his hips to play sticky coverage. He’s also not afraid of playing in a crowd and will come up to make plays in the run game if called upon, though he could stand to wrap guys up better. If he can round out his technique in zone coverage, he’ll find time on a good team.

Pick 64 - Kansas City Chiefs: Roger Rosengarten (OT, Washington)

The Chiefs let go of left tackle Donovan Smith in free agency and now need someone to protect Mahomes. Rosengarten played right tackle at Washington, but was responsible for protecting Michael Penix’s blindside (Penix is left-handed). He’s a bit limited athletically and not necessarily the strongest tackle around, so he may never pan-out as a long-term solution. But Rosengarten does a good job of finding a way to stay on blocks and could function as a spot-starter early if needed. He’s also young enough to reasonably project some physical improvement, especially in terms of strength.

Round 3

We’re down to Round 3 and I have few more words left. The notes are going to get shorter.

Pick 65 - Arizona Cardinals: Christian Haynes (OG, UConn)

Haynes was a standout at the Senior Bowl and can shore up the Cardinals interior offensive line.

Pick 66 - Arizona Cardinals: Ruke Orhorhoro (DT, Clemson)

Developmental defensive tackle with an intriguing blend of size, strength, and athleticism. He’s got experience playing inside out to head-up on tackles. Probably needs to keep adding weight to reach his peak on the interior.

Pick 67 - Washington Commanders: Ja'Tavion Sanders (TE, Texas)

The Commanders feel weird without a quality tight end (apologies to Zach Ertz, whose best years are behind him). Sanders is a quality receiver for a tight end but light in the run game and ran slower than expected.

Pick 68 - New England Patriots: Patrick Paul (OT, Houston)

Paul is a project but has the chance to become an effective pass protector at the NFL level. He’s got great length, but needs to build strength.

Pick 69 - LA Chargers: Kris Jenkins (DT, Michigan)

Harbaugh gets a Michigan guy! Jenkins is a powerful athlete who excelled in the run game, but he’s still got a fair amount of work to do to become a credible pass rush threat. The Chargers need a dude on the interior, though, and Jenkins can be it.

Pick 70 - New York Giants: Cooper Beebee (OG, Kansas State)

The Giants need to build talent on the O-Line and Beebee has experience playing a variety of positions. He’s got good size and power, which gives him a solid floor as a prospect even though he isn’t necessarily an elite athlete for the position.

Pick 71 - Arizona Cardinals: Malachi Corley (WR, Western Kentucky)

This is one of my favorite players in the third round. Corley is a dog with the ball in his hands, and he can bring a physical element to the receiving game that the Cardinals do not have. Paired with Rome Odunze and Michael Wilson, you can picture some pretty nasty WR screens going Corley’s way.

Pick 72 - New York Jets: Dominick Puni (OG, Kansas)

After eating dessert first and drafting Brock Bowers in the first round, the Jets turn to the trenches and grab Dominick Puni from Kansas. Puni plays with power and has experience at guard and tackle, so he can fill in if the Jets do suffer injuries on the O-Line.

Pick 73 - Detroit Lions: Jermaine Burton (WR, Alabama)

Jermaine Burton has a really strong athletic profile, with decent size (6’0” and 196 pounds), speed (4.45 second 40 yard dash), and explosion. His production at Alabama and Georgia was a bit underwhelming, though. Off-field issues and reports of character concerns push Burton down the board, but Detroit can afford to take the risk here—they won’t actually need him if he doesn’t find a way to fit in.

Pick 74 - Atlanta Falcons: Jonah Elliss (Edge, Utah)

Dallas Turner is the Falcons pass-rushing prize from this draft, but Elliss can also help out as a situational pass rusher. He has a solid variety of pass rush moves and plays hard all the time; he also has the college production to prove it, as he had 13 sacks in his last season at Utah. He’ll need to get stronger and add bulk to become a three-down player.

Pick 75 - Chicago Bears: Devontez Walker (WR, UNC)

Tez Walker is a luxury pick and a bit of a project. He has a great combination of size and speed, but he didn’t produce nearly as much as you’d like to see and he struggles at times with tracking the ball and drops. He also needs to work on his footwork to do more than run vertical routes—getting him in a room with Keenan Allen and DJ Moore may help unlock his potential.

Pick 76 - Denver Broncos: Jalen McMillan (WR, Washington)

The Broncos need help in the receiver room and McMillan is a good player out of the slot. He’s got decent size and speed, and does a good job finding space, but he will need to work on his ability to make plays in a crowd to be really effective.

Pick 77 - Detroit Lions: Jaden Hicks (S, Washington State)

Hicks likes to hit people and plays with aggression all the time. He wants to come up and make big hits. But he’s got some work to do on technique, including reading plays. He’s got the size and athletic traits to bet on though and can contribute on special teams early.

Pick 78 - Washington Commanders: Calen Bullock (S, USC)

Bullock is more of a coverage safety. He’s rangy and does a great job of reading quarterbacks. He’s on the smaller side and can struggle defending the run. While he’s willing to mix it up, he can get tossed around a bit. Washington’s biggest secondary issues are really with coverage though, and Bullock can help with that.

Pick 79 - Atlanta Falcons: Kris Abrams-Draine (CB, Missouri)

Falcons need a slot corner and Abrams-Draine was a menace last year. He’s small, but he breaks up a lot of passes and can turn QBs over. He’s never going to be the best press corner or tackler, but the Falcons have already added TJ Tampa in the second round to address those needs.

Pick 80 - Cincinnati Bengals: Jaylen Wright (RB, Tennessee)

Another one of my Five Favorites, it pains me that Wright has to wait this long to find a home, but there aren’t many teams with huge running back needs earlier in the draft. Wright has big-play speed and if he gets space, he can break a game wide open. He’ll bring a different skill set than Zack Moss and Chase Brown.

Pick 81 - Seattle Seahawks: Blake Fisher (OT, Notre Dame)

The Seahawks continue to build out their offensive line by selecting Blake Fisher, an athletic right tackle from Notre Dame. Fisher isn’t plug-and-play like Troy Fautanu, but if he can build up his strength, he’ll be able to slot in at right tackle (assuming Fautanu eventually lands at guard).

Pick 82 - Indianapolis Colts: Austin Booker (Edge, Kansas)

The Colts don’t have huge needs to they take a swing here on a toolsy pass rusher in Austin Booker. Booker needs to add bulk and strength, but he’s got good length and produced last year for Kansas. He could develop into a high-quality player if given time.

Pick 83 - LA Rams: Junior Colson (LB, Michigan)

Colson is a traditional middle linebacker who does a little of everything well. The Rams could use depth at middle linebacker, and Colson has the chance to develop into a starter for them over time.

Pick 84 - Pittsburgh Steelers: Khyree Jackson (CB, Oregon)

The Steelers have a clear need at corner opposite of Joey Porter Jr. Khyree Jackson is enormous for the position (6’3”, 195 pounds), but he still moves well and displays good flexibility. He can get caught looking in the wrong places, but the tools are really good.

Pick 85 - Cleveland Browns: Brenden Rice (WR, USC)

The son of Jerry Rice, Brenden Rice has really nice size for a receiver. He’s not the quickest guy on the field, but he can get up to decent speeds when he needs to. He had solid, though not outstanding production at USC. Amari Cooper, Jerry Jeudy, and David Njoku are going to be the primary receiving threats in Cleveland, but Rice can work his way into a rotational role.

Pick 86 - Houston Texans: Jeremiah Trotter Jr. (LB, Clemson)

Trotter Jr. is the son of former Eagles stand-out linebacker Jeremiah Trotter Sr. He’s got great athleticism and plays smart football, including doing a nice job of finding his run fits and playing sticky in pass coverage. But he has significant size limitations at just 228 pounds with shorter arms. But Demeco Ryans will love his ability to find the ball and stick his nose in the mix.

Pick 87 - Dallas Cowboys: Javon Baker (WR, Central Florida)

The Cowboys are thin at receiver and need to starting looking for cost-controlled options as extensions for Dak Prescott, Ceedee Lamb, and Micah Parsons loom. Baker has some developing to do, but he’s got good size and manages to separate well enough to put up good production.

Pick 88 - Green Bay Packers: Bralen Trice (Edge, Washington)

Trice is one of those defenders who just screws things up. He’s always creating havoc and pushing quarterbacks off their spot, which is a nice talent to have. He generated 99 pressures in the last two seasons according to Pro Football Focus. Trice doesn’t have elite get-off, but he’s got good size and strength to wreak havoc (even if it’s not always controlled).

Pick 89 - Tampa Bay Buccaneers: Trey Benson (RB, Florida State)

Benson has a really interesting athletic profile—at 6’0”, 216, he’s a bigger back, but he has really fantastic breakaway speed. He runs hard and can break through arm tackles, but he’ll need to play with a bit more physicality to be at his best. He’s a bit too eager to try to get outside to use his speed, he’s got other clubs in the bag.

Pick 90 - Arizona Cardinals: Bucky Irving (RB, Oregon)

Bucky Irving is pretty small at 5’9” and 192 pounds, and he’s not as fast as you’d like at that size with 4.55 second 40 speed, but he produced like crazy at Oregon, with almost 1,192 yards on the ground and another 395 yards receiving. He plays really hard, doesn’t shy away from contract, and he’s got versatility. I’m a bit scarred by seeing Oregon backs with similar profiles who couldn’t reproduce their success in the NFL (hello, LaMichael James), but Irving deserves a shot.

Pick 91 - Green Bay Packers: Mason McCormick (OG, South Dakota State)

McCormick is a bit of a depth pick for the Packers. They could use interior offensive lineman, and McCormick has as good of a chance to pop as anyone at this point in the draft. He can really move people around in the run game.

Pick 92 - Tampa Bay Buccaneers: Sedrick Van Pran-Granger (C, Georgia)

Van Pran-Granger has started 44 games for Georgia since 2021, so you know the guy can play football. It’s not always pretty and he can get off-balance at times, but he finds a way to handle his assignment consistently. The Bucs have some holes on the interior of their O-Line and Van Pran-Granger should help solidify things there.

Pick 93 - Baltimore Ravens: Malik Washington (WR, Virginia)

The Ravens need to find some receiver help for Zay Flowers, but at this point in the draft the top prospects are gone. Malik Washington is on the smaller side, and his skillset overlaps a bit with Flowers, but he was incredibly productive in college and can find time on the field immediately.

Pick 94 - San Francisco 49ers: Michael Hall Jr. (DT, Ohio State)

Hall Jr. is the last of my Five Favorites on the board, and he finds a good home in San Francisco. Hall is small for an every-down defensive tackle, so the Niners would use him primarily on passing downs. Nick Bosa, Leonard Floyd, Javon Hargrove, and Hall could make for a pretty scary pass rush group on third down.

Pick 95 - Kansas City Chiefs: Jalyx Hunt (Edge, Houston Christian)

The Chiefs are often playing with a lead, so pass rushers are a key part of their defensive success. Hunt is athletically gifted enough to play in the NFL, but he still needs a lot of work (to say nothing of the competition jump he’ll face coming from Houston Christian). The Chiefs can develop him as a backup and hope he can convert his athletic traits into production.

Pick 96 - Jacksonville Jaguars: Cole Bishop (S, Utah)

Bishop has starting caliber speed, size, and athleticism, so he could easily go higher in the draft than this. He plays with force and is a willing tackler, but he can sometimes get too loose with his assignments. Jacksonville could use his versatility to enhance their physicality in the secondary.

Pick 97 - Cincinnati Bengals: Cam Hart (CB, Notre Dame)

Hart is a big, physical corner who may ultimately be better suited to special teams. But Cincinnati’s cornerback room is on the smaller side and the Bengals will appreciate having a bigger DB who they might be able to develop into a starter on the outside.

Pick 98 - Pittsburgh Steelers: Jamari Thrash (WR, Louisville)

Thrash has the coolest name of any wide receiver in the draft. He’s got good vertical speed and does a solid job tracking the ball, but he can improve his functional play strength so that he can catch the ball through contact. The Steelers need another receiver after letting Diontae Johnson go, and Thrash may be the best remaining receiver.

Pick 99 - LA Rams: Spencer Rattler (QB, South Carolina)

Rattler may never develop into a starting quarterback, but with Stafford approaching the end of his career, the Rams should look to put themselves in position to have a replacement on the roster if they can get lucky. Rattler’s had a bit of an up and down career, but he’s got enough talent to potentially succeed at the NFL level if he can play with more pace.

Pick 100 - Washington Commanders: Javon Solomon (Edge, Troy)

Solomon is undersized (with short arm length) and played at a lower level in college, but he managed to rack up 17 sacks last season anyway. The Commanders need pass rushers, though, so taking a flyer on Solomon with a compensatory pick is a worthwhile shot to take.

Round 4

Alright, my fingers are truly tired. Nothing to say about these guys except the Chargers (I can’t help myself), but you can email me if you want to know more about any of them!

Pick 101 - Carolina Panthers: Blake Corum (RB, Michigan)

Pick 102 - Seattle Seahawks: Brennan Jackson (Edge, Washington State)

Pick 103 - New England Patriots: Xavier Thomas (Edge, Clemson)

Pick 104 - Arizona Cardinals: Dadrion Taylor-Demerson (S, Texas Tech)

Pick 105 - LA Chargers: Caelen Carson (CB, Wake Forest)

The Chargers badly need corner depth and Carson has the athletic profile to do it, with solid size and adequate speed. He’s got a good amount of experience playing in different types of coverages and has displayed solid coverage skills and a willingness to play strong run defense too. He’s battled injuries in the past, which he’ll obviously need to avoid.

Pick 106 - Tennessee Titans: Kamren Kinchens (S, Miami)

Pick 107 - New York Giants: Michael Pratt (QB, Tulane)

Pick 108 - Minnesota Vikings: Jarvis Brownlee (CB, Louisville)

Pick 109 - LA Chargers: Marshawn Lloyd (RB, USC)

Lloyd is a talented running back with starting caliber athletic traits. He’s got speed, burst, and the chance to turn into a solid pass catcher. He won’t be used in a starting role, but he could bring some juice to the run game.

Pick 110 - LA Chargers: Christian Mahogany (OG, Boston College)

Even though I think the hype about the Chargers drafting OL early is a bit overrated, they do need some more guys. Neither Zion Johnson nor Jamaree Salyer showed enough at guard to have a vice-grip on a starting role, but they’ll probably keep their roles initially. Mahogany offers good power in the running game and a downhill mentality that Harbaugh and Greg Roman will appreciate.

Pick 111 - New York Jets: Tykee Smith (S, Georgia)

Pick 112 - Las Vegas Raiders: Ray Davis (RB, Kentucky)

Pick 113 - Baltimore Ravens: Renardo Green (CB, Florida State)

Pick 114 - Jacksonville Jaguars: DeWayne Carter (DT, Duke)

Pick 115 - Cincinnati Bengals: Cade Stover (TE, Ohio State)

Pick 116 - Jacksonville Jaguars: Ben Sinnott (TE, Kansas State)

Pick 117 - Indianapolis Colts: Blake Watson (RB, Memphis)

Pick 118 - Seattle Seahawks: Sione Vaki (S, Utah)

Pick 119 - Pittsburgh Steelers: Mohamed Kamara (Edge, Colorado State)

Pick 120 - Philadelphia Eagles: DJ James (CB, Auburn)

Pick 121 - Denver Broncos: Hunter Nourzad (C, Penn State)

Pick 122 - Chicago Bears: Jarrian Jones (CB, Florida State)

Pick 123 - Houston Texans: Matt Goncalves (OT, Pittsburgh)

Pick 124 - San Francisco 49ers: Marist Liufau (LB, Notre Dame)

Pick 125 - Tampa Bay Buccaneers: Tanner McLachlan (TE, Arizona)

Pick 126 - Green Bay Packers: T'Vondre Sweat (DT, Texas)

Pick 127 - Houston Texans: Will Shipley (RB, Clemson)

Pick 128 - Buffalo Bills: Jacob Cowing (WR, Arizona)

Pick 129 - Minnesota Vikings: Mekhi Wingo (DT, LSU)

Pick 130 - Baltimore Ravens: Zak Zinter (OG, Michigan)

Pick 131 - Kansas City Chiefs: Theo Johnson (TE, Penn State)

Pick 132 - San Francisco 49ers: Tyrone Tracy (RB, Purdue)

Pick 133 - Buffalo Bills: Tanner Bortolini (C, Wisconsin)

Pick 134 - New York Jets: Luke McCaffrey (WR, Rice)

Pick 135 - San Francisco 49ers: Christian Jones (OT, Texas)

Five Favorites - 2024 NFL Draft Edition

In this Five Favorites post, I’m taking a look at five players that I’m super excited about ahead of the 2024 NFL Draft. I’m not a trained scout, but I’ve watched a ton of tape in my time and have watched each of these players as much as I can. They’re all awesome, and I fully expected these guys to turn into studs in the NFL. No need for a lengthy intro—let’s dive in.

Quinyon Mitchell (Cornerback, Toledo)

Mitchell is the best and most exciting cornerback prospect in this class in my view, hands down. The Toledo product has a prototypical physical profile for a modern corner. Standing 6’0” and weighing in at 195 pounds, Mitchell posted the second fastest 40 time at 4.33 seconds (with a strong 1.51 second 10 yard split) alongside an impressive 38” vertical and 10’2” broad jump. He also put up strong numbers on the bench, hitting 20 reps of 225 pounds. Taken together, Mitchell has the speed, strength, and size to keep with the vast majority of WRs league-wide.

With that kind of athleticism, one would expect Mitchell to dominate at the collegiate level (particularly given Toledo faced just two Power 5 schools over the course of the last two seasons). And as a 3 year starter playing over 2,200 snaps, that’s exactly what he did. In 2021, Mitchell’s first year as a starter, he had 34 total tackles (2 tackles for loss), 8 pass breakups, an interception, and a forced fumble. In 2022, he had arguably his best season with 41 tackles (3.5 TFLs), 20 pass breakups, and 5 interceptions—including two for TDs against Northern Illinois. Last season, Mitchell had 41 tackles (two TFLs), 18 pass breakups, 1 interception, and a blocked kick. Mitchell also graded out well in coverage. According to Pro Football Focus, in 437 coverage snaps last season, Mitchell gave up a grand total of 27 catches (in 62 targets) for 290 yards and no touchdowns, and opponents posted a passer rating of just 51.1. 2022 was arguably better, as Mitchell also gave up 27 catches (in 70 targets) for just 270 yards and 3 touchdowns in 481 coverage snaps, and opponents posted a passer rating of just 34.8.

Setting the numbers aside, Mitchell shows up well on tape. He routinely shows good hip fluidity and change of direction to go with his obvious straight-line speed. He isn’t afraid to get physical and he rarely shies away from contact. Routinely you see him play through receivers to break up passes, and he’s got a couple tackles where he drops people with the force you’d expect to see from a safety more than a cornerback. Check out this hit:

The one question mark is how Mitchell plays on the line of scrimmage and in press. The vast majority of the time, Mitchell starts plays 5-10 yards off the line of scrimmage. This was obviously a strategy choice by Toledo that allowed Mitchell to easily track both the quarterback and his man effectively, which helped him rack up pass breakups (PBUs). But most NFL teams ask their corners to play press at least sometimes to give offenses different looks and disrupt their timing. You can’t really tell from Mitchell’s play at Toledo whether he can do that effectively against quality receivers, though his athletic profile suggests he’ll be fine if he can be coached up on technique.

Ultimately I think Mitchell will be able to gain the skills he needs to be an effective corner in almost any scheme at the NFL level. He’s tenacious and has great instincts for finding the ball, and he’s got the physical tools to match up with anyone in the league. What’s not to love?

Byron Murphy II (Defensive Tackle, Texas)

To be honest, I initially wanted to watch Texas film with an eye toward mammoth defensive tackle T’Vondre Sweat. The Chargers need a nose tackle and Sweat seemed to fit the profile at 6’4” and 366 pounds. So I was super confused seeing a (relatively) small defensive tackle lining up at nose tackle, junior Byron Murphy.

What the hell is that? Murphy, #90, is lined up in a 0 technique head up on the center while Sweat—who is almost 70 pounds heavier—is lined up as a 3 technique outside the right guard against Alabama! That’s crazy, but it’s not an accident. Texas did it all the time last season.

It doesn’t take long to figure out why: Murphy is a dog.

I’ll start with Murphy’s draft profile. At 6’0.5” and 297, Murphy is compact for a defensive tackle but incredibly powerful and quick. He threw up 28 reps on the bench press at the combine with strong explosion numbers for his position (4.87 second 40 yard dash, 33” vertical jump, and 9’3” broad jump). In three years with the Longhorns, Murphy totaled 70 tackles, 15 tackles for loss, and 8 sacks. According to Pro Football Focus, he also had 62 quarterback hurries (36 in 2023) and posted a pass rush win rate of 19.6% this past season, amongst the leaders for defensive tackles nationwide.

That said, what really jumps out is Murphy’s tape. Though on the smaller side for his position, Murphy has enough strength to hold up at nose tackle and take on double teams without getting pushed backward. He also holds up well in the running game, routinely showing the ability to shed blocks and make plays. Check out these clips from Texas’ marquee matchups last season against Alabama and Washington—Murphy is routinely wrecking run plays.

While his run defense is very strong, especially at his size, Murphy’s pass rushing skills are what will really get him reps at the next level. Defensive tackles that can rush the passer are increasingly at a premium in today’s game, as shown by mammoth deals given out this off-season to players like Chris Jones (10.5 sacks), Christian Wilkins (9 sacks), and Justin Madubuike (13 sacks). Murphy’s talent rushing the pass rusher is obvious, and the NFL has recently made clear it values players who can create havoc from the interior to bring pressure in a quarterback’s face. In pass rush, Murphy’s quickness and strong hands allow him to defeat one-on-one blocks routinely. He also takes advantage of his smaller frame and quickness to get skinny and slip through double-teams. He’s even shown that he can get off the line quickly enough to blow by the occasional blocker who doesn’t get off the snap quick enough. You see all three traits in the clip below:

Murphy still has to work on getting home after he beats blocks, but there’s no question the talent to do so is there. Lots of mocks have Murphy going to the Rams at pick #19 to replace future Hall of Fame Aaron Donald. Those are big shoes to fill and it’s unfair to expect anyone to replace Aaron Donald, but Murphy’s still good enough to very excited about.

Malik Nabers (Wide Receiver, LSU)

I hear there have been a handful of good receivers to come out of LSU in recent years. Justin Jefferson, Ja’marr Chase, and Odell Beckham come to mind. After exploding for 1,569 yards and 14 touchdowns this past season as a junior, Malik Nabers set LSU’s all-time receiving yards record, loudly announced himself as part of that vaunted group of receivers, and put himself in the conversation to be the #1 wide receiver in the 2024 draft alongside Marvin Harrison Jr. (Ohio State) and Rome Odunze (Washington).

LSU’s passing game dominated SEC defenses last season to the tune of 45.5 points per game, propelled by almost 339 yards per game and over 10.7 yards per attempt passing. Nabers was a huge part of that success, as he lead LSU’s wide receiver corps in yards and receptions and placed second in touchdowns. In fact, Nabers ranked second nationwide in receiving yards (behind only Odunze) and tied for third in touchdowns (his teammate Brian Thomas Jr. led the nation with 17 receiving touchdowns).

Obviously Nabers benefitted from tremendous seasons from Thomas Jr. and star quarterback Jayden Daniels, but he was a driving force behind LSU’s offense himself. Nabers was Daniels’ favorite target, as he led the team in catches (89) and targets (128). Despite the high volume, Nabers was remarkably efficient. According to stats from Pro Football Focus, Nabers caught almost 70% of his targets for 17.6 yards per reception while sporting a contested catch of over 45% (10 of 22 on contested catches) and a drop rate of just 5.3% (5 total drops). He also showed the ability to rack up yards in a variety of ways. He had a healthy average target depth of 12.2 yards and racked up 624 yards on deep passes, but he also had 14 catches on screens, forced 30 missed tackles, and racked up 6.6 yards after catch per reception on the season per PFF.

Nabers’ success was possible because he is a rare athlete by almost any measure. From a numbers standpoint, Nabers matches up well with some of the best athletes at the wide receiver position; for example, he fits right in with the LSU greats that I mentioned above. Nabers is 6’0”, 199 pounds, ran a blazing 4.35 second 40, and posted astounding jumping numbers with a 42” vertical and 10’9” broad jump at his pro day in March. For comparison, here’s how his measurables compare to Ja’Marr Chase, Justin Jefferson, and Odell Beckham:

But forget the numbers, the real delight is watching Nabers play. You can see he has the quickness to get on top of cornerbacks in a hurry. Everyone in the secondary is aware that he has game-breaking speed, and they react accordingly. Here’s some fun clips from last season that show Nabers taking advantage of his speed to either blow past DBs (including with safety help over the top) or create plays where nothing much was there to be had.

You can find a million highlight videos for Nabers and, truly, they’re really fun to watch. The guy has insane movement skills, and watching cornerbacks and safeties give him absurd cushions just to avoid getting burned is awesome. Or sometimes you can find even good teams failing to respect Nabers’ speed enough, to disastrous results. For example, he torched even Georgia’s championship caliber defense in the 2022 SEC championship to the tune of 128 yards and a touchdown, including some truly epic blow-by’s of double coverage from Kelee Ringo (now on the Eagles) and Malaki Starks:

Yikes.

Michael Hall Jr. (Defense Tackle, Ohio State)

Unlike the first three guys on my Five Favorites list, Michael Hall Jr. isn’t likely to be drafted in the first round. More likely, Hall isn’t going to come off the board until late Day 2 or early Day 3. But I really like his game regardless, and I expect him to be a high-quality interior pass rusher at the NFL level.

Hall Jr. played all over the defensive line at Ohio State and he’s generally expected to settle in as a 3-technique defensive tackle in the NFL. He was decently productive in terms of counting stats, racking up 43 tackles and six sacks in the last two seasons. Last year, Hall also posted good pass rushing numbers per Pro Football Focus, as he posted 22 hurries in just 413 defensive snaps and a pass rush win rate of 18.3%, impressive numbers for a defensive tackle. While it would’ve been nice to see him convert more of his pressures to sacks, disruption from the interior can be very valuable even if the DT doesn’t get home, as it can screw up the quarterback’s timing or force them to turn into oncoming edge rushers.

Hall put together some solid pass rush tape. He’s really quick and explosive for a defensive tackle, and he does a good job of finding ways to annoy quarterbacks. Even when he can’t get there for the sack, Hall will throw up his hands and push guys back into the QB’s lap. Here are a few clips from games last season against Penn State and Michigan, where Hall showed some promising pass rush ability against quality opponents:

To the extent folks have concerns with Hall, they’re largely around his size and ability to hold up in the run game. Hall was listed at 6’2” and 280 pounds for most of last season, which is on the small side for a defensive tackle. Ohio State frequently moved Hall out to outside shades of guards and even head up on tackles, which masked some of his size issues, but there’s no question he wasn’t the biggest or strongest defensive tackle around. But Hall won’t even turn 21 until June, and it looks like he’s still quite capable of adding bulk to his frame. In fact, at Ohio State’s Pro Day in March, Hall put up some incredible testing numbers that showed he can add weight and stay explosive. Hall weighed in at a respectable 299 pounds but still managed to run a blazing 4.78 second 40 yard dash and post strong jumping numbers with a 33” vertical and 9’3” broad jump, while putting up 24 reps on the bench press test. For comparison, Braden Fiske (DT from Florida State) dominated NFL Combine coverage with roughly similar numbers: 292 pounds, 4.78 second 40 yard dash, 33.5” vertical jump, 9’9” broad jump, and 26 reps on the bench press. If Hall can continue to build up his body while maintaining his athleticism, he could easily become a 3-down player at the NFL level.

Even if Hall can get bigger and stronger, he’ll need to continue to refine his run defense. Although he does a decent job of shedding blocks, there are times that he can get pushed out of gaps a little too easily. Size and strength will help there, and Ohio State’s defensive scheme may have played a role, but it would be nice to see him anchor his space more consistently. There’s no question in my mind he can play the run when he wants to though. Just take a look at this clip from Ohio State’s 2022 game against a very good Notre Dame team—Hall absolutely dominated against the run, and put some great reps together in pass rush too:

Regardless of where Hall ends up going in the draft, he’s going to be a player I watch closely next season in the NFL. He has tremendous talent and can be an impact player right away.

Jaylen Wright (Running Back, Tennessee)

Most of the time, I dislike Auburn and I hate Tennessee. But I’m going to make an exception for Jaylen Wright. This man is a flat out baller.

Wright showed out in 2023. In 12 games, Wright toted the ball 137 times for 1,013 yards and 4 touchdowns and he averaged 7.4 yards per carry, second in the nation amongst qualifying running backs per Sports Reference. I’m a sucker for explosive, and Wright showed repeatedly that he could make magic happen whenever he touched the ball. Wright had four carries of 40+ yards (including runs of 42, 52, 75, and 82 yards) and 10 carries of 20+ yards (7.3% of his carries). Check out these two house calls to open games against Georgia and Connecticut:

Wright’s speed shines in the clips above, and he confirmed his track-star status with numbers at this year’s Combine. Even at 5’10.5” and 210 pounds, Wright was able to run a blistering 4.38 second 40 yard dash, good for second fastest amongst the running backs. Wright’s other explosion numbers were also encouraging, as he had a 38” vertical jump and stellar 11’2” broad jump, the best amongst running backs and third amongst all offensive players at the Combine.

Wright isn’t a between-the-tackles bruiser and definitely shows a preference for getting to the edge of the defense. That makes sense given that when he is able to get to the edge, he can absolutely kill defenses. But he does show some willingness to mix it up inside the tackles. While he’s not a natural downhill runner, he shows good patience in the hole and can turn on the jets if he gets a seam. Check out the mix of runs in the clip below. Wright makes chunk run after chunk run, whether he’s running through the B- and C-gap or hitting the edge. These rushes may not all be home runs, but solid gains like these really stress defenses that are already on alert for the possibility of a house call.

I’d love to see Wright improve his pass protection and ability to rush through early contact. He also didn’t produce a ton as a receiver, although he does appear comfortable catching the ball. But few running backs come out of college as complete players, so it’s hard to knock him for not being Christian McCaffrey.

There isn’t a running back in this year’s draft that’s going to go in the first round. Wright himself will probably end up going in the third or fourth round, in part because he has some holes to fill and in part because of the NFL devaluing the running back position. Still, Wright’s tremendous talent leaps off the screen, and I’m super excited to see what he can do in space in the NFL.

Mitigating the Loss of Monk and Huerter

[Basketball News]

With only 7 games left for the Kings, we’re coming up on the home stretch of the NBA season. The last couple weeks have featured some injury tough breaks for the Kings. After getting injured in a game against the Memphis Grizzlies, news broke last Friday that starting shooting guard Kevin Huerter will undergo season-ending shoulder surgery. Just a few hours later, the anchor of Sacramento’s bench unit and leading candidate for Sixth Man of the Year Malik Monk limped off the court after Luka Doncic awkwardly fell into him. Reports are that Monk will miss 4-6 weeks, meaning the earliest that he could feasibly come back is part-way through the first round of the NBA playoffs.

Spring injuries in the NBA are bad for any team, but they’re particularly consequential for a Kings team that is fighting for a top-6 seed—a task made more difficult by losing twice to the Dallas Mavericks last week (losing Monk early in last Friday’s game was a key reason the Kings lost).

The Monk and Huerter injuries leave the Kings without two critical rotation pieces—Huerter and Monk are 5th and 6th on the team in minutes per game—and with significant questions at guard.

Prior to getting hurt, Monk was in the midst of his best NBA season. According to Basketball Reference, Monk averaged 15.4 points, 5.1 assists, and 2.9 rebounds over 26.0 minutes per game, while posting respectable shooting numbers (44.3% from the field, 35.0% from three, 82.9% from the line). Despite slightly-below-average three point shooting, Monk’s 11.0 three point attempts per 100 possessions made him a critical space generator for the Kings. Monk had also become the team’s de facto backup point guard by developing a more robust passing game and building a strong pick and roll rapport with Kings centers Domantas Sabonis and Alex Len to go along with his penchant for scoring. In fact, amongst players with 100+ minutes played, Monk was second on the team in points per 100 possessions (28.8) and assists per 100 possessions (9.6). While Monk can get a little loose with the ball (2.1 turnovers per game), his ability to serve as a primary ball handler has given the Kings needed offensive versatility, and it has kept Monk on the court in late-game situations, where he ranks second on the team in fourth quarter scoring (behind Fox) and leads the team in clutch net rating per NBA.com.

Huerter has also been an important offensive weapon for the Kings, even though he’s had a down year compared to last season. Before being sidelined, Huerter averaged 10.2 points, 3.5 rebounds, and 2.6 assists in just under per game, with his most important contributions coming as a floor spacer. Among the Kings rotation players, Huerter ranked third in three point attempts per 100 possessions (10.6), just behind Monk and Sasha Vezenkov. While his percentage slipped to just 36.2% from three this year, teams still were wary of Huerter’s three point shooting. Huerter, Monk, and Keegan Murray were also the perimeter players most likely to run dribble handoffs (DHOs) with Sabonis, which has become a staple of the Kings offense over the last two years.

Losing Monk and Huerter at the same time has pretty huge implications for the Kings. If the Kings tried to simply replace Monk’s and Huerter’s contributions, the task would be daunting: they would have to replace over 25 points per game and about 50 minutes played per game, find a way to fill the backup point guard role, find a way to manufacture over 21 threes per 100 possessions, and figure out who will be on the floor in crunch time alongside the regular crew of Fox, Sabonis, Murray, and Harrison Barnes.

That’s basically impossible given the Kings current roster.

But hope isn’t totally lost despite that! Rather than trying to re-create the same kind production that Monk and Huerter provided, the Kings have had to shift their identity. They can’t score as prolifically without Monk and Huerter, so instead they’ve had to lean into a new identity centered around perimeter defense and transition buckets.

So far, the results are encouraging. We’re seeing better defense overall, which has made up for some of the offensive drop-off. Similarly, the Kings’ defensive improvement—particularly with respect to generating turnovers and better shot contests—has allowed them to get out in transition, a good way to mitigate some of the impact from losing Monk and Huerter on the offense. If the Kings can improve their defense on ball screens, they may have a chance to weather losing two of their best guards late in the season.

Dialing Up the Perimeter Defense

Since Kevin Huerter got hurt on March 18, the Kings have dialed up their defensive intensity on the perimeter. During that stretch, the Kings have posted a defensive rating of 110.1 (9th in the NBA), compared to their season-long defensive rating of 115.0 (17th), per NBA.com.

A huge part of that defensive jump comes from swapping Keon Ellis in for Huerter as a starter. Ellis shines on defense. According to Dunks and Threes, Ellis’s Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus (DEPM) of 1.9 ranks in the 93rd percentile across the entire NBA—and tops on the Kings. Compare that to Huerter, whose DEPM was just -1.2 (27th percentile league wide).

With Ellis playing alongside Fox and Murray, the Kings have been able to play above-average defenders at every perimeter position (Fox’s DEPM is 1.3, in the 86th percentile while Murray’s DEPM is 1.4, in the 87th percentile).

Monk’s injury has also led the Kings to play backup point guard Davion Mitchell more over the last few games. Mitchell’s defense hasn’t been as impressive in terms of DEPM this season (his -1.3 DEPM ranks in the 23rd percentile), but historically he has been a strong defensive contributor—especially in terms of on-ball defense. Over the last two seasons, Mitchell has posted DEPMs in the 66th and 76th percentile respectively.

These line-up changes have helped the Kings tremendously in generating turnovers, and it’s helped to cover up the long-time issues with the Kings defense and lack of paint protection. Per NBA.com, over the last eight games, the Kings are generating 8.9 steals per game (4th in the NBA), compared to just 7.6 steals per game for the season (14th in the NBA).

It’s also just helped the Kings be more disruptive in general, as their increased athleticism on the perimeter and confidence that guys will make the right rotations and reads allows players to bend the basic defensive rules, making offensive players hesitate.

You see it watching the Kings play. Watch this play from the Kings-Clippers game on Tuesday.

Murray plays strong on-ball defense on Paul George, but George is confident that he can still get off a reasonable fadeaway from the paint. But Fox bites down hard and gets a hand on the ball from behind. While this sequence depends on great heads up defense by Murray and an awareness by Fox, it’s also made possible by Keon Ellis’ being in the right position. Ellis is in the passing lane between George and Norman Powell, cutting off the easy outlet for a three. He’s also looking directly at James Harden, and will be able to rotate to Harden if Fox cannot recover in time to contest a kick-out to him. That’s high-level defense from all three players, and not something that occurs as often when Huerter or Monk are in the game.

Here’s another play from the same game.

Strong on-ball defense from Ellis, Lyles, and Vezenkov (!) leads to a couple errant passes, but the real gem here is what happens at the end of the play. With only about 4 seconds left on the shot clock, Westbrook has to try to create something off the dribble. Ellis forces Russell Westbrook into the middle of the paint, which allows Fox to step into the key and block off an easy outlet pass to James Harden. Westbrook’s only good options are an outlet to Brandon Boston (a 30% three point shooter) or to shoot a contested floater, which Alex Len summarily rejects. Obviously the highlight here is Len, but the play is made possible by Ellis and Fox correctly playing their responsibilities and having the athleticism to discourage Westbrook from kicking the ball out for a three.

The Kings are also handling defensive rotations and switches much more effectively with Fox, Murray, Ellis, and Mitchell on the floor more often. Swapping Ellis and Mitchell for Monk and Huerter has made this more feasible, as they both have stronger defensive instincts and the athleticism and quickness to make ball-handlers hesitate and still recover to their defensive responsibility.

Two examples:

Here, Mitchell is able to help Fox to stop Paul George from driving and force a kick-out to Westbrook (a subpar shooter). Mitchell recovers quickly enough to prevent Westbrook from driving, instead forcing a pass down to Brandon Boston. Murray gets his hand up and prevents a clean pass, which disrupts any opportunity for Boston to launch a corner three and lets the Kings reset defensively.

But what happens next is just as important. Boston sets an on-ball screen for Westbrook, but Murray and Mitchell switch it effortlessly. There’s nowhere for Westbrook to attack, and Mitchell carries Boston out to the three point line to prevent a quick swing. Seeing this, Westbrook opts to go at Murray, who uses his length to prevent an easy drive and force Westbrook into a contested long two. That’s savvy play for everyone involved! Sabonis also shows in the lane to discourage Westbrook from driving too quickly at Murray, and Fox is hedged inside while staying close(ish) to Paul George to prevent a kick-out three (although ideally you would like to see Fox to get just a bit higher with Boston there to potentially screen for George).

This clip is from the Dallas game last Friday. You can see that Ellis and Barnes expertly switch a double-screen set for Kyrie Irving, and Ellis even gets his hands on the pass back to Tim Hardaway Jr. Mitchell and Len actually switch off on Dante Exum and Derek Lively, which is fine given Lively’s position so far away from the basket. That switch also allows Mitchell to step up and cut off a potential drive by Hardaway Jr. Eventually, Kyrie Irving is forced to take a pull up two—and even though Irving absolutely can make that shot, that is a good defensive possession.

The Kings sort of spoil the strong sequence by allowing a long offensive rebound. Whatever, it happens sometimes. But Mitchell recovers well and runs Hardaway Jr. off of an open three and into a weak drive attempt that gets cut off. Hardaway backs off and outlets to Irving, but Mitchell and Barnes keep the pressure on Irving, forcing a dump off to Lively who actually makes a solid read to find PJ Washington in the corner for three. Fox, however, makes a good effort to contest the shot, which misses.

That’s 27 seconds of good defense! Sure, the Mavs got a couple contested looks, but you can live with that. What stands out is the timely switches and effective rotations. Guys are in the right place and making the right defensive reads. That’s not something that can always be said for the Kings, and a noticeable improvement.

Defense Leads To Transition Points

Obviously it’s better to play good defense than bad defense (duh). But an added benefit is that strong defense—especially steals—helps the Kings get into their transition game much, much more easily. The Kings get into transition at the fifth highest rate in the league per NBA.com’s tracking data. Without Monk and Huerter to bolster the half-court offense, the Kings need to find easy buckets in transition whenever they can.

Strong perimeter has lead the Kings to a number of high-quality opportunities in recent weeks.

Kessler Edwards and Davion Mitchell do a great job passing off a guard-guard screen from Kyrie Irving and Luka Doncic, and when Luka drives, Edwards does a really nice job of aggressively digging at the ball and forcing a turnover that leads to a fast break layup.

Fox and Ellis pair up here to force Kyrie Irving into a bad dribble. Fox plays solid head-up defense, and Ellis biting down off of Dante Exum causes Irving to hesitate. Fox takes advantage by stripping Irving and getting into transition, leading to free throws.

You even see the Kings getting into transition off shot contests more than they have in the past. Here’s my two favorite from recent games:

In both cases, good shot contests lead to blocks, and the Kings are able to get into transition and get open threes for Keegan Murray. That’s strong defense leading to high-quality offense, and it doesn’t depend on having a second shot creator in Monk or a good shooter like Huerter on the floor to make it happen.

Ball Screens Are Still a Problem

Though the Kings have improved their perimeter defense and rotations, they’re still struggling a bit with how to address on-ball screens. Having Ellis, Murray, Fox, and Mitchell in the line-up more often gives them some flexibility and recovery speed, but they still need to find a way to address screens more consistently.

No matter how you look at it, this is a busted defense:

Derek Lively sets a ghost screen for Irving and Sabonis gets caught in no-man’s land. Sabonis doesn’t drop with the screener and doesn’t double hard either—it looks like he’s trying to hedge the screen, but he’s roughly 40 feet away from the basket. The result is that Irving has an easy pass into Lively about 8 feet from the basket. It’s fine to force the ball into Lively’s hands and make him a decision-maker, but this is just way too easy. Lively makes an easy read and hits Tim Hardaway Jr. for an open three.

The Kings also struggled to find the right balance when he laid off the screen. In this next clip, you see the screen gets set in the backcourt. Sabonis drops way back to prevent Doncic from getting downhill too deep, and Murray recovers too slowly back to his man. They don’t communicate well, which results in Sabonis going for a steal and letting Doncic out of the double-team with an easy pass to Dante Exum.

A similar problem happened with Fox and Sabonis just a couple minutes later, though luckily the Kings got out of it.

When Sabonis did try to double off of the screen, he often did so too slowly. Again, this let Doncic (and Irving) off the hook—they made relatively casual passes to open teammates and forced the Kings into an extremely difficult rotation. In the clip below, Keon Ellis has to recover to the corner for the contest through a backside screen by Daniel Gafford. That’s never going to work, and it leads to a wide open three.

Dante Exum’s game winner from Friday night also came off a similar action. Again, Sabonis doesn’t double hard enough, making it far too easy for Doncic to get out of the potential trap. The result is an easy three for Exum.

Obviously that was heartbreaking for the Kings and their fans. And defending Doncic and Irving while they get on-ball screens is hard for any team to defend. But the Kings have to do better.

Get Out of No-Man’s Land

The first thing they can fix is avoiding no-man’s land. The screen defender (most often Sabonis, Barnes, or Len) has to avoid getting caught between a double-team/hedge and drop coverage. If they are not doubling/hedging, but also not dropping to defend the screener as he rolls, they are effectively guarding air. That can’t happen.

Even if you pick up the guard, by the time he’s going downhill, the big is going to get burned. Plays like this have no real place in a good defense.

If You’re Going to Double, Be Quick

The second thing the Kings can clean up is doubling quickly and with intensity. Lackadaisical double-teams are easy for players like Doncic and Irving to get out of—they’ve seen doubles off of screens thousands of times, and if they’re not pressured with intensity, they’re going to pick it apart.

These are good pressures that happen quickly, and they make it much more difficult to pass out:

If you can’t be that quick, get big! Alex Len does a good job of this to make up for his lack of foot speed. Sure, these aren’t ideal—but at least he’s in the way:

There’s obviously significant risk in doubling during an on-ball screen. That’s a strategic decision that the coaching staff will make based on game, circumstance, and personnel. But doing it quickly—or at least being a nuisance—is key to making double teams work (at least sometimes) against elite players like Doncic.

Don’t Fear Drop Coverage

Drop coverage on a screen with players like Doncic and Irving is also risky. You may give them an open look or let them generate speed and get downhill toward the basket, which often results in layups or fouls. But it’s important to mix so that the offense doesn’t see the same look every time.

The Kings used drop coverage a lot against the Jazz in Sunday’s game, relying on their perimeter defenders to fight through screens without giving up too much of an advantage.

In this first clip, Fox simply slips under the screen and Sabonis drops back to the paint. With Walker Kessler (a non-shooter) as the screener, this is a pretty viable strategy—Kessler isn’t going to make anyone pay for leaving him open at the top of the key.

Fox also accomplishes pretty much the same thing by going over the screen a little later:

Obviously, this kind of defensive strategy is tougher when the ball-handler is better or the screener is a more capable shooter. But it can still work in doses. In this last clip, Keegan Murray does a good job fighting through the screen to at least discourage an immediate shot from Doncic:

The Kings will need to figure out the right mix of coverages for on-ball screens, but it’s critical that they get more effective executing their coverages regardless. With more athletes on the perimeter who are better at fighting through screens (with due respect to Monk and Huerter as players, they too often died on screens), they have a decent chance to do so.

That’s It!

I’ll be back with more Kings coverage as we head into the home stretch of the season. Here’s to hoping they can keep up the good defense and continue to improve on screens!

Another Look At NFL Positional Value

Like any good overzealous NFL fan, I’m spending a lot of time these days thinking about the upcoming NFL draft in April—undoubtedly too much time. One of the things I’ve been toying with lately is finding ways to assess which positions to target in the draft, ignoring the prospects of individual players—what I’ve been calling “positional value.” I previously looked at positional value from a money standpoint by looking at which positions teams focus their salary cap spending on. From that vantage point, it’s apparent that quarterbacks take home the lion’s share of team spending, with edge rushers a distant second. Wide receivers, defensive tackles, offensive tackles, and cornerbacks are the next tier, while other positions like center, running back, tight end, and off-ball linebacker are clearly not valued as much and net much smaller contracts.

But there are of course other ways to look at positional value, so I wanted to talk through some of them.

Which Positions Do Teams Actually Prioritize For Their Best Draft Picks?

One thing I wanted to look at is when teams actually draft particular positions. The NFL draft has seven rounds, so we can try to assess positional value by looking at which positions typically get drafted higher in the draft. It’s a relatively simple task in concept, but there are some things I had to clean up to get good positional groupings since teams may draft a player who played one position in college intending for them to play another role at the pro level. For example, a fair number of college cornerbacks get drafted with the expectation that they’ll ultimately play safety in the NFL; same thing for college tackles who may profile physically as NFL guards.

Using info from Pro Football Reference, I pulled every draft pick from the last 10 drafts and categorized each player (excluding pure special teamers like kickers, punters, and long-snappers) into the following positions: quarterback, wide receiver, tight end, running back, offensive tackle, offensive guard, center, edge rusher (includes defensive ends and 3-4/rush linebackers), defensive tackle (aka interior defensive line, same thing), linebacker (off-ball), cornerback, and safety.

There are a few house-keeping items I wanted to acknowledge off the jump, specifically regarding how I selected player’s on-field positions as of the time they were drafted.

1. I checked what position each player in fact played during their first few years in the NFL to confirm they were slotted correctly. For example, I categorized Micah Parsons as an edge rusher even though he played off-ball linebacker in college, as Dallas moved him to edge rusher in the summer leading up to his rookie year. This is obviously an imperfect way of handling things, and there is some degree of my judgment baked in. I did my best, and I’m happy to email anybody the list of positions I used for each player if you’re curious.

2. I chose not to divvy up positions further than the categories described above. That was deliberate. I didn’t draw distinctions between left and right offensive tackles and offensive guards, as those positions shift a lot from where guys play in college, or even from where NFL teams initially hope they will land—quite often, players drafted in the hopes they will eventually be left tackles or left guards often move to the right side if their skill sets are better suited there or if a greater need develops on that side of the line for a particular team.

3. I also didn’t draw any distinctions between slot, X, and Z wide receivers, nor any distinctions between boundary cornerbacks and nickel/dime cornerbacks. Players often switch between those roles in different coaching schemes after they’re drafted, and it’s really tough to get reliable data at scale. I note this just because conventional wisdom suggests that left tackles/guards are more valuable than right tackles/guards, X/Z receivers are more valuable than slots, and boundary corners are more valuable that nickel/dime corners. I don’t dispute any of that, but it’s more than I set out to address here.

4. Finally, I chose 10 years of draft data on purpose, though I admit it’s a bit arbitrary. Things change quite a bit in the NFL over time, and I didn’t want to go so far back that it would mask current trends. For example, 20 years ago, running backs were highly sought after, but it is pretty evident that is no longer the case. Going too far back into the past runs a very real risk of including too much historically dated information to make any analysis about the current NFL useful. On the flip side, I also didn’t want such a small time period that it would be impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions from having too small of a dataset. Thus, 10 years seemed about right.

So, where are teams spending their picks?

[Figure 1]

Figure 1 shows the percentage of players drafted in each round for the 12 positions I looked at over the course of the last 10 drafts, from 2014 through 2023, as well as the total number of players drafted at each position (at the bottom in parentheses).

There’s a fair amount that can be seen from this chart, but I want to focus on what I found most notable in particular.

• A very high percentage of drafted quarterbacks (almost 28%) are drafted in the first round, but there’s a relative dearth of quarterbacks taken in the second round (under 7%). At the same time, there isn’t really anything notable about the proposition of QBs getting drafted in rounds 3-7. That suggests QBs who aren’t quite first round talents are often getting pushed up from the second round. That does appear to happen—for example, the Ravens and Vikings traded up from the second round to the very last pick in the first round to draft Lamar Jackson in 2018 and Teddy Bridgewater in 2014, respectively. Surely this trend is in part because teams can also secure a fifth-year of team control for first round picks, which can lead to significant financial value for the team if the player winds up being successful, especially for QBs.

• After quarterbacks, teams appear to select a high percentage of their offensive tackles and edge rushers in the first round. Over 19% of drafted offensive tackles and nearly 18% of drafted edge rushers are taken in the first round. That makes sense given the premium teams place on these positions in free agency. Also, for offensive tackles in particular, there may be a similar trend of players getting pushed up from the second round to the first round as with QBs, although it’s less pronounced—there’s a big drop-off from the percentage of players taken in round 1 to round 2 compared to other positions.

• Just like with free agency spending, teams do not want to spend up, in terms of early draft capital, on low-value positions in free agency like tight end and running back. Only about 18% of drafted running backs and 20% of drafted tight ends are taken in the first two rounds. A similar trend occurs withs with drafted guards (about 20% taken in the first two rounds) and linebackers (about 17%). I was a little surprised to see how low the percentage of guards taken in the first two rounds was. Even though it’s not a “high value” position, it’s still higher value than RB, TE, and LB.

• Teams appear to use a high proportion of middle round picks on the lower value positions I just described. Around 54% of tight ends, 50% of running backs, 55% of guards, and 50% of linebackers are taken in rounds 3 to 5 —tight ends, running backs, guards, and linebackers. Compare those numbers to quarterbacks and offensive tackles, centers, and cornerbacks, where around 39% to 41% are taken in the middle rounds.

• There’s a weird thing going on with centers, who teams appear to typically forgo in the first round and prefer in the second round. Only 9% of drafted centers are taken in the first round, but over 30% of centers are taken in the first two rounds taken together. I am not sure there’s an obvious reason behind this trend, but it definitely stands out amongst the lower value positions. This could be coincidence given the relatively low number of centers drafted compared to other positions.

• I was surprised to see that wide receivers and cornerbacks are pretty evenly drafted through the seven rounds. They’re among the highest value positions in the free agency market, so I would’ve guessed that teams were drafting them more frequently in early rounds. I will flag that the fact that my dataset doesn’t distinguish between slot and boundary players is probably masking some trends. In addition, it’s also worth noting that WR and CB are usually the two deepest positions on NFL rosters—most teams carry 5+ receivers and corners respectively—so it makes sense that teams have to draft a lot of them.

• It’s notable that defensive tackles haven’t been drafted all that early relative to edge rushers. Only about 22.5% of defensive tackles are taken in the first two rounds compared to about 33% of edge rushers. For years, conventional wisdom has said that edge rushers are more valuable given their pass rushing role, but that weighting has changed a lot in recent years. More and more DTs are becoming elite pass rushers (Aaron Donald comes to mind), so they’re getting paid like it. The free agency spending data I looked at previously showed that DTs are the fourth highest paid position based on average annual contract value, trailing only QBs, edge rushers, and WRs. And at the top end, DTs are paid pretty closely to edge rushers—the top 20 DTs are paid about 90% of what the top 20 edge rushers get in terms of average annual contract value—so I would’ve expected edge rushers to get a slight advantage in the early draft rounds, but it’s still more than I would’ve thought.

By looking at where teams draft particular positions over time, we can get some insight into how NFL teams on the whole are valuing different positions without getting bogged down too much in individual talent evaluations. Combined with looking at positional spending, we can get a pretty decent picture of which positions are priciest in terms of dollars and assets (draft picks) in order to weigh where to allocate resources. Unsurprisingly, the two markets show a fair amount of similarities. The two markets agree that QBs are the most important position and price them accordingly (big dollars in salary, and first round pick expense in the draft). Both markets also seemingly agree that edge rushers and offensive tackles are premium positions, while RB, TE, LB, and safety aren’t. Some of the other positions present some interesting value opportunities. For example, WR and CB are expensive positions to fill in free agency, but team’s aren’t necessarily allocating their early draft picks to those positions disproportionately—that suggests there’s value to be had by drafting those positions rather than filling them with veteran talents at market prices. Centers might be the opposite—it’s a really cheap position to fill in free agency, but a big chunk of centers are getting drafted in the first two rounds.

Can You Prioritize What Positions to Draft By Looking At Production?

One of the benefits of determining the relative value between the various positions is figuring out which positions to focus on during the draft. If a given position is expensive to fill in free agency, such as quarterback or edge rusher, it makes sense that teams would benefit from filling that position through the draft where salaries are set to a rookie scale for up to five years for first round picks (four years for non-first round picks). Of course, the biggest potential values also come at the high-end of each position.

A top 10 overall NFL edge rusher can command around $25 million or more per year in average compensation, which will lead to a comparable salary cap hit (before cap manipulations to push cap hits into different years). A top 10 center is likely to command somewhere between $10-13 million in average annual compensation. Meanwhile, the #1 overall pick in this year’s draft (the highest compensated draft slot) draft will have a 2024 cap hit of just over $7 million per Spotrac. In other words, a team will save about $18 million or more in cap space by drafting a defensive end that performs comparably to top 10 edge rusher, but they would only save about $3-6 million in cap space by drafting a top 10 center. The exact amounts will vary by position and player quality of course, but the basic idea is fairly intuitive—teams save cap space by hitting on draft picks at the right positions, and they can use that cap space in free agency on better players at other positions that they don’t (or can’t) fill through the draft.

Teams realize this, which probably helps explain why some high value positions are drafted disproportionately in the first few rounds of the draft (as shown in Figure 1).

But drafting positional value also depends on some other assumptions.

One built-in assumption is that players drafted in round 1 are likely to be better than players drafted in round 2 (and so on). Put another way, players drafted higher are more likely to be good. That makes sense, and if you believe (as I do) that NFL teams are collectively good at evaluating talent, it’s a reasonable assumption.

There’s also an assumption that teams will “hit” on draft picks at about the same rate regardless of position. If you could identify top 10 centers much more often than top 10 edge rushers, for example, it would eat into the value proposition of drafting edge rushers more often and earlier than centers. But that’s a tough question to assess without looking at how teams and draft analysts rate individual players. Perhaps I’ll look into it more down the road, but for now, it’s a bigger project than I want to take on in this post.

A third assumption is that prospect quality at each position follows a relatively similar pattern. We would expect round 1 players to be better than round 2 players, round 2 players to be better than round 3 players, and so on and so forth—but what if the changes in player quality by draft round change at different rates for different positions? You can easily imagine a world where round 1 quarterbacks are great but round 3 quarterbacks basically never see the field—after all, only one QB plays at a time—but that’s much harder to imagine for a deeper position like cornerback, where 5-6 players might see playing time in a game. So I wanted to check into it here.

Draft Round vs. Production

You can imagine a variety of ways to evaluate how different positions compare with respect to performance by draft position. You could look at how many All Pro teams or Pro Bowl teams players make, you could look at counting stats like passing yards or receiving yards relative to their position, you could look at all-encompassing metrics like individual DVOA. Whatever measure you choose, they’re all going to be imperfect, especially given the wide variety of roles in football. Measuring players based on yards or touchdowns alone usually won’t work when more than half of the positions on the field will never accrue a yard or score a touchdown. So I wanted to pick a metric that is theoretically applicable to all 12 positions I cared about, and where it was reasonably possible to get the relevant data (with apologies to metrics Pro Football Focus grades, which are a pain in the butt to compile). Lucky for me, Pro Football Reference has a custom performance metric called weighted career approximate value that they have calculated for players drafted in the last 10 years (my focus) and more.

Pro Football Reference gives a full description of the approximate value (AV) metric here, but in essence, it is designed to get at the value of a particular player based on their contribution to their team’s offense or defense given the number of points scored or given up by the team, the fact that there are 11 players on the field at a time per team, and the fact that different positions contribute in different ways. The metric assumes a total number of points for a team’s offense (or defense) based on how many points the team scores (or gives up) compared to an average team, and then apportions some of those points to various position groups like the offensive line, rushers, receivers, etc., and then divvies those points up to the various players on the field. It also appears to incorporate some looser elements, such as whether players made Pro Bowls, particularly for positions that lack obvious statistical metrics like offensive linemen. It is, in effect, a composite metric designed to look at a player’s overall contributions given the context of the team they play on.

Weighted career AV (wAV) is a derivative of AV, but it looks at the total AV generated by a player over the course of their career and weights things in favor of their peak performance season (100% for the player’s best season, 95% for his second best season, 90% for his third best season, and so on). The effect of the weighting basically means that player quality is based on their athletic peak, and not weighed down as much by down seasons that may be the result of injury or their eventual career decline, but it does favor players with high peaks compared to players with sustained quality play at a lower peak. For my purposes, that’s fine. Even though wAV and AV are imperfect metrics, but they are readily available and I was able to pull them for every player in the 10 year draft pool that I looked at. Perhaps in a future post I will look at other advanced metrics like individual DVOA or Pro Football Focus grades, including as a point of comparison, but for now, wAV and AV will have to do!

Anyway, because Pro Football Reference’s wAV metric already incorporates positional differences, it shouldn’t be used to reliably compare players at different positions. That’s fine, no stat can be used for everything. While baseball has metrics like wins above replacement (WAR) that are great for that type of comparison, football’s diversity of roles and stats makes it less amenable to such all-encompassing metrics, so there isn’t anything perfect available. wAV doesn’t really fill the “WAR” role, but it can be useful to compare players within a position group (QBs to QBs, for example) while also controlling, at least somewhat, for differences in quality of offenses and other players on the team. Since I wanted to compare how players drafted early in the draft compare to players drafted later in the draft at the same position, and to see whether those differences are similar or different across positions, I had to play around with the stat a bit.

Specifically, I used the draft round, position, and wAVs for the relevant positions (quarterbacks, wide receivers, tight ends, running backs, offensive tackles, offensive guards, centers, edge rushers, defensive tackles, linebackers, cornerbacks, and safeties) to calculate the average wAV of players drafted in each round (1 through 7) by position. I used the average for each round because I wasn’t super concerned about capturing any individual player profile. If someone tells me I really ought to be looking at the median player in each round to capture an actual person, or that I ought to take the average wAV overall (rather than per season), maybe I’ll do so down the road. Also, while you would expect there to be differences in player/prospect quality at different draft slots within a particular round, the dataset I was working with probably isn’t big enough to go to that level of granularity.

Regardless, here’s what you get:

[Figure 2]

As you can see from Figure 2, on average, Round 1 picks perform better than later round picks regardless of position. But you can also see that the Round 1 wAVs are all over the place for different positions—for example, quarterbacks and running backs have relatively high Round 1 wAVs compared to cornerbacks and safeties (they all converge to zero in the later rounds, which makes sense given players drafted in the later rounds are less likely to have long, successful careers in the NFL).

That might be true, or it could simply be the result of how wAV is calculated (Pro Football Reference’s description of wAV makes clear that it is calculated differently for each position). Looking at the chart, I was skeptical that running backs were anywhere close to so valuable, so I wanted to make some adjustments to avoid simply capturing issues with the wAV metric being used. I decided to fix the starting points for each position around a consistent figure—the Round 1 average for each respective position. In other words, I set the Round 1 average to 1, and compared subsequent round averages to that figure. The effect is that QB wAVs get compared only to other QBs, edge rushers only to edge rushers, and safeties only to safeties, etc. That way, we can see how each position’s average wAV changes by round without having to worry too much about the differences in how wAV is calculated by position (it’s still baked in to an extent, but this is better).

The chart below shows the updated data, which I think is a bit clearer—it also shows the changes in player wAV by round for each position on the same scale, so cross-position comparison is more feasible.

[Figure 3]

Of course, this isn’t to suggest that all positions start off with the same round 1 value. It’s still a little messy given the 12 positions shown on one graphic, but I like Figure 3 because it lets you see how the various positions compare on a similar scale.

For convenience, to show how each position changes by round, I’ve also included individual charts for each that show the same data in slightly easier-to-see bar chart formats below (figures 4, 5, and 6).

[Figure 4]

[Figure 5]

[Figure 6]

Given this is still a small-ish data set—remember, we’re looking at 10 years of drafts and somewhere between 80 and and 324 players drafted at any given position—it’s important not to read anything too dramatic from these charts. But there are a few general things that are reflected.

Surprise, Surprise! Good Quarterbacks Go Early

The most notable thing to me is the dramatic cliff that QBs seem to hit, both after the first round and again after the second round. QBs drafted in the second round are, on average, posting career wAV totals that are 35% lower than first round quarterbacks. And QBs drafted in rounds 3-7 are basically just a crapshoot—it barely makes a difference at all which round you draft them in, chances are they won’t be good. [Special shout out to Brock Purdy for basically single-handedly propping up the 7th round QBs in this data set.].

This trend makes a ton of sense given what conventional wisdom (and Figure 1 above) says about quarterbacks: they’re disproportionately valuable, and teams will reach to draft quarterbacks in the first round.

Coupled with the fact that quarterbacks are the highest value position in terms of compensation, the obvious conclusion is that teams are correct to use early draft assets on quarterbacks if they think they can play in the league. The chances of finding someone reliable after the first round drop off markedly, and after the second round, they drop even further.

Edge Rusher Production Falls Off Quickly After Round 1

I was pretty surprised at how huge the drop-off was for edge rusher performance outside the first round. On average, second round edge rushers produce just over half the wAV of their first round counterparts (51%), a full 12 percentage points bigger of a drop off than the next closest position, defensive tackle. That was unexpected enough that I went back and looked over the full list of 44 second round edge rushers and it makes some sense at a glance. The group is headlined by a few standouts with pretty successful careers like DeMarcus Lawrence and Preston Smith, but it also has a fair number of guys who flashed for a year or two and have otherwise not been consistent like Randy Gregory. Compare that to Round 1 (52 players), which has those same types of players plus multiple truly elite players in Khalil Mack, Nick Bosa, TJ Watt, and Myles Garrett (among others), and stand-out young players like Micah Parsons, Aidan Hutchinson, and Will Anderson. It certainly seems like the studs at edge are identified quickly by teams and pounced on in the first round.

Even though there’s a decent drop off after the first round, average production doesn’t change a ton between rounds 2 to 4. This could suggest that players who obviously have high-level NFL talent get identified properly and go in the first round, but that teams aren’t as good at sussing out the next tier of player who may be missing some ideal traits or need time to develop. It could also just mean there are a lot of players with below first round talent, so they can’t all go in the second round.

Regardless, the implication is that teams probably should focus on the first round if searching for top-end pass rushers. When you factor in that edge rusher is an extremely expensive position to fill in free agency, and that teams draft a high proportion of edge rushers early in the draft, the conclusion is even stronger. That said, teams probably should still be willing to draft edge rushers in rounds 2-4 based on their production—and given what we could distill from Figure 1, that’s exactly what they seem to do.

Defensive Tackles Also Drop Off After Round 1, But There’s Solid Middle Round Talent

After edge rushers, the biggest drop-off following round 1 is for defensive tackles, where the average wAV drops 37% in round 2. Once again, this is partly due to a handful of stellar defensive tackles who’ve been drafted in the first round in the last ten years, headlined by future Hall of Famer Aaron Donald as well as Jeffery Simmons, Dexter Lawrence, and Quinnen Williams.

But unlike with edge rushers, the talent level at defensive tackle appears to level off a bit longer. For edge rushers, after a big drop off after round 1, average wAV stayed pretty flat from round 2 to round 4. For defensive tackles, the decline isn’t quite as steep initially and things don’t stay quite as even, but the average wAV in round 5 stays at over 40% of round 1 (compared to 28% for edge rushers). In other words, there has often been useful players still available in the fourth and fifth rounds in drafts, which is relatively deep.

The relatively big drop-off in production from round 1 to round 2 amongst DTs runs against how teams appear to actually draft the position (Figure 1). Teams don’t seem to prioritize drafting DTs in round 1 or round 2 compared to other positions, even though there’s a big drop-off early and it’s the 4th most valuable position in terms of salary cap spending. That suggests the potential to find good value in drafting first round defensive tackles.

Little Advantage Drafting Interior OL, LB, and Safety Round 1

The charts for offensive guard, center, linebacker, and safety are kind of interesting. What stands out is how small the apparent advantage is of drafting these positions in the first round versus the second round. For centers, guards, and safeties, you’re talking about less than a 10% drop-off in average wAV; for linebackers, the drop off is a little bigger but still relatively small at 17%. This makes some sense if you think about the relative value of these positions on the free agency market. Generally, these are positions you can fill reasonably cheaply in free agency (though that is becoming less true for offensive guards), so seems teams aren’t going after talented players at these positions in the first round. That’s backed up by the actual draft results from Figure 1, which show between 6-9% of players for these positions being drafted in the first round.

Center and safety talent also looks to stay reasonably high even through the third and fourth round. There just isn’t the same drop-off in average wAV compared to the other positions, it’s much more gradual. For centers, this might be explainable by the fact that it’s a single position, so teams don’t need to draft tons of players at the position. That explanation doesn’t make as much sense for other positions, though, like with safeties and linebackers. For those positions, it’s possible that teams have a deeper pool of players to pull from—in fact, you often see NFL safeties and linebackers come from other positions at the college level, especially players coming from FCS programs.

I suspect part of what’s happening here is that teams are doing a reasonably good job of appropriately valuing these positions. They’re easier to fill in free agency, so teams don’t want to spend their most premium assets on these positions. But after the first round, the performance curve seems to be more similar to other positions.

WR, OT, and CB—All “Lower” High Value Positions In Free Agency—Follow A Similar Pattern

It’s interesting that wide receivers, offensive tackles, and cornerbacks seem to follow a similar path in value-decline-by-draft round. Here’s the percentage of first-round average wAV for each position for rounds 2-6:

• Round 2: WR 77%; OT 76%; CB 72%

• Round 3: WR 51%; OT 56%; CB 52%

• Round 4: WR 30%; OT 36%; CB 42%

• Round 5: WR 40%; OT 35%; CB 43%

• Round 6: WR 21%; OT 21%; CB 23%

• Round 7: WR 9%; OT 24%; CB 23%

Obviously round 7 wide receivers drop completely off, so stay away from them!

I wonder if this trend is roughly what you’d expect from a “normal” high value position (quarterbacks are definitely funky, and it looks like there really is a bigger drop-off for edge rushers and defensive tackles before a slow-ish taper). It’s a relatively consistent and probably reasonable decline for each round, with some hiccups of course. The drop-off from round 1 to round 2 isn’t nearly as stark as with QBs, edge rushers, and DTs, which makes a bit more sense intuitively—it’s not as though second round picks are seen as chopped liver by teams and draft analysts, many of them are considered high-level talents that need more development early on. At the same time, there is a clear difference in average performance between the first round and second round groups at these three positions, which is what you’d expect. For guards, centers, and safeties, it’s definitely weird that there is basically no real drop-off between round 1 and round 2.

It’s also worth noting there are more wide receivers and cornerbacks drafted in the last 10 years than any other position (324 and 322 respectively). So it would make some sense that data for those positions would be less prone to noise. On the other hand, you also see teams regularly going 4 or 5 deep at these positions in games, so even late-round draft picks are probably going to see the field for meaningful time and contribute.

Gut Check With Games Played

I’m not totally convinced that Pro Football Reference’s wAV metric is all that reliable, so it’s hard to know how valuable any of the inferences above are.

As a gut check, I wanted to find some other relatively simple, easy to obtain data to at least see if the trends above make conceptual sense, beyond applying general draft trends that I’ve seen from watching the draft every year myself and reading a lot of draft coverage (a truly preposterous amount).

The easiest thing I could think of is whether the number of games actually played changes at different rates for different positions based on draft round. For example, the wAV analysis above suggests there isn’t a huge difference between centers and guards drafted in the first round versus the second round, but do first round centers and guards play a similar number of games to second rounders? If that matches the wAV trend, I’ll be more inclined to think of wAV as a useful proxy for performance when looking at draft picks by round. In addition, looking at games played has the added benefit of incorporating subjective views of NFL teams regarding how their draft picks perform, as we can assume that teams like to play good players more often (probably? I’ll disregard a couple teams perhaps…go ahead and fill in who).

Figure 7 shows the average number of games played for players drafted in rounds 1-7 by position. Figure 8 shows the same information, but as I did with Figure 3 above, I set the average number of games played by first round picks at 1 and scaled the data accordingly so you can see the different trends together (I didn’t dive into this, but some positions have longer careers than others due to the nature of football—I wanted to look at the data without worrying too much about that).

[Figure 7]

[Figure 8]

Without diving too much into the details, the rough check of wAV versus games played actually looks pretty decent for wAV. You see some of the same trends.

For example:

• There’s an enormous drop-off in average games played by quarterbacks drafted in round 2 versus round 1, and an even steeper drop-off after that. You can be pretty confident if you draft a quarterback in rounds 3 to 7 that they won’t play a lot, as they’re probably a full-time backup.

• Safeties and linebackers drafted after round 1 continue to play a relatively high number of games compared to other positions. There’s some lumpiness in the data (round 2 linebackers apparently play a lot, and round 5 safeties apparently don’t get on the field much), but it’s pretty consistent with what we saw from wAV.

• Centers also seem to play a high number of games, but there’s a weird dip for round 3. Given they’re the smallest group in terms of total numbers—only 14 centers were drafted in round 3 in the last 10 drafts—I’m not reading much into it.

• Wide receivers and cornerbacks seem to follow a common trend again, and it looks like they could be the most representative. Offensive tackles depart a bit from them, however.

Other things don’t show up:

• Edge rushers look to be following basically the same downward trend as the other positions—if you draft them later, they’re less likely to play as many games. But there isn’t a dramatic drop-off after round 1 like we saw for wAV. That doesn’t necessarily mean the trend showing up in the wAV analysis was wrong. For example, most teams play at least 3-4 edge rushers per game, so it’s possible that underperforming players still see the field enough to register. But it’s worth looking into a bit more.

• Guards appear to suffer a pretty stark drop-off in average games played after round 3. We didn’t see a similar drop-off in the wAV analysis. It could be noise? No real obvious reason jumps out to me.

Let me know what else you see.

Sign-Off

That’s it for now! Let me know if you have any observations or thoughts in the comments or by email at duncan@thesportsappeal.com. I’m happy to look into more depth on any position!

KAT Is Hurt, But Don’t Sleep on the Wolves

Just going to do a quick post this week as we got some big news this week that significantly impacts the NBA playoff race. Shams reported that All-Star Karl-Anthony Towns has a torn left meniscus. It looks like KAT will have surgery on the knee next week and the team will re-evaluate his knee in four weeks, but he will likely miss more time than that given meniscus surgeries can take 4-8 weeks to recover (plus rehab). That’s a problem since the first round of the NBA Playoffs will start on April 20, about six weeks from now.

Obviously this is a huge bummer for the Pups and their fans who have been riding high all season. The T-Wolves currently sit second in the Western Conference after losing last night in OT to the Cavaliers, but they’re only a half-game back of the first place OKC Thunder (with whom they’ve traded back and forth for first place in recent weeks).

Towns’ injury has a lot of people concerned, and while it’s never a good thing to lose one of your best players, I actually think the Wolves are well positioned to weather the storm.

First off, Minnesota’s strong start through the first three quarters of the season has put them in a great position. It’s exceptionally unlikely that they can fall any further than fourth in the Western Conference, so they’re going to have home-court advantage in the first round of the playoffs barring an epic collapse.

Although they have only a slim half-game lead over the third-place Nuggets, the Wolves have a much healthier two game lead on the fourth place Clippers and a huge 5.5 game lead on the fifth place Pelicans. Eight of the Timberwolves’ 18 remaining games are against teams with records under .500, so Minnesota should be able to at least tread water. If they can win even half of their remaining games, the Wolves would effectively lock up a top-4 seed unless the Pelicans can go on a miraculous run of 15-4 or better (and win eventual tiebreakers).

Setting the standings and future schedule aside, the Wolves have built their success this season on the defensive end of the floor. They are by far the NBA’s best defensive team this season, sporting a defensive rating for the season of 108.1—fully two points better than the second place Boston Celtics at 110.3. [For those who prefer traditional stats, things look just as good: the Wolves give up just 106.6 points per game, lowest in the NBA and about 2.7 points per game better than the second place Knicks.] That’s a meaningful improvement over last year, where the Wolves were 10th in the NBA in defensive rating, and a sea-change from where the Wolves typically resided before adding Rudy Gobert in 2022 (in the seven seasons Towns’ was in Minnesota before Gobert arrived, the Wolves finished higher than 20th in defensive rating just once).

Other metrics similarly confirm the Wolves status as an elite defensive team. Led by Rudy Gobert and strong defensive wings Jaden McDaniels and Anthony Edwards (when he wants to), the T-Wolves are holding opponents to shooting just 44.6% from the field (best in NBA) and 34.9% from three (third best). They only struggle defending the free throw line, where they give up a middle-of-the-pack 78.3% free throw percentage—just kidding, I’m only making sure you’re paying attention. On top of that, the Wolves are amongst the league’s top 5 teams in blocks per 100 possessions, top 5 in defensive rebounding rate, and top 10 in steals per 100 possessions per Basketball Reference. Except for steals, all of those numbers are significantly up from last year.

Towns, for all his talents, isn’t a huge contributor to the Timberwolves defensive explosion this year, so losing him isn’t likely to harm them much on defense. Towns has never had a reputation as a quality defensive player. That reputation may be slightly overstated, but it’s not wrong either. Although he does a solid job on the defensive glass, you’ll struggle to find other defensive metrics where Towns excels. Despite his 7-foot size, he’s 75th in the NBA in block percentage per Basketball Reference and he ranks 150th in steal percentage. According to PBP Stats, the Timberwolves give up 5.8 more points per 100 possessions on defense with Towns on the floor. [Cleaning the Glass puts a similar metric at 3.8 points worse per 100 possessions.]. Meanwhile, Dunks and Threes rates Towns’ estimated defensive plus/minus at 0.0 (slightly above average) and Basketball Reference gives up a defensive box plus/minus of 1.0 (not terrible, but not noteworthy). At the end of the day, we shouldn’t expect losing Towns to really cost Minnesota on the defensive end beyond losing front court depth.

Losing Towns is a much bigger deal offensively.

According to Cleaning the Glass, the Wolves score 7.9 more points per 100 possessions with Towns on the floor and their overall effective field goal percentage jumps by 3.8%, huge benefits that are hard to replace. Yet Minnesota has one of the best “KAT replacements” in the NBA already on its roster in Naz Reid. Reid isn’t the same level of offensive talent as KAT, but he’s a pretty close facsimile, and even with Reid filling in the Pups will still have to make some adjustments. But they can cover Towns’ absence through the regular season and potentially even for the early part of the playoffs.

Comparing Towns and Reid based on rate stats, it’s easy to see the similarities. Guess who is who?

Per Basketball Reference

Player A is Towns and Player B is Reid, and their numbers are awfully close.

Towns is a slightly better shooter than Reid and definitely has more of a penchant for getting to the line and knocking down free throws. He’s also a bit better as a rebounder and distributor. Otherwise, Reid puts up pretty similar numbers to Towns, and he does so while carrying a relatively high usage rate of 22.3% (especially high for a backup big man). Pushing Reid’s minutes and usage upward can help the Wolves make up for a lot of what Towns does.

Reid’s ability to play the same role as Towns on offensive is apparent watching the Wolves, too—and it showed up repeatedly in the Cavs game last night.

Perhaps most importantly, Reid runs the pick and pop to perfection, which helps Minnesota to generate a healthy 1.23 points per possession when he operates as the screener per NBA.com (they generated an outstanding 1.45 points per possession with Towns).

Reid sets a pick for TJ Warren on the wing then reverses to set an on-ball screen for Nickeil Alexander-Walker and pops out for an open three. Minnesota doesn’t have a true scorer on the floor (with due respect to Warren, who just joined the team), but using Reid as the screener forces the defense into a series of really tough decisions. They can’t easily cheat off of Warren, who is a capable scorer despite his faults and running toward a potential screen action with Rudy Gobert. And faced with the Alexander-Walker/Reid screen, Georges Niang opts to pick up the driver which leaves Reid with a wide open three. Even if Darius Garland cheats back, that’s still leaving a small guard to contest a 6’10” shooter in Reid.

Here the Wolves run a simple screen action, but they’ve pulled several help defenders outside with Ant Edwards replacing TJ Warren on the weak side. Jordan McLaughlin pushes downhill aggressively, forcing the screen defender Jarrett Allen to step up or risk getting blown by without a good help option to save him (Walker-Alexander is in the corner holding the playside help). Reid knocks down another triple.

They can also run similar concepts with Edwards, who is far and away Minnesota’s biggest offensive threat.

Ant misses Reid popping out on this play, but you can see that running on-ball pick and pops with Edwards and Reid is a hard thing for defenses to deal with. Ant drives so forcefully that all five defenders are watching him, including Damion Jones who is supposed to be guarding Reid. Jones sprints back and loses all sight of Reid who is sitting wide open, ready to shoot, without a defender in the frame.

The Wolves can even run pin-downs for Reid, like they have frequently in the past with Towns.

That is a big time play. It’s overtime against a top-3 seed in the East. Reid still has the confidence and talent to drill a huge three off a pin-down action centered around Mike Conley and Kyle Anderson (not exactly the biggest offensive threats in the world).

Reid isn’t quite the midrange that Towns is, but he can still find ways to be effective by getting deeper into the paint to take advantage of his size.

Reid’s being guarded by Isaac Okoro (a good wing defender), but he has a significant size advantage. Rather than settling for a midrange jumper, Reid drives to his strong-hand to take advantage of a half-hearted closeout and gets deep into the paint, going through Okra’s chest for the bucket. It should’ve been an and-1. That’s a big time bucket to put the Wolves up by one in the last minute of the fourth quarter.

Reid will also take advantage of slower bigs off the drive too, especially if they are closing out late to stop a three:

Jarrett Allen gets caught here closing out high on Reid (he was understandably watching for the Edwards cut to the basket). Reid sees it and immediately gets Allen moving laterally, where he’s at a disadvantage, which Reid presses by spinning back for a layup at the rim.

Reid also does a great job of getting out into transition, which isn’t something the Wolves often get from Towns. He’s got enough of a handle to push the ball himself and most importantly he’s willing to do so. According to NBA.com, Minnesota generates a strong 1.26 points per 100 possessions with Reid in transition, too (KAT doesn’t do it enough to even make NBA.com’s stat page).

I love this play. Reid recognizes Sam Merrill and Caris Lavert are the only defenders back and uses his speed and handle to run the floor. He’s got McLaughlin in the corner (who he maybe should’ve hit), but it doesn’t matter because he attacks the rim and gets fouled. It’s not sexy, but it’s the type of instant transition game that can help an offense get easy points.

Here’s another transition win of a different sort.

Reid again initiates the transition, but this time he gives the ball up to Alexander-Walker in the corner. When Alexander-Walker drives, Reid continues into the paint on a secondary break and puts Sam Merrill in the basket, drawing a foul. This is fundamental basketball, but it’s only made possible by Reid’s willingness (and skill) to initiate the fast break himself.

With Reid substituting for Towns temporarily, the Wolves can stay afloat in the regular season and perhaps even make it through the first round of the playoffs. Given Minnesota hasn’t won a playoff series since 2004, that would be a success. But at the end of the day, the Wolves probably can’t advance far into the playoffs without Karl-Anthony Towns. He’s a core piece of the puzzle for them and a ceiling-raiser. Towns is also better and more versatile than Reid offensively—in fact, he is one of the best (if not the best) big-man shooters and carries a substantial offensive load for a Wolves team that has at times struggled on that end of the floor.

The Wolves can run most of the same offense with Reid that they’ve run with Towns in the past, and they can use Reid’s better transition ability to try to get easy buckets. They also should get a defensive boost, too, as displayed by Reid’s stellar block on a Darius Garland jumper to force last night’s game into OT:

By slotting Reid into KAT’s offensive role, the Wolves can cover Towns’ absence if they find a way to fill Reid’s old role with Anderson and others. That’s a less scary task, and one that the coaching staff should be able to navigate over the next 18 games. It may even have the added benefits: letting Ant fully become the offensive engine (he’s already well on his way) and encouraging Mike Conley to look for offensive more aggressively.

All told, even with KAT’s absence, I’m bullish on the Wolves finding their way to a top-3 or -4 seed in the West and being in position to win a playoff series. They’ll need KAT back, but they can survive while he heals up.

NFL Pre-Draft Thoughts: Positional Value

Happy Sunday!

The NFL Combine wrapped up this weekend, so we are fully into NFL draft season. No surprise then that I’m seeing tons of conversation about the upcoming draft in April, including mock drafts, player projections, and content about team needs. That’s awesome for people like me that want to geek out over football, and you can easily spend hours (days? weeks?) pouring over every little nuance of potential roster moves. But there’s often something missing from a lot of the content I come across, specifically the importance of positional value and the cost of alternatives.

At a high-level, positional value is pretty straight forward and people get it intuitively: setting aside the talents of individual players, some positions generally have more value to teams than others. For example, it’s axiomatic that quarterbacks are more important in football than players at other positions, and it’s almost become dogma that left tackles are critical and that running backs should never be drafted early. Those conclusions make sense in the current NFL, but they don’t always provide enough information to weigh the relative values of NFL positions in general.

So, I want to use this post to talk about a pretty simple but powerful approach I like to use for understanding how to value the various position in the draft: who do you have to pay up for in free agency? If the position is expensive (especially at the top of the market), that strongly favors drafting it early.

Every year NFL teams dole out contracts in free agency, effectively putting a price on different players at different positions. That information is the purest form of price discovery that exists in the league since the draft isn’t a free market (worse teams get better picks), trades are much harder to measure when multiple players are involved, and undrafted free agents typically sign for the minimum. Thus we can use player contracts as a strong heuristic for how valuable each position is. The overall market still dictates the replacement cost for a particular position, regardless of whether an individual team has different views of positional value. Similarly, by looking at the broader market of player contracts, we can mostly ignore differences in perception about individual talent.

This approach isn’t anything unique that I’ve come up with, and I believe most teams do something like this when coming up with organizational draft philosophy. But it’s still a really useful exercise to go through because it forces you to think how much value you gain or give up by using draft picks (especially high draft picks) on particular positions.

The Process

Let’s start with the data on NFL contracts.

Every NFL player signs a contract with compensation comprised of base salary and often bonuses. It’s pretty common for NFL contracts include an upfront signing bonus (paid immediately) on top of base salaries (paid out weekly over each season of the contract) and future bonuses, too. Although some players—largely starters—get a portion of their future salary/bonus compensation guaranteed, typically NFL teams can release a player and avoid paying them future amounts. That means that assessing the “value” of an NFL contract can be a bit tricky.

To get around the valuation problem, I want to look at a couple different ways to value NFL contracts. The first is to look at the average annual value (AAV) of each contract—basically the total compensation divided by the number of years called for in the contract. The second is to look at the total guarantees in a contract. Looking at AAVs is the easiest short-hand, but I want to make sure there isn’t something totally unusual happening with guarantees (for example, some positions getting guarantees and others not). Plus, Overthecap and Spotrac have this kind of information readily available and I’m all about convenience.

Using data from Overthecap, I pulled together a list of all players league-wide under contract as of February 26, 2024 by position. I used positional groupings from Overthecap, too, except I excluded positions that aren’t common to all teams (fullbacks) or are purely for special teams (kickers, punters, etc.). The groups are as follows:

• Offense:

  • Quarterbacks

  • Running backs

  • Wide receivers

  • Tight ends

  • Left tackles

  • Right tackles

  • Left guards

  • Right guards

  • Centers

• Defense:

  • Interior defensive linemen

  • Edge rushers

  • Linebackers (excluding 3-4 outside linebackers)

  • Cornerbacks

  • Safeties

[The positional grouping for each player can be debated sometimes, particularly for positions like left vs. right side on the offensive line or between interior defensive linemen and edge rushers. I looked over how Overthecap grouped them and it seemed reasonable to me, though, so I didn’t dwell on it.].

The compensation data for the position groupings we care about covers 2,296 players (it’s available here, or you can email me if you want a copy of the spreadsheet I pulled the data into).

Looking at the data as a whole, it jumps out right away that the NFL pays top-tier players well and the lower-end players very little. At the high end, 19 players have contracts with AAVs of $30 million or more. On the other end of the spectrum, the vast majority of players—over 70%—are on contracts with AAVs under $2 million (for reference, the league minimum for 2024 ranges from $795,000 to $1.21 million depending on seniority); about the same number have less than $2 million in salary guarantees, too.

This disparity makes some sense once you consider that NFL teams have 53-man rosters (plus practice squads) and there is a distinct need to employ backups, special teamers, and injury replacements.

Practically speaking, it also means that at the bottom end of the pay scale, it’s basically impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about positional value because all the contracts start collapsing toward the league minimum salary. To avoid that issue, I’ve basically ignored lower-end contracts for purposes of this article (trust me, it doesn’t make a difference).

I also want to quickly point out that obviously not all positions are the same in terms of how many players you need to play them. Only 32 quarterbacks can start in the NFL, but most teams effectively “start” three wide receivers, two or three cornerbacks, two or three linebackers, two safeties, two edges, and two interior defensive linemen. That obviously has a material impact on the market—there are more wide receivers and cornerbacks that actually play than there are quarterbacks (before accounting for backups). That reality should be priced into player salaries, but it’s worth keeping in mind.

Where Does the Money Go?

The chart below shows averages of the Top 5, Top 10, Top 20, Top 30, and Top 50 highest AAVs by position. As a cautionary note, these aren’t perfectly apples to apples comparisons for the top 50 column in particular, as there are different numbers of players at different positions.

[Figure 1]

The next chart shows the average total guarantees by position for the same groups (Top 5, Top 10, Top 20, Top 30, and Top 50).

[Figure 2]

Something leaps out immediately: Quarterbacks are crazy valuable!

That’s not really a surprise to anyone. In fact, they’re so valuable that they distract from what’s going on with the other positions. So let’s take as true that quarterback is the most valuable position in football (at least based on how NFL teams pay them) and take it out of consideration for now.

We can re-work the chart to exclude quarterbacks—here’s the same data without quarterbacks shown:

[Figure 3]

And here’s a line graph based on the same data (rounded), which makes it a bit easier to compare the positions against one another generally. I find the line graph a little misleading, but it’s a useful way to compare the positions at the different levels of extraction (top 5 to top 50).

[Figure 4]

Figures 5 and 6 are similar to Figures 3 and 4, but but by Total Guarantees:

[Figure 5]

[Figure 6]

These charts (Figures 3 to 6) are a bit easier to follow without quarterbacks mucking things up with their giant contracts.

I'm also including a table with the rounded dollar figures in millions (Figure 7) so they’re easier to see—you’re welcome to trace the bar charts if you like.

[Figure 7]

Alright, that’s out of the way.

This information is helpful to rank positions by value.

When looking at position AAVs, a pretty clear ranking shows up at the top of the market (top 5 and top 10):

1. Edge rushers

2. Wide receivers

3. Interior defensive line

4. Left tackles

5. Cornerbacks

6. Right tackles

7. Linebackers (T-7)

8. Safeties (T-7)

9. Tight ends (T-9)

10. Right guards (T-9)

11. Left guards (T-9)

12. Running backs

13. Centers

But if you look at top-market total guarantees, another order pops up—I’ve put in bold red text the positions that moved down and bold green text the positions that moved up relative to the AAV order:

1. Edge rushers (massive advantage over every other non-QB position)

2. Wide receivers

3. Cornerbacks

4. Interior defensive line

5. Left tackles

6. Right tackles

7. Linebackers

8. Safeties (T-8)

9. Tight ends (T-8)

10. Left guard

11. Right guard

12. Centers

13. Running backs

These generally rankings seem to generally stay roughly the same even as you expand to bigger shares of the market (top 30 and top 50 players at each position), but it’s again worth noting that the number of players that actually see the field for a given position (without injuries) starts to have a bigger impact once you get past the top 20-30 players at the position. This is most apparent with cornerbacks passing left tackles for AAV at the top 30—assuming health, only 32 left tackles start league-wide on any given Sunday, whereas you’re going to see at least 64 cornerbacks play each week (and probably closer to 96, since almost every team plays a lot of nickel defense at least). That same thing probably also explains why right guards, left guards, and centers all start to lump together after the top 20—at a certain point, you’re talking about replacement-level starters or backups at relatively low cost positions.

I was also curious and looked at the same AAV and total guarantees compensation data for each position sorted by the percentile ranking within the position itself. The data here isn’t averaged out by top 5, top 10, etc., it’s just the straight data. I also took out anything below the 75th percentile as the compensation starts to veer off toward the league minimum and just collapses on itself. I think it tells a pretty similar story, but I’ll post it anyway so folks can see (Figures 8 and 9 below). The major caveat here is that the number of players at each position has a HUGE impact on the bar charts below—offensive line at every level looks way more expensive, but that’s because there are the fewest players under contract at those positions. The data set I have covers 94 left tackles, 99 right tackles, 93 left guards, 77 right guards, and 70 centers, while there are 307 wide receivers, 277 cornerbacks, 234 interior defensive linemen, 231 edge rushers, 219 linebackers, 182 safeties, 159 running backs, and 153 tight ends. It skews the percentile comparisons a lot. For example the 75th percentile center is #18 in the league, whereas a 75th percentile wide receiver is #77. Take these with a grain of salt.

[Figure 8]

[Figure 9]

Lessons for Drafting

So let’s get to some lessons we can draw from the information above about the draft.

Edges and wide receivers are ideal early draft targets.

Excluding quarterbacks, the top edge rushers and wide receivers get more money per year on average than anyone else and get the most in guarantees. That premium cost shows up at the top end of the market clearly, but it continues even as you move downward. These are obviously high-value positions in the modern NFL, where the passing game is so important, but the substantial distance between their average pay and guarantees compared to other premium positions like cornerback and left tackle is pretty apparent, especially at the very top of the market.

The value of finding high-end talent at these positions in the draft is absolutely massive. First round rookies get signed to 4 year deals with a 5th year team option, so locking in All-Pro level talent with a first round pick at edge rusher or wide receiver can create a huge amount of surplus value to the team compared to getting the same level of talent at other positions.

I also want to flag something that came up as a bit of a surprise to me. Edge rushers get absolutely massive total guarantees in the veteran market compared to every other non-QB position (even wide receivers). If you look at Figures 5 and 6, it jumps out immediately—they’re getting $30 million or more in guarantees than any other position. While edge rushers may only make a couple million more per year than wide receivers at the high end of the market, that difference in guarantees actually is a major, major difference for teams who need to worry about the risk of injury.

If you assume (as I do) that over time and on average, higher draft picks are more likely to end up being high-end NFL players, there’s no doubt that focusing on edge rusher and wide receiver for team’s premium draft assets (first round and second round picks) is a good bet.

On top of that, from a practical perspective, every team has to have at least three capable wide receivers and edge rushers. Offenses frequently run 3 WR sets and edge rushers really can’t stay on the field the entire game no matter how good they are. So even if you don’t get a player who turns out to be a top-of-market talent, landing guys who can play even at a back-end starter level has incredible financial value.

Don’t Forget the Beef (At Least On Defense)

You never hear anyone talk about defensive tackles as a premium position, pretty much ever. Occasionally, reporters and prognosticators will talk about how a couple interior D-linemen like Aaron Donald, Chris Jones, or Quinnen Williams are valuable because they can pass rush like ends, but that’s really understating things hugely. Even guys who are thought of more often as space eaters like Dalvin Tomlinson and DJ Reader are making $13-14 million per season on average. In fact, at every level of the market, defensive tackles are getting paid more than offensive tackles (left or right side) and corners, which isn’t the prevailing wisdom amongst pundits and draft watchers.

Also, like with edges and wide receivers, most teams have to regularly play three or more defensive tackles every game. These guys are big and asked to do a lot athletically—they need breathers, more than most positions. Having extras makes sense. And even if a defensive tackle doesn’t turn out to be an All Pro, having a top 50 player at the position is more valuable than getting a comparably talented offensive lineman, who will inevitably be a backup.

Be Cautious Drafting Right Tackles Early

The whole league values left tackles more than right tackles, since they’re the blindside protectors for right handed quarterbacks (though obviously there are a number of lefties in the NFL now like Tua Tagovailoa), so it’s no surprise that LTs are generally paid more than RTs per year. But I was surprised by how much of a gap shows up at the middle- and lower-end of the market for starters.

Amongst the top 10 players at each position, left tackles are paid on average about 13% more than right tackles. But that gap widens substantially when you look at the top 20 and top 30 at each position, where the pay difference is about 26% and 25% respectively. Using a high pick on a right tackle can be fine (it’s about middle of the pack in terms of positional value) if you end up with a high-end starter, but if you end up with a back-end starter it’s a lot less efficient financially that drafting a left tackle.

Common Wisdom Is Sometimes Spot On

Football followers all know this by now, but the league does not value running backs. The league’s highest paid (and presumably best) running backs are getting paid comparably to the 50th best edge rushers and wide receivers, or the 30th best corners and left tackles. Forget whether it’s true that you can find running backs late in the draft—simply paying for a running back in free agency is a cheap alternative to drafting one early. The opportunity cost of using early picks on running backs is far too high to justify in most situations. You’d have to believe that a given running back you draft will be a top 5 player at his position versus believing that an edge rusher you draft would be a top 50 player for it to make any sense.

Teams Seem to Know Centers Are Cheap, But Does Anyone Else?

I keep seeing mock drafts putting multiple centers in the first two rounds—usually Jackson Powers-Johnson from Oregon, Graham Barton from Duke, and Zach Frazier from West Virginia. That’s not a good use of draft capital, as centers are one of the easiest positions to fill in the open market, where a starting caliber player (top 20) is actually cheaper than even running backs. I never hear analysts talk about this, but it’s a useful lesson. DON’T WASTE EARLY PICKS!

A similar thing can be said for guards even though the top of the market is more robust. If a team thinks a guard will be a top 5 player at his position, it could be worth using early draft capital on him—any other outcome, and it’s similar to drafting a running back or center. It’s not a good position to use early draft capital on.

Safeties, Tight Ends, and Linebackers Are Fine, I Guess?

Perhaps the least interesting groups here are safeties, tight ends, and linebackers. Their comp seems to track each other reasonably closely and they land pretty squarely in the middle of the value stack. As a result, drafting them early isn’t the highest use of resources, but it’s not as inefficient as drafting RBs or interior offensive lineman like guards and centers. The “best case” outcomes really pale in comparison to edges, wide receivers, interior DL, and left tackles in terms of potential value though, so it’s probably best to avoid using first round picks on these positions even if you think the player is going to be great—just pay somebody in free agency instead.

Wrap Up

I really like looking at positional drafting based on market cost. It’s simple, intuitive, and reflects the real world value of the position. Teams always have the option of filling roster holes with free agency instead of the draft, so they ought to be thinking about how much it costs to do so when evaluating picks. Of course there are other interesting ways at looking at positional value (Pro Football Focus has a fun one looking at their wins above average stat), but most of them tend to rely on imperfect comparisons that may not reflect what’s actually happening in the league, so I tend to put less weight on them. And while obviously teams need to think about things like draft slot and their own roster, scheme, and strategy—those are important!—they always have to live by the rules of the market they exist in, since roster needs change, coaches get fired, and prevailing wisdom changes. Looking to the alternative cost of filling roster holes, besides draft picks, is a good place to start.

Chargers 2024 Salary Cap

It’s been a bit since I’ve posted because I was on vacation and watching the Super Bowl. Sorry Niners fans, I was pulling for you. I’m back to it this week to take a look at the upcoming Chargers offseason.

Things are looking better in Los Angeles for the Chargers after hiring new head coach Jim Harbaugh and new general manager Joe Hortiz in January, but it’s been widely (accurately) reported that the Chargers are facing some big off-season salary cap challenges in deciding who to bring back and at what price.

I think a lot of the conventional wisdom in articles and reporting has gotten ahead of itself on the Chargers salary cap issues, so I wanted to go through them. The Bolts aren’t in a great situation with respect to the salary cap, but it’s definitely not “salary cap hell,” as I’ve heard it described by a few pundits. Depending on how the Chargers address contracts for just a handful of players, they don’t necessarily face long-term issues either.

Before diving into the Chargers specifically, I want to go over some basics about the salary cap, how players get paid, and how teams manage their rosters around the salary cap. The rules can be confusing, but they’re integral to how teams build their rosters—there’s no way to understand what a team is going to do in the offseason if you don’t have at least some familiarity with these issues—so it’s a good jumping off point. [There are some primers on this stuff if you want to really get the details—this one from Anthony Holman-Escareno at NFL.com is really thorough, though it covers the 2023 offseason. You also can dig into the CBA.]

I’ll jump right into it.

The NFL Salary Cap

The NFL salary cap rules are the bedrock of roster construction. They can be confusing, so I’m going to simplify things a bit where appropriate to hopefully make this more digestible (you can let me know in the comments if you want more details).

At a basic level, NFL teams have to fill their roster with players who are paid a combination of salary (paid weekly) and bonuses (paid at specified times). Players sign contracts for one or more years and for each year of the contract, the player has a “salary cap charge” that counts towards the team’s salary cap based on how much salary and bonuses the player is slated to receive that year, with some accounting nuances that I’ll describe more later.

The NFL salary cap is what’s known as a “hard cap,” meaning that the money teams pay their players in a given year cannot exceed the salary cap. In other words, player salaries and bonuses for the whole roster added together must fall below the cap. That’s different from the “soft” salary cap for the NBA, which I’ve talked about before, that has a dozen or more exceptions that allow teams to go over the salary cap. The NFL’s salary cap was set at $224.8 million this past season and it is projected to increase to over $240 million for 2024, though the final figure hasn’t been set yet. [Note: some projections, including OvertheCap.com’s, expect the salary cap to come in slightly higher, but I’m using $240 million for now because that’s the latest the NFL has indicated. There’s a good chance the actual cap number comes in a bit higher.]

Counting Team Salary

The way a team’s salary gets calculated for salary cap purposes is detailed and can be convoluted, but at a high level it’s fairly simple. You simply add up the salaries and bonus payments made to players on the roster for a given year, with some fairly simple accounting for discrete items. The components of a team’s salary can be thought of as the three buckets below:

• Salaries for players on the roster;

• Bonuses paid to players on the roster (this gets more complicated, but we’ll deal with the nuances later); and

• “Dead cap” or “dead money” hits, which represent salary caps for players who are no longer on the roster but for whom the team still has to take a salary cap charge.

These components aren’t super confusing—teams have to count the actual money they’re paying to players in a given against the salary cap (salaries and bonuses), and they also have to account for money they already paid to former players as “dead cap” if that money wasn’t counted against the salary cap in a prior season.

The natural implication is that timing is important. When teams take cap charges for salary, bonuses, or dead cap depends on the team’s strategy, but they have to operate within the league’s rules.

Generally, the NFL counts player salaries—the amount they get per year in game checks—toward the team’s salary cap in the year the salaries are paid. If a player’s salary is $10 million for the season (and, for simplicity, we assume the player has no bonuses), the team’s salary cap charge for the player would be $10 million. There are some nuances for players with salary guarantees which I’ll discuss a bit later, but the basic rule is straightforward.

When teams take cap charges for bonuses depends on the type of bonus it is. For some bonus categories like signing bonuses, teams spread out the salary cap charges across the life of the contract—for those familiar with accounting, the team expense of the signing bonus is simply amortized on a straight line basis over the life of the contract. Most other bonuses, including things like roster bonuses (for being rostered as of a particular date), workout bonuses (for attending team workouts), and performance-based bonuses are charged against the salary cap in the year they are paid.

Dead cap hits typically result from a team cutting a player, trading a player, or a player retiring. The dead cap hit counts against the team’s salary cap for either the season in which player was cut/traded (or retired) or the following season, depending on the specific date the cut or trade occurred (June 1st is the magic day if you’re curious).

For any given season, all of those salary cap charges combined—salary and bonuses for rostered players and dead cap hits—have to fall below the salary cap.

Team Use of Cap Space

It’s also important to understand what NFL teams have to use salary cap space for because it governs how they think about managing their respective cap situations. I’ve talked about the first two items below, player compensation and dead cap, but the latter four are also important and often not top of mind for NFL observers:

• Teams must pay the players on the roster (player salaries + bonuses).

• Teams must account for “dead cap” hits for player cuts, trades, or retirements.

• In connection with the NFL draft, teams must set aside some portion of salary cap space for players they select (how much depends on how many picks they have and, especially for first round picks, how high in the draft order they go).

• Teams reserve some amount of salary cap space to sign new players in case someone on their roster gets hurt (this is pretty much guaranteed to happen at some point).

• Teams may save a portion of their cap and use it as “rollover cap” for the next season—in other words, if a team has space below the cap, they can choose to “rollover” that space into the next season.

• A bunch of other stuff! Practice squad player salaries, money paid in response to player grievances, off-season workout payments, and a host of other things are also lumped into the salary cap. These are generally small amounts (relatively) so I won’t dwell on them.

What Goes Into a Player’s Salary Cap Charge

The way that a salary cap charge for an individual player gets calculated is conceptually simple—it’s basically the sum of his compensation for the year plus a prorated portion of his signing bonus (the amortized bonus). A simple way to think of it is that the player’s salary cap charge for a given season is the sum of the following:

• Base salary for the season. This is the player’s salary, which is typically paid out per game.

• In-season bonuses. There are several kinds of in-season bonuses including roster bonuses (bonuses paid for the player being on a roster as of a specified date, like the start of training camp); workout bonuses (bonuses paid to incentivize players to show up for off-season or pre-season workouts); and per game bonuses (pretty self-explanatory).

• Incentives. These are basically bonuses paid for a player hitting particular performance targets, like rushing yards for the season or total touchdowns. For salary cap charge purposes, these get wonky. There are “likely to be earned” incentives (LTBEs) and “not likely to be earned” incentives (NTLBEs), and they are treated differently for salary cap purposes. We don’t need to dive into the details here, so I’ll skip it for now.

• Prorated signing bonus. Players usually get cash up front as a signing bonus when they sign their contracts. This cash is paid up front to the player at the time they sign their deal, but it is accounted for under the salary cap as though it were paid out in equal installments for each year of the contract.

  For example, a player could sign a three year deal for a total value of $45 million, with $15 million paid as a signing bonus and $10 million in base salary for each year of the contract. The $15 million signing bonus would be accounted for as though it was paid in equal installments over the course of three years, or $5 million per year.

• Prorated “restructuring” bonus. Restructuring bonuses are something that articles and media sometimes refer to, but they aren’t really a different category of bonus—it’s treated the same as signing bonus. These restructuring bonuses occur when when the team elects to pay some portion of a player’s salary in a given season as bonus (this is a pretty unique rule for the NFL, so I’ll discuss it more below). Rather than getting weekly salary, the player gets the money up front as a signing bonus, and the amount is then prorated over the remaining life of the contract.

  To see how this works, let’s look at the same three year, $45 million total value contract with a $15 million initial signing bonus that I referred to previously. In Year 1 of the contract, the player actually receives $15 million in signing bonus and $10 million in base salary, $25 million in total, but his salary cap charge for the season is just $15 million—$10 million in base salary and $5 million in prorated signing bonus. In Year 2, the salary cap charge is once again $15 million, although the player actually gets paid only the $10 million in base salary (he already received the signing bonus at the start of the contract). Year 3 is the same as Year 3.

  Now instead imagine that at the start of Year 2, the team decides to convert $6 million of the player’s base salary into so-called “restructuring” bonus. That $6 million bonus gets prorated for the remaining two years of the contract in the same way the original signing bonus was prorated over the life of the original three year deal. This time, the player still actually gets paid $10 million in Year 2, but $4 million is base salary and $6 million is paid as restructuring bonus. Thus his Year 2 salary cap charge is $12 million (instead of $15 million): $4 million base + $5 million in prorated signing bonus + $3 million in prorated restructuring bonus.

  In Year 3, the player gets paid $10 million (all base salary), but his salary cap charge would go up to $18 million: $10 million base + $5 million in prorated signing bonus + $3 million in prorated restructuring bonus.

Teams Have Three Primary Ways to Address Cap Issues

There are three main ways that a team can reduce the salary cap hit for a particular player: (1) move on from the player, usually by releasing or trading them or if they retire, (2) “simple restructures” of the player’s contract, or (3) renegotiations of the player’s contract, which typically involves extending the contract in some way.

Moving On

Teams can move on from players in a few ways to save themselves cap room:

• If the player’s contract is up, they are a free agent and the team can choose not to re-sign them;

• The team can release a player to move on from their contract and avoid paying the player unpaid upcoming salary and certain future bonuses, subject to any negotiated guarantees in the player’s contract;

• The team can trade the player away; or

• The player retires.

For purposes of this post, I’m going to focus on player releases as the main way to “move on” from a player and avoid paying salary. This is because letting a player walk in free agency doesn’t really directly affect the salary cap situation—the player isn’t under contract and doesn’t count against the team’s cap anyway—and because trading away a player has similar implications for salary cap purposes as waiving them (setting aside whatever player salaries come back in a deal). Similarly, for cap analysis purposes, a player retiring functions mostly like them being cut, though there are some nuances based on when and why a player retires (e.g., whether the player retires for injury and how much time they have left on their contract, if any).

Teams release players by cutting them from the roster, which generally allows the team to avoid paying the player any unpaid upcoming salary (other than guarantees they may have specifically negotiated). Unlike in the NBA and MLB, the vast majority of NFL contracts are not guaranteed, so when team’s release players that typically ends any future obligations to continue paying the player after release. Teams also aren’t required to take salary cap charges for the unpaid, non-guaranteed salary and unpaid, non-guaranteed bonuses, so releasing players is often an effective way for teams to clear out cap space.

Some players negotiate for guaranteed or partially guaranteed salary or bonuses in their contracts, and those guarantees generally do have to get paid even if a player is released. Guaranteed salary or bonuses also do get counted as salary cap charges for the team, so the benefits of cutting a player with guarantees are much less significant for the team. As a result, players with salary or bonus guarantees usually aren’t going to get released—that’s why they negotiate the guarantees in the first place.

While teams don’t have to count any unpaid, non-guaranteed salary, bonuses (like roster bonuses or workout bonuses), or incentives to the player as salary cap charges when the player is released, signing bonuses are treated differently. As I noted above, signing bonuses are paid up front and amortized across the life of the contract. So when a player gets released—meaning the contract is terminated early—the future years still have prorated signing bonus cap charges. Those future cap charges don’t just disappear. Instead, the future cap charges for prorated bonus get “accelerated” and count against the team’s salary cap immediately. These aren’t cash amounts the team pays out upon releasing a player—it’s just on paper, the team already paid the money—but the NFL forces teams to account for those bonuses as “dead money.”

For example, the Chargers released cornerback JC Jackson midway through the 2023 season. As a result, they will have to eat over $20.8 million in dead money against their salary cap this year ($15 million of Jackson’s prorated signing bonus and just over $5.8 million of “restructuring” bonus) even though they won’t actually pay Jackson any money in 2024. [If you’re wondering why Jackson’s dead money hit comes in 2024, it is due to the timing of his release—he was released after June 1 of the 2023 season, so the dead cap hit is counted for 2024.]

Teams release players when they can save money against the cap and not generate huge dead money hits, since that dead money can’t be used on the rest of the roster that season (hence the name).

Simple Restructures

Simple restructures are often used by teams to manage their salary cap situation. As I’ve explained, an NFL player’s compensation in a given season can be broken up into (A) base salary and (B) bonuses. The NFL CBA allows teams to convert the majority of player’s base salary into signing bonus essentially at will (they can’t convert it all, as there are some restrictions like players having to make at least the league minimum salary for his seniority level).

Simple restructures are a valuable tool in salary cap management because they allow a team to create cap space immediately. Player base salary gets charged against the team’s cap for the year in which it is paid, but signing bonuses and “restructuring” bonuses are prorated across the remaining contract term—so by converting base salary to bonus, the teams can create salary cap space in the current season by spreading out the cap charges over multiple seasons.

Team’s don’t generally need to consult the players to do these kinds of simple restructures under the CBA. That seems weird, but there’s no real reason the players should care since getting paid earlier is generally favorable for them: they get paid the same amount at the beginning of the season as opposed to getting paid out over the course of the year in game checks. It’s just an accounting gimmick that lets teams move around what salary cap hit they take in a given season (base salary) versus what gets spread out over multiple seasons (signing bonus).

Extensions/Renegotiations

Teams can also renegotiate contracts with players, subject to some restrictions that aren’t super important for this post. Renegotiations can work a variety of ways, but it basically just means the team and player revisit the essential terms of the contract—the amount of compensation, the amount of guaranteed compensation, and/or the number of years the contract runs.

There are lots of situations when renegotiations can occur, but I’ll focus on a few common ones:

• The team wants to extend the length of the contract to keep the player under contract longer.

• The team wants to extend the length of the contract in order to spread out the prorated cap charges for the player’s signing bonus over a longer period of time.

• The team wants to reduce the amount paid to the player, but would keep them around if they are willing to stay at a lower price—implicitly, this means the team would otherwise cut the player if they don’t take a pay cut.

In these situations, the team and the player will negotiate to change the terms of the contract to allow the team financial flexibility.

A lot of extensions just add years to the contract and the team and player negotiate what salary they will be paid in each year and how much will be paid up front as bonus (and prorated over all the years of the contract). These are pretty normal and function like contract extensions in other sports.

The NFL also allows another odd accounting gimmick where teams can negotiate to add “void years” to contracts. Essentially, void years are fake years added to the end of a contract for salary cap accounting purposes. The player will not play in these void years, and everybody knows that, but the void years extend the length of the contract and allow teams to spread out the cap impact of signing bonuses over a longer period because the void years get included as part of the contract term when amortizing the signing bonus.

As an example, a player signs a contract with a $12 million signing bonus for four years, with two void years at the end. For salary cap purposes, the signing bonus is prorated over six years (even though the player is only contracted to play for four), so the cap charge of the signing bonus is $2 million per year. Without the void years, the cap charge for the signing bonus alone would be $3 million per year.

Void years don’t allow the team to avoid cap charges entirely. When the real contract years end and the player is no longer going to play, the remaining prorated bonus cap charges accelerate and are charged to the team’s salary cap (assuming the player isn’t re-signed or extended). Thus, when the cap charges for the void years accelerate, the team winds up taking a big cap charge as dead money. This functions like a sort of balloon cap charge at the end of the contract, so it can be tough to manage—so some teams like to use void years as a regular tool to manage their cap while other teams just avoid them entirely (the Chargers haven’t used void years very frequently, but we’ll see what new GM Joe Hortiz prefers soon enough).

Now that we’ve eaten our vegetables, let’s get to the Chargers situation.

The Chargers Are WAAAY Over the Cap

At a glance, the Chargers look to be in a tough cap situation. According to Overthecap.com, the Bolts have about $270.8 million in salary cap dedicated to their 2024 roster (49 players out of 53 total roster spots) and $24.6 million in dead cap hits—meaning their overall team salary cap number would be about $295.4 million. Given the 2024 salary cap will be around $240 million, the Chargers look to be roughly $55.4 million over the cap right now. [I’m rounding numbers here for simplicity—there’s no need to be too precise given we’re working with several projections anyway. Overthecap uses $242 million for the expected 2024 salary cap.]

But things aren’t quite that simple.

For one, the basic cap analysis above doesn’t account for a few important things.

The Chargers still have four empty roster spots and they will eventually have to sign their 2024 draft picks. The Chargers have seven picks in the upcoming NFL draft, so they’re going to be adding up to seven players to the roster (barring trades, which can increase or decrease the number of selections they have in the draft). Assuming they stay at their current draft positions, the Chargers will need to pay the seven newly drafted players ~$14.4 million next season—the bulk of which will go to whomever they take with their first round pick. Since the Chargers have just four open roster spots, they would also get to cut three players on their current roster—likely guys who make the minimum of $795,000—which would save about $2.4 million in cap space. So we can assume the Chargers would need about $12 million to sign their 2024 draft picks and fill out the roster ($14.4 million minus $2.4 million).

The team also needs to reserve at least some space for potential injuries and miscellaneous cap charges. It’s hard to say exactly how much cap space the team will need for this, but we want to leave a reasonable cushion of about $10 million.

In addition, the Chargers were about $8 million under the salary cap in 2023 and can use that $8 million as “rollover cap” for 2024. In essence, that $8 million amount would get taken off of the team’s salary cap total for next season.

The net result is that even though the Chargers are about $55.4 million over the cap for next year, they actually will need to shed about $69.3 million to get under the cap and leave room to maneuver injuries and other cap items next year.

Here’s a table for keeping track of these numbers if it’s easier. Keep in mind that this involves some estimates, so understanding this directionally is more useful than referring to the specific estimated numbers (especially given the 2024 cap hasn’t been set yet).

What Happened to the Chargers Cap Space?

Having to cut almost $70 million in salary seems daunting, and maybe it is ($70 million is almost 30% of the cap if you’re curious). How in the world can the team be so far above where they need to get?

In the Chargers’ case, it really comes down to a handful of players. I see a lot of people suggesting that these cuts are being prompted by the Chargers signing quarterback Justin Herbert to a 5 year, $262.5 million deal this off-season, but that’s not true. Herbert’s contract isn’t a big issue for this coming year (his cap charge for 2024 is just $19.3 million, middle of the pack for QBs), though it will be something the Chargers need to navigate down the line. We can see who is driving the Chargers high team salary by taking a closer look at the Chargers roster overall.

The Chargers 2024 roster has just 10 players with cap hits of over $5 million for 2024, which is roughly middle of the pack and tied for 18th in the NFL. But the Chargers have four players with salary cap charges of over $30 million for 2024—Khalil Mack, Joey Bosa, Keenan Allen, and Mike Williams—twice as many as any other team. About half of NFL teams don’t have a single player with a cap charge over $30 million and the Rams are the only team besides the Chargers to have more than one (Matt Stafford and Aaron Donald).

I’ve listed below the Chargers 10 biggest cap hits for next season to help contextualize what’s really happening with the roster.

1. Khalil Mack at $38.52 million (in the last year of his contract)

2. Joey Bosa at $36.61 million

3. Keenan Allen at $34.72 million (in the last year of his contract)

4. Mike Williams at $32.46 million (in the last year of his contract)

5. Derwin James at $19.86 million

6. Justin Herbert at $19.35 million

7. Corey Linsley at $14.10 million

8. Eric Kendricks at $9.25 million (in the last year of his contract)

9. Trey Pipkins at $8.75 million

10. Rashawn Slater at $5.29 million

In total, these 10 players account for just over $218.9 million in salary cap charges. Mack, Bosa, Allen, and Williams account for over $142.3 million—that means almost 60% of the total salary cap is being used on four players.

That’s not ideal!

Put simply, the Chargers are way, way too top-heavy in terms of salary. It is a problem, but it’s not necessarily the end of the world. What happens with the 10 players listed above—especially Mack, Bosa, Allen, Williams—will drive how the Chargers get under the cap for 2024.

Slashing Salary: Who to Keep & Who to Let Go

The Bolts could take a meat cleaver-style approach and just cut a bunch of players to get under the cap. It wouldn’t be pretty next season, but cutting Khalil Mack, Keenan Allen, Mike Williams, and Eric Kendricks, who are all in the last year of their contracts, plus Corey Linsley retiring, would save the Chargers over $77 million against the cap (after adding back replacement players at the minimum salary). That would totally fix the problem, though it would be painful to let so many veteran productive players walk out the door.

I don’t think the Chargers will (or should) take such a dramatic approach—there are better ways for the team to create cap space and keep at least some of those guys. The team will instead look at each of the 10 players I listed above and consider how to address their situations case-by-case. They’re going to have to shave enough salary to get under the cap and handle injuries, but the Bolts will also probably want to create at least some cap space to go after some free agents too—probably not the at the top of the market, but not necessarily just the bottom of the barrel free agents either.

So I’m going to go through the 10 players at issue, too. I’ll start with the easy ones.

Nothing Much To Do

Justin Herbert and Rashawn Slater. There’s nothing the Chargers really need to do about the contracts for Justin Herbert or starting left tackle Rashawn Slater.

Herbert is a franchise cornerstone and the Chargers just signed him to a new deal before last season, so there’s no significant concerns with his contract. At $19.4 million, Herbert’s 2024 cap charge is actually pretty good—about half of teams have higher 2024 cap numbers for their quarterback as of this post. If needed, the Chargers can easily perform a simple restructure to convert some of Herbert’s $6 million base salary into bonus, saving themselves up to $3.9 million against the 2024 cap.

Slater, who is going into his fourth season and has already made an All Pro team, is similarly not a concern for the team based on his cap number. He’s still on a rookie scale deal (though the team will almost certainly look to extend him), so his cap charge for 2024 is just $5.3 million—a great value. The Chargers are going to look to extend Slater since he’s in the last year of his rookie deal, and they could theoretically lower his cap hit for 2024 by doing so, but his base salary is already low enough that it wouldn’t create cap space in the near term anyway (in fact, a big signing bonus for Slater would probably increase his cap number for 2024).

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $3.9 million

Corey Linsley. Corey Linsley, the Charger’s starting center last season, missed 14 games due to a heart issue and has indicated that he is 99% likely to retire as a result (though a final decision probably won’t come until March). He carries a $14.1 million cap number for 2024, but his cap number will fall if he retires. Linsley’s retirement would result in the Chargers getting back either $8.1 million or $10.7 million (accounting for a roster replacement) depending on whether he retires before or after June 1. Most likely, Linsley’s official retirement date will be coordinated with the Chargers’ cap strategy—it won’t effect him, but it will effect the team’s salary cap as Linsley’s 2025 prorated signing bonus will either be counted toward the 2024 or 2025 team salary. I’ll assume that Linsley’s retirement doesn’t take effect until after June 1, which would spread out the dead money on his contract between the Chargers’ 2024 and 2025 caps.

It’s also worth at least acknowledging that because Linsley is retiring before his contract is over, the Chargers also can theoretically ask him to return signing bonus for contract years he won’t play (2024 and 2025), which adds up to $5.2 million in total. It seems unlikely the Chargers would do that given the circumstances of Linsley’s retirement and what he’s provided to the team with respect to leadership and mentoring younger players, but if he does return some portion of his signing bonus, that amount wouldn’t count against the team’s salary cap.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $10.7 million

[Update: Per ESPN’s Field Yates, Linsley agreed to restructure his contract and lower his base salary for 2024 from $11.5 million to the league minimum. The move brings Linsley’s 2024 cap number down to $3.81 million frees up just under $10.3 million in cap space for the Chargers in 2024, close to what the team would’ve gotten by effectuating his retirement after June 1, 2024. The move suggests that Linsley won’t rush his retirement decision. He is unlikely to retire before June 1, which would just incur a dead cap hit of $5.2 million to the Chargers (larger than his 2024 cap number), though he could still retire after June 1 and the team could spread out the $5.2 million dead cap hit evenly across 2024 and 2025. The team and Linsley are apparently working together to give Linsley to the space to make his retirement decision when he’s ready and give the Chargers financial flexibility ahead of free agency opening in March.]

Simple Restructures If Needed

Derwin James. 28 year old safety Derwin James is under contract with the Chargers through 2026 after signing a 4-year, $76.5 million extension in 2022. James will be in the second year of his extension this season and he’s slated to have a cap charge of $19.9 million, one of the five biggest cap charges for a safety league-wide.

James is one of the biggest names on the Chargers defense and still a productive player, though he had possibly his worst season last year (especially in coverage). Given James is still a core part of the Chargers defense and just 28 years old, it’s more than likely the Chargers will keep him. And because he also still has three years left on his contract, the Chargers wouldn’t be able to save much money in 2024 by releasing him or trading him.

If the team were to release or trade James before June 1, his cap charge would actually increase by about $5 million to over $24.7 million. That’s because James’s prorated signing bonus cap charges in 2024, 2025, and 2026—$7.1 million apiece—would accelerate and land on the Chargers 2024 cap sheet, along with about $3.4 million in guaranteed base salary for 2024. Cutting James after June 1 would save the Chargers about $9.3 million in cap space this year, but they’d also be saddled with substantial dead cap hits in both 2024 and 2025 as a consequence.

With James presumably staying on the roster, the Chargers have three remaining options: (1) leave his contract as is, (2) perform a simple restructure, or (3) negotiate to extend his contract or add void years to his deal in order to spread out the prorated bonus charge over more years.

Option 1 is simplest and would present the fewest complications if James can’t return to his Pro Bowl form next season. It also would give the team the most flexibility to deal with cap issues for other players in 2025 and 2026.

Option 2 is also plausible, and could save the Chargers up to just over $7.7 million in 2024 cap space per Overthecap at the cost of some financial flexibility in 2025 and 2026.

Option 3 would similarly allow the Chargers to save space, up to $9.3 million per Overthecap, but it would depend a lot on whatever the new deal looked like. A true extension for James seems risky—it’s not clear whether last year was just a down year or whether his production is starting to decline, and the current deal already runs through 2026, when James will be 30 years old. But adding a void year or two to reduce James’ 2024 salary and spread out the prorated signing bonus charges over more years wouldn’t carry the same risks and could save the Chargers over $9 million in cap space this year at the cost of increasing James’ cap hits in 2025 and beyond.

All together, the Chargers don’t actually need to touch James’s contract at all. But if they want to maximize the amount of cap space they can free up in 2024 without making other cuts to the roster, they’ll probably do something. Some simple restructures seem the least painful path, so I’ll assume that they convert the max amount of James’s base salary to bonus that they can.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $7.7 million

Trey Pipkins. Starting right tackle Trey Pipkins signed a 3 year, $21.75 million deal before the 2023 season. Pipkins is heading into his sixth season with the team and has largely performed adequately, providing serviceable tackle play while mostly staying healthy the last couple years. He’s not quite overpaid given how hard it is to find quality offensive lineman in the NFL, but he hasn’t played well enough to say he’s obviously outperforming his contract either.

Pipkins carries a 2024 cap charge of $8.75 million comprised of $6.25 million in base salary ($4.5 million of which is guaranteed) and $2.5 million in prorated signing bonus. Because his current deal runs through 2025, the Chargers wouldn’t save much money by cutting him—they would actually lose cap space in 2024 if they cut him before June 1 and would only gain $1.75 million in cap by cutting him after June 1, per Overthecap. As a result, it’s likely Pipkins will be on the roster for 2024 regardless of who the Chargers draft in April. On top of that, teams generally are wary of cutting decent offensive lineman even if they find other starters because so many injuries occur during the season.

The Chargers could theoretically extend Pipkins to spread out his cap charges over more years, but he hasn’t played well enough to warrant that now. If the team does anything with Pipkins’ cap number, it would likely be a simple restructure to convert $5.125 million of his 2024 base salary into signing bonus. This would make Pipkins’ 2024 cap charge just under $6.2 million, saving the Chargers a little over $2.6 million against the 2024 (they’d also increase Pipkins’ 2025 cap number by the same amount). While that would make Pipkins harder to cut in 2025, odds are the Chargers would want to keep him around for 2025 even his play doesn’t improve since he’s still good enough to at least be a reliable backup.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $2.6 million

Maybe a Little Risk, But Clear Choices

The Chargers have to figure out how to handle a couple older but productive players from last season: Keenan Allen and Eric Kendricks. Both players were significant contributors last season but their cap hits for 2024 are high enough that they need to be addressed. One of them should stay, but it’s time to let the other walk.

Keenan Allen. This may be the Chargers easiest decision: they should absolutely extend Keenan Allen.

There’s no real question about what Allen (31) means to the Bolts. He’s the longest tenured player on the team and has been a stand-out for over a decade since he was drafted in 2013. In 11 seasons with the team, Allen has made six Pro Bowls and is the team’s second all-time leader in receiving yards and catches behind only Antonio Gates (whom Allen could potentially pass in both categories pass next season). He was also without question the Chargers best offensive player last season outside Herbert, posting 1,243 receiving yards and 7 touchdowns on 108 catches. With Mike Williams out and Austin Ekeler and rookie WR Quentin Johnston underperforming, Allen was routinely the only real weapon Herbert could go to. Opposing defenses knew that too, yet Allen posted stellar performances anyway.

Heading into the 2024 season, Allen is in the last year of his deal and will carry a cap charge of $34.7 million ($18.1 million in base salary, plus a $5 million roster bonus due this year, plus a prorated signing bonus hit of just over $11.6 million). That’s too high to just leave alone. But the Chargers can easily knock Allen’s cap number down by extending him, which his legacy with the franchise and 2023 performance absolutely warrant. Allen has also expressed interest in finishing his career with the Bolts, so there’s mutual benefit to making the relationship last.

That said, the Chargers will need to be smart in how they go about Allen’s extension. He’s going to turn 32 in April and has some injury history, though it’s typically over-stated (Allen has missed just 13 games in the last 7 years, four of which came after Herbert was shut down for the 2023 season). The Chargers should look to extend Allen without going deep into the future and without pushing huge cap hits into the future that don’t make sense as Allen eventually starts to decline.

I won’t go through a full-blown contract for Allen, but I want to walk through what an extension could look like and how it saves the Chargers cap space for 2024.

Allen is slated to make $23.1 million this coming year in base salary and roster bonus (remember, his signing bonus charge of $11.6 million is just on paper since he’s already been paid that money). Any possible extension would likely have to pay him at least that much in guarantees and probably more.

Allen’s latest contract paid him an average of just over $20 million per season, the 10th highest average annual value (AAV) for a WR in the league. He’s likely to make less than that annually given his age, and recent contracts handed out to receivers over age 30 suggest he might be looking at an AAV of closer to $12-15 million (Spotrac lists receiver contracts, and the closest comps to Allen are Odell Beckham, who signed a 1-year, $15 million deal last year, and DeAndre Hopkins, who signed a 2-year deal with an AAV of $13 million). Thus, it’s fair to estimate that Allen could receive a contract extension with an AAV of at least $15 million per year, but probably for more years than Beckham and Hopkins given he’s been more productive recently and is under contract for this season, which increases his negotiation leverage.

The Chargers could make both sides pretty happy by giving Allen a 3-year deal worth $48 million ($16 million AAV) with guarantees to make it likely Allen gets paid in 2025. There are tons of ways this kind of contract could look, so I’ll just pick what I think could be workable for both sides—a 3 year contract, with a total value of $48 million that includes a substantial $24 million signing bonus and a injury-guaranteed salary in 2025. The salary break-down and cap hits for each year could look like the below:

Prorated bonuses calculated using Overthecap

This contract would give the Chargers over $13.8 million in cap savings for 2024, give Allen $24 million as an up front (increasing his 2024 pay slightly), ensure that Allen stays on the roster in 2025 assuming health, and give the Chargers a way to either keep Allen in 2026 at a reason cap number or move on from him as he hits his mid-thirties.

There’s no question in my mind that the Bolts will do an extension with Allen to get some of these savings, although the exact terms (how much signing bonus, guaranteed dollars, base salary apportionment, and number of years) could change based on the free agency market for receivers, what the two sides negotiate, and what else the Chargers do with their other large cap hit players (Mack, Bosa, and Williams).

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $13.8 million (TBD)

Eric Kendricks. Kendricks joined the Chargers last year as a free agent. He is a solid player and he was without question a stabilizing presence amongst the Chargers linebackers this past year—exactly why he was brought in. He seemed to be the only linebacker on the team who could consistently get to his spots and make tackles (Kenneth Murray struggled next to him in the starting lineup, again).

But going into his tenth year, there are obvious concerns with Kendricks’ age and athleticism. His pass defense has taken a step back with age; he’s not fast enough to stick with receiving tight ends and running backs in man coverage and he was over-stretched at times in zone coverages. Kendricks’ strength as a run defender were worth the trade-off last year, but the Chargers ought to assume that Kendricks’ play will continue to drop at least some next season.

Most importantly for our purposes, Kendricks has too high of a cap number for an aging interior linebacker so he’s a natural candidate for release. Kendricks carries a 2024 cap charge of $9.25 million, and he’s set to make $6.5 million in base salary and roster bonus next season—by cutting him, the Chargers would save that money.

While they’re a bit thin at linebacker, the Chargers do have two younger linebackers in Nick Niemann (26) and Daiyan Henley (24, a third round pick in 2023) who have cap numbers of just $3.3 million combined. Although Niemann and Henley lack the same experience and probably won’t hold up as well as run defenders, they’re both better in coverage, they both bring more athleticism to the position, and they both played reasonably well last year when called upon. Given Kendricks’ age and limitations in coverage, it’s not obvious Kendricks will outplay Niemann and Henley by enough next season to justify the added salary expense. Plus, the Chargers can always look to the draft to add linebackers if needed—in fact, there are a few former Michigan linebackers that will be in the draft this year, presumably Harbaugh and defensive coordinator Jesse Minter (who both coached at Michigan last year) will be familiar with them.

Assuming the Chargers cut Kendricks, they would ultimately end up saving about $5.7 million against the cap in 2024, net—although cutting Kendricks shaves $6.5 million in salary and roster bonus, the Chargers would still have to fill the roster slot.

The team could alternatively try to extend Kendricks for a year (any longer wouldn’t make sense given his age). I think that route is less likely given there are typically inexpensive linebacker options available in free agency. But it would be plausible if Kendricks would agree to take a meaningful pay cut. A two year contract with a minimum base salary in 2024 (about $1.2 million) and $2.5 million in signing bonus would bring his 2024 cap number down to about $5.2 million—about $4 million in savings (obviously if he’s paid more, the potential cap savings go down).

Ultimately, I think cutting Kendricks is most likely for the larger savings and on account of his age, but if the Chargers want to keep him they can probably find a way to do so.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $5.7 million

This Is Where Things Get Hard

For those of you keeping score, if the Chargers make all the moves that I assumed above, they’ll only shave about $44.6 million off of their 2024 salary cap:

• $3.9 million from restructuring Justin Herbert’s contract

• $10.7 million from Corey Linsley retiring

• $7.7 million from simple restructures for Derwin James

• $2.6 million from simple restructures for Trey Pipkins

• $13.8 million from extending Keenan Allen through 2026

• $5.7 million from cutting Eric Kendricks

But remember, we’re aiming to get to over $69.3 million in salary cuts—we’ve still got at least another $24.9 million to go (more if the Chargers want to sign anybody for more than the minimum in free agency).

That said, there are three big roster questions that remain regarding star players Mike Williams, Khalil Mack, and Joey Bosa.

The Chargers have to do something about the cap numbers for at least two of these three players, if not all three, to get to under the cap—there’s no real way around it. But what they actually will do depends on several factors:

How healthy are Williams and Bosa? Is there a trade market for any big names on the roster like Mack, Bosa, or Williams? What positions will the Bolts target on draft day? Are Williams or Mack willing to take a step-back in salary? [Spoiler: nope, keep dreaming]

I can’t answer all of those questions here (or at all in some cases, though a future post will focus on draft strategy). Instead, I’ll go through what I think are reasonable paths forward for each of the three players given what we know today.

Mike Williams. Let’s at Mike Williams, one of the most up and down players on the Chargers’ roster.

Williams is 29 (he’ll turn 30 during the first half of the 2024 season) and coming off an ACL tear in week three of last year. When healthy, he’s one of the best jump-ball receivers in the NFL and he’s been a much-needed alternate weapon for Herbert aside from Keenan Allen. Yet Williams’ overall production has never quite lived up to the potential the Chargers saw when drafting him #7 overall in 2017. Although he’s scored lots of touchdowns, in seven seasons with the team Williams has cleared 1,000 yards just twice, caught more than 50 balls just twice, and has suffered his fair share of injuries. Williams’ inconsistent production and injuries, in part, are why the Chargers drafted Quentin Johnston last year, who boasts similar size and more athleticism (though not the catching ability).

Williams is also in the last year of his contract, and he’s slated to make $20 million this year ($17 million in base salary and $3 million in non-guaranteed roster bonus). That would be fine for a good wide receiver like Williams, but his cap charge is actually far bigger, sitting at $32.46 million for 2024. That cap figure is simply not tenable for a guy coming off an ACL tear who isn’t an All Pro level player.

The Chargers have three options for Williams: cut him, trade him, or extend him (they can’t do a simple restructure of his contract since he’s already in the last year of his deal).

If the Chargers cut Williams, they will save $19.2 million against the 2024 cap (his 2024 compensation minus salary to sign a replacement player for the roster). They would be left with a dead cap hit of about $12.5 million. It’s a clean solution, but it would leave the Bolts with a receiver corps of Allen, Johnston, Josh Palmer, and Derius Davis (unless they draft a WR—for a later post!). That said, that’s basically the same group the Chargers had last year, and the passing game wasn’t really the issue last year. Plus, the Chargers can at least hope for growth from Johnston and Davis, who were both rookies last season.

Trading Williams would net similar savings, offset by whatever the Chargers would have to pay to any players or draft picks they get back in return. But the trade market for Williams isn’t likely to be super robust given his up-and-down production, recent ACL tear, and the possibility the Chargers might cut him.

Extending Williams is possible but would result in lower cap savings. A market contract for Williams would be affected by the same factors as his potential trade market, so he’s probably looking at a deal that is worth somewhere between $8-12 million per year (significantly less than Allen, who is better, healthier, and more historically important to the franchise).

If the Chargers extend Williams through the 2025 season (two years overall), they could offer a reasonable though above market deal that Williams might be willing to take in order to bring down his 2024 cap number and mitigate the team’s long-term risk. Here’s a sample deal for two years at a $15 million AAV, with $17 million in signing bonus, to entice Williams into signing:

Prorated bonuses calculated using Overthecap

With the above contract, the Chargers would save $10 million against the 2024 salary cap. The team would have the option to cut Williams in 2025 if he doesn’t return to form with a reasonable dead cap hit of just $8.75 million. For his part, Williams would get a substantial signing bonus and higher annual pay than he’s unlikely to get from another team, but he’d also have the risk of a short term deal—the Chargers could cut him if Williams doesn’t play well or stay healthy and save about $2.8 million in 2025.

Williams could easily insist on a 3-year deal to avoid the chance that the Chargers cut him in 2025. If he does, the Chargers are probably going to knock down the per-year value of the deal. Here’s a possible deal with a lower $12 million AAV and the same $17 million signing bonus:

Prorated bonuses calculated using Overthecap

This sort of deal would be better for Williams as it would be pretty likely the Chargers keep him on the roster through 2025 (they wouldn’t save money by cutting him at all, so they probably wouldn’t)—I don’t think the Chargers would give an injury guarantee for 2025 since Williams has a long history of big injuries. Still, more likely than not, Williams would be pretty likely to get at least $27 million under this structure. It would also still help the Chargers with their 2024 salary cap situation, as they’d save about $12.8 million against the cap. The bigger risk for the Chargers would be that they have less flexibility to get off of Williams’ contract before the 2025 season if he doesn’t return to form coming off the ACL tear, a real concern.

In sum, I see three reasonable options with different risks:

1. Cut (or trade) Williams and save up to $19.2 million in 2024 cap space;

2. Extend Williams through 2025 and save ~$10.2 million in 2024 cap space;

3. Extend Williams through 2026 and save ~$12.8 million in 2024 cap space.

Personally, I lean toward option 1, as I think extending Williams gets too risky and could muck up the Chargers’ cap situation in 2025 and 2026. On top of that, Williams is coming off a major injury, has a long injury history, and extending him and Allen is probably too much to spend on aging receivers. Cutting Williams also gives the Chargers a lot of wiggle room to deal with Mack and Bosa, both of whom I’d rather keep than Williams. I’ll go into why below, but Mack and Bosa play a more valuable position (edge rusher). Plus, Mack is more reliable (and productive) than Williams and Bosa has a much higher ceiling when healthy. I’ll admit that there have been (faint) whispers that the Chargers could trade Bosa or Mack, which could change the calculus, but for now I am going to assume the Chargers don’t deal either one.

For purposes of this analysis, I’ll assume the Chargers cut Williams. If they keep him, I suspect a three year contract is a little more likely than a two year deal, and the Chargers would save about so the Chargers would save about $6.4 million less against the 2024 cap.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $19.2 million (TBD)

Khalil Mack. What to do with Khalil Mack gets really interesting. Mack is a stud—he was the Chargers best defensive player last year by a wide margin. Mack played over 80% of the Chargers defensive snaps over all 17 games and posted truly remarkable stats for a 32 year old player: 74 tackles, 17 sacks (4th in the NFL), 36 quarterback pressures, 5 forced fumbles, 10 passes defended per Pro Football Reference. He also scored really well by some advanced metrics. For example Pro Football Focus graded him at a 91.8 for the year, with a 90.8 run defense grade and 86.3 pass rush grade. That matches what you see watching Chargers games from last year; Mack consistently made good plays and he was also one of the few guys on defense that made splash plays for the Bolts. He’s also an iron-man who has never missed a game since joining the Chargers in 2022 (he’s only missed 12 games in 10 years, which is INSANE!).

On the flip side, Mack is about to turn 33 years old and he’s in the last year of his deal. He carries a 2024 salary cap number of over $38.5 million, the highest of any defensive lineman in the NFL (Joey Bosa is a close second at $36.6 million while Aaron Donald and TJ Watt the only other defensive lineman over $30 million). It’s also possible that last year was an outlier—Mack posted nine or fewer sacks in each of the four seasons from 2019 to 2022 and his PFF grade jumped up to 91.8 this year from 71.1 in 2022 and 73.0 in 2021 (though those are admittedly his worst career seasons per PFF).

I’m inclined to think that even though Mack’s statistical production probably won’t reach the same heights in 2024, he will still be a premium defensive player next year. But that won’t change the fact that the Chargers need to do something about his contract.

Like Mike Williams, Mack is heading into the last year of his deal, so the same basic options are on the table: cut him, trade him, or extend him.

Cutting Mack outright seems like the wrong move. While it would save the Chargers about $22.5 million against the 2024 salary cap after filling Mack’s roster spot, they really have no replacement for his high-end talent and consistent availability. Tuli Tuipulotu came on strong as a rookie last year, but he and Bosa (whose availability is always an issue) are the only other solid pass rush options on the team. That could change if the Chargers use an early draft pick on a pass rusher, but there are other roster needs.

Trading Mack is a possibility if the Chargers can get a good enough return, though it’s hard to gauge exactly what the team could get back for him in a deal. The Chargers traded a second round and a sixth round pick for Mack two years ago, and while he was coming off of foot surgery when the Chargers traded for him and has been healthy since, that was still two years ago and Mack wasn’t coming up on free agent at the time. If the Chargers can get back good draft capital for Mack (better than third round pick value), or if Mack wants to leave, then trading him probably makes sense. Otherwise, I’d rather try to keep him on the team. Even if Mack isn’t among the league’s absolute best pass rushers, he’s still a very good player that can defend the run and pass rush.

The other option is to give Mack an extension, a tricky exercise given his age. At some point you can assume that Mack’s going to hit a wall—perhaps without warning—so the Chargers will have to structure the contract with ways out, much as we did for Keenan Allen earlier. Mack, for his part, will probably want to ensure that he still gets paid and has some long-term security.

As with Allen, a deal running three total years would be ideal if Mack will agree to it, but Mack is probably going to command a big price tag regardless. Outside of quarterbacks, edge rushers tend to be the highest paid players in the league, as evidenced by the fact that Mack is set to make over $23 million this season. A new deal would probably have to clear that in guarantees and include the possibility of upside for Mack.

The closest comp for a new Mack contract is Von Miller’s 2022 contract with the Bills, but it’s also a cautionary tale and may ultimately be one of a kind. There’s no doubt Khalil Mack’s agent will point to Miller’s deal as a starting point. Miller is two years older than Mack, but has a slightly better career resume—Miller’s Super Bowl performance with the Broncos probably means he’s eventually headed to the Hall of Fame. At age 33 (the same age Mack is now), Miller signed a six year deal with the Bills for $120 million total ($20 million AAV), including about $51.5 million in salary guaranteed money. Unfortunately for the Bills and Miller, things have gone pretty poorly since; Miller has played in just 23 games in two years with Buffalo and he didn’t register a single sack this year. The Bills would presumably like to move on from Miller before 2024 given his lack of performance, but they can’t. Cutting Miller would leave the Bills with a 2024 dead cap hit of over $32 million dollars, so they’re going to end up paying him handsomely to potentially do nothing this year.

Cameron Jordan’s contract with the Saints is an alternative comp that the Chargers can point to. Before the start of last season, Jordan was heading into the last year of his deal and had just turned 34. He signed an extension with the Saints before last season to carry his contract through the 2025 season for $27.5 million (AAV of $13.5 million). The extension netted Jordan more than $25 million in practical guarantees, and he can make another $12.5 million in salary in 2025 if the Saints keep him all the way through the life of the deal. Jordan was a year older than Mack is now when he signed the extension, and he had been a little less productive as a player than Miller or Mack to that point. But like with Mack and the Chargers, the Saints wanted to bring back Jordan and get significant salary cap relief, so the situations are definitely similar.

An extension for Mack should probably fall closer to Jordan’s contract than Miller’s in terms of number of years for it to make sense for the Chargers—they don’t want to end up in a situation like the Bills. But because Mack is a little younger and a bit more productive, in order to keep the kind of flexibility the Saints got with Jordan, the Chargers will likely have to pay Mack handsomely for 2024 and 2025. They could do so with a two year extension (three years overall) that offers Mack a total of $54 million ($18 million AAV) with a $20 million signing bonus, and guarantees of $40 million in total, is probably enough to get a deal done. Here’s how it could look for the Chargers cap sheet:

Prorated bonuses calculated using Overthecap

This kind of deal makes sense for Mack because it secures him at least $40 million (substantially more than Cam Jordan got in a similar situation last season) and the possibility of playing through 2026, his age 35 season, at a good salary. It’s not the Von Miller deal obviously, but I don’t think anything close to a six year deal would be on the table for Mack given how Miller’s deal has worked out. Plus, Mack would still be getting paid an AAV of $20 million in 2024 and 2025, the same as Miller and still among the top 15 edge rushers in the league even though he probably won’t hit that level of performance regularly.

The Chargers, meanwhile, would get about $15.3 million in 2024 salary cap relief and keep a consistent, starting caliber defensive end on the roster for a couple more seasons while they position themselves for the future. They will have to absorb the risk of Mack deteriorating in 2025, but hopefully the full effects of Herbert’s contract won’t have kicked in by then. The team would still be able to move on from Mack in 2026 and only eat about $6.7 million in dead cap.

This deal for Mack would be pretty hefty—it’s a more favorable extension than the one proposed for Keenan Allen earlier. But it’s reasonable and would be closer to what Mack might get in the open market, given the league-wide premium for pass rushers.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $15.3 million

Joey Bosa. If you’re paying close attention, you’ll notice that by cutting Williams and extending Mack, we created another $34.5 million in cap relief—almost $10 million more than the $24.9 million I said was needed to fix the cap situation.

That’s great! In theory, it means the Chargers could keep Eric Kendricks, extend Mike Williams, or sign above-the-minimum free agents without even touching Joey Bosa’s contract.

But more flexibility is still good so the Chargers ought to think about what to do with Bosa’s contract anyway.

Let’s start with the fundamentals of Bosa’s deal. Bosa (29) is in the second to last year of a five year, $135 million extension he signed in 2020 (AAV $27 million for the extension, $24.9 million for all six years). At the time, it was a record deal for a defensive end that included $102 million in guarantees ($78 million fully guaranteed at signing).

Bosa has made two Pro Bowls since signing the extension, but unfortunately he’s suffered a lot of injuries that have really eaten into his value. In the last four seasons, Bosa has missed 25 of 67 possible games, over 37%. Bosa’s snap share in the games he has played has also dropped substantially in the last two seasons, as was only on the field for 54% and 51% of the Chargers defensive snaps in 2022 and 2023 respectively. But he’s been a solid player when on the field. He has 27 sacks in 42 games played since 2020, he’s posted solid pass rush grades of 90.5, 90.3, 84.2, and 80.3 from 2020-2023 according to PFF, and his pass rush win rate outpaces Khalil Mack. But at the end of the day, Bosa’s lack of availability is a giant problem given how much the Chargers have invested in him.

Consistent with his big contract, Bosa’s cap charges for 2024 and 2025 are going to be big, about $36.6 million and $33.0 million respectively, though he will actually get paid less than that. Because he’s got time left on his deal, the Chargers have more options with Bosa than they do for Khalil Mack and Mike Williams—on top of the cut/trade/extend options, they can also perform simple restructures.

Bosa’s contract doesn’t have any guaranteed money left, so cutting him now would allow the Chargers to get out of paying him $22 million this year and $25.4 million next year. But because he’s got two total years left on the deal, cutting him would only save the Chargers over $14.3 million against this year’s cap (they would incur about $22.2 million in dead cap charges for 2024). If Bosa can’t stay on the field, that money would be useful in finding another edge rusher, but it’s probably not enough to find anyone remotely close to Bosa’s talent level. The Chargers would also be completely giving up on their highest drafted player this decade during his theoretical prime. If Bosa ends up staying healthy on another team, it would be a tough pill to swallow.

The team could also try to trade Bosa, but it’s not clear what he would fetch on the trade market. Before last season, ESPN’s Bill Barnwell argued that Bosa was worth “one first-round pick and change” in value. That would be nice, but another injury-riddled season has probably dropped his value below that, though it’s possible Bosa could net a first round pick given how many teams need pass rushers.

If the Chargers can deal Bosa for a first round pick, they have to seriously consider doing it. I’ll talk about this more in a future post, but they ought to be looking at edge rushers in the second or third round anyway depending on who is available, and having another first round pick would make filling the hole much easier. A combination of Mack, Tuli Tuipulotu, and first-round edge talent would be a solid pass rush group, and the Chargers hopefully could avoid having one of their best pass rushers miss a huge chunk of games. Plus, trading Bosa would also net the Chargers more than $14.3 million in cap space (the same as if they cut him), minus the eventual salary of whatever draft pick they get back.

The Chargers could also perform simple restructures of Bosa’s contract for 2024. The Chargers could convert up to $13.79 million of Joey Bosa’s base salary and all $7 million of his roster bonus for 2024 into “restructuring” bonus, which would drop the 2024 cap charge for Bosa down to under $26.3 million from it’s current level of over $36.6 million—about $10.4 million in 2024 cap savings. That’s good for 2024, but the cost would be pushing that money into the Charger’s 2025 salary cap. As things stand with Bosa’s contract now, the Chargers can keep him 2024 and cut him before 2025 if he doesn’t perform to get over $25 million in 2025 cap savings, with a dead cap hit of about $7.6 million. Doing a simple restructure would change that—if the Chargers need to cut Bosa before the 2025 season (e.g., he plays poorly or gets hurt again in 2024), they’d only be able to save about $15 million in 2025 and take a dead cap hit of about $18 million.

Extending Bosa with actual additional years on the contract doesn’t make sense this off-season given his injury history. If Bosa can stay healthy and produce in 2024, there’s plenty of time to re-sign him before his contract expires after the following year (the Chargers could also always use a franchise tag if they needed to). The Chargers could try to get Bosa to agree to a “faux extension” that either adds years he’s unlikely to play, but it’s not clear why Bosa would agree to that without getting more money, which the Chargers probably won’t be willing to pay. Alternatively, the Chargers could try to add void years to the end of his current deal, but that could present similar problems and regardless wouldn’t do much more than simple restructures would.

In all, I think trading Bosa for a first round pick is probably the most financially sensible move for the Chargers. If that kind of value doesn’t materialize, though, the team is probably best off by keeping Bosa and not touching his contract unless they have specific free agency targets in mind. If they want to create another $10.4 million in cap space using simple restructures to sign a quality free agent, I would be fine with it.

Because the Chargers brought in a new coaching staff and front office this off-season, there’s a decent chance they will want to get at least some free agents they identify. So I am going to assume they do the simple restructure and save $10.4 million against the 2024 salary cap.

Estimated potential 2024 cap savings: $10.4 million

The Net Result: Under the 2024 Cap, and No Insurmountable Future Contracts

If the Chargers do all the moves above, they’re going to have some reasonable financial flexibility this off-season—enough to sign a key free agent or two, potentially including players that were on the roster last season like safety Alohi Gilman, tight end Gerald Everett, or running back Austin Ekeler.

Added together, we freed up about $89.3 million in salary for 2024 with the below moves:

• Simple restructure for Justin Herbert - $3.9 million

• Corey Linsley retiring - $10.7 million

• Simple restructure for Derwin James - $7.7 million

• Simple restructure for Trey Pipkins - $2.6 million

• Extension for Keenan Allen (through 2026) - $13.8 million

• Cutting Eric Kendricks - $5.7 million

• Cutting Mike Williams - $19.2 million

• Extension for Khalil Mack (through 2026) - $15.3 million

• Simple restructure for Joey Bosa - $10.4 million

These moves would put the Chargers under the 2024 salary cap, allow them to sign their 2024 draft picks, preserve about $10 million for roster management and backfilling injuries, and leave about $20 million left over to shop around in free agency. That’s not a ton of wiggle room, but it’s enough to re-tool for 2024.

At the same time, making the roster decisions above would affect the Chargers salary cap in 2025 and 2026. They need to be mindful of how Justin Herbert’s extension will start to impact those years, and on top of Herbert’s increasingly expensive contract, potential extensions for Rashawn Slater and Asante Samuel will inevitably require more strategizing from the front office.

That said, most of these moves aren’t too harmful to the team’s cap in 2025 and 2026. The simple restructures push over $20 million onto the cap sheet for 2025, while the extensions for Allen and Mack would add another $45 million to the 2025 cap sheet. But the Chargers only have about $148 million in salary on the books for 2025 right now anyway, so they can absorb those hits and still have wiggle room under the cap, especially since the 2025 cap will likely be higher than 2024 anyway. In addition, the Allen and Mack extensions would also add about $40 million to the Chargers cap for 2026, but the Chargers only have eight contracts that run out that far anyway (Herbert, Derwin James, and rookies from last season) and both Allen’s and Mack’s extensions would probably be structured to give the Chargers a way out if the need it.

So we fixed the 2024 cap!

In a future post, I’m going to write about how these kinds of decisions affect the Chargers draft strategy for 2024. So stay tuned!

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 4): Trade Targets!

[This is part four of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline. In part one, I looked at the areas on the floor that the Kings should be trying to improve, specifically defense and efficient, reliable offense when Fox sits. In part two, I wrote about what the Kings can send out in potential trades and how the NBA’s rules governing player- and draft-pick trades affect what the Kings can offer. Part three covered the Kings’ roster construction needs, diving deep into future contracts the Kings will want to offer to De’Aaron Fox, Malik Monk, and Keegan Murray, as well as reviewing what on-court roles the Kings will look to fill ahead of the deadline.]

We’re finally here at the most exciting part of the post—who are the potential trade targets for the Kings ahead of the trade deadline and does it make sense to go after them?

There are obviously a lot of rumors about potential trades that make the rounds this time of year. I’m not going to weigh in on how true those rumors are or which players are truly on the trade block. Shams, Woj, and dozens of other reporters (shout out to Sam Amick for reporting on the Kings) will give the best intel on that. But I will look at players that have frequently come up in reporting or the rumor mill that may be of interest to the Kings. For each player, I’ll try to talk about the player’s talents, how they would fit on the Kings, what the Kings would sacrifice by making a deal, and whether I think a deal makes sense.

I’m going to organize this summary by team since there are a number of teams that are could be sellers at the deadline. The Bulls, Hornets, Raptors, Blazers, and Wizards all come to mind as obvious candidates—I cover all of them and more below. Other teams might consider one-off deals that make sense, even if they’re not full-on “sellers,” so I’ll look at those possibilities individually (plus Detroit, which only has one trade candidate that should even draw remote interest from the Kings in my view).

Just so folks know how this is organized, I cover the following players in the below order. The order is just how I started writing things, so don’t think too hard about how it doesn’t make sense, I concede that’s true.

• Chicago Bulls

  • Zach Lavine

  • Alex Caruso

• Atlanta Hawks

  • Dejounte Murray

  • De’Andre Hunter / Saddiq Bey / Bogdan Bogdanovic

    • [I combined these three for convenience]

• Utah Jazz

  • Lauri Markkanen

  • John Collins

  • Kris Dunn

• Brooklyn Nets

  • Mikal Bridges / Cam Johnson

    • [I combined these two because, realistically, the Nets aren’t going to deal them anyway]

  • Dorian Finney-Smith

  • Royce O’Neal / Lonnie Walker IV / Spencer Dinwiddie / Nic Claxton

    • [I combined these guys for convenience. Even though they’re different styles of players, the thinking is comparable.]

• Portland Trailblazers

  • Jerami Grant

  • Malcolm Brogdon

  • Matisse Thybulle

• Washington Wizards

  • Kyle Kuzma

  • Tyus Jones

• Charlotte Hornets

  • Miles Bridges

  • PJ Washington

• Toronto Raptors

  • Gary Trent Jr.

  • Bruce Brown

• Miscellaneous

  • Naji Marshall

  • Bojan Bogdanovic (Detroit version—how’d we get two Bogdanovic’s?)

  • Andrew Wiggins

Let me know in the comments if there are other players you want me to look at, or if there’s other details you want to know about any of these prospective deals.

Bulls Trade Targets

The Bulls are sitting in 9th in the East but their roster is way too old and way too expensive for the production they’re getting. It feels like they’ve stagnated over the last couple years without Lonzo Ball. One of their best players, Demar Derozan, is about to hit free agency and their highest recent draft pick, Pat Williams, is about to get a pay bump as a restricted free agent (even though his on-court production hasn’t been anything to write home about). This team should be looking to re-tool, but what they’re going to look for in doing so is harder to predict.

Zach Lavine

As most basketball fans know already, the Bulls are trying their best to ship Zach Lavine to anyone who will take him, but they still want to get at least something of value back.

Only 28 years old, Lavine is still a high-level scorer who can create for himself and knock down shots, but there are lots of questions about what else he brings to the table.

Lavine’s numbers have historically looked pretty good. During the five seasons from 2018 to 2023, Lavine scored more than 23.5 points per game each year, always shooting above 45% from the field and over 37% from three, and put up 4.0+ assists and 4.5+ rebounds per game, all while playing heavy minutes (34.5+ minutes per game). Those are impressive numbers, and proved out that Lavine is capable of generating quality offense with relative efficiency.

Lavine also has a good combination of size (he’s 6’5”), length, and athleticism, which allows him to create space against most defenders and get to the rim when he wants to attack. He pairs these skills with solid ball-handling and strong perimeter shooting. He doesn’t need a lot of help to get quality offense, as he largely lives off of a strong pull up game these days. But he can also run pick and rolls when he needs to, with decent efficiency—Lavine runs about 6.2 pick and rolls per game this year, which generate about 0.94 points per possession, a tick down from 8.1 pick and rolls per game and 0.93 points per possession last season.

Lavine has always had a “score first” game, so he’s never excelled at creating offense for others. He’s not a black hole on offense at all, but he’s not always quick to move off the ball—for example, at 42.5 passes per game, he’s moving the ball at about the same rate as Tyler Herro. This could make for a bit of an awkward pairing with the Kings style and De’Aaron Fox in particular, who is also a score-first guard (though a better overall distributor than Lavine). There’s only so much room for players with a score-first approach in Kings’ line-ups, as they rely heavily on ball movement. That said, issue can be can be mitigated by staggering when Lavine and Fox are on the court, especially since generating offense when Fox sits is one of the things the Kings need to improve (as I wrote about in part one of this series). [Just as a quick aside—staggering minutes isn’t always the “best” use of players. Staggering minutes is nice, but it also generally means that the team’s ceiling is lower since the best players aren’t functioning perfectly together in late-game situations, especially in the playoffs.]

In addition, Lavine’s strong shooting and ability to get up efficient shots could work nicely when the Kings run their offense through Domantas Sabonis, which they often do in non-Fox minutes. Lavine is an expert shooter with the ability to pull up from all over the court, so having him work off of Sabonis—who creates tons of space for shooters with dribble hand-offs and screens—could work wonderfully. Adding Lavine would also let the Kings to keep at least one elite scorer on the floor with Sabonis at all times. Monk, and to a lesser extent Kevin Huerter, fill that role now, yet there’s no doubt that Lavine packs more of an offensive punch.

Still, there are glaring questions that come with Lavine.

Health has been an issue for Lavine throughout his career. Now in his tenth season, Lavine has played 65+ games just four times, and over halfway through this season, Lavine has only played in just 25 games.

Lavine has also never been part of a winning NBA team, raising questions about whether his game contributes to winning. He’s been on just one team with a .500 record or better in his NBA career, despite the Bulls attempting to build a championship contender around him. Of course it isn’t fair to put this on Lavine alone, and it doesn’t detract from his skill as a player, but it does raise red flags.

One of the reasons Lavine’s teams have struggled to win is that Lavine has never been a strong defender himself, despite having the physical tools to be one. That’s obviously an acute concern for a Kings team that desperately needs help defensively. Given Lavine’s offensive talent, his defensive limitations aren’t fatal. Plus, just because Lavine isn’t great defensively doesn’t make him a complete zero. In fact, several advanced metrics paint Lavine as just slightly below average on defense, which is probably sufficient. For example, Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus, which estimates the points per 100 possessions a player contributes above league average, rates Lavine is at -0.5 this year and -0.7 last year, while Dunks and Threes Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, a similar stat, rates Lavine at 0.2 the last two years (a little above average defensively). With that said, Lavine has rarely (never?) been part of a good defensive teams. His effort defensively can come and go, and the defensive stats one might look at to see effort (like steals, blocks, and deflections) don’t stand out at all. There’s also a little bit of Rockets James Harden to his game defensively, where he appears to sometimes lose track of his assignment inexplicably.

The net result is that while Lavine would help the Kings offensively, they can’t expect him to bring much more to the table on defense beyond slightly improved rebounding.

Trading for Lavine would probably help the Kings this season, but Lavine’s injury history and limitations on defense make that a risky bet in a vacuum. There’s also no guarantee that adding would help in the playoffs. Lavine has no real prior playoff successes himself, and it’s not clear how much of a benefit he would provide overall when rotations start to tighten and teams buckle down. And if there are struggles playing him alongside Fox and Monk, whether because of overlapping offensive skillsets or defensive limitations, adding Lavine may not add as much to the team’s playoff ceiling.

We also haven’t talked about Lavine’s contract yet, which may be the poison pill that ultimately kills the possibility of the Kings trading for him.

Lavine signed a 5 year, $215 million contract in 2022 that pays him $40 million this year, $43 million in 2024-25, $46 million in 2025-26, and gives him a player option for $49 million in 2026-27. He’s pretty likely to pick up that player option, so he’s effectively got four years and almost $180 million left on his deal.

Lavine’s future salary would be high for any player, and if Lavine can’t stay healthy or help deliver playoff success, they’re completely absurd for a team like the Kings to trade for.

Take a look at the chart below showing the projected salaries for the Kings core plus Lavine, compared to the projected salary cap and luxury tax line.

[For simplicity, I’ve assumed Fox signs an extension for a max contract, not the super max he could become eligible for if he makes another All-NBA team this year or next. I’ve also assumed that Murray signs an extension with a starting salary of $30 million in 2026-27, but you could imagine the extension ranging from $25-40 million depending on how well he plays. Those estimated salaries are shown in green.]

As you can see from the chart, even before trading for Lavine, the Kings core of Fox, Sabonis, and Murray is going to get expensive. Combined, the trio will make over $85 million in 2024-25, over $93 million in 2025-26, and could top $129 million in 2026-27. If Fox makes another All NBA team this year or next, or if Murray continues to develop, they could easily push the trio’s combined salary to almost $150 million before adding Lavine or filling out the roster.

Adding Lavine’s salary would be tough even before extensions the Fox and Murray kick in, as it would push the combined salary for just four players (Lavine plus Fox/Sabonis/Murray) to $128.5 million in 2024-25 and $139.2 million in 2025-26. That’s inching close to the cap in both seasons, and would leave little room for the Kings to maneuver elsewhere. They’d be limited in re-signing players, signing free agents, or trading for new talent without pushing toward the luxury tax line.

The 2026-27 season is where things could get really ugly from a cap standpoint, as extensions for Fox and Murray would likely put the Kings over the cap with just Lavine + Fox/Sabonis/Murray. Filling out the rest of the roster would likely put the Kings into the luxury tax—though the tax aprons probably wouldn’t be a huge issue (the Kings would still have about $39 million under the projected first apron and about $52 million under the projected second apron to operate). The Kings could theoretically try to find ways out of the luxury tax at that point by moving off Lavine’s contract in the last year, but getting off contracts always comes with its own challenges. Teams are often happy to take on expiring contracts but they usually want something valuable stapled to it like a future draft pick, and that ask would be comparatively high to eat a salary over $40 million (the imposition of a higher salary floor in the 2023 CBA could change market dynamics on this, as teams might be more willing to absorb big expiring contracts).

On top of thinking through future cap issues, the Kings also need to think about how to match Lavine’s salary in a trade. Complying with the trade salary matching rules for a $40+ million contract is, almost by definition, expensive—especially for a Kings team whose only big salaries are for meaningful rotation players.

Lavine’s $40.1 million salary this year means the Kings would have to send out about $31.9 million or more in any potential deal. There is simply no way for the Kings to piece together that much salary for a trade without raiding their current rotation. To get to $31.9 million in outgoing salary, the Kings would have to trade at least two or three players at a minimum. That would most likely be Barnes ($17 million) and Huerter ($15.7 million), or one of those two plus some combination of Monk ($9.9 million), Lyles ($8 million), Vezenkov ($6.3 million), Mitchell ($5.1 million), and Duarte ($4.1 million). Dealing Huerter and Monk might make the most sense given their skillsets overlap with Lavine’s the most, but that would be quite painful in terms of depth. For that kind of outlay to make sense, the Kings would have to be absolutely convinced that Lavine will seriously outperform Monk. That’s certainly possible, but it’s not a guarantee by any means.

Taking on Lavine’s huge salary and sending out multiple rotation players is tough to swallow given Lavine’s injury history, lack of playoff success, defensive limitations, and imperfect fit with Fox. This simply isn’t the most natural roster fit for Lavine. On top of that, the Bulls, somewhat surprisingly seem to be asking for first round draft pick compensation back from any team that wants Lavine, which further complicates things. Nobody appears all that ready to dish out picks to get Lavine—the consensus around the league appears to be that the Bulls should probably be willing to give away picks just to get Lavine’s salary off their own books . . .

Verdict: Hard pass on Lavine. Lavine is a good player, but it is hard to envision a trade for him making sense for the Kings. The contract issues, health questions, lack of defensive impact, and lack of playoff success make the price too much to absorb.

Alex Caruso

Even though Lavine isn’t a good fit, Chicago does have another very attractive trade target for the Kings: Alex Caruso.

Caruso isn’t a big household name. He’s played in relative obscurity on a mediocre Bulls team for the last three seasons and at a glance, his numbers aren’t eye-catching. He averages 10.1 points, 3.5 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in just under 26 minutes per game. He is, however, relatively efficient offensively: he shoots 49.1% from the floor and 41.5% from three and he rarely gives the ball away.

But Caruso really shines on defense, and his impact on that end of the floor shows up all over the place. Caruso is averages 1.3 steals and 1.0 blocks per game, which are both stellar numbers for a 6’5” guard. He’s also top-10 in the NBA in Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus (10th) and Dunks and Threes’ Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus (8th). The Bulls, too, benefit enormously defensively with Caruso on the floor, as they give up about 5.5 fewer points per 100 possessions when he’s in the game according to PBP Stats.

Caruso’s impact defensively is obvious watching the Bulls play and it earned him All-Defensive NBA First Team honors last year. It’s also not new—he’s basically done the same thing his entire career, even dating back to his days at Texas A&M where he was on the All SEC Defensive team.

Caruso brings the kind of defensive presence the Kings are sorely missing on the perimeter. He’s big enough to take on guards that are too big and powerful for Fox or Monk to handle and agile enough to stick on guards that are too quick for Kevin Huerter. Caruso defending opposing guards would also free up Keegan Murray’s defensive responsibilities a bit. Murray is being asked to cover players like Steph Curry too often in the Kings’ current lineups, and while he typically does an admirable job, Murray is much better suited to guarding wings that he doesn’t need to chase as much.

At the same time, Caruso brings enough on offense that he would fit well with the Kings’ core. He shoots well enough from deep to maintain spacing (averaging 37.6% from three for his career), he moves well without the ball, and he’s a willing cutter, which plays well with Sabonis.

Caruso is basically a plug-and-play add that would raise the Kings’ floor defensively instantly.

The only real downsides to trading for Caruso are his age and the cost to get him. Caruso will turn 30 next month, so he’s probably in the back half of his defensive prime, though still young enough that it shouldn’t be a major concern. He also is an ideal fit for lots of playoff teams that could use a perimeter defender of his caliber. The Bucks, Sixers, Pacers, Nuggets, Suns, and Mavs would all benefit tremendously from adding a player like Caruso. Many of those teams have little to offer the Bulls in a trade, but it’s enough of a market that any deal for Caruso isn’t going to come cheaply. The Bulls haven’t shown a lot of interest in dealing Caruso to date, but given their current roster situation, it’s hard to see why they wouldn’t deal him for a solid offer.

Despite Caruso’s age and a potentially hot market, the Kings would be wise to consider giving up meaningful future draft capital to get him. He would give the Kings enough juice on the defensive perimeter to meaningfully improve their overall prospects, even if he doesn’t provide a ton offensively. Being able to roll out line-ups with two strong perimeter defenders would go a long way to improving the Kings defense generally, hopefully with an effect similar to what the Knicks got after adding an elite perimeter defender in OG Anounoby (though less dramatic). Getting Caruso shouldn’t be nearly as expensive as prying Anounoby away from the Raptors was, and Caruso’s $9-10 million salary over this year and next is a bargain compared to the $30+ million that Anounoby is likely to receive. It’s also easier than trying to add rim protection alongside Sabonis, which could really compromise the Kings’ offense.

The Kings could potentially get Caruso with just a small outgoing salary like Davion Mitchell’s ($5.1 million) plus future draft picks. That would give the Kings flexibility to play stronger defensive line-ups with Caruso, but keep the option to bring more offensive firepower off the bench with Huerter and Monk. Alternatively, the Kings could send Huerter ($15.7 million) to Chicago for Caruso and a smaller, expendable contract like Andre Drummond’s ($3.4 million). That would cost the Kings a bit more in terms of offensive firepower, but it might mitigate the amount of future draft capital that the Kings would need to send out. The Bulls could use shooting (they rank 20th in three point percentage), and Huerter is still young and has a favorable contract for the next three seasons.

There’s also a funky (and far-fetched) alternative the Kings could offer if the Bulls want to get off of Lonzo Ball, who hasn’t played a game since January 2022 due to a career threatening knee injury. Ball just got cleared to run this month, and it’s possible he will never play again—yet he is on the books for $20.5 million this year and has a player option for $21.4 million next season that he is assuredly going to exercise. The Bulls have paid Ball to not play for two years and could be looking at another one (the Bulls could try to stretch Ball’s salary to save themselves the salary cap hit, but they’re still paying for no on court production if they do). The Kings could send Huerter ($15.7 million) + Mitchell ($5.1 million) + Duarte ($4.1 million) and a future first to the Bulls in exchange for Caruso ($9.5 million) and Ball ($20.5 million). There’s risk to the Kings here, as they’d be sending out Huerter and a pick, plus absorbing a year of Ball’s contract, but the deal could work out well for the Kings if Ball can return to playing (he’s a good distributor, shooter, and defender when he plays) and the down-side of carrying Ball’s $21.4 million contract next season is palatable for the Kings, since it would end before extensions for Fox and Murray kick in. Meanwhile the Bulls would get shooting they need on a movable contract in Huerter, plus free looks at Mitchell and Duarte.

Verdict: This is the guy this trade season the Kings should want (given we couldn’t get a deal done for OG)! I really like the idea of the Kings trading for Caruso, so long as they don’t have to sell the farm in terms of draft picks to get him (giving up multiple first rounders gets to be too pricey without big protections on the picks). Obviously, the Kings can’t overpay dramatically—but giving up a little more than Caruso’s actually worth because of his limited offense is still fine given his defensive prowess. He’s a clear floor raiser that could hopefully transform the team’s identity on defense from middling to hounding, and adding him would let Fox and Murray guard guys they’re more naturally suited to. The Kings are right to bet on their core, but adding Caruso is the type of incremental move that can actually enable that growth to happen smoothly.

Hawks Trade Targets

The Hawks are in a weird spot. They’re hanging on by a thread to a spot in the play in at 10th in the East, but this season has largely been forgettable. They’re certainly not as good as they envisioned when they gave up three first round picks and a first round swap right to add Dejounte Murray a year and a half ago. There’s a lot of smoke around the Hawks shedding pieces that don’t fit well together, so there is a ripe chance for the Kings to make a deal.

Dejounte Murray

Before trading for Dejounte Murray, the Hawks had a high-usage, deep shooting scorer in Trae Young who couldn’t play defense. To shore up their squad, the Hawks traded an absolute haul to the Spurs for Murray, a lanky and athletic 6’5” point guard, in the hopes that he would bring excellent defense, downhill scoring, and strong ball distribution.

His last season in San Antonio, Murray averaged 21.1 points, 9.2 assists, 8.3 rebounds, and 2.0 steals per game, and he brought an athletic, attacking style that put a ton of pressure on defenses. Murray would run right at guys to get them in backpedals and either get to the rim, pull up for short jumpers and midrange shots, or kick the ball to open shooters. Fitting that game alongside Trae Young made some sense on paper.

But that hypothesis hasn’t worked out at all like the Hawks hoped.

Offensively, the Murray-Young pairing has been like oil and water. Far too often, they end up playing an undesirable brand of “your turn, my turn” basketball, where neither player really does anything to help the other succeed. Teams like the Dallas Mavericks have done that in the past, but Doncic and Irving are transcendent offensive talents who still had to learn to play more complimentary basketball to start winning games more often.

Since joining Atlanta, Murray’s offensive efficiency has stayed pretty solid, but he’s had to change his game a bit too. It’s not clear that it’s really an improvement. As Murray’s usage rate has dropped, his assist rate has plummeted to 22.2% this year, down from 40.6% his last year with the Spurs. He’s also shifted to a more perimeter-oriented game, which shows up in the numbers. Murray now shoots 6.2 threes per game compared to just 4.3 per game in his last year in San Antonio. Though he’s hitting threes at a career high clip—38.7% from three this year compared to a career average of 34.6%—he’s also not getting downhill nearly as often. Murray is shooting a lower proportion of his shots from inside 10 feet, making fewer trips to the line, and getting offensive rebounds less frequently, all of which indicate his game is moving farther and farther away from the basket. That’s normal as a player ages, but Murray is still just 27 years old and in his athletic prime. While there’s nothing inherently wrong with Murray’s move outward (it does create more space on the interior), it’s not quite what the Hawks envisioned when they traded for Murray, and they don’t have other players who’ve stepped up to put downhill pressure on defenses and score in the paint.

At the same time, Murray hasn’t been the elite defensive weapon that many thought he might turn into based on his time with the Spurs. Murray’s steals rate has dropped each of the past two years, from 2.8% his last year as a Spur to 1.8% this year. Per Dunks and Threes, his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has also dropped too; he was in the 81st percentile of defenders his last year with the Spurs, but he’s dropped to the 53rd percentile this year. While Murray’s defensive reputation was probably a little overblown, he’s still had a meaningful drop-off on that end of the floor. That may be on Murray or it may be on the Hawks as a team, but it’s been an issue for them trying to pair Young and Murray regardless.

The net result has been the Hawks failing to live up to their own expectations, and it seems like they’re ready to get off of Murray. The Hawks have also overpaid several players on their roster, such that they’re already within $10 million of the luxury tax line this year and projected to be about $9 million below the luxury tax next year, so they have a clear incentive to get out of Murray’s contract if they want to create more operating space to adjust their roster. That presents an opportunity for the Kings to get Murray or someone else off the Hawks roster.

Fitting Murray on the Kings does raise some of the same issues that have come up for the Hawks in the Trae Young-Dejounte Murray pairing.

Offensively, it’s a cautionary tale of sorts for a potential Fox-Murray backcourt. Fox is one of just nine players in the league with a higher usage rate than Trae Young, so there’s a concern that he and Murray could end up playing “your turn, my turn” offense too. And Fox and Murray both seem to be moving their games out toward the perimeter and away from the paint, which might be too much of the same thing. But there are a few things that I think would make adding Murray to the Kings more feasible.

One point of adding Murray is to solidify the Kings’ offense when Fox sits, which minimizes some of the risk that they have overlapping skillsets. During those minutes, the Kings try to run offense through Sabonis. Murray’s pull-up shooting and quickness should work well off of Sabonis in the high post, and Murray is athletic enough to serve as a capable cutter off actions where Sabonis starts with the ball (though Murray doesn’t cut often enough now). Murray is also an experienced pick and roll initiator, running 7.3 pick and rolls per game, which would be an effective half-court tool for Murray-Sabonis lineups. Murray’s ball-handling and knack for avoiding turnovers would also be a big benefit to the Kings. While Fox does a good job taking care of the ball, the Kings’ other primary ball-handlers (Sabonis and Monk) turn the ball over too often. Finally, Murray’s improved three point shooting has really shorn up what was previously a weakness. Murray is an effective spot up shooter, scoring about 1.18 points per possession on those shots, and he’s managed to push out his range beyond the three point line. If he can keep that up, he would be an effective floor spacer that can also attack close outs (much like Monk, and to a lesser extent Barnes, already do for the Kings), which puts a lot of pressure on defenses to collapse to the paint and opens up other shooters.

On the defensive end, even the Hawks version of Murray would be an upgrade for the Kings’ perimeter defense. He’s bigger and lankier than Fox and Monk, and quicker on his feet than Huerter or Keegan Murray, which would provide some benefit against scoring guards. He also has active hands defensively to generate steals and deflections (3.0 deflections per game, tied for 10th in the NBA), which would be a nice addition. If it does turn out that the Spurs defense version of Murray is still there, the upgrade is even more obvious.

Let’s turn to the contract situation. Murray signed a four year, $120 million extension this off-season, but his salary this year is just $18.2 million, which makes salary matching a bit easier. The Kings would have options of who to send out, but the Hawks roster is in such a transition state that it’s hard to know what they would want back. Presumably, players with contracts cheaper than Dejounte Murray’s going forward like Barnes and Huerter would have some appeal to the Hawks, as they could get them another $7.5-10 million in cap relief next season. But those guys probably don’t add much for the Hawks on the court. A three-way deal could make more sense, as Huerter or Barnes could be more useful to a playoff contender. The Hawks have a big trade exception of over $23 million from the John Collins trade with Utah that could be used to facilitate such a three way deal so they don’t have to take back $45 million or more in long term salary, as they would have to do if they accepted Barnes or Huerter.

The real prize for the Hawks in a Dejounte Murray deal with the Kings would be draft picks and salary cap relief. The Hawks already have Sacramento’s 2024 first round pick (top 14 protected), but they are still pretty short on draft equity from 2025 to 2027. They might jump at the chance to get another future first rounder from the Kings, plus whatever could come from a third team for Huerter or Barnes. The Hawks aren’t going to recover the three first rounders and a pick swap they gave to get Murray, but if they can get back 70% of that, it might be worth cutting bait.

The cap relief benefit for the Hawks is also real. They’re almost $24 million over the cap this year, and the problem gets worse in the next two years. If the Hawks do nothing, Dejounte Murray’s extension will kick in next season, and they also have to decide what to do with restricted free agents Jalen Johnson (2025) and Saddiq Bey (2024). The Hawks could deal Bey at the deadline, but extending Johnson is a must. The Hawks are also probably stuck overpaying a bit for Trae Young ($40-50 million) and De’Andre Hunter ($20-25 million) each year through 2026-27, and they likely want to hold on to quality players on reasonable, tradable contracts like Bogdan Bogdanovic (making $16-19 million on a declining contract through 2026-27) and Onyeka Okongwu (making $14-17 million through 2027-28). The Hawks are in a tough cap situation, so they’re going to have to let someone go below market value. Trading Murray would probably get them the cap relief they need and allow them to get back reasonable valuable in terms of future assets.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Ultimately, I think a Kings trade for Dejounte Murray would be super interesting, but it’s high risk. If Murray can’t play with Fox effectively, as he’s struggled to do with Trae Young in Atlanta, the Kings could be looking at moving him on from him relatively quickly. That said, the Hawks are in a precarious cap situation without an obvious way out, so it’s possible that the Kings could nab a clear talent on a reasonable contract without giving up a ton of on-court talent. I’d be comfortable letting Huerter head back to Atlanta, giving up a future first rounder, and adding perhaps some additional draft capital (second rounders or a first swap, perhaps) to get a deal done, but not much more than that.

De’Andre Hunter / Saddiq Bey / Bogdan Bogdonavic

I mentioned De’Andre Hunter, Saddiq Bey, and Bogdan Bogdanovic in the Dejounte Murray section. These guys are all different players and in totally different contract situations, but they could also make for appealing trade targets. I’ll go quickly here.

De’Andre Hunter is the most interesting, but he’s also totally confounding. Hunter is a 6’8” wing that sports incredible length and athleticism. He can also shoot well from distance and he’s young, only 26 years old. He was drafted as a prototypical 3-and-D player who could cover four positions, and he looks like he should be exactly that. Hell, the Hawks gave him a 4 year, $95 million extension because they thought that’s what he is.

But the on-court production has been consistently underwhelming, and it’s hard to figure out exactly why. Hunter is scoring 15 points per game on a slash line of 46% from the field, 40.4% from three, and 90.7% from the line, but it still feels disappointing. Despite the solid offensive numbers, his impact on games is hard to see unless you squint. You don’t see him making plays that pop as a scorer or a passer, and he offers way less than he should as a rebounder given his physical profile. Hunter also hasn’t lived up to his prospects as a defender, and you rarely see him pop on that end of the court either. Advanced metrics show him to be a bit of a paper tiger defensively too—his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of -1.1 is in the 26th percentile of all players.

Hunter’s profile and shooting ability makes him an intriguing target, but his marginal impact on games in four of his five seasons in the league makes it hard buy into the next four years and $95 million of his contract. Given that, it’s hard to see the Kings swinging a deal for him unless they believe he’s got a leap in him. Trading for Hunter would require sending out Barnes or Huerter plus another player, and he just hasn’t produced enough to warrant that and taking on more salary at the same time. I would love for the Kings to add a player with his physical profile on defense to add length on the perimeter, but it’s hard to justify at $20-25 million a year.

Saddiq Bey is another player whose early prospects looked more promising than his actual NBA performance. Bey is only 24 years old and is a bit of a SF/PF tweener, but he can get points and rebound reasonably well at a low usage rate, though he’s not particularly efficient. He’s sort of like a less consistent Harrison Barnes, but he brings better rebounding and worse shooting. He might be useful to shore up the Kings rotation, but he’s not going to meaningfully improve the roster in the near term. He is also on the last year of his contract, so he will be a free agent next year even if the Kings trade for him—but his $4.6 million salary is easy to match this year and the Kings may be able to get him cheaply.

Kings fans know and love Bogdanovic. He’s pretty good at a lot of things (scoring, passing, defense), and he’s on a totally reasonable contract that pays him between $16-19 million through the 2026-27 season, the last year being a team option to boot. That said, Bogdanovic doesn’t truly excel at any one thing and probably wouldn’t be a big upgrade for the Kings (plus, the the Kings already picked Huerter over Bogdanovic in a way, and it’s not like it hasn’t worked out). He doesn’t shoot better than Monk or Huerter, he isn’t a stellar ball handler or offensive organizer, and he has similar defensive limitations that the Kings have lived through before. I love the guy, but he doesn’t make sense as an addition this season, though it’s possible he’ll be traded off the Hawks.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Of the three, Hunter and Bey are probably the most interesting, but I wouldn’t give up a future first to take either of them. Hunter for Huerter and a second rounder or Bey for a second rounder plus Kessler Edwards or Chris Duarte would be reasonable, but there’s no reason to break the bank to get these guys.

Jazz Trade Targets

The Jazz don’t need to make a trade this year, but they’ve shown a willingness to deal players (even very good ones) in order to build up a long term championship roster. They’re playing well right now, which could mean they’re less likely to make a move—although a surprisingly strong showing last season didn’t stop them from dealing Mike Conley to the Timberwolves. The Jazz currently sit 10th in the West and are playing well, but they’ve bounced in and out of the play in so far.

Lauri Markkanen

A Kings trade for Lauri Markkanen is a huge long-shot given his talent and the likely cost to get him, but man, would it be fun to watch! It’s the kind of big swing trade that can really raise the team’s ceiling, without having to bet on a player that may be past his prime.

Just 26 years old, Markannen is the type of offensive force that can fit onto basically any team. At seven feet tall, Markkanen is an elite scorer (24.0 points per game) that can space the floor with ease (he’s shooting over 39% from three the last two seasons on heavy volume), and he rarely turns the ball over (1.7 turnovers per game this year). Markkanen scores effectively off of catch and shoots, in transition, off offensive rebounds, and as a cutter, and he’s also able to get downhill to pressure the basket despite not being an particularly good ballhandler. He doesn’t need the ball much to be effective, as he’s getting 12+ shots up per game on touches of under two seconds and hitting over 50% of them.

Even though Markkanen was drafted as a floor-spacing big, during the last two seasons in Utah, he’s also developing into a very good interior scorer. Prior to joining the Jazz, Markkanen scored about 5-6 points in the paint per game, but last season he upped that to 10.2 paint points per game according to NBA.com (he’s holding pretty steady this year at 8.7 paint points per game and keeping his overall scoring numbers up).

Adding Markkanen to the Kings would be an enormous boon offensively, where his scoring prowess would essentially eliminate concerns about the King’s offense struggling when De’Aaron Fox sits. Markkanen’s strong shooting, quick trigger, and ability to score off cuts would make him a fantastic fit with Sabonis, and he’s big enough to play as a pick and roll partner with Fox or Monk when Sabonis sits (even though he hasn’t done that much in Utah). You can even imagine some funky big-big plays where Markkanen plays off of Sabonis dribble hand-offs or runs inverted pick and rolls with him, which would be wild to watch and totally throw off lots of NBA defenses.

Defensively, Markkanen isn’t a ceiling raiser, though he would still probably help the Kings a bit. He has much more size than current forwards Harrison Barnes and Trey Lyles, which would let the Kings add desperately needed length at the rim and rebounding. A starting front line made up of Sabonis, Markkanen, and Keegan Murray would bring a ton of size and rebounding that could be tough for some undersized Western Conference teams like the Clippers and Thunder to deal with.

Obviously everyone knows Markkanen is good, he was an All-Star last year, so the toughest part about getting a deal done for him would be the cost to acquire him. While his age, offensive game, and adaptability would fit perfectly on the Kings, those same factors also make him an attractive player for Utah to build around and for other teams to target, so Utah can wait for a Godfather offer or choose not to move him at all. The Jazz have also historically demanded enormous hauls to trade away players of Markkanen’s caliber: the Donovan Mitchell trade netted the Jazz three young players (Markkanen, Collin Sexton, Ochai Agbaji), three future first rounders, and two first round pick swaps, while the Rudy Gobert trade similarly resulted in the Jazz getting young players (Walker Kessler, Jared Vanderbilt, and Leandro Bolmaro), two veterans (Malik Beasley and Patrick Beverley), three first round picks, and two first round pick swaps.

To get Markkanen, the Kings would have to put together a huge offer. That means they would probably have to give up all of the first round picks they can feasibly make available. To do so, the Kings would have to free up restrictions on the 2024 first round pick owed to the Hawks so that the Kings could trade three first round picks (2026, 2028, and 2030), and they would also potentially have to give the Jazz pick swap rights for some of the years the Kings retain their first rounders (2025, 2027, and 2029).

In addition, to match Markkanen’s $17.3 million salary, the Kings would need to send out at least $9.8 million in salary, which would probably mean trading away either (A) Harrison Barnes, (B) Kevin Huerter, (C) Davion Mitchell and another player, or (D) perhaps most realistically, whatever Utah asks for (within reason). Still, because Markkanen’s salary is relatively low compared to players like Zach Lavine, salary matching alone wouldn’t force the Kings to raid their depth as much.

If the Kings were to deal for Markkanen, they’d be locking in a young, elite offensive core (Markkanen is 26, Fox is 26, Sabonis is 27, and Murray is 23). But the Kings would also probably be limited to this core, and would potentially face steep cap restrictions and luxury tax bills down the line.

Markkanen is on the books for 2024-25 at $18.0 million, but signing him to an extension could easily cost upwards of $40 million per season. The 2024-25 season would be fine: Fox, Markannen, Sabonis, and Murray would combine to have a salary of just under $103.5 million (the salary cap should be around $142 million), but things could get really tight after that—much like with a potential trade for Zach Lavine (discussed above).

If Markkanen were to be extended with a first year starting salary of $45 million, a four player core of Fox/Sabonis/Murray/Markkanen would make about $138.1 million in 2025-26, $176.8 million in 2026-27, and $186.4 million in 2027-28—again, assuming Fox is extended to a max deal (not a supermax) and Murray is extended starting at $30 million. Those figures would be about $9 million higher if Fox signed a supermax, and it’s possible Murray could sign for more than $30 million too.

In other words, with just four players, in 2025-26 the Kings would have only about $18 million in cap room to fill out their roster, although they’d be about $51 million under the luxury tax line. In 2026-27, those four players would put them about $5 million over the cap, with just under $32 million of room below the luxury tax line. In 2027-28, the team would be about $2 million below the cap, with about $43.3 million in luxury tax room. [You can see the projected cap and tax levels in Part 3.]

Those kind of salary cap/luxury tax issues would probably be worthwhile if things panned out with Markkanen and Murray, so it’s hard to fuss too much. Unlike with the Lavine trade, the Kings would also get a chance to see how a core of Fox/Sabonis/Markkanen/Murray functions before they have to commit to any extensions for Fox, Markkanen, and Murray. Putting aside Markkanen’s better fit with the Kings roster, that’s a massive distinction between a trade for Markkanen and Lavine, as the Kings have time to figure out potential cap issues along the way, and they could always unwind a Markkanen deal if it didn’t work out.

Verdict: Only if the price is right, but man it would be fun! I think this one is far-fetched given what the Jazz are likely to ask for in return, but I’d be excited about it if it did happen—this kind of deal could make the Kings the best offensive team in the league. The defense might struggle but hey, how many teams can put up 150? If the Jazz demanded three future firsts and swaps, as they probably will, this doesn’t make sense—but if the price comes down? I’d go for it.

John Collins

It’s much more plausible that the Jazz trade forward John Collins. Collins, now 26 years old, is a 6’9” power forward who the Hawks traded to the Jazz last year in exchange for Rudy Gay and a future second round pick after things didn’t work out in Atlanta. The Hawks wanted to get out of Collins’ contract, which pays him a little over $26 million a year through 2025-26 assuming he exercises his player option in the last year of the deal.

Collins is a bit polarizing as a player and in recent years he hasn’t quite played to his ceiling. He is talented, athletic, and has the ability to score at the rim, get to the line, hit threes, rebound, and contest shots. Although Collins doesn’t really create a ton of offense for himself and he’s not a great distributor, he excels at finishing at the basket (he’s a career 75%+ shooter from within 3 feet according to Basketball Reference) and has been a solid floor spacer most years, even if he’s not an elite shooter like Markkanen. He’s a career 35.6% three point shooter on relatively low volume (about 3 to 3.5 threes per game)—he’s managed to pull his shooting back up to his career average after dropping to under 30% last season, which may have been attributable to an ugly finger injury.

Collins has some attributes that would be helpful aside from his scoring. He’s pretty good on the glass, sporting a career rebounding rate is 14.9%, though that has waned a bit in recent years as he’s become less active on the offensive glass in particular. And even though he’s not a true rim protector, Collins does provide some shot blocking, averaging more than 1.0 blocks per game each year of his career but one. Early in his career, Collins also graded out as a reasonable defensive player. According to Dunks and Threes, Collins posted defensive EPMs between -0.4 and 1.3 for his first five years in the league. But this year, he’s dropped off dramatically, to the point where it’s a significant concern. His defensive EPM per Dunks and Threes has dropped to -2.1 and his defensive rating has dropped all the way to 121.3 per NBA.com.

Overall, Collins could bring scoring, rebounding, and athleticism to the Kings’ front court, though the team would take a step back in terms of shooting and passing. At this year’s defensive performance levels, Collins would be a step backward, but I do think there’s a good chance he can recover his form since this year’s defensive numbers are an outlier for him.

Given the Jazz got Collins for peanuts just last year (basically a second round pick), it’s doubtful that the Kings would have to pay a ton of draft capital to obtain him—perhaps as little as a protected first or a couple second rounders. To match Collins’ $25.3 million salary this year, though, the Kings would also have to be willing to deal players. Likely, the Kings would send out Harrison Barnes ($17 million) and another player with some untapped potential like Davion Mitchell ($6.4 million) or another back-end player like Chris Duarte ($4.1 million). Such a trade would net the Jazz some pick equity, a flier on Mitchell, and some cap flexibility in 2025-26. The Kings would lose some cap flexibility and lineup versatility at guard in particular, but they’d still have the ability to go after other trade targets, too. Alternatively, the Kings could try to send out Huerter ($15.7 million) instead of Barnes.

I think trading for Collins would be a smart shot to take, although it’s not a “must” by any means. He’s not an obvious part of Utah’s future plans because he overlaps positionally with Markkanen, Utah’s best player, and they have Walker Kessler at center. As a result, the price to get Collins could be pretty reasonable if Utah doesn’t see him as part of its future. His game should work well with Fox and Sabonis, and he would provide the Kings with better size, athleticism, and rebounding, and could provide some defensive help inside as well. But the Kings need to believe he will continue to rebound well and recover some of his defensive form, otherwise a deal doesn’t make sense. You can’t pay $25-26 million for the next three years for Collins if he’s going to play bottom-of-the-league level defense.

Giving up Barnes or Huerter would hurt a bit, but Mitchell and Duarte barely play, and sacrificing a protected first or some second round picks to raise the team’s ceiling seems worthwhile. At the same time, the Kings would only be adding about $2 million in salary in 2024-25 and $7.6 million in 2025-26, but those seasons will be before extensions for Fox and Murray would kick in anyway. Plus, even though Collins would be overpaid, he’ll still be in his prime and his contract isn’t so big that there would be no market for him if the Kings need to get out of the deal down the road.

The Kings could make a trade for Collins even more desirable by trying to add Kris Dunn to the deal. I’ll discuss Dunn more below.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Barnes + Duarte + a protected future first rounder (or various seconds) seems like a fine deal, and the Kings could even go up a bit from there if needed. If the Jazz demand Mitchell, I’d want to also try to get Kris Dunn in the deal to keep some defense, even though that could add to the price.

Kris Dunn

Dunn is a 29 year old point guard known for his defensive prowess. Dunn never developed into a strong offensive player and his shooting is pretty suspect, but he offers very good perimeter defense. Although only about 6’3”, Dunn has very good length and he’s physically strong enough to hold up at the point of attack against most guards. For the Kings, this would pair well with Fox and Monk, who can struggle with more powerful guards. Dunn would provide the defensive help that the team hoped to get from Davion Mitchell, but in a bigger package that more readily compliments Fox in particular on defense.

Offensively, Dunn really wouldn’t provide much help. He’s essentially a non-factor from the perimeter, as he takes just over 1.5 threes per game this season and he is a career 32% shooter from three. He’s also doesn’t break down defenses off the dribble or provide significant playmaking, though thankfully he doesn’t hold on to the ball too much either. Still, because the Kings run so much of their offense through Fox, Sabonis, and Monk, the Kings wouldn’t be asking him to create offense—the only real compromise would be to spacing, which the Kings already have to give up when they play Duarte or Mitchell anyway.

Dunn is on the last year of his contract and his salary for this year is just $2.5 million, so he’s not likely to be a long-term answer for the Kings and they shouldn’t give up a ton to get him. But he would help improve the defense and offer alternate line-ups against teams with attacking guards that are too big for Fox (for example, the Timberwolves, Thunder, and Clippers). The Jazz have Keyonte George, Collin Sexton, Jordan Clarkson, and Ochai Agbaji on longer contracts, so they don’t have much reason to hold onto Dunn past the deadline, so the cost to acquire him or add him to a deal for John Collins shouldn’t be high.

Verdict: Do it (assuming the Kings can’t get Caruso or Finney-Smith)! A small deal for Dunn or a combo deal for Collins and Dunn would both help the Kings improve in the near term and set them up well for the next couple of seasons.

Nets Trade Targets

The Nets have fallen into a hole. Since the start of December, they’re 7-18 and have dropped out of the play in, which would counsel in favor of a reset. But they don’t control most of their own first round picks as a result of the James Harden trade two years ago, so they don’t have a strong incentive to strip the roster down to the studs and hope for a better draft pick. They don’t seem desperate to do deadline deals even though they perhaps should be more willing to consider offers.

Mikal Bridges / Cam Johnson

The prime trade target on the Nets is undoubtedly Mikal Bridges, but all indications are that he isn’t likely to be available based on recent reports. I won’t spend a ton of time on Bridges, but he would be a pretty stellar get for the Kings as he is only 27 years old and offers high-quality perimeter defense and strong shooting at a pretty reasonable contract price—$23.3 million next season and $24.9 million in 2025-26. He’s over-extended as a lead scorer in Brooklyn, as reflected by his dip in efficiency and their inability to win games, but he would be a great fit alongside Fox, Sabonis, and Murray because he would offer better scoring than Huerter, similar shooting capability, and dramatically improved defense. Alas, the Nets probably won’t trade him, and the Kings would probably have to move a Markkanen level package to get him anyway. But we can always dream!

Cam Johnson would also be a great trade target for the Kings, although less appealing than Bridges. Johnson is also 27 years old and on a reasonable 4 year, $94.5 million contract. He’s a little bigger than Bridges, and though he is a solid defender, he’s not as versatile defending the perimeter. But Johnson can absolutely stroke it from three point range, where he’s a career 39.3% shooter, so he can find minutes on any roster. Johnson would be able to replace Barnes in the starting line up and offer a bit better defense at the power forward position. Given Brooklyn just signed Johnson to an extension and has given no indication they want to move him, he’s also a pretty far-fetched trade target and not worth spending a lot of time on. But if the Kings could get him for a deal centered around a future first round pick, a trade would be worth considering.

Verdict: Only if the price is right (and it probably won’t be).

Dorian Finney-Smith

Even though the Nets probably won’t deal Bridges or Johnson, there’s been smoke about teams inquiring about the availability of Dorian Finney-Smith (including the Kings).

Finney-Smith is a relatively unheralded player, but he’s a popular trade target for teams ahead of the deadline this year. At 6’8” and 220 pounds, Finney-Smith plays high-quality defense, is versatile enough to guard wings and power forwards effectively, and knocks down threes at a solid clip (37.8% this year and 35.9% for his career). Each of the past six seasons, Finney-Smith has posted Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus scores of at least 0.6 per Dunks and Threes, which confirms what you see on film: Finney-Smith is good at defense.

Because he plays solid defense and hit threes, Finney-Smith is the type of player who can find a role on any team. Adding Finney-Smith would give the Kings two plus perimeter defenders (with Keegan Murray), and provide a lot of versatility and pick-and-roll switchability on defense, which is extremely valuable in the postseason. Finney-Smith won’t provide much in terms of offense, but he’s a good enough shooter that he wouldn’t compromise the Kings’ floor spacing the way that a player like Kris Dunn would.

The contract situation for Finney-Smith is also pretty reasonable. He’s got three years left in his deal (the last of which is a player option) at $13.9 million this year, $14.9 million next year, and $15.4 million in 2025-26—not exactly a bargain basement prices, but definitely favorable. The Kings could do a deal for Finney-Smith by sending out draft compensation and one of Harrison Barnes ($17 million), Kevin Huerter ($15.7 million), or Trey Lyles ($8 million). Sending out just Lyles and a draft pick would let the Kings improve on the floor defensively and only sacrifice some size in backup line-ups; the Nets, meanwhile, would save money and get pick compensation.

Verdict: Do it (if no Caruso deal), and be willing to overpay a little! A Finney-Smith trade is pretty appealing given his reasonable contract and defensive capabilities. He would give the Kings a second plus defender with versatility, which would allow them to improve their perimeter defense and expand the ways they can play in the playoffs, all at a reasonable cost. If the Kings can get Finney-Smith for Lyles and some second round picks, I’d be ecstatic. I’d be willing to send out a first round pick too, but would want to add some protections. Getting much beyond that starts to get too pricey though, given Finney-Smith isn’t an All-Defense level player like Caruso and his offense is pretty limited.

Royce O’Neal / Lonnie Walker IV / Spencer Dinwiddie / Nic Claxton

The Nets also have a few other players who might be helpful to the Kings ahead of the trade deadline. None of them are likely to dramatically change the Kings’ playoff prospects on their own, but they could be part of a trade package that brings some defense and bench depth to the Kings. These are solid players who have roles on a functional NBA roster, but they’re only worth pursuing if they can be obtained at a reasonable price.

There have been a handful of rumors about the Kings being interested in Royce O’Neal, alongside Finney-Smith. O’Neal is solid defender, but at just 6’6”, he’s on the smaller side for a forward. On top of that, he is already 30 years old, a pending free agent, and offensively doesn’t offer much but hitting open threes (he’s a career 38% three point shooter). On his own, O’Neal probably doesn’t warrant a trade for much. That said, O’Neal has a $9.5 million salary for a contract that expires this off-season, so the Kings might be able to snag him for little more than a salary match and a second rounder, or add him to a potential trade for another Nets player. He would offer the Kings some defensive versatility, but I don’t think he’s good enough to get too excited about on his own.

In a lot of ways, Lonnie Walker IV is presents a similar trade scenario to Royce O’Neal. He’s also on an expiring deal, though at a salary of only $2 million. Walker IV is a better shooter and scorer than O’Neal, but he’s more of a traditional guard and offers pretty average defense overall. He’s not a player the Kings should target as a stand-alone, but if they do a deal with the Nets, he could be an interesting piece to pull into the deal to help bolster the Kings bench without incurring a big expense.

Spencer Dinwiddie is the best offensive player of this bunch, but he’s having a bit of an odd season overall. On the one hand, he’s a 30 year old guard who has never established a clear identity as a point guard or shooting guard. His shooting has also been awful (just 39.7% from the field and 33.2% from three this season). On the other hand, the Nets are about 3 points better with Dinwiddie on the court this season (per PBP Stats) and advanced metrics suggest he’s an above average player on both offense and defense. At the end of the day, Dinwiddie offers some reasonable scoring ability and shot creation (even if it’s inefficient at times) and decent perimeter defense. He’s also on an expiring contract and the Nets probably aren’t in a rush to bring him back given his age and positional ambiguity, so he can probably be had for cheap. The Kings would have to send out at least $13.8 million in salary to get Dinwiddie, and because they don’t have have that much in expiring salary (other than Malik Monk) that the Nets might want, they would probably ending up sending Brooklyn draft picks to get a deal done. Sending picks out for Dinwiddie is a little hard to swallow given the Kings needs, so presumably a deal for him won’t happen unless it’s part of a bigger trade. He would bring the ability to stabilize the Kings offense when Fox sits, though, so it’s OK to keep him on the radar.

Nic Claxton would be an interesting add for the Kings, although it’s pretty unlikely the Nets would actually part ways with him and he would be a short-term rental given he is in the last year of his cotract. Claxton is a 24 year old, 6’11” center, and he brings strong rim protection and shot blocking, effective rebounding, and a solid offensive game predicated on transition offense and rim-running. Claxton’s athleticism would make him a viable part of the Kings’ transition offense, but he’s a non-shooter, so it’s hard to envision how he would play with Sabonis right now. That, combined with the pending expiration of Claxton’s contract, makes him an imperfect fit for the Kings this year. The Nets also haven’t given any reason to think they want to deal Claxton, so he’s probably staying put anyway.

Verdict: Small deals for O’Neal or Walker IV would be good, but pass on Dinwiddie and Claxton unless it’s a bargain.

Blazers Trade Targets

Whether they acknowledge it or not, the Blazers went into rebuilding mode when they traded Damian Lillard this past offseason. Their record reflects that, as their 13-33 record is fifth worst in the NBA. They’ve retained some veteran players anyway in the hopes for a quick turnaround, but given the age of their future core and performance on the court so far, that’s probably wishful thinking. This team is probably 2-3 years away from competing meaningfully, but you wouldn’t know that looking at how they’ve allocated their resources. They should be looking to make deals to get future assets and young players, and to get off of some of their higher-priced vets.

Jerami Grant

Jerami Grant is a perplexing player to me. He’s an athletic forward with great size and length (standing 6’7” with a huge 7’3” wingspan), he can score, he moves well defensively, and he fills up the stat sheet. He’s averaging 21.1 points, 3.6 rebounds, 2.6 assists, 0.7 steals, and 0.8 blocks per game with good shooting numbers: 45.9% from the field, 41.0% from three, and 79.8 from the line. He can score at all three levels and has the length, athleticism, and quickness to guard a range of positions defensively.

But his impact on the game too often feels too marginal. He’s not quite a looter in a riot, but Grant’s lofty numbers have come during four straight seasons on completely uncompetitive teams. Advanced metrics don’t paint a particularly rosy picture for Grant either. Now in his tenth season, Grant’s career Box Plus/Minus (per Basketball Reference) is just -0.4, and he’s never posted a BPM over 1.2; Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus tells a similar story, as Grant routinely grades out as an above average player, but nowhere near a star.

But Grant is certainly paid a lot like a star, in fact he just signed a 5 year, $160 million contract this off-season—borderline All-Star money. He’s never really lived up to that billing.

Still, Grant has some skills that would definitely help the Kings roster, and he wouldn’t have to be the best player on the team (he’s been miscast as a lead scorer in Detroit and Portland, although in fairness that is because he chose that purposefully).

Offensively, Grant is a versatile scorer who can knock down threes (36.3% from three for his career) and get to the rim, and he does a good job of getting to the free throw line (5.3 free throws per game). Although Grant can be a little sticky with the ball, he’s a substantially better scorer than Barnes, and he can get to his shots in a variety of different ways. Playing with Sabonis and Fox, it’s also likely that Grant’s efficiency would improve—he’s a little stifled on a Portland team that lacks consistent offensive threats and outside shooting.

Defensively, Grant would add a ton of length to the Kings’ front court. His 7’3” wingspan is enormous and he’s athletic enough to make a good impact defensively. These are things the Kings would benefit from in particular, as Keegan Murray is the only guy they have on defense with size, length, and the ability to defend out on the perimeter.

Unfortunately, Grant’s defensive performance can disappear at times and he’s not going to be a defensive tone-setter. It’s hard to blame him too much, as he’s played the past for years in Detroit and Portland, where defense is more of an option that an objective. Still, Grant has the tools to be an effective defender and he flashes it at times. The Kings would need Grant to lock in consistently on defense and bring intensity there on every possession, which he hasn’t done regularly since his early years in Oklahoma City. They would also need him to improve his rebounding, which has been a weakness in recent years despite Grant’s impressive physical ability.

Grant’s new contract has a few important effects on any potential trade. First, it means that Portland just recently decided they wanted to keep him for the long term, so getting a deal done might be challenging. Second, it makes salary matching difficult. Grant is getting paid just under $27.6 million this year, which means the Kings would need to send back about $20.1 million in salary to effectuate a trade. Doing so would require the Kings to give up either Barnes ($17 million) or Huerter ($15.7 million), plus another player like Mitchell, Duarte, or Lyles. That’s OK, and giving up Huerter or Barnes would mitigate the impact of taking back Grant’s substantial contract, but the team needs to keep in mind that Grant is already 29 years old—his current deal is going to take him into age 34 (assuming he exercises his player option in the last year of the deal, which he probably will).

Grant’s contract was probably a bit of an overpay the moment he signed it due to his age and come-and-go defense. But Portland probably won’t see it that way; the Blazers aren’t looking to get off Grant’s salary, so they will demand draft picks on top of whatever players come back in a trade. That makes doing a deal tricky, since Grant doesn’t live up to his defensive capabilities consistently enough to warrant giving up a lot of future draft capital.

Verdict: Only if the price is right (it probably won’t be).

Malcom Brogdon

Malcolm Brogdon plays ugly basketball, and I love it. He’s kind of slow, a little bit ground-bound, and plays a herky-jerky style that doesn’t look super great on film, but he can hoop!

Brogdon is a 31 year old point guard that plays an efficient, if not particularly appealing brand of basketball. At about 6’5” and 220 pounds, he uses his size effectively to bully his way to his spots offensively, even if it’s not particularly fast. He can drive reasonably well and is a knock-down shooter from distance, hitting 42.2% of his threes this season and 39.1% for his career. Brogdon also can run a reasonable NBA offense in most situations. He’s a good distributor who averages 5.3 assists per game and just 1.5 turnovers, and he has the ability to get to pick and rolls if all else fails offensively, although it’s not something he should do all the time.

Defensively, Brogdon does a good job of using his strength to stay in front of defenders. He lacks foot speed, so he can get beat by the league’s faster guards, but he has enough size and savvy to do a solid job defensively. Per Dunks and Threes, Brodgon’s been a slightly above average defender for his career—and he’s carrying a slightly above average 0.1 Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus this year (that’s in the 61st percentile of defenders).

Brogdon is in the first year of a two-year deal that pays him $45 million. While that salary is reasonable, the situation in Portland isn’t. Brogdon makes virtually no sense on the Blazers given their team’s timeline and the need for Scoot Henderson to develop as a playmaker and lead ball handler. He’s expensive veteran leadership, but he is also taking away minutes from the young players that the Blazers need to develop. The Blazers ought to be looking to deal him.

That presents an opportunity for the Kings. Sacramento could offer Huerter, who is also on a reasonable 4 year, $65 million dollar deal. Huerter is younger than Brogdon at just 25, so he’s more in line with the Blazer’s overall timeline. Plus, Huerter plays a complimentary offensive role that benefit the Blazers by allowing Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe to play with the ball in their hands. They’d be taking on more salary overall, but that’s a good thing given the Blazers aren’t likely to be competitive this year or next regardless.

For the Kings, Brogdon would provide better ball-handling and a reasonable back-up point guard option to Fox. There are too many times that the Kings offense gets sloppy with Fox out of the game in particular, and Brogdon’s methodical, careful style would be a good way to calm those situations down and take pressure off of Malik Monk and Sabonis to run all of the offense when Fox sits. And because Brogdon is a good shooter, swapping him for Huerter wouldn’t hurt the Kings much from a floor-spacing perspective.

Defensively, adding Brogdon would give the Kings another option to deal with bigger guards that can be tough for Fox, Monk, or Davion Mitchell to handle (a theme of this post). No one is going to confuse Brogdon for a defensive stopper at this point in his career, but he’d still offer some improvement in on-ball defense over Huerter, who gets beat on far too many straight line drives. It’s not a cure, but it would be an improvement.

Verdict: Worth it at a bargain price. If the Kings can get Brogdon for Huerter, perhaps adding a second round pick, it would improve their prospects this year. There’s a legitimate question of whether the improvement would be big enough for the Kings to make a run in the playoffs, but it would shore up their ability to get to the postseason and give them more lineup options. Other deals that don’t require giving up Huerter to bolster the team’s defense may be better long-term though, so this wouldn’t be my first choice.

Matisse Thybulle

Thybulle is definitely a defensive stopper. Although he’s only 6’5”, he has great length, strength, and athleticism, and he plays a hyper-intelligent game on defense. He gets his hands in passing lanes, always seems to play his help responsibilities correctly, and can effectively guard almost any 1 through 3 in the NBA without resorting to fouling. Four of out five seasons in the NBA, Thybulle has graded out as a 95th percentile or better defender according to Dunks and Threes, which is absolutely consistent with what you see watching him play (this year is a bit of an anomaly, as Thybulle’s defense rates in the 77th percentile).

The problem is on offense, where Thybulle offers almost nothing. As good as he’s been defensively, Thybulle’s offense has consistently ranked in the bottom quartile of players per Dunks and Threes. He doesn’t attack the basket, he doesn’t drive, he doesn’t cut, and he’s not a particularly adept passer, so it’s not like he keeps the offense moving all the time. He only really shoots when he’s wide open, but at least he’s managed to up his three point percentage in the last couple of years to 37.3% this year and 38.8% last year (he shoots 34.3% for his career). That’s made him more playable on offense, as he can at least provide some spacing, but it’s not like he’s turned himself into a threat as a floor spacer.

At age 26, Thybulle is still in his prime. There’s a chance he continues to develop his jumper, but at the moment he doesn’t fit well with Portland, which has a bevy of young guards and small forwards that need to get time on the floor. I’ve already mentioned Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe, but Portland also drafted 19 year old Rayan Rupert hoping he’d be a defensive stopper in the future, and Kris Murray should get time given the success his brother Keegan has had too. They should be willing to part with Thybulle for a reasonable cost.

Thybulle is on a 3 year, just under $33.1 million deal that runs through 2025-26 if he exercises his player option in the last year. That’s a pretty fair contract that the Kings could carry with their core. Thybulle won’t provide anything on the offensive end that the team doesn’t already have, but he could fill the role of “break glass when needed” defensive stopper much more effectively than Chris Duarte and Kessler Edwards do, without much difference on the offensive end. Thybulle probably wouldn’t see huge minutes on the Kings, but for the handful of stretches per game when the Kings absolutely need stops, he would be a great option to have available.

Thybulle’s $10.5 million salary this year means the Kings could send out a small salary like Davion Mitchell’s or Chris Duarte’s, plus Kessler Edwards and a future second rounder (or slightly more) to get him. That would be absolutely worth it in my mind.

Verdict: Do it (if there’s no deal for Caruso or Finney-Smith). The Kings should make a run at Thybulle, especially if they can’t get Alex Caruso from the Bulls or Dorian Finney-Smith from the Nets. The Kings could trade any two of Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, and Kessler Edwards, plus a future second, and probably get this done. That would improve their roster options for this year without sacrificing players that are going to be around long term (I would miss absolutely Davion and try to avoid dealing him, for the record). They could also try to target both Brogdon and Thybulle, but getting salaries to match would be a bit tricky there—the Kings would need to send out Huerter or Barnes plus a couple other players just to make it work, which is probably too much.

Wizards Trade Targets

The Wizards are struggggggling. They’re not fun to watch, they don’t really compete, and they have only one player on the team that I would be excited about having on the team long-term, rookie Bilal Coulibaly (Deni Avdija also has some talent and will probably also be part of the long-term squad). They have a couple veterans on the roster that could contribute to other teams and the Wizards should be looking to deal them for whatever they can.

Kyle Kuzma

Kyle Kuzma has been linked to the Kings for quite a while at this point; there were rumors the team wanted to sign him in free agency, and several years ago, the Kings almost sent Buddy Hield to the Lakers for Kuzma.

I’ve never been a huge Kuzma fan (he feels too much like empty calories, but that might be my anti-Laker bias), but he offers some definite upgrades for the Kings. Kuzma is a 28 year old, 6’9” stretch power forward who is averaging 22 points, 6.5 rebounds, and 4.4 assists per game, which are good numbers. Kuzma flashes a ton of talent on offense, as he can create his own shots, attack the paint against slower forwards, spread the floor, and move the ball, and his numbers reflect that. But at the same time, imagining Kuzma as a key part of a good team offensively requires some projection. Kuzma’s shooting numbers are just OK (45.7% from the floor, 33.3% from three, and 78.9% from the line) and he can get a little loose with the ball on offense. He also takes his fair share of ill-advised shots and he can be prone to watching the action when he’s off the ball. Those are fixable issues, but they’ve shown up often in Kuzma’s seven year career.

On the defensive end, Kuzma is athletic and stout enough to guard fours and some fives, but other than a surprise showing last year, he’s typically been about average defensively. Dunks and Threes rates his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus at just -1.7 this year, but that’s down from a career high 1.4 last year, and even down from previous years where he graded out around the middle of the league. Advanced metrics aside, Kuzma’s effort is rarely consistent defensively, and no one is going to confuse him for a stalwart on that end of the floor.

Yet for the Kings, Kuzma offers a clear ceiling-raising opportunity. He’s got enough offensive talent that he can provide meaningful firepower and play with either Fox or Sabonis on the floor. If the Kings were to unlock his willingness to move without the ball and cut to the basket, and get him to be more selective in the shots he takes, there’s a good chance his shooting numbers could improve significantly. He also brings more size and rebounding than the Kings’ current options at power forward (Barnes and Lyles), while shooting well enough to keep the floor spaced. If Kuzma can regain last year’s defensive form, he’d provide a significant improvement over Barnes and Lyles, too.

Kuzma’s talent and favorable contract means that the Kings will have to give up a hefty sum to get him. Kuzma’s getting paid $25.6 million this year during the first year of a four year, $90 million deal that declines year over year. That makes Kuzma’s contract quite valuable; by the last year of Kuzma’s contract, he will be 31 years old and be getting paid just $19.4 million, a very reasonable sum.

Just to make a deal for Kuzma work, the Kings would need to send the Wizards at least $18.1 million in salary. Practically speaking, this would mean trading away either Barnes or Huerter and a back-end rotation player like Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, or Sasha Vezenkov (there’s a world in which the Kings could trade Monk too, but that seems unlikely and probably not worth it for anyone involved). The Kings would also probably have to send at least one first round pick to the Wizards given that Huerter or Barnes won’t actually save them salary or give them a long-term piece they covet.

Verdict: Reluctant yes, if the price is right. I would personally be a little sad if the Kings traded Barnes, Davion Mitchell, and a future first for Kuzma—I like rooting for Dave, and Barnes brings a calm veteran presence that Kuzma won’t replicate. But I can’t dispute that adding Kuzma would improve the team’s potential and raise the heights they could get to in the playoffs. And Kuzma’s favorable contract structure also brings solid value going forward. That said, Washington isn’t going to be forced into a deal here given they just re-signed Kuzma, so they may try to demand a lot of draft capital in a deal. I would be super wary of that. Giving up multiple first rounders for Kuzma seems like an overpay that the Kings should avoid.

Tyus Jones

Tyus Jones is the type of veteran point guard that announcers love and teams often covet. There will definitely be interest in Jones from numerous playoff contenders as we head toward the trade deadline. But he’s also a pending free agent in the second year of a two year, $29 million deal, which caps how much the Wizards could get back for him in a trade.

Jones is undersized at around 6’1”, and he’s not a premier athlete. But he plays a very controlled and efficient offensive game centered on making the right decision all of the time, without fail, that can fit in well on almost any roster. He’s a good passer and ball handler, he rarely turns the ball over, and he has turned himself into a strong shooter (he’s over 50% from the floor and hitting a career high 41.4% of his threes). Jones isn’t going to burn people off of the dribble or attack the rim, but he does make the right reads and can run an efficient offense.

Defensively, Jones’ lack of size and athleticism really limits his potential. He doesn’t make a lot of mistakes on defense, but he doesn’t have the physical tools to really bother talented guards. He can be shot over and beaten off the dribble, and he’s not quite strong enough to hold up against big guards/forwards. The net result is Jones provides average to slightly below average defense, consistent with his career Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, which has been between -1.8 and 0.7 for his career.

Jones would offer the Kings a reliable backup point guard to handle the minutes that Fox sits. Adding him would keep shooting on the floor and let Malik Monk give up some on-ball responsibility, which can be important during the occasional stretches where Monk starts to get wild with the ball. Jones could also work with Sabonis to get to an effective pick and roll offense when nothing else is working—Jones runs about 4.6 pick and rolls a game and generates 1.06 points per possession as the ball handler per NBA.com.

Jones is paid $14 million this season, so to get him the Kings would probably need to send out either Huerter, Monk, or Davion Mitchell + another player. Given Jones’ pending free agency, the return doesn’t seem worth sending Monk or Huerter out the door, so a deal involving Mitchell + Chris Duarte/Kessler Edwards/Javale McGee/Alex Len seems far more appealing for the Kings. But that would cost the Kings quite a bit on the defensive end and would limit the types of line-ups they could roll out in the playoffs. Plus, other than maybe Mitchell, it’s hard to see the Wizards really valuing any of those players in return. Thus, given there probably will be a solid market for Jones at the deadline, the Kings would likely have to give up a future pick (probably a second) to get a deal done.

Verdict: Pass on Jones. The Kings would have to give up too much to get Jones, including players that matter to the team’s line-up flexibility this year. Adding Jones would help settle the Kings down offensively when Fox sits, but Jones probably isn’t good enough to make the Kings’ late game line-ups, and it would cost the Kings in terms of defensive flexibility. I like Jones as a player, but this one doesn’t make a ton of sense.

Hornets Trade Targets

The Hornets are one of the NBA’s most forgotten teams. They’re not as bad as the Pistons or Wizards, so nobody really harps on them. They’ve also suffered from a ton of injuries, including to their only star player LaMelo Ball, so they’re not that interesting to watch either. Ball led the Hornets to 43 wins just a couple seasons ago, and young players like Brandon Miller and Mark Williams (if he can stay healthy) look like they can form part of a healthy core going forward. Everybody else should be tradeable, as the Hornets showed last week by dealing Terry Rozier to the Heat for Kyle Lowry (who probably won’t play for them) and a protected first rounder.

Miles Bridges

I’m going to preface this by saying Miles Bridges has been accused of several heinous acts of domestic violence and pleaded no contest to felony domestic violence charges in 2022. He missed the entirety of last season and was given a 30 game suspension by the NBA as a result (he was credited with 20 games for missing last year and missed another 10 games to start this season). He’s also been recently arrested just last October for allegedly violating a protection order, threatening his ex-girlfriend, and throwing pool balls at her car with children in the vehicle. That hasn’t been adjudicated yet, but the allegations are bad.

As a defense lawyer by trade, I’m generally in favor of second chances, but I am not in favor of trading for Bridges based on his off-the-court behavior alone. I’ll reserve judgement on the latest arrest warrant, but it is absolutely something to be concerned about. The repeat nature of the domestic violence allegations and Bridges’ lack of public contrition are dealbreakers for me (even though I understand why he isn’t talking about these issues publicly). I want to state that up front.

I’ll go through the on-court piece quickly. At 25 years old, Bridges has all the tools to be a hugely productive SF/PF in the modern NBA. He’s just 6’7” but he has a powerful, 225+ pound frame; he’s a better athlete than the vast majority of NBA players; he’s an effective three-level scorer; he rebounds at a high level for his position; he keeps the ball moving on offense. Advanced metrics paint him as an above average defender, too. Dunks and Threes gives him a Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of about 0.0, which is the 64th percentile, and you could imagine that figure improving if he were on a more competitive team and gave more consistent effort.

Bridges is the kind of on-court player that the Kings would really benefit from adding, as his skill set would improve their defense and rebounding without sacrifice much offensively. But it’s impossible to ignore that the only reason Bridges is theoretically available is because of his off-court actions. Players like him don’t normally become available at age 25 otherwise.

Bridges’ off-court issues have also put him into a difficult contract situation that makes trading for him very challenging even if the Kings were willing to give him a second chance. Bridges signed a 1 year, $7.9 million contract this off-season following his no contest plea, missed season, and lengthy suspension. We don’t need to cover all of the rules surrounding one-year deals, but there are a few important points that stem from Bridges signing that deal:

• Bridges can veto trades;

• Bridges’ Bird rights won’t travel to any team that trades for him (the details of Bird rights aren’t important here, but I described the concept in part two already); and

• Because teams trading for Bridges will not have Bird rights, they would only be able to re-sign him using cap space or a cap exception—for example, the largest available cap exception is the non-taxpayer midlevel exception (which I discussed in part three), which was only $12.4 million this season.

These factors combined would make it very hard for the Kings to pull off a deal for Bridges even if they wanted to. The Kings are already over the cap next season, so they’d be limited to re-signing Bridges with a cap exception. The most they could even theoretically offer Bridges is a contract with a starting salary of about $12.4 million (the non-taxpayer MLE should go up slightly next season) and 5% annual raises. It’s hard to know what the market for Bridges will be like as a free agent given his off-court issues, but that is probably the floor of what Bridges will seek in free agency (he was looking at a contract worth upwards of $25 million a year before the domestic violence issues came to light).

In all likelihood, Bridges wouldn’t agree to a trade to a team with no cap space like the Kings. Even if Bridges didn’t veto a deal, the Kings wouldn’t have any way to ensure they could re-sign him next season, which significantly limits how much the Kings could justify giving up in a trade. Add to that the off-the-court issues and PR nightmare that would result from dealing for Bridges, and there’s just no way to make a trade for Bridges make sense.

Verdict: Don’t even think about it.

PJ Washington

Charlotte does have a more desirable trade target on its roster in 25 year old, 6’7” power forward PJ Washington. He’s on the short side for his position, but he’s a good athlete who can play with force on offense and defense, though he needs to bring that force much more consistently.

Washington brings solid versatility on the offensive end. He’s a decent three point shooter (just 34.8% this year, but he shoots 36.3% from three for his career) and knows that he needs to shoot from distance to be at his most valuable, so he focuses on those shots. He’s strong and athletic for his size, so he can hit a high percentage on shots inside 10 feet and threaten on the offensive glass. But he lacks the handle and creativity to really get quality interior shots on his own, and he doesn’t have a back-to-the-basket game to lean on to otherwise generate consistent interior scoring himself.

Defensively, Washington has the strength to hold up against most forwards and be an adequate rebounder for his position. He doesn’t offer a ton of rim protection, but he still posts decent block rates and he does a reasonable job of keeping his hands active and generating steals. Most years, he’s graded out well as a defender, though it is notable that this season his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has dropped to below average this year at just -1.2, per Dunks and Threes.

Washington signed a 3 year, $46.5 million contract this off-season that actually declines year over year. That’s a pretty favorable contract that offers a good value opportunity if Washington can return to his defensive form from previous seasons. To acquire Washington, the Kings could send out either Barnes or Huerter, whose salaries come pretty close to matching Washington’s $16.9 million salary for this season. Barnes doesn’t really make sense for Charlotte, but they might benefit from adding a floor spacer like Huerter. There are a few other salary matching alternatives given the Kings would only need to send out about $9.35 million in salary. The Kings could trade some combination of Trey Lyles ($8 million), Sasha Vezenkov ($6.3 million), Javale McGee ($5.7 million), Davion Mitchell ($5.1 million), and Chris Duarte ($4.1 million) and the deal could work.

Charlotte would presumably seek draft compensation back too. The Hornets don’t need to trade Washington and his contract is not massive, so they’re probably going to want meaningful draft compensation—like a first round pick or multiple seconds—regardless of what players come back to them in a deal. How much draft capital they’d be willing to take will depend on how much interest Washington draws ahead of the deadline, whether the salary they get back is expiring (e.g., McGee), and whether they think younger players they get back like Mitchell or Duarte have future value. Given Charlotte probably will end up keeping Bridges next year (they’re the only team that has already taken the PR hit from having him on the roster and the only one that has Bird rights), they will have a good amount of front court depth already, and might be willing to part with Washington in favor of finding guards to supplemental Ball, Miller, and maybe Nick Smith Jr., also a first round pick this year.

Verdict: Only if it’s a bargain—and don’t give up anything unprotected! I think Washington would be a better defensive fit for the Kings than current starter Harrison Barnes. While he suffers from some of the same flaws defensively as Barnes (lack of size/length and little rim protection), he is a better athlete and rebounder. Washington can hold up a little better than Barnes against quicker forwards, he does a better job of handling pick and roll defense, and he offers a little bit more as a rebounder. There would definitely be a step-back in shooting, but Washington is good enough as a shooter and active enough on offense to hopefully mitigate the impact. That said, this isn’t a home run deal, and getting a trade done probably means the Kings would end up with two undersized forwards: Washington and Barnes. Thus, a trade only really makes sense if you can work out the right deal and not overpay in terms of future draft equity. If the Kings could send out Trey Lyles, Chris Duarte, and multiple second rounders, a deal could make sense as a “diet” version of a trade for Kyle Kuzma.

Raptors Trade Targets

The Raptors have gone into sale mode already, as they’ve already moved on from two of their best players in OG Anounoby and Pascal Siakam. They still have a couple players on the roster who are pretty obvious trade candidates, so there’s a good chance they do at least one more deal. They’ve shown at least some preference for on-court fits, but they did take picks back for Siakam. Either way, their best trade candidates have either already been traded or are effectively untouchable (Scottie Barnes and Immanuel Quickley ain’t going anywhere).

Gary Trent Jr.

Gary Trent Jr. is the most obvious next trade candidate for Toronto given he’s a pending free agent.

Trent Jr. is a 6’5” shooting guard whose calling card is his three point shooting. He’s a career 38.7% three point shooter on good volume (the last four seasons, he’s taken between 10.5 and 11.6 threes per 100 possessions), and most teams can find a place for that kind of floor spacer. Trent plays to his strengths and stays within himself. He understands that his job is to create space, play off of more prolific scorers, and not turn the ball over—he plays that role well.

Trent Jr. is also capable of playing effective defense, though he’s slipped a bit this season. He’s never been elite on defense, but when Trent Jr. locks in, he does a good job of chasing shooters, closing out, and staying engaged. In past years, he’s done well generating steals, although that’s dropped off some this year. A relative lack of length and so-so NBA athleticism means that he can get beat at times on dribble-drives, and he’s not tall enough to bother every perimeter shooter. That’s usually fine since only a handful of players can do that consistently.

That said, there’s some reason to be concerned that Trent Jr.’s defensive performance has dropped off a bit this year. I’ve already mentioned his drop in steal rate, but multiple other defensive metrics also point to a small drop off. For example, Trent Jr.’s Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has dropped from 0.2 to -1.3 per Dunks and Threes and his Defensive Box Plus/Minus has dropped from 0.0 to -1.3 per Basketball Reference. The Raptors are also giving up about 5.2 points per 100 possessions more with Trent Jr. on the floor this season, which is up from previous years. He’s also getting fewer deflections and contesting fewer shots compared to the last two years, which is only partly explained by him playing fewer minutes. Per NBA.com, Trent Jr. is getting about 1.7 deflections and contesting 1.3 shots per game this season, down from 2.7 deflections and 2.3 shot contests per game last season and 3.4 deflections and 2.9 shot contests per game in 2021-22.

Still, Trent Jr.’s age (25) and shooting ability are enough to get the Raptors back something of value in a trade. Teams always need shooting, and there’s at least a chance that his defense improves back to where it was the last couple of seasons.

Trading for Trent Jr. is where challenges come up for the Kings. Trent Jr.’s salary this season is just under $18.6 million, so the Kings would need to put together about $11.1 million in salary to have a workable deal. The easiest way to get there is trading Huerter, but that would see the Kings basically dealing a shooter for a shooter. Sure, Trent Jr. has a chance at being better defensively than Huerter, but that hasn’t really been on display this year, he would have to regain his previous defensive form to do so. Huerter also has two years left under contract after this season, whereas Trent Jr. may just end up a short-term rental. Unfortunately, there also isn’t really another good option to match salary. The Kings could compile a bunch of miscellaneous salaries under $6 million (McGee, Mitchell, Duarte, Len, and Edwards) and hope to get to the minimum of $11.1 million, but it’s not clear why Toronto would want to take back so many players that they can’t even roster, especially when some of them will carry extra salary into next season when Toronto will have to pay Immanuel Quickley a raise. If the deal were Trent Jr. for Huerter, it’s possible Toronto would say yes without asking for any draft capital—but for a mishmash of back end rotation players, they’d probably demand at least a second round pick. That’s not unreasonable, but the Kings might be better able to put those resources to use on targeting a player with stronger perimeter defensive skills—shooting hasn’t really been the issue in Sacramento.

Verdict: Pass on Trent Jr. Even though Trent Jr. would be a nice addition, he’s no guarantee to stay with the team and his salary situation makes designing a deal for him challenging. He would probably bring better defense than Huerter, but he’s not a strong enough defender to warrant trading away a similar offensive player on a medium-term, manageable contract in Huerter.

Bruce Brown

Bruce Brown (27) would probably be a better trade target for the Kings. Brown has a bit of a unique role in the NBA—he’s one of a handful of 6’5” and under players who basically play like power forwards.

Brown made his way into the NBA as a non-shooting guard, so he had to make his money by hustling, playing defense, rebounding at a high level for his position, and generally being a pest on the floor. It’s a useful role for any team, and Brown fills it perfectly.

In the last couple of years, Brown has evolved to at least become a passable three point shooter. Last year, he hit 35.8% of his threes and took about 3.2 threes per game. That helped him secure a two year, $45 million deal this past off-season (there is a club option for the second year, which is valuable flexibility for teams). Those numbers have dipped a bit this year to 32.7% from three on 3.0 threes per game, but that’s still within the realm of “expected” for Brown. He’s still got the same motor, and he’s still operating as a effort glue guy on offense.

Defensively, Brown has always been good though short of elite. He's always active, bull-strong, and he isn’t afraid to guard anyone (though at 6’4”, he can be at a significant height disadvantage at times). He’s not a defensive stopper, but he will do all of the little things that teams need—rebounding, getting to loose balls, getting his hands in passing lanes, and just generally pestering opponents.

Brown has been with Toronto for less than two weeks; he arrived as part of the Raptors trade sending Siakam to Indiana. He’s not attached to the team and they haven’t really integrated him into their roster. There’s a good chance the Raptors deal Brown this season they would need to shell out $23 million next season to pick up Brown’s team option on top of having to pay Quickley.

As with Trent Jr., the tough part about the Kings trading for Brown is who they’d have to give up. To match Brown’s $22 million salary, the Kings could trade Barnes or Huerter. Trading Barnes would be tough to do, as it would make the Kings even smaller in the front court than they already are. Trading Huerter could work, but there’s a question whether Brown is a big enough improvement over Huerter to justify paying an extra $6-7 million in salary next season and giving up a contract year in 2025-26. The Kings could again try to piece together back-end roster pieces to get to the requisite $14.5 million in outgoing salary, but that’s going to be even harder to do than getting to $11.1 million for Trent Jr.—I’m not sure Toronto would want to play ball.

Verdict: Only if the Kings can’t swing other trades for defenders. Ultimately, I think it would take too much to get a deal for Brown to work. I like Brown’s game, and swapping Huerter for him could help the Kings enough on defense to justify the deal, but there are probably better trades options available that either yield bigger improvements or less disruption to the current roster. The Kings could give up a little more draft equity than they would have to give up for Brown and bring back better defensive fits like Alex Caruso or Dorian Finney-Smith. They could also look at smaller deals for guys who can add to the defense, like Kris Dunn or Matisse Thybulle, yet wouldn’t force the Kings to send out starters/rotation pieces like Huerter and Barnes.

Other Possible Targets

Naji Marshall

I really like Naji Marshall’s game. He’s on the back end of the Pelicans rotation, but when he comes in, he plays hard on defense and bugs the hell out of everyone on the court. He’s got size and he uses it well to play hard-nosed defense. He plays a bit like a bigger Bruce Brown, although not quite as impactful. He’s not a great offensive player, though he can do just enough to stay relevant. He’s willing to mix it up on the offensive glass and he’s upped his shooting this year to 37.6% from three, which would be enough to keep defenses honest if he can sustain it (that could be a bit of a mirage, he doesn’t take a ton of threes).

Because the Pelicans have crazy depth on the wing, the 26 year old Marshall doesn’t see a ton of minutes, only about 18 per game. He’s a free agent next year too, and it’s pretty unlikely the Pelicans can bring him back—they’re already paying $119 million to Zion Williamson, Brandon Ingram, CJ McCollum, and Herb Jones combined, and they need to think about re-signing Jonas Valanciunas this off-season and extending Trey Murphy III after next year. So he’s ripe for a trade.

Marshall’s salary is tiny by NBA standards at just $1.9 million, so there’s no real salary match concerns. The biggest question is whether the Pelicans would let him walk to a competitor this year (although the Pels have owned the Kings so far this year, so maybe they don’t care).

Verdict: Do it! If the Kings can snag Marshall for a second round pick, they should do it. At the very least, he’s a defensive option the Kings can go to when they need to muddy up games.

Bojan Bogdanovic

I feel obliged to at least mention Bojan Bogdanovic. He’s a good player on a bad team in Detroit, and his name comes up more often than maybe anyones in trade discussions.

I don’t think he’s a good target for the Kings. Bogdanovic is a good scorer and very strong perimeter shooter, but he offers little on defense, where the Kings need to improve the most. He’s also on a salary that would presumably require the Kings to send back Barnes or Huerter in a deal, and that doesn’t seem worth it given Detroit is probably going to ask for at least a first rounder to send Bogdanovic anywhere. I would concede that he’s probably a better player than Huerter or Barnes in a vacuum, but swapping Huerter for him would make the Kings perimeter defense slower and swapping him for Barnes would actually hurt the Kings rebounding.

Verdict: Not worth it.

Andrew Wiggins

This one is fascinating. The Warriors are 19-24 and sitting in 12th place in the Western Conference—over halfway through the season, it’s not clear whether they’re going to even make the play in. Obviously, the Warriors have rebounded from subpar seasons before, but there’s a glaring issue this time on top of their age. According to Spotrac, the Warriors’ payroll for this season is just over $206.9 million and they are facing a luxury tax bill of $186.3 million. In other words, the Warriors are going to have a roster that costs over $393 million just to maybe miss the play-in. That would be an ignominious record to hold, and presumably something that the Warriors’ ownership isn’t thrilled about.

Things would naturally improve for the Warriors next year if they let Klay Thompson walk in free agency, but they may not want to do that. While Thompson isn’t the player he used to be, he’s still one of the franchises greatest players, so they probably don’t want to push him out the door if they can avoid it.

Assuming they do want to keep Thompson, the Warriors have limited options. The three obvious ones are:

• Try to improve the current roster. This path could be really hard, as the Warriors have a lot of salary already on the roster and a limited about of young players and future draft picks to send out in a trade. It’s also an uphill battle given the Warriors’ current seeding.

• Trade Chris Paul. Paul is under contract through 2024-25 at a salary of $30 million, so sending him out the door would give the Warriors the ability to pay Thompson without going too far back into the luxury tax.

• Trade Andrew Wiggins. This is the scenario the Kings care about. Wiggins is under contract through the 2025-26 season and has a player option in 2026-27 at a salary of $30.2 million. He’s being paid $24.3 million this year.

Wiggins is a 6’7” wing with tremendous physical ability. He’s got great size, length, and athleticism, and during the 2022 season and playoff run, he put together a remarkable stretch of defensive play that helped lead the Warriors to an NBA championship. He always had the physical tools, but it appeared that Wiggins had finally unlocked his defensive potential. At the same time, he was also improving his three point shooting, hitting a then-career high 39.3% of his threes on 5.5 threes per game in 2022. Combined with a versatile offensive skillset, it looked like Wiggins was coming into his own and becoming a really good wing player.

Wiggins played similarly in 2022-23, though with a slight decrease in efficiency. That didn’t seem like a huge deal at the time—he was dealing with undisclosed off-the-court personal matters, and he was still playing effectively enough. But this year, Wiggins has run into a brick wall. To put it bluntly, he’s been awful.

Wiggins has regressed in virtually every aspect of his game. His scoring is down, his shooting has been poor from the field, three point range, and the free throw line, he’s rebounding less, he’s dishing out fewer assists, he’s turning the ball over more often, and he’s getting fewer steals and blocks than he has in his previous two seasons with the Warriors. This drop off is perhaps best encapsulated by a precipitous fall in is Estimated Plus-Minus, which has gone from a career high 1.5 in 2022-23 to a career low -4.2 this season according to Dunks and Threes (Basketball Reference’s Box Plus/Minus stat tells a similar story: Wiggins has gone from 0.4 in 2021-22 to -5.2 this season).

You see the drop-off watching Wiggins play this year. He’s missing shots regardless of how open he is, he’s playing timidly on offense, and he’s barely exerting any influence on games defensively. Wiggins has played well in maybe a half-dozen games on the season (one happened to be against Sacramento in November, but luckily the Kings won), which is a minuscule number for a starter, much less a guy getting paid upwards of $25 million per year.

Wiggins has always been demure on the court, but over the past few seasons, he’d really found his footing as a player. Now, it’s like he’s reverted to how he played his rookie season—it’s baffling.

So why might he be of interest to the Kings?

At his best, Wiggins offers quality shooting, some one-on-one scoring ability, and enough size and quickness to put pressure on the rim from cuts. He also is capable of being a strong head-up defender, and he has the sort of length and quickness to offer really strong help defense, even offering respectable rim protection as a weak side helper despite not being a natural power forward. Combining Wiggins’ length and perimeter defense (when he’s right) with Keegan Murray would go extremely far in solving the Kings’ difficulties defending the perimeter, and he could even offer reasonable interior defense against forwards.

The Kings have to be curious if this year’s version of Wiggins is a fluke. The Warriors are wondering that too. That ambiguity makes it pretty hard to decipher whether the Warriors will ultimately move Wiggins but their cap situation is going to force them to think about it.

If Wiggins does come available, the Warriors would presumably be looking for salary cap relief first. They probably won’t, and shouldn’t, look to rebuild while Steph Curry is still playing at an All-NBA level, so they may be interested in taking back players who can provide on-court help (at least compared to Wiggins’ production this year) at a lower salary, even if they have to give up the potential that Wiggins returns to form.

Because Wiggins has a salary of just over $24.3 million this year, salary matching will be a bit tricky for the Kings—they would most likely have to include either Harrison Barnes or Huerter in a deal. The Kings could offer (1) Barnes plus light draft assets (think second rounders or a protected first) or (2) Huerter plus a back-end rotation player like Chris Duarte or Kessler Edwards, perhaps again with light draft assets.

Those offers, objectively, don’t give amazing return for the Warriors, but it would get them the cap relief they need and bring back at least one player that can contribute right away in Barnes or Huerter, and both of them have been better than Wiggins this year anyway.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Ultimately, if Wiggins becomes available, the Kings should check in on it. They can make an offer that would be useful, but there’s definitely a solid chance other teams would top it. That said, the Kings shouldn’t go crazy trying to get Wiggins. Wiggins has been shockingly bad this year, but if that is the new reality for him (he was bad at the start of his career too), he’s going to be a salary cap problem for several years, as he has at least another three years under contract—probably four if he is really this bad, as he would pick up his player option for 2026-27. Trading for Wiggins would be such a high risk/reward play that the Kings shouldn’t pay handsomely to do it.

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 3): The Kings’ Current Roster Dictates Potential Deals

[This is part three of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline.]

In the first post from this series, I looked at what areas the Kings have struggled with so far this year that need to be improved upon. Like many observers, I think the biggest issues are the team’s struggles defending the rim and the three point line, but they also need to find ways to generate more offense when De’Aaron Fox sits to rekindle their top-notch offense from last year (while shooting from 2 point range and free throws still need to improve, those issues aren’t as easy to address through trades). Part two of this series looked at what the Kings can send out in potential trades and how the NBA’s rules governing player- and draft-pick trades will affect what the Kings can actually deal, which in turn governs what they’ll be able to potentially get back in a deal.

Now, we’re on to part three, where it’s time to start thinking about the Kings’ own roster situation and what it means for trades they might consider. To do that effectively, I want to think about two things in this post:

1. What is the Kings salary cap situation right now, and what should they expect in the near- and medium-term?

2. What are the on-court needs the Kings should be looking to fill?

For simplicity, I’ll go in the order above.

The Kings’ Salary Cap Situation

I wrote about what the Kings have available to trade last week, including draft capital. Those matter to the team’s long-term future, but the Kings are actually in a pretty good position going forward, as they own all but one of their future first round picks and they have plenty of future second rounders. But retaining future cap space and staying under the luxury tax (as well as the first and second aprons) are important considerations.

The CBA Rules: Caps, Taxes, and Contracts

NBA teams always have to think about their roster in terms of the salary cap as well as the NBA’s luxury tax line (and the more restrictive aprons above the luxury tax line, the first apron and the second apron). I’ve explained the basic rules on this before, but since the last post I made got really into the weeds, I will only quickly summarize things here for convenience.

The basic rules of the salary cap are simple: teams can’t sign players above the salary cap unless they find an exception that allows them to do so. Those exceptions cover things like extending players already on the team’s roster, signing players the team drafts, trading for players, and signing free agents at certain specified salary levels. The net result is that teams above the cap are restricted in how they can operate.

The basic luxury tax rules are also pretty simple. If a team’s salary for the year is at or above the luxury tax line, they pay an additional tax per dollar they are over the line, and that tax is redistributed to the teams below the luxury tax line. Those taxes get increasingly onerous as the team moves higher and higher above the luxury tax line or if they are repeatedly paying luxury tax in multiple years.

Teams above the first and second aprons face increasingly restrictive rules about how they manage their roster. For simplicity, suffice it to say that teams generally want to avoid being above the first or second apron so they can continue to make roster moves easily.

In any given season, the salary cap is set by the league based on basketball-related revenue from the prior year, while the luxury tax line, the first apron, and the second apron, are all calculated based on the salary cap. For this season (2023-24), the salary cap is $136.21 million, the luxury tax line is $165.294 million, the first apron is $172.346 million, and the second apron is $182.794 million. It’s impossible to know precisely what each of these thresholds will be in future seasons, but we can expect that these thresholds will increase most years by up to 10% (the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dictates that the salary cap can grow by up to 10% per year, but cannot decrease in any given season).

There are also several player salary levels that have to be calculated based on the salary cap. Simply put, the starting salary that teams can offer to players depends on what kind of contract they offer, and the starting salary amounts of many types of contracts are calculated based on a percentage of the salary cap. This is really important, as it dictates how teams can re-sign their own players, sign free agents above the salary cap, and whether the team can make trades for players whose salaries would put them over the salary cap (or the first or second aprons).

This has huge impacts on the trade market and free agent market.

The key types of contracts that are dictated by the salary cap are listed below, but they fall into a couple buckets: max contracts, rookie extensions, and salary cap exceptions. HoopsRumors has pretty good articles on max contracts and salary cap exceptions if you want extra detail there.

• “Max” contracts: Max contracts get complicated and it’s not necessarily worth going into all the detail here, but at a basic level, teams can offer players “max” salary contracts that allow the player to be paid up to a percentage of the salary cap based on the player’s level of NBA experience (or, if greater, up to 105% of their previous season’s salary).

  These “max” salaries can be equal to up to 25% of the salary cap for players with less than seven years of experience, 30% of the salary cap for players with seven to nine years of experience, and 35% of the salary cap for players with 10+ years of experience. For the 2023-24 season, this equates to about $34.0 million, $40.8 million, and $47.6 million respectively.

  These contracts can be up to five years long and include raises of up to 8% per season for players re-signing with their current team (5% for players signing with a new team).

• “Supermax” contracts: In limited situations, teams can also offer players what are informally known as “supermax” contracts (which actually covers a few different “designated veteran” situations).

  Simply put, star players who meet certain eligibility and performance criteria can be offered contracts (or contract extensions) of up to six seasons at starting salaries up to 30% or 35% of the cap. Normally, players are only eligible for five year deals, and the max salary can only get to 35% of the cap for players with 10+ years of service.

  These supermax contracts are generally only available to players with 7-9 years of experience who haven’t changed teams (with some limited exceptions, including if a player was traded in their first four years).

  To be eligible, prior to being offered a supermax, the player also has to meet the following supermax performance criteria:

  • win an MVP in any of the three preceding seasons;

  • be named to an All-NBA team or be named Defensive Player of the Year (DPOY) in the immediately preceding season; or

  • be named to an All-NBA team or be named DPOY in any two of the preceding three seasons.

  This is highly relevant for the Kings, as De’Aaron Fox may become eligible for a supermax extension soon. In fact, Fox turned down a “max” extension before the 2023-24 season in the hopes that he will become eligible for a supermax deal before his current contract expires after the 2025-26 season.

• Rookie extensions: Certain rookie extensions can function similarly to the supermax (conceptually).

  Normally, rookies selected in the first round receive two year deals with team options for the third and fourth year, and they’re only eligible to receive contract extensions after their third season. These extensions get capped at of 25% of the salary cap (or, if greater, 105% of the salaary in the last season of their contract) because they have less than seven years of NBA service.

  But rookies who meet the “supermax” performance criteria that I described previously can receive a salary in the first year of their extension of up to 30% of the salary cap.

  This probably won’t apply to any of the Kings’ players on their rookie deals.

• Non-taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “non-taxpayer MLE”, this exception allows teams above the salary cap, but below the first apron, to sign a player at a first year salary of up to 9.12% of the salary cap—set at $12.4 million for the 2023-24 season. Non-taxpayer MLE contracts can be for up to four years and may include salary raises or decreases of up to 5% per year.

  Teams can also split their non-taxpayer MLE to sign multiple players.

  The non-taxpayer MLE is only available to teams below the first apron. So if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE (the precise amount of the taxpayer MLE, discussed below), that team will be “hard capped” at the first apron. In other words, if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE in 2023-24, it cannot have its team salary go above the first apron for that season even another exception would normally be available.

  Practically speaking, the non-taxpayer MLE often becomes the de facto starting salary “price” for free agent rotation players, as several teams can usually offer it in free agency.

  Teams below the salary cap (referred to as having “room”) can’t use the exception because they’re below the cap.

• Taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “taxpayer MLE,” this exception is similar to the MLE but less favorable. It is available to teams above the first apron but below the second apron.

  Like the non-taxpayer MLE, teams can still split their taxpayer MLE between multiple players and offer salary raises or increases of 5% per year, but the amount available and maximum contract length are lesser. The taxpayer MLE was set at $5 million for the 2023-24 season (even though not set as a percentage of the salary cap for this season, the taxpayer MLE will increase based on the salary cap in future seasons).

  Teams can’t use the non-taxpayer MLE and the taxpayer MLE at the same time.

  Similar to the non-taxpayer MLE, because the taxpayer MLE is not available to teams above the second apron, if a team uses its taxpayer MLE, it will be hard capped at the second apron.

• Bi-annual exception: the “bi-annual exception” is another exception to the salary cap that teams can use . . . wait for it . . . every two years. The bi-annual exception is set as a percentage (3.32%) of the salary cap; for the 2023-24 season, teams could offer starting salaries up to $3.382 million, with the same 5% raises per year, for up to two seasons.

  Teams can’t use the bi-annual exception to exceed the first apron.

• Room exception: officially titled the “mid-level salary exception for room teams” but better known as the “room exception,” this exception can only be used by teams whose salary falls below the salary cap in a given year—it’s essentially an alternative to the non-taxpayer MLE and taxpayer MLE.

  Once a room team uses up its salary cap space, it can use the room exception to sign a player (or multiple players) for a starting salary equal to up to 5.678% of the salary cap, about $7.72 million for the 2023-24 season. In other words, if the team has salary cap space, it can use that space to sign free agents and then get a room exception to sign additional players above the salary cap. Room exception contracts can be up to three seasons long and can include the same 5% raises per year as the other exceptions described above.

  Teams can’t use the room exception and any of the non-taxpayer MLE, taxpayer MLE, or bi-annual exception in the same year—so essentially if the team is eligible for the room exception, it’s not eligible for those other exceptions.

• There are other exceptions, but they’re not as relevant here and/or not inherently tied to the salary cap’s changes.

How Do Cap & Contract Rules Affect the Kings?

For the 2023-24 season, the Kings already have about $150 million committed in salary and other cap hits (we don’t need to go into detail on dead cap holds and other cap holds, but they combine with the actual roster salary to count against the salary cap). That puts the Kings about $14 million above the salary cap ($136.21 million) and little more than $15 million below the luxury tax line.

As a small market team that can’t rely as much on huge revenues from other sources (concert fees, parking fees, etc. typically get retained by the team), the Kings are likely to try to stay below the luxury tax whenever they can, unless they’re truly in championship contention. Staying below the luxury tax line ensures both that the Kings won’t pay luxury tax and that they are eligible to receive luxury tax distributions, which can be worth over $10 million for each non-tax team. By the same token, the Kings are generally likely to stay below the first apron and second apron in most years, saving them some additional headaches with roster construction and cap compliance.

Regardless, the Kings have to manage their salary cap in future seasons and be mindful of the luxury tax line (and the aprons) from year to year. To do so, they have to be mindful of what contracts they have and how long they run, and what contracts they expect to give out. The team surely has its own internal trackers, but for us members of the public, Spotrac has nifty trackers showing the contract and salary situations for each team—a year by year tracker of the Kings salary cap situation by year is available here.

The Kings are projected to be over the cap in each of 2024-25, 2025-26, and 2026-27. [Note: Spotrac is doing something funky with the cap projections. They project 4.4% growth in the salary cap in the 2024-25 season, which the NBA has projected, but they assume a 10% growth rate in all subsequent seasons. I don’t know how realistic that is (I suspect it over-predicts the rate of cap growth), but I will use it for now.].

The chart below shows the Kings roster count and team salaries by year, compared to the projected salary cap and luxury tax lines using Spotrac’s growth projections, with some assumptions. Specifically, the chart assumes that all team options are exercised and all cap holds get renounced; the chart also excludes all 10-day and two-way player contracts, which are short-term and for negligible sums. Numbers in red show the Kings will be over the salary cap or luxury tax line, as applicable.

[Chart 1]

What jumps out from Chart 1 is that the Kings will be about $7.4 million over the cap next season (2024-25) before filling out their 15-man roster, and they will be just $16.8 million under the cap two seasons from now (2025-26) with just seven players.

Kings Salary Cap in 2024-25

The Kings will be $7.4 million over the cap in 2024-25 with only 10 players on the roster. They would also be able to add only $23.1 million of salary before creeping into the luxury tax. But that total salary doesn’t account for the Kings re-signing Malik Monk, who will be a free agent after this season, nor does it account for any 2024 draft picks the Kings might need to sign or other roster spots they might fill at the veteran’s minimum.

In other words, if the Kings want to re-sign Monk at a starting salary of $17.4 million (which they can offer him), they’re going to be at least $24.8 million over the cap with an 11-man roster. Assuming they fill out the rest of the roster for the veterans minimum of about $2.1 million (this value will also change based on the cap, but we’re fudging here for simplicity), the Kings would be about $33.2 million over the cap. At the same time, they’d push over the luxury tax line by about $3.1 million.

Any trade the Kings make needs to keep this reality in mind. If they make a trade that takes back salary, the team will need to manage the roster so that they can trade players to get under the luxury tax line if needed. If the team is super competitive, ownership may be willing to stay above the luxury tax line for a season or two, but any prospective trade analysis needs to keep a path out of the luxury tax in mind. Players like Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte can all be free agents after the 2024-25 season, meaning there would be some value to keeping one or more of them on the roster as a way to trade out of the luxury tax during the 2024-25 season if it becomes necessary.

Mitchell and Duarte are also both eligible for extension prior to the 2024-25 season, but given they’re not fixtures in the starting line-up, it’s not clear that they will be offered substantial extensions.

De’Aaron Fox also becomes eligible for an extension at the same time, which could be enormous. I’ll talk about that more later.

Kings Salary Cap in 2025-26

Based on Chart 1 (above), the Kings could actually be about $16.8 million under the cap for the 2025-26 season (two years from now), albeit with only seven players under contract (Fox, Sabonis, Barnes, Huerter, Murray, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones). But there are a few qualifiers to keep in mind.

We’ve already covered the first two: the Kings will probably want to re-sign Malik Monk and they need to fill out their roster regardless. Assuming the Kings re-sign Monk, he’s likely to be paid around $18.3 million in 2025-26. But that alone would eat through the $16.8 million of theoretical cap room that the Kings would have.

Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2025-26, the salary cap would be about $156.2 million, the luxury tax line would be about $189.8 million, the first apron would be about $197.9 million, and the second apron would be about $209.9 million. With Monk, the team’s salary would be about $157.7 million; adding seven more players at the veteran’s minimum would bring the team salary to about $173.1 million—over the cap but under the luxury tax.

The other issues are pending free agency for Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte. Trey Lyles will be an unrestricted free agent before the 2025-26 season, so the Kings will need to decide whether to bring him back. Maybe Lyles would come back at the veteran’s minimum, but more likely he’d seek more money elsewhere. Meanwhile, Mitchell and Duarte will be restricted free agents assuming they don’t agree to extensions beforehand. The Kings would need to decide whether to renounce their matching right for any contract that Mitchell and/or Duarte sign with another team (before free agency starts). I suspect that will happen, but if the Kings were to keep their matching rights, the team would then need to decide whether to let them go if an offer sheet gets too rich.

After the 2025-26 season, the Kings will also need to decide whether to offer an extension to Keegan Murray and what that looks like. Given he’s a core player, it’s likely the Kings would agree to a big extension with Murray, but it’s tough to predict exactly what that will look like—it will depend a lot on his growth the rest of this season and in the 2024-25 season. Murray getting an extension worth $35-45 million per year (starting the 2026-27 season) is well within the realm of possibility given his age, elite shooting, defensive potential, and positional flexibility—this would actually be a pretty great scenario for the Kings, as it would mean Murray has continued to develop into something like a top 50 player in the league overall. This won’t affect the team’s salary cap situation much during the 2025-26 season, though, as the team has a $11.1 million option for Murray that they’re going to exercise.

Kings Salary Cap in 2026-27

This is where things get a little wild.

Only two players are technically under contract for 2026-27, Domantas Sabonis and Colby Jones (assuming the Kings exercise his team option), and the team is projected to be about $121.3 million below the cap.

But as I’ve noted, the Kings will probably have re-signed Monk and agreed to extensions with Fox and Murray. Monk’s contract will probably be around $20 million by 2026-27 and Murray (assuming he continues to develop) is likely to be paid around $40 million.

That would put the Kings at $51.3 million below the cap, with just Sabonis, Jones, Monk, and Murray under contract.

But what about the team’s star, De’Aaron Fox? As I noted, Fox turned down a two year, $105 million extension that would have carried his contract through the 2027-28 season in the hopes of becoming eligible for a supermax. If Fox makes an All-NBA team this year or next year, he can sign a five year extension starting in 2026-27. That extension would have a starting salary in 2026-27 worth up to 35% of the cap, which equates to about $60.1 million. If he doesn’t make another All-NBA team, Fox would still be eligible for a four year extension with a 2026-27 salary worth up to 30% of the cap (about $51.5 million).

The net result is that if the Kings extend Fox and Murray and re-sign Monk this off-season, their 2026-27 salary is going to put them at or above the cap with only five players under contract; the team’s salary would be around $180.6 million if Fox makes another All-NBA team, and around $172 million if he doesn’t). They would still need to fill out a roster with 10 more players, which will probably cost another $25-30 million and push the Kings’ roster salary to as much as $210 million.

Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2026-27, the salary cap would be $171.8 million, the luxury tax line would be $208.8 million, the first apron would be $217.7 million, and the second apron would be $230.9 million. That means that if the Kings trade for someone today whose salary is still on the books in 2026-27, the team could be facing extremely steep luxury tax bills and restrictions from passing the first (or even second) apron—if they want to do a trade for a star with 3+ years left on their deal, the team needs to be thinking seriously about how it’s going to cost them in dollars and flexibility down the road.

2027-28 and Beyond

This is four plus years out, so I’m not going to write much about it here since so much can change. By the 2027-28 season, the projected salary cap could be up to $189.0 million, the projected luxury tax line to $229.7 million, the projected first apron to $239.5 million, and the projected second apron to $254.0 million.

Fox and Murray, if extended, would still be on the team, as would Sabonis (whose current deal expires after the 2027-28 season). Every other roster slot is hard to project, as whomever the Kings might sign or trade for, may not be on a deal long enough to make it all the way to 2027-28.

Sabonis’ salary is set for 2027-28 at $51.2 million, but we have to do some projection for Fox and Murray. I’ll assume that Fox made his second All-NBA team before being extended and signs a supermax extension—that would put his salary at about $64.9 million in 2027-28. If Murray’s extension were to start at $40 million per year, by the 2027-28 season, he’d be paid around $42 million. That means the Fox/Sabonis/Murray trio would make over $158 million in 2027-28, hopefully still in their primes with Fox at age 30, Sabonis at age 31, and Murray at age 27.

The Kings’ On-Court Needs

Basketball is a fluid sport, and every player has an impact on both ends of the court. As a result, even after identifying areas for improvement, teams have to think about how adding and subtracting players in trades will impact their performance offensively and defensively.

Which weaknesses have to improve and which can we live with? What kinds of players can address the issues on the floor? Will addressing those flaws create new flaws, or will addressing the big weaknesses allow the team as a whole to clean up other areas too? What strengths can the team take away from to bolster a weakness, without losing so much that it creates a new weakness? These are critical questions that should drive the team’s decision-making, but how they all shake out is hard to pin down with precision.

As I noted in part one, there are three big weaknesses that I think the Kings should look to address—perimeter defense, rim protection, and how to generate offense with Fox off the court—but the Kings don’t necessarily have to address all three to improve meaningfully. On top of that, it’s probably impossible to find a single player, or even two or three players, who can address all three without taking away from what the Kings already do well. You can’t bank on getting back someone who can play strong perimeter defense, protect the rim, and create offense while not taking away from the Kings’ core strengths, Fox and Sabonis—that list is basically made up of Kawhi Leonard or Kevin Durant, and they’re not on the trading block (and Keegan Murray is already on the roster . . . ).

Rather than dream up players who can fill all three holes, one thing I usually try to do is think of player archetypes that could address a couple problem areas without causing too many issues elsewhere. I’m thinking more of a style of player than anyone in particular—for example, traditional passing point guards, rim protecting centers, 3-and-D wings, etc.

Player Types That Fit

What player archetypes make sense to add depends a lot on the players who definitely will play even after any trades. For the Kings, that list is pretty easy. De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray are the team’s core and are exceptionally unlikely to be traded, and Malik Monk is such a pivotal part of the bench unit that they’re unlikely to move him either (Monk is also set to be a free agent next season, so his value to the Kings is probably going to be higher than for teams they’re likely to trade with).

Combined, these four players have a ton of strengths, especially on offense.

The Core: Fox, Sabonis, Murray, and Monk

The Fox/Sabonis/Murray core can create effective offense regardless of who else is on the court, as there is plenty of scoring talent, shot-creation, deep shooting, passing, post-up play, and screening. Fox can create his own shots easily, Sabonis can be the hub of an effective offense when paired with shooters, and Murray’s shot-making and burgeoning midrange game slots in perfectly. Monk is also a good enough offensive player to lead an effective bench, as his shooting pairs well with either Fox or Sabonis (whose minutes are often staggered), and he also has enough shot-creation and passing ability to create offense at times, too.

But there are also some readily identifiable holes defensively. Fox and Monk are both undersized for their position and can be over-powered at times on defense. Although Fox plays effective defense for stretches and does a good job of creating steals, his offensive workload is so high that it’s no surprise you don’t want him guarding the opponent’s best backcourt player. Monk’s calling card isn’t on defense—he gets beat too often off the dribble despite good quickness and his small frame makes it hard for him to defend bigger guards. Murray is becoming a better and better defensive player, so he has been regularly tasked with guarding opposing teams’ best perimeter players, but he’s still learning how to guard a star offensive player and provide effective help defense. As a result, he’s sometimes unable to provide help and close out to top-tier perimeter players without fouling. Meanwhile, Sabonis is a great rebounder, but he offers very little rim protection, and his lack of length sometimes forces him to choose between contesting shots and rebounding position.

Offensive Archetypes

The offensive archetypes that fit with the Kings’ core depends a lot on who is playing. With Fox and Sabonis on the court, the Kings benefit most from having strong perimeter shooters. Fox can attack the paint on his own or with help from a screener like Sabonis, and Sabonis can function as the hub of the offense while Fox waits for opportune times to attack. Adding Murray also provides some bail-out protection if defenses can stop Fox, as he’s started to add mid-range and step-back jumpers to already elite shooting from three point range. When these three are on the court together, the Kings really just need guys who can hit open shots, keep the ball moving on offense, cut, and occasionally slash to the rim or handle the ball on the perimeter.

When Fox sits, though, it’s a different story. In those situations, the Kings tend to rely heavily on three offensive strategies:

1. Sabonis as the “offensive hub” at the top of the paint/elbow. The Kings run this all the time, even with Fox on the court. Sabonis has the ball in his hands up top to drag bigs away from the basket, and the Kings run good shooters around the perimeter to force defenses to focus on the three point line. Murray, Monk, Harrison Barnes, and especially Kevin Huerter do a great job of playing off of Sabonis in these sets, and they’re good enough shooters that it forces defenses into hard rotations. But the downside is there’s often no real threat to the paint because Sabonis is away from the basket (even though sometimes Sabonis will attack the paint off of the dribble), the Kings’ shooters mostly aren’t great at attacking off the dribble from this look, and the Kings don’t always do a good enough job cutting to the rim to put pressure on the paint.

2. Sabonis on the block. Sabonis is a good post-up player, especially against smaller frontcourt players who he can overpower. He relies on quick feet and strength to get good looks, as his lack of length doesn’t just allow him to go over guys. Against sturdier, strong bigs, Sabonis post ups aren’t as effective since he’s forced to rely on his quickness alone. On top of that, even though Sabonis is typically an elite passer, he has a tendency to focus on scoring from the low-block. Combined with the Kings’ other players lacking size and preference to shoot threes, when opponents double Sabonis and focus on denying the immediate three point shooters in the corner or at the wing, there’s often no other threat (such as a paint cutter or weakside attack from the opposite wing).

3. Pick and roll with Sabonis as the screener. The Kings also will run pick and rolls with Sabonis as the screener, but right now, only Monk and Davion Mitchell are really strong enough ball handlers to initiate it (the Kings have tried this with Chris Duarte but it hasn’t worked). Monk is still learning how to play the pick and roll efficiently, as it wasn’t a huge part of his game in previous seasons. He can get to shooting spots effectively and has some incredible underhand passes coming off of the screens, but he also gets too loose with the ball and hasn’t mastered where to go when the roller (Sabonis usually) is covered. Mitchell, for his part, isn’t yet a strong shooter, so defenders just duck under screens when he’s in the game, clogging up the lane and cutting off his biggest strength as a driver.

Shooters work okay for these scenarios obviously, but the Kings would really benefit from having at least one player on the roster who can do things besides provide spacing.

The Kings would benefit tremendously from adding a player who shoots well enough to act as a decent floor-spacer but who also has the size and athleticism to cut to the paint and finish, either when Sabonis is up top/at the elbow or from the weak side when Sabonis is on the low block. This would help the team threaten the paint area more when Fox sits, regardless of what big is on the floor defending Sabonis, and in turn open up shooting opportunities for the rest of the perimeter players. Murray can sometimes serve this role, but he is such a threatening shooter that it would be nice to find someone else who can add that threat while Murray acts as a spacer.

Alternatively, the Kings should find someone to help make the Sabonis pick and roll more effective when Fox is on the bench. There are basically two options here. The first is finding a player who can alternate with Monk as the pick and roll ball handler, which would free Monk up to also operate as an off-ball scorer and outside shooter, where he is really effective (the Kings often use Monk in this way when Fox is in the game), rather than to run so many pick and rolls with Sabonis. The second option letting Monk continue to be the pick and roll ball handler and add a player who can operate as an off-ball attacker and shooter. There is some benefit to this second approach, as it would let Monk continue to develop his pick and roll game.

Defensive Archetypes

The Kings defensive struggles mean there are actually quite a few areas they can stand to improve by adding players ahead of the trade deadline. Per Dunks & Threes, the Kings have just three players with a positive defensive estimated plus minus, which estimates a player’s contribution in points per 100 possessions from defense: Keegan Murray (1.3), Chris Duarte (0.9), and Domantas Sabonis (0.2). Murray and Sabonis are a part of the regular rotation, but Duarte’s playtime has been up and down as a result of struggles shooting the ball.

Most of the team’s defensive issues are apparent watching them.

Frontcourt/Paint Defense

In the frontcourt, the Kings lack shot-blocking and rebounding. Sabonis lacks length for a center and carries such an enormous rebounding burden that he cannot be relied on to block shots. Even though Javale McGee and Alex Len theoretically could provide rim protection, they both play sparingly because they’re somewhat awkward fits for the Kings fast-paced and high-post offense and they’re lack of footspeed contributes to the Kings difficulties defending pick and rolls (admittedly, this happens because the Kings guards get stuck on picks too often, too). The Kings’ other forwards (Murray, Barnes, and Lyles) are better able to handle pick and roll defense as well as guard bigs that like to get out on the perimeter, but they are all undersized to play power forward and aren’t strong rebounders or shotblockers for their positions.

Of course, these kinds of defensive trade-offs aren’t unique to the Kings. Most NBA teams have trouble defending guard-big pick and rolls, and finding frontcourt players that can block shots and rebound effectively is tough (finding someone who can block shots, rebound, and play offense is even tougher—there’s not a team in the NBA that wouldn’t love love to have Bam Adebayo).

The Kings also have to be more mindful of spacing offensively than many teams, as Sabonis largely does not shoot from the perimeter. This really narrows the possibilities, as there are very few rim protectors that can space the floor offensively in the NBA. There are 25 only players this season averaging at least 1.5 blocks per 100 possessions, who shoot at least 2.0 threes per 100 possessions, and who hit 30% or more of their threes. Half of them are guards, and several others are effectively impossible to trade for (Brook Lopez, Chet Holmgren, Anthony Davis, Joel Embiid, Kristaps Porzingis, Jaren Jackson Jr., Scottie Barnes, and Kevin Durant aren’t being dealt any time soon).

Rather than looking for a big who can block shots and shoot, the Kings instead could look for a big who can fill the void when Sabonis is off the floor. This opens up possibilities. Such a player would need to be able to rebound, defend the paint, and handle pick and rolls on defense, but offensively, they can be more limited—setting screens for Fox and Monk, moving the ball, and diving to the basket.

Alternatively, the Kings could look to bolster their perimeter unit with stronger rebounders with length, which would alleviate some of the burden on Sabonis and at least provide some opportunity for more shot contests in the paint and at the rim. None of the Kings current perimeter players (Fox, Monk, Huerter, Duarte, Mitchell) or their forwards (Barnes, Murray, Lyles, Vezenkov) really provides that now due to size limitations.

Perimeter/Backcourt Defense

The Kings also have some significant issues with perimeter defense. This is in part due to the fact that many of the Kings perimeter players are undersized, but there are also times when the Kings’ lack of quickness on defense can hamper them. The Kings give up far too many straight line drives off the dribble, either because someone isn’t quick enough to cut off the drive or gets overpowered. This forces help defenders to bite down (on the strong side) or rotate over to help weakside, which leaves open shooters. Because this happens quite a bit, the Kings help defenders tend to cheat just a bit too far off of shooters so that they can be ready to help, but the result is far too many uncontested threes.

Other than Keegan Murray, the Kings don’t really have any plus one-on-one defenders on the wing. Barnes and Lyles lack the quickness to stay in front of attacking wings, so they can get beat off the dribble too easily and give up drives to the basket, which forces help defenders to come and comprises the defense against shooters. Their lack of quickness, combined with average height/length, also means that they can’t easily play help defense and get back out to shooters when other players get beat. Huerter is quicker and has decent length for his position, but he gets caught too high and flat-footed a lot as both an on-ball defender and in help defense. He also resorts to reaching too often, so he picks up a ton of fouls on defense. This lack of quickness and defensive prowess on the wing leaves the Kings very vulnerable to shooting guards and small forwards who can shoot and drive, which is a problem since so many guys in the Western Conference can rack up points that way (Kevin Durant, Kawhi Leonard and Paul George, Jalen Williams, Luka Doncic, Brandon Ingram, etc.).

At guard, the Kings have a couple players capable of playing better defense, but they have significant size limitations generally and a couple of them are really tough to keep in the line-up due to their offensive limitations. Fox, Mitchell, Duarte, and Monk are all on the small end, and none have great length for their position. Fox can be a solid defender when he’s focused on defense, but he carries such a big responsibility on offense that he rarely locks in defensively all game, and his lack of height and bulk can mean he has trouble handling bigger guards like Anthony Edwards and James Harden. Monk is extremely athletic, but he also lacks size and is too easy for opposing guards to go through on defense. His defensive attention waxes and wanes, he gets caught on screens too often, and his close-outs are frequently too aggressive, so he often gets caught out of position. Duarte and Mitchell are better defensively, but they both struggle so much offensively that it is hard for them to find consistent minutes. Mitchell is also really undersized, which limits how he can be used defensively when Fox and Monk are on the court.

The end result is that the Kings would benefit tremendously from bigger, more athletic defenders at guard and on the wing. In addition to adding size and athleticism, they need to find at least one player who is a strong defender to help Keegan Murray anchor the perimeter defense. There’s little chance that the Kings can resolve their rim protection issues during the Sabonis minutes without a major change at power forward (or a dramatic sacrifice to spacing on offense), so the alternative is to bolster the perimeter defense substantially in the hopes they can put up enough resistance at the point of attack to reduce straight-line drives and the number of difficult help rotations that happen each game.

The Fourth and Final Part Coming Soon!

In the next—and definitely last—part of this series, I’m actually going to look at some of the trade candidates that reporters/pundits say the Kings might pursue. Pascal Siakam and OG Anounoby are off the table sadly, but that’s OK and will hopefully make my life easier. I may also throw in a couple names of players I’d think about, even if they haven’t been talked about.

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 2): In the Weeds On Trade Chips and Rules For Deals

[This is part two of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline. In part one, I wrote about some of the key issues that have crept up for the Kings so far this season, including issues on offense when De’Aaron Fox sits and on defense protecting the paint and three point line.]

The most exciting part about the trade deadline is imaging who your team might go get. Trade rumors, whispers about which players may want out, and hypothetical trades are all over the place this time of year, so it’s easy to get excited and jump right into playing with trade machines to build out your own hypos.

And honestly, who can blame you? Trade machines these days are pretty good! They’ll do most of the hard work for you. They have already listed out each player and their contract, identified draft assets held by each team, and figured out how to match salaries, all of which is critical to making any NBA trade work. Yet they still don’t do the harder work of figuring out how teams can protect against downside risk, address future cap issues, deal with looming contract decisions, and ensure roster flexibility. That part is still quite a slog.

Here, I’m going to go over what the Kings have to offer on the trade market, specifically current players and future draft picks, and I’ll try to flag the core, nitty-gritty issues that impact what can get done in a deal and the value of players and future picks.

So What Can the Kings Offer In a Trade?

The first thing that any team has to look at is what it has in the cupboard. Broadly speaking for basketball, there are two primary buckets: players on your roster and future draft picks.

The Players

On the player-side, the Kings have 14 players on the current roster, one player on a 10-day contract (Juan Toscano-Anderson), and three players on two-way deals so they can split time with the G-League Stockton Kings (Jordan Ford, Keon Ellis, and Jalen Slawson).

You can see a pretty comprehensive break-down of the Kings player contracts on Spotrac, but for convenience, the chart below shows the team’s player contracts (excluding 10-day contracts, two-way deals, and dead cap hits, which are pretty marginal and not worth charting for simplicity):

The Kings have two All-NBA caliber players under contract long-term in Fox and Sabonis, and there’s been no indication the team would even consider moving them. The team has also repeatedly shot down any notion of trading second-year player Keegan Murray, even in exchange for all-stars Pascal Siakam and Lauri Markkanen. That leaves the Kings with 12 roster players they can trade (plus one 10-day player, Juan Toscano-Anderson, and two-way players Keon Ellis, Jalen Slawson, and Jordan Ford).

Realistically, opposing teams are most likely to be interested in a handful of players—Murray (who the Kings refuse to trade), Harrison Barnes, Kevin Huerter, pending free agent Malik Monk, and Davion Mitchell—or future draft picks. The other players on the Kings roster could still be fit into a deal, either because someone wants to trade or to make salaries match, but their names don’t come up in trade rumors often because they’re not as appealing to other teams.

But we can’t just stop at listing the players the Kings might trade. We also have to look at a handful of key issues that influence who can be traded where as well as the value they have in a deal. The most important of these issues is salary matching, but I’ll also talk briefly about contract restrictions that could impact the trade value of players the Kings could consider dealing.

[The below sections on Salary Matching and Contract Restrictions are pretty granular. If you’re not interested, you can skip it, but I do want folks to understand two concepts: (1) the NBA’s CBA has detailed rules governing how trades can be constructed, which can significantly impact which players are included in trades, and (2) the CBA also has rules governing re-signing players and player extensions that can impact how much value they have in a deal.]

Salary Matching

Player-for-player trades in the NBA require "salary matching.” This can get complicated, but the basic idea is that if a team wants to trade a player, they can only receive back players with salaries inside of a certain band (or specified amount).

The amount of salary that a team can receive back in a trade depends on a few factors, the most important of which are the amount of the outgoing player’s salary and the team’s overall salary cap position. [HoopsRumors has a solid summary if you want to get into the details more, but I’ve tried to simplify things below. Relatively speaking.]

Let’s start with the team’s salary cap position to get familiar with some of the terms that will help with understanding the salary matching rules.

• The NBA’s salary cap is specified each year by the league based on a pre-set formula outlined in the league’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). For the 2023-24 season, the NBA set the salary cap at $136,021,000—teams can thus operate below the cap, at the cap, or above the cap, and different rules can apply to them as a consequence. That said, there generally aren’t many restrictions for teams simply being at or above the cap.

  [In case you’re wondering, the NBA has a “soft” salary cap—meaning there are various ways to go over the cap. These exceptions cover trades, re-signing players that were already under contract with the team the previous season, signing draft picks, signing new players at the veteran’s minimum salary, and signing players using various other specified salary cap exceptions. As a result, most competitive teams end up operating above the cap in any given season.]

• The NBA also has a luxury tax threshold, which is based on the cap and set at $165,294,000 for the 2023-24 season. Luxury tax teams have to pay an additional luxury tax for any salary paid at or above the luxury tax threshold. For example, if a team’s 2023-24 salary is $170,000,000, in addition to paying their salary out to the players, they have to pay an additional $4,706,000 in luxury taxes to the league, which in turn gets distributed to the other teams who aren’t luxury tax payers.

  The amount of luxury tax is based on the amount by which a team exceeds the luxury tax threshold, and it gets increasingly onerous as a team spends more and more beyond the luxury tax threshold. I’ve included an explanation below, but note that all of the underlined amounts will increase in the 2025-26 seasons and beyond, per the CBA.

  • Between $0 and $4,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $1.25 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $5 million and $9,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $1.75 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $10 million and $14,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $2.50 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $15 million and $19,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $3.25 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  [Teams that repeatedly have salaries above the luxury tax threshold (based on CBA-specified formulas) can also be charged additional amounts as “repeater” tax. It’s the same concept as outlined above, but the prices get even higher.]

  The practical effect of the luxury tax is that as a team spends more and more above the luxury tax threshold, their roster becomes more and more expensive—and they effectively give more and more money to their competitors who stay below the luxury tax threshold.

  This can have a huge effect on the trade market, because teams that can afford to spend (think big market teams like the Warriors or the Knicks) are more willing/able to pay a tax on salary, while other teams often prefer to stay below the luxury tax threshold so they can get money back.

• The NBA also sets two salary cap thresholds above the luxury tax threshold called the “first apron” and the “second apron.” For 2023-24, the first apron is $172,346,000 and the second apron is $182,794,000.

  Teams with salaries at or above these two thresholds are subject to a variety of restrictions this season, and will be subject to additional penalties in future years of the current CBA. We don’t need to go into the details other than to keep in mind a couple concepts:

  • Next year, teams are going to face increasingly stiff restrictions and/or penalties for having team salaries above the first apron and the second apron;

  • Specifically at issue here, teams above the first apron (and of course the second apron) have to comply with stricter trade rules; and

  • Teams generally don’t want to exceed the first apron or the second apron unless they need to, as they will face significantly reduced roster flexibility once the rules take effect next season.

• Lastly, there is a minimum team salary threshold—often referred to as the salary floor. For the 2023-24 season, the salary floor is $122,418,000. The salary floor is an issue far less frequently than the salary cap and luxury tax threshold, and gets less attention than the first and second aprons, but the basic idea is pretty simple. Teams have to have team salaries above the salary floor, and if they don’t, they get penalized. Those penalties come in the form of having to pay up to the salary floor anyway (for example, players on the team will get paid more even though they signed contracts for less); the team will be subject to “cap holds” that prevent the team from taking advantage salary cap space below the salary floor; and the team will get 50% less money in distributions from teams paying luxury tax (this will go down to no money starting in 2025-26).

  The details here aren’t so important for our purposes. What is important is to understand that there is no real benefit to teams going below the salary floor, and they can suffer penalties for doing so.

With that out of the way, let’s talk about the salary matching requirement.

The amount of salary a team can get back in a trade depends on the outgoing player salary this season and the team’s overall salary (specifically, whether the team is above the first apron). For teams below the first apron, the following salary matching rules apply:

1. For outgoing salaries up to $7.5 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals 200% of the outgoing player salary + $250k.

2. For outgoing salaries above $7.5 million up to $29 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals outgoing player salary + $7.5 million.

3. For outgoing salaries above $29 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals 125% of the outgoing player salary + $250k.

To help understand the concept, think about a few simplified examples.

• A team wants to trade away a player whose salary is $5 million, which falls under Category #1 above. The player they receive back can only be paid a salary that is up to $10.25 million.

  2 x $5 million + $0.25 million = $10.25 million

• A team wants to trade for a player that makes $25.5 million. The player they trade away must be paid a salary of at least $18 million—this is Category #2 above.

  $18 million + $7.5 million = $25.5 million

• A team wants to trade away a player who makes $30 million. The most they can take back in salary is $37.75 million—see Category #3 above.

  1.25 x $30 million + $0.25 million = $37.75 million

The rules are simpler, but more restrictive for teams at or above the first apron. For first apron teams, they can only take back a player whose salary is up to 110% of the outgoing salary no matter what the outgoing salary is. In practice, this means that teams at or above the first apron have less wiggle room in trades and have to match salaries more closely—they can’t take players who earn more than 10% of the players they’re sending out in a deal. This will go down to 100% starting next season.

Right now, teams generally can also aggregate salaries of multiple players in trades. Put simply, this means that teams can combine the salaries of more than one player for salary matching purposes in trades. For example, if a team wants to trade two players for three players, the salary matching rules described above still apply—the “outgoing salaries” would be the combined salaries of the two players the team is trading away, and the incoming salaries would be the combined salaries of the three players coming back in the trade.

Here’s a simplified example:

The Spurs want to trade Players A and B to the Wizards in exchange for Players X, Y, and Z. Player A has a $20 million salary and Player B has a $12 million salary.

Meanwhile, Player X has a $18 million salary, Player Y has a $8 million salary, and Player Z has a $7 million salary.

The trade is allowed, regardless of whether either team is a first apron team, because it meets all the salary matching requirements.

$20 million (Player A) + $12 million (Player B) = $32 million in outgoing salary

$18 million (Player X) + $8 million (Player Y) + $7 million (Player Z) = $33 million

General rule (non first apron teams): 1.25 x $32 million = $40 million, which is greater than the $33 million in incoming salary to the Spurs

First Apron Rule: 1.10 x $32 million = $35.2 million, which is also greater than the $33 million in incoming salary to the Spurs.

Both rules would also obviously be satisfied from the Wizards' perspective, as their $33 million of outgoing salary is greater than the returning $32 million in salary they are getting back.

Following the 2023-24 season, teams above the first apron and second apron will start to face more and more restrictions on the salary they can take back in trades and whether they can aggregate salaries for trades. Among other things, teams at or above the first apron won’t be able to take back more than the amount of salary they send out in a trade, and teams at or above the second apron won’t be able to aggregate salaries for trades (aggregation of salaries is described more below).

Teams can also send out a limited amount of cash per year in trades and/or include future draft picks in trades (which have no value for salary matching purposes).

There are a number of other minor salary matching rules that can apply in limited cases, but hopefully that covers the meat of it!

Contract Restrictions

There are a bunch of rules governing NBA contracts that are largely driven by how much time the player has served in the NBA, most of which don’t really impact trade considerations. For example, veteran players typically have fewer restrictions (although there can be exceptions and weird things like no-trade clauses exist sometimes, but they’re pretty rare).

Most of the Kings players have standard NBA deals, so there aren’t really special considerations for teams to look at when trading for them. But a few are worth flagging:

• Malik Monk is scheduled to be a free agent this off-season, and either the Kings (or any team they trade Monk to) would have his “Early Bird rights.” I won’t go into detail on Bird rights, but the gist is that Bird rights let a team re-sign its own players and exceed the salary cap. “Early Bird rights” rights are a more limited version of Bird rights, but they limit how much the team can pay the player in the first year of a new contract. In Monk’s case, if he were traded, a team would be able to offer him a contract for the 2024-25 season and beyond with a starting salary at about $17.4 million and also go over the salary cap.

  This could ultimately limit Monk’s trade value if teams think that Monk would be offered substantially more than $17.4 million as a free agent (which is certainly possible if not likely). This is because the team trading for Monk would be limited to offering him a below market starting salary if his contract would push the team’s salary above the cap, which in turn would make it less likely that Monk actually re-ups with them.

• Separately, a number of Kings players have contracts with team options: Keegan Murray and Sasha Vezenkov in 2025-26, and Colby Jones in 2027-28. This gives teams the right to choose whether to keep the player under contract during the option year, which gives the team added control and flexibility with the player’s future contract. This is generally seen as positive for the team and bolsters trade value—especially on (comparatively) low salary deals that may prove to be below market for the player.

• Keegan Murray, Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, and Kessler Edwards are also still on their rookie contracts, so they are slated to eventually hit "restricted free agency” rather than “unrestricted free agency” (like the rest of the Kings players) in different years. Without going into detail, unrestricted free agents can generally sign wherever they like, but the team gets the chance to match any deal a restricted free agent signs with another team—conceptually like a right of first refusal. This is generally favorable for the team, as it gives them more leverage in negotiations for players that out-perform their rookie deals in particular.

  As first round picks, Murray, Mitchell, and Duarte can also be offered extensions of their contracts for up to five years (by the Kings or an acquiring team).

Draft Picks

Everyone knows that future draft picks, especially first round picks, are extremely valuable in trades. Often, teams trading away players ahead of the trade deadline are trying to turn their focus to the future, so getting back future draft picks for current players is a natural strategy.

The chart below shows the draft picks that the Kings own (in black) and the draft picks they’ve traded away (in red).

The Kings Future Picks

* Sacramento owes its 2024 first round pick to Atlanta, but it is protected for the top 14 picks. If the pick does not convey to Atlanta in 2024, it rolls over to 2025, where it is protected for the top 12 picks. If the pick does not convey to Atlanta in 2025, it rolls over to 2026, where it is protected for the top 10 picks. If the Kings pick is in the top 10 in 2026, then Atlanta loses the right to receive a first round pick and instead will receive the Kings’ second round picks in 2026 and 2027.

The CBA Restricts Trading Future Picks

As you can see from the chart above, the Kings have all of their first round picks through 2030, except for a protected pick in 2024 that they owe to the Hawks (part of the trade for Kevin Huerter almost two years ago). That’s a good war chest for trades, as they have a number of picks that they can send out in exchange for players now.

But there are a few key rules to keep in mind that restrict what the Kings can trade away.

First, per the CBA, teams can only trade draft picks up to seven years in the future, hence why the chart above only goes out to 2030. Next year, teams will be permitted to trade picks out to 2031.

Second, there’s something called the Stepien Rule, which requires that teams have a future first round pick in every other draft. In effect, this means that a team can’t trade its first round picks in successive years. Generally speaking, this is pretty simple to figure out: if a team has traded away its pick in 2024, it cannot trade its 2025 pick, the team would only be able to trade its pick in 2026 and beyond. [The Stepien Rule only applies to first round picks because the perception is that a team trading all of its first round picks could really hamstring it in the future. Second round picks aren’t seen as quite so important.]

The combination of the two rules above means that a hypothetical team today could trade, at most, four of its future first round picks: 2024, 2026, 2028, and 2030.

Third, teams can place protections on the picks they send out. Pick protections are often structured so that they pick doesn’t convey if it falls in a particular draft slot. For example, the Kings 2024 first round pick will go to the Atlanta Hawks so long as it does not fall in the top 14 picks. If the pick falls anywhere between 15 and 30, the Hawks get the pick for the 2024 draft, otherwise the Kings keep it.

Trading a future unprotected first round pick will usually net way more back in a trade than trading a top 20 protected first round pick, for example. The unprotected pick has more opportunity to convey and of course has the chance to be higher in the draft, so it carries way more value to the team trading for it. Teams often use these protections heavily as a way to change the value of their picks so that each side to a deal gets appropriate value. Pick protections can bridge the gap between a team trading for a player who is not quite worth a future first round pick, but is better than a second round pick, and the counterparty who isn’t interested in getting multiple second round picks.

Teams have a lot of flexibility to negotiate protections on picks, so long as the pick conveys within seven years at most, if at all (there are other rules, but they’re not really relevant to pick value). In other words, the protection has to be structured so that the pick either goes to the other team within seven years or the obligation to give the pick extinguishes, or alternatively turns into some other kind of trade value (like multiple second round picks that convey right away). As you can probably guess, how much protection gets placed on a particular pick has an ENORMOUS impact on that pick’s value in a trade.

All together, this can really make trading future first round picks complicated.

Let’s look at the Kings 2024 first round pick set to be traded to the Hawks. As I noted above, that pick is top 14 protected in 2024, but if it doesn’t convey to the Hawks in 2024, it gets converted to a top 12 protected pick in 2025. Same thing if it doesn’t convey in 2025, it converts to a top 10 protected pick in 2026. And, just to add some more complexity, if the pick hasn’t conveyed and Kings are picking in the top 10 in 2026, the Hawks would instead get two second round picks in 2026 and 2027. The three rules listed above conspire to really limit what the Kings can trade right now.

Because the Kings have agreed to trade their 2024 first rounder, they can’t trade their first rounder in 2025 because of the Stepien Rule. But, because the Kings placed protections on their 2024 pick, there is no guarantee that it will actually convey to the Hawks in 2024—instead, the Kings let that pick effectively roll over to 2025. Because of that, the Kings also can’t trade their first round pick in 2026, as it’s theoretically possible they would have already traded away their 2025 pick. The same situation would apply for their 2026 first round pick: because the Hawks could theoretically receive the Kings 2026 first round pick, the Kings can’t trade their 2027 first round pick under the Stepien Rule.

[1/16/24 addition: There is one caveat that I should add for completeness. The Kings can theoretically trade their 2026 first round pick if they structure the pick to be conditional on the Kings 2024 first round pick actually being conveyed to the Hawks. In such a situation, the team that trades for the Kings 2026 first round pick would only be able to get that pick if the Kings 2024 first round pick actually falls outside the top 14, and thus is conveyed to the Hawks. Otherwise, the team trading for the Kings 2026 first rounder would have to get something else (such as second round picks, a later year first round pick, etc.) or nothing.]

So What Draft Picks Can the Kings Actually Trade?

This is something that I see lots of people mix up when talking about what future the Kings have available to trade.

As of today, for their first round picks, the Kings can either trade (A) two first rounders in 2028 and 2030 or (B) one first rounder in 2029. They cannot trade their first round picks in 2025, 2026, or 2027, even though they most likely will end up owning those picks, as a result of the current deal they have with the Hawks. All of the second round picks the Kings have, however, can be traded (other than the 2030 pick they owe to Indiana).

But that’s not the end of the story!

The Kings can, in theory, remove the protections on the 2024 first round pick they owe to Atlanta to ensure that it actually conveys in 2024. Doing so would allow the Kings to open up additional first round picks for trade, such that they could make up to three first rounders available (in 2026, 2028, and 2030).

There are two things that must be accounted for, though, before the Kings remove protection from the 2024 first round pick owed to the Hawks.

The first is obvious: removing protections is the same thing as giving away value. If the Kings were to remove the protections on the pick they owe to Atlanta, it would be the same as giving additional value in the form of a better pick in 2024—so, whatever potential trade for a player this year would have to take that into account.

The second issue is that the Kings can’t unilaterally change their deal with Atlanta. Instead, the two sides have to reach another deal to change the protections. What if the Hawks think that the 2024 draft is terrible, but the 2025 draft is great? If they think that, the Hawks may not want to remove the protections on the Kings’ 2024 pick because they think it is unlikely to convey (basically meaning they think the Kings won’t make the playoffs) and they’d rather take a shot at getting a first round pick in 2025. It’s unlikely the Hawks are betting on that now, with the Kings sitting at 5th in the West, but the 2024 draft isn’t very highly rated so they may want to gamble. Regardless, the real point is that the Kings may have to give up something to take the protections off of the 2024 first rounder they owe to the Hawks so that they can be more flexible trading first round picks this year.

[1/16/24 addition: I should also flag that the Kings can trade the unprotected portions of the first round picks they’ve conveyed to the Hawks, although they won’t have as much value as a stand-alone first round pick. The Kings retain the rights over their 2024 first round pick if it lands in the top 14 (same for the top 12 picks in 2025 and top 10 picks in 2026)—essentially the inverse of what they’ve traded away from the Hawks—so they can trade those pieces. In other words, even without changing the protections on the first round picks owed to the Hawks, the Kings are allowed to trade their 2024 first round pick protected for picks 16-30, and they could add on roll-over years like they did with the Hawks deal. First round picks with these kinds of protections can be hard to value, but a Kings trade partner could essentially bet against the Kings making the playoffs in 2024 (with rollovers to 2025 and 2026, for example) by taking the lottery-protected portion of the first round pick the Kings have already traded away.

It’s also worth noting that NBA teams also can do pick swaps. This isn’t the same as trading a pick, but teams can essentially trade away the option to swap picks with another team. In such a situation, the Kings would give another team the right to choose, after the draft order is set and before the draft, between the more favorable of the Kings pick and their own. This has much less value than a pick itself, as the trade counter-party has to send back their own first round pick if they elect to swap, but these swap rights do have trade value.]

Cash

Teams can also include cash consideration in trades. Cash consideration is often used for smaller deals to make sense, as sometimes a team wants to get off of a player’s contract because they don’t play much and aren’t in the team’s future plans. Unsurprisingly, there are rules in the CBA governing how much cash can be included to avoid rich teams throwing money at less wealthy teams for their best players, but because these are usually just used for smaller deals, they don’t come up a lot. I’m talking about them here primarily to acknowledge that these rules exist and have a small part to play in deadline deals of all sizes.

For the 2023-24 seasons, teams are limited to paying cash considerations to a total of $7.05 million for the season. Theoretically, this can be split up among several trades or included in one trade. The practical effect of this limit is that cash considerations are usually only relevant for small deals involving a player or two with relatively small salaries (at least by NBA standards), otherwise it ends up not making much sense. For example, cash considerations were part of the Kings-Nets deal last year that brought in Kessler Edwards—the Nets sent Kessler Edwards and cash to the Kings so that they didn’t have to pay his salary and lower their luxury tax bill.

Part Three Coming Soon!

In the next (and probably? hopefully? last) part of this series, I’m going to look at some of the trade candidates that reporters and pundits are suggesting the Kings might pursue. I’m hoping to look at these potential trade targets from a few angles: What areas of need would they help address (PLEASE DEFENSE!)? Who would the Kings likely have to send out the door in order to get them? And, what do the Kings need to think about with respect to future draft picks and salary cap space before actually making a trade?