The Warriors 2024 Offseason: Getting Out of Cap Jail

The Golden State Warriors have been one of the most interesting teams to watch in the NBA over the last decade. Their core of Stephen Curry, Klay Thompson, and Draymond Green have been together since 2012, and in that time they’ve made the playoffs nine times, made the finals six times, and won four championships—as strong of a run as any team since Michael Jordan’s Bulls in the 1990s.

Yet despite going 46-36 this season, two wins better than their 2022-23 record, it seemed like the Warriors had taken a step back this year. That feeling turned into a reality when the Warriors got dismantled by the Kings in their lone play-in game, missing the playoffs for just the third time since their core unit first came together (the other two playoff misses could be excused, too as both resulted from serious injuries to Curry and Thompson).

Everyone recognizes that the Warriors now have an aging core and an exceptionally expensive roster.

On the age front, there’s little question the Warriors’ core is past its prime despite still playing at a high level Curry is 36 while Thompson and Green are both 34. Backup point guard Chris Paul is 39 and played the sixth most minutes per game (MPG) on the team. Even starting small forward Andrew Wiggins (fourth on the team in MPG) is now 29, and core rotation players like Gary Payton (31) and Kevon Looney (28) aren’t young bucks anymore.

The Dubs also had the most expensive roster in the NBA last season, with over $206.8 million allocated to their roster according to Spotrac (their total cap allocations were over $224.8 million after accounting for cap holds). As a result of that spending and years of operating over the cap, the Warriors are expected to incur a luxury tax bill of almost $177 million on top of their roster salary. When the dust settles, the Warriors will have paid over $380 million this season for a roster that missed the playoffs.

Yes, the Warriors have spent extravagantly for years; they have been above the salary cap every year but one since 2017 and they’ve paid luxury tax in six of the last eight seasons. But the price tag has gotten exorbitant. Since 2020 (and excluding this year), the Warriors have spent over $530 million in team salary and paid over $400 million in luxury tax—about $930 million in total. For context, that far outpaces big spending teams like the Clippers and Nets, who have respectively paid about $730 million and $650 million for their rosters during the same time period (including salary and luxury tax payments).

Add it all up and the Warriors will have spent about $1.3 billion on their roster since 2020. That’s untenable for an NBA team. They are going to find a way to drive spending down.

So what should we expect the Warriors to do? Let’s take a look at their roster needs going into the off-season and how the NBA’s new CBA will affect their strategy going forward.

The Roster

Most of the Warriors from last season are still going to be under contract next year. Stephen Curry and head coach Steve Kerr are under contract for two more years (through 2025-26), Draymond Green signed a 4-year deal last off-season (with a player option in 2026-27), and Andrew Wiggins is under contract through at least 2025-26 (with a player option in 2026-27). Jonathan Kuminga and Moses Moody are both on rookie deals for next season and will only hit restricted free agency afterward, so the Warriors will have a chance to re-sign them both. Last season’s rookies Brandin Podziemski and Trayce Jackson-Davis are tied up through at least 2026-27 at the team’s option.

The big question marks are Klay Thompson, Chris Paul, Kevon Looney, and Gary Payton II. Dario Saric, Usman Garuba, Lester Quinones, and Jerome Robinson are also free agents, but by the end of the season none were really part of the regular rotation (Saric played a lot early on but his minutes dropped precipitously in the last few months of the season).

Klay Thompson

Thompson is an unrestricted free agent this off-season, so the Dubs will have to decide whether to bring him back next season or split apart the Splash Brothers.

Though Thompson had an up-and-down season, he was still productive, ranking second on the team in scoring and minutes played. Per Basketball Reference, Thompson averaged 17.9 points, 3.3 rebounds, 2.3 assists, and 1.5 turnovers in about 30 minutes per game—largely in line with his career averages. His shooting dipped slightly from three point range, but he still posted solid shooting numbers at 43.2% from the field, 38.7% from three, and at 92.7% from the free throw line.

Despite posting solid counting stats, Thompson got benched for a stretch during the season, a first time since his rookie season. At the time, the Warriors were looking to get young players involved and find working line-ups. Though it’s not clear benching Thompson made much difference—the Warriors were 8-6 in games Thompson came off the bench and 33-30 in games he started—the reasons for it aren’t that tough to parse. Offensively, Thompson shot the second lowest percentage from three point range of his career. He also slumped quite a bit in February, when he was moved to the bench role.

But Thompson’s defense was really the issue. Per Cleaning the Glass, the Warriors were 4.8 points per 100 possessions worse on defense when Thompson was on the court—worst on the team amongst players with over 500 minutes played. That 4.8 figure is also by far the worst mark of Thompson’s career, and a severe drop-off from 2022-23 when the Warriors were 1.5 points per 100 possessions better defensively with Thompson on the floor. Other advanced metrics tell a similar story. Per Dunks and Threes, Thompson posted a Defensive Estimated Plus/Minus of -0.7, putting him in the bottom half of NBA players this past season. Basketball Reference pegged him at -1.5 in its Defensive BPM metric. Of course Thompson’s age and injury history make his defensive struggles a bit more understandable. He’s also never been much of a steals or blocks generator. Still, it’s hard to deny there’s been a drop-off since Thompson was regarded as a high-level defensive player in the mid-2010s, and that’s significantly impacted Thompson’s on-court value.

Chris Paul

Entering his age 39 season, Chris Paul is on the books for one more season at $30 million, but his salary is not guaranteed. The Warriors can waive Paul before June 28 and avoid paying him, but he would become an unrestricted free agent (assuming he clears waivers, which would be likely).

Paul mostly played a bench role for the Warriors, which makes sense given his age. He was still a solid contributor despite his age. Per Dunks and Threes, Paul graded out as a top quartile defender (Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of 0.7, in the 78th percentile) and an above average offensive player (Offensive Estimated Plus-Minus of 0.0, good enough for the 71st percentile). The Warriors also gave up about 3.5 fewer points per 100 possessions with Paul on the court per Cleaning the Glass, a very respectable number for an aging point guard. Of course, Paul isn’t the offensive engine and efficiency wizard that he’d been through the prime of his career, but you’d be hard pressed to find many backup point guards with more reliable production.

Kevon Looney

Looney is on the books for 2024-25 at a salary of $8 million ($3 million of which is guaranteed), a relatively small salary even for a backup center. Even though he will be just 28 years old to start next season, it’s possible Looney is already past his physical peak. Looney’s had a long history of lower body issues, particularly with his hips, but he’s also had to deal with neuropathy and gastrointestinal issues that have impacted his ability to be on the court. He’s been able to get on the court consistently (playing all but 8 games in the last three seasons), but his minutes declined significantly this year (he averaged just over 16 minutes per game) and started only 36 games this season (after starting 70 last year and 80 the year before).

Looney’s advanced metrics took a bit of a hit this year, which could partly explain the lower playtime. His Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus dropped to -1.3 this season from 1.4 in 2022-23. Per Cleaning the Glass, Looney also had a negative efficiency differential for the first time since the 2019-20, driven largely by the fact that the Warriors were about 1.6 points worse defensively per 100 possessions with him on the floor. While his rebounding, steals, and block rates stayed relatively flat, Looney turned the ball over too frequently (his turnover percentage of 15.6% was the highest of his career) and started fouling more. And though he’s never been known as a perimeter defender, Looney also struggled to effectively contest midrange shots; with Looney on the court, opponents shot 5.3% better on two-pointers between 4 and 14 feet. In all, Looney was a reasonable backup center option—but not as productive as he was from 2021 to 2023 when he was starting consistently.

Gary Payton II

Whether Payton returns to the Warriors next year is really up to Payton—he holds a 1-year player option at just over $9.1 million for next season, and the deadline for his decision is June 19.

Payton is a useful situational defender who's had meaningful impact over his past few seasons with the Warriors. He posted a stellar Defensive Box Plus-Minus of 2.0 (94th percentile) per Dunks and Threes and had the third-highest efficiency differential, 6.0 points per 100 possessions, of any player on the team per Cleaning the Glass. At the same time, he’s played in just 44 games, averaging a little over 15 minutes per game, so it’s hard to say he is truly a core piece of the team going forward.

The CBA’s Effect on the Future

As a result of the team’s expensive roster, Golden State will in all likelihood enter 2024 over the salary cap. And without substantial changes to the roster, they’re likely going to remain over the luxury tax as well. For reference, based on projections for the 2024-25 season, the salary cap will be set at $141 million, the luxury tax line at $171.315 million, the first apron at $178.655 million, and the second apron at $189.486 million. Under the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA), these thresholds are critical for teams to consider as part of roster construction.

With that in mind, let’s take a quick look at the Warriors salary cap situation as their roster stands today:

As you can tell from the chart above, without waiving anyone or Gary Payton II opting out of his deal, the Warriors will be well above the salary cap and even a bit above the luxury tax line before re-signing free agents Klay Thompson (or anyone else). The Dubs will, however, be below the first apron and the second apron—which means they won’t necessarily be subject to the harshest restrictions under the CBA unless they continue to add salary.

The Impact of Luxury Tax

Being over the luxury tax alone probably isn’t a huge deal for the Warriors. As I noted above, they’ve frequently been in the luxury tax in the past and generally haven’t hesitated to build out an expensive roster.

Generally, teams in the luxury tax pay penalties based on how far above the tax line they are. The chart below shows how the tax penalties work for a standard luxury tax teams:

[Chart 2]
* I am using the 2023-24 “tax brackets” as a reference only—they won’t apply for the 2024-25 season. Instead, each “tax bracket” will increase by a percentage equal to the change in salary cap from the 2023-24 season to the 2024-25 season, which is expected to be about 3.66% (a $136.021 million salary cap for 2023-24 versus a projected $141.0 million cap for 2024-25).
** Tax rates increase by $0.50 for each additional $5 million increment above $20,000,000

As you can see from the chart above, the amount of luxury tax teams pay increases depending on how far above the luxury tax line they go. Teams barely above the luxury tax line don’t really face onerous luxury tax penalties—teams less than $10 million* over the luxury tax line don’t have to pay more than $1.75 in penalties for every dollar they go over. Conversely, teams that are $10 million* or more over the luxury tax line face increasingly stiffer fines. The point here is pretty simple: discourage teams from over-spending in the first instance, but if they do, throw more and more hurdles in front of them to encourage teams to tamp down their spending. You can also see from the chart that the CBA actually contemplates making this point even more explicit going forward in the 2025-26 season and beyond—teams just over the luxury tax (less than $10 million*) will be penalized less harshly than under the current regime, while teams well above the luxury tax ($10 million* or more) are going to face even more onerous penalties.

If they were a standard luxury tax team, the 2024-25 Warriors probably aren’t looking at huge luxury tax payments for their current roster: their active cap is projected to be about $174 million, only about $3.7 million over the luxury tax line (the actual amounts charged under the luxury tax calculation vary a bit based on CBA nuance that isn’t relevant here).

But the Warriors aren’t a standard luxury tax team. The NBA CBA imposes even stiffer “repeater tax” penalties for teams that are too often above the luxury tax line. Teams that pay the luxury tax in four of the five previous seasons are subject to the “repeater tax” rates, which are much higher:

[Chart 3]
* See note from Chart 2 (above)
** See note from Chart 2 (above)

As Chart 3 shows, the repeater tax rates are meaningfully higher—teams like the Warriors in the repeater tax essentially pay an extra $1 penalty per $1 in salary above the luxury tax line compared to non-repeater teams. And you can also see that the repeater tax penalty is going to get even worse in 2025-26 and beyond, as repeater tax teams are going to be paying an extra $2 penalty compared to non-repeater teams. The message from the NBA’s CBA is pretty clear here, too: even if you are a luxury tax team, you better not stay a luxury tax team year after year, or you are going to pay handsomely for it.

These luxury tax rules are critical for the Warriors going forward—as much or more than any other team (arguably, the rules were made specifically to stop the Warriors and Clippers from doing exactly what they were doing under the old CBA).

The Warriors will be heavily incentivized to avoid going far over the luxury tax line, as the repeater tax penalties are significant (even in 2024-25);
The Warriors will be thinking about how to structure their roster so that they aren’t facing the more onerous repeater tax penalties in 2025-26 and beyond; and
The Warriors will be heavily incentivized to find a way out of the luxury tax soon to avoid the repeater tax penalties all together in the next few years (though that may have to wait until after Stephen Curry's contract expires following the 2025-26 season).

With about $174 million in salary on the books for 2024-25 (their tax charges will differ slightly, but it’s not material for our purposes here), the Warriors would be only a small ways into the luxury tax. Still, it’s hard to overstate the significance the points above will have on the Warriors’ roster decisions this off-season, especially when it comes to re-signing Klay Thompson and how to handle Chris Paul and Kevon Looney, who carry significant salary. I’ll dive into the players more later, but I also want to look a couple other CBA-imposed items the Warriors will need to consider: the tax aprons.

The Tax Aprons

The tax aprons have taken on new meaning in the NBA’s latest CBA. Teams over the first apron face a number of restrictions on roster moves they can make, and teams above the second apron face even more onerous restrictions.

The First Apron

The first apron is projected to be $178.655 million next season. Since we are now past the 2023-24 regular season, the following restrictions apply to teams that are above the first apron:

First apron teams cannot take back more salary in a trade than they send out;
First apron teams cannot acquire players via sign-and-trades;
First apron teams cannot use the Biannual Exception;
- [The Biannual Exception allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $4.74 million]
First apron teams cannot use the Non-taxpayer Midlevel Exception (Non-taxpayer MLE);
- [The Non-taxpayer MLE allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $13.03 million]
First apron teams cannot use pre-existing traded player exceptions (as of the end of the 2023-24 regular season), however, they can still create and use new TPEs generated from trades in the off-season or during future seasons, provided the TPE gets used within the same season;
During the season, first apron teams cannot sign players off waivers whose salary for that season is greater than the Non-taxpayer MLE;
First apron teams can sign players using the Taxpayer Midlevel Exception (Taxpayer MLE), provided that if they use the Taxpayer MLE, the team is “hard capped” at the second apron—meaning they cannot exceed the second apron for any reason; and
- [The Taxpayer MLE allows above-the-cap teams to sign players for up to two seasons with a starting salary worth up to a projected $5.25 million]
First apron teams can aggregate salaries in trades—meaning they can trade away multiple players with lower salaries to get back a player with a higher salary (as non-apron teams can)—but if they do aggregate players in a trade, they are hard capped at the second apron;
First apron teams can send out cash considerations in trades, but if they do so, they are hard capped at the second apron.

Some of the first apron restrictions above are pretty meaningful, as they really limit the strategies that teams can use to acquire new players. It can be tough for first apron teams to successfully add talent via trade because they’re prohibited from taking back more salary than they send out (as usually higher paid players are better), they lose access to their existing trade exceptions, and they’re prohibited from engaging in sign-and-trades. It’s also hard to add back-end rotation talent since first apron teams lose some cap exceptions (like the Biannual Exception) and face a hard cap at the second apron if they use even the relatively small Taxpayer MLE. Similarly, the inability to sign players off waivers with bigger salaries limits the team’s options to add talent during the season if they need to.

The Second Apron

The second apron is projected to be $189.486 million next season, and it comes with additional restrictions on top of the restrictions imposed on first apron teams.

The following restrictions now apply to second apron teams (they are also subject to the first apron restrictions):

Second apron teams cannot use the Taxpayer MLE;
Second apron teams cannot aggregate salaries in trades;
Second apron teams cannot send out cash considerations in any trade;

In addition, if a team is over the second apron for the 2024-25 season (or any season thereafter), that team will face significant penalties for its future draft picks.

A future second apron team will have its first round draft pick in the seventh draft following that salary cap year frozen (the “Frozen Pick”). In other words, going forward, second apron teams won’t be allowed to trade draft picks 7 years into the future, as other teams can.
In addition, a future second apron team in two of the four previous seasons may have its Frozen Pick moved to the very end of the first round.

In all, the second apron restrictions are pretty significant. In addition to facing all the restrictions of the first apron, second apron teams can’t use even the Taxpayer MLE to add players, they can’t combine salaries in trade, they can’t trade cash, and they could face restrictions on trading future draft picks and have those picks knocked down to the end of the first round. Those are severe penalties that can materially affect short- and long-term roster construction, and teams will try hard to avoid them.

Where Will the Warriors’ Salary Land Next Year?

For the remainder of the 2023-24 salary cap year, the Warriors are a second apron team, which means they’re subject to the most stringent restrictions on roster moves until the cap year rolls over on June 30 and new contract numbers take effect. Without making any moves, the Warriors will have about $174 million in team salary. That would put them slightly above the luxury tax line, but comfortably below the first apron. The roster would be the same as this past year, except the Warriors would no longer have Klay Thompson and Dario Saric (as well as back-end players like Lester Quinones, Jerome Robinson, and Usman Garuba).

Losing Thompson in particular would leave a major hole on the roster. They wouldn’t be able to replace him easily. If the Warriors want to replace Thompson and stay below the first apron, they can only spend about $4 million on Thompson’s replacement. In theory, they could sign a free agent for more money (up to $4.7 million using the Biannual Exception or $5.25 million using the Taxpayer MLE), but that would be somewhat impractical as using either the Taxpayer MLE or Biannual Exception would hard cap the Warriors at the second apron (about $189 million in total salary), without without materially changing the quality of player they could sign—after all, you’re not talking about hugely different calibers of free agents at $4 million in salary versus $5.25 million in salary.

A Roster Shake-Up Is Coming

The Warriors finished 10th in the Western Conference this season, which on its own may suggest roster change is warranted. But the CBA rules—specifically the luxury tax and apron restrictions—are likely to drive the Warriors to significant roster changes anyway. It’s obvious the Warriors’ leadership thinks so, as owner Joe Lacob made abundantly clear:

“Our Plan 1, or 1A, is that we'd like to be out of the tax, and we think that we have a way to do that.” “That kind of is the plan, not just under the second apron. I’ll tell you why that’s important, because the truth is that we need to be out of the tax two years out of the next four, below the tax line, in order to get this repeater thing off our books. We don’t want to be a repeater. It’s just so prohibitive, not to say we wouldn’t do it if we had to, but you’ve gotta look at what the downside is to doing that.”

Getting out of the luxury tax entirely certainly seems plausible for the Warriors. As I mentioned, they’ll be a little around $4 million over the luxury tax line if they don’t do anything. But if the Warriors want to keep Klay Thompson, getting the team’s salary down under the luxury tax will require other meaningful moves.

Bringing Back Klay Won’t Be Cheap—Will the Dubs Try to Keep Him?

I can’t speak for the Warriors’ front office, but I find it hard to believe the Warriors would let future Hall of Famer Klay Thompson walk without making a competitive bid to keep him in town. Thompson is beloved in the Bay Area and one of three players centrally responsible for pulling the Warriors out of decades of disappointment to win multiple championships. Franchise pillars often leave at the end of their careers—but it’s still hard to fathom for Klay. He’s still a useful player on any team, and probably has the chops to start for a number of playoff teams despite his waning defensive talents.

Thompson made $43.2 million last season and has a cap hold for just over $48.5 million this offseason. He will not see salaries near that range given his age, injury history, and defensive limitations, especially in a potentially cool free agency market. As I detailed in my last post, only a handful of teams project to have meaningful cap space this off-season: Detroit, Philadelphia, Utah, Oklahoma City, Orlando, San Antonio, Charlotte, and potentially Toronto. Of those teams, Orlando, Philadelphia, and OKC may be interested in Thompson—but they have other options as well (Detroit or Toronto could try to sign him to add shooting, but their rosters are probably too young and too far away to match well with Thompson’s timeline).

With even a few bidders, it’s probably safe to say that the low-end for Thompson’s services is a 3-4 year deal worth well over the Non-Taxpayer MLE if he wants to—think 3 or 4 seasons at $15 million+ per year. The Warriors gave Draymond Green a 4 year contract worth $25 million per year last off-season, so you could see them offering Thompson a similar deal (perhaps a bit less given Green doesn’t have the same injury history and has been more productive the past few seasons). That’s probably around the high-end of the range other teams might offer for Thompson based on recent comps, too. For example, Brook Lopez, another older but productive player, got a 2 year deal worth $24 million per season last off-season, while younger but less consistently productive players like Cam Johnson, Kyle Kuzma, and Dillon Brooks received 4 year deals worth $21.5 million to $23.7 million per year on average (per Spotrac).

There have also been a couple recent examples of teams giving players “balloon” contracts with shorter terms but high salaries to lure them away from teams facing big potential luxury tax bills—that’s exactly what happened with the Pacers signing Bruce Brown Jr. away from the Nuggets (2 years, $45 million) and the Rockets signing Fred VanVleet away from the Raptors (3 years, $128.5 million). A team like the Magic or Sixers could make a similar offer to Thompson and potentially price the Warriors out of making a competitive offer. Detroit and Utah could conceivably do the same if they wanted to go for a quick turn-around like the Rockets did last season, but they don’t seem like obvious candidates (Detroit is too far away, Utah doesn’t really need to add Thompson). Regardless, while Thompson may prefer to stay with the Warriors if all else is equal—he’s spent his entire career there—there’s always a price that could lure him away.

With that said, I expect the Warriors will have to spend something like $15-25 million next year to keep Thompson around. That’s a pretty conservative range obviously, but it’s good enough for my purposes here. For simplicity, I’ll use $20 million (the midpoint) as the cost to keep Thompson with Golden State for 2024-25 and beyond. I’ll also assume the Warriors in fact opt to keep him at that price (for the record, I think they should do so—it would be a shame to break up the Splash Brothers this far into their careers).

Getting Under the Tax With Thompson Returning

So, what can Golden State do to get under the luxury tax if they bring Klay Thompson back? There are a few possibilities, but one is most obvious.

Waive Chris Paul.

Like Thompson, Chris Paul is a clear future Hall of Famer. But he’s going to be 39 to start next season, he has little historical connection to the Warriors (last year is the only season he’s played with the club), and he’s almost certain to make more than Thompson would if he stays on the team.

Paul is slated to make $30 million next season with the Warriors if they don’t waive him. Under the CBA, the Warriors can’t negotiate that amount downward either (the NBA Players’ Association negotiated for provisions preventing teams from doing so for aging players). But Paul’s 2024-25 salary is non-guaranteed, meaning the Warriors can waive him and they’re not on the hook for his salary. His salary will fully guarantee on June 28, so whatever happens will happen soon.

Paul is still productive, especially for his age. He remains a good perimeter shooter (37.1% from three), an incredibly efficient passer (Paul’s assist-to-turnover ratio has been other-worldly throughout his career, and it’s still one of the tops in the NBA), and a decent defender (at least for an undersized guard). Advanced metrics also point to Paul’s productivity—his Estimated Plus-Minus is in the 78th percentile per Dunks and Threes and he sports a positive efficiency differential per Cleaning the Glass. Yet, Paul’s stats (traditional and advanced) have been trending downward for a few years, and there’s no serious question he’s approaching the end of his productive career on the floor.

If the Warriors want to re-sign Thompson and have a chance of getting below the luxury tax line, waiving Paul is a no-brainer. If the Dubs waive Paul and re-sign Thompson at $20 million (for 2024-25), they would end up with a team salary of about $165 million after filling out their roster, comfortably below the luxury tax.

The Warriors could alternatively try to trade Paul, but it’s hard to see much of a market given other team’s aren’t going to pay handsomely for a 39 year old point guard and will be fully aware of the Warriors’ salary cap situation.

Make a Trade?

Other than Paul, the only players with non-guaranteed salary on the 2024-25 Dubs’ roster are Gary Payton II and Kevon Looney.

Payton has a single-season player option worth about $9.1 million. Given there aren’t a ton of teams with cap space that need a non-shooting guard, it’s hard to see a major market for him materializing in free agency—so more likely than not, he will pick up the player option and try again next year. We’ll know by June 19 what Payton chooses to do, but it’s out of the Warriors’ control regardless.

Looney is under contract for one more year, but his contract is only partially guaranteed ($3 million guaranteed out of his $8 million total salary) until June 24, when it becomes fully guaranteed. Waiving Looney before his salary fully guarantees would clear $5 million in cap space for the team.

If (A) the Warriors keep Thompson (estimated $20 million) and Paul ($30 million), (B) Payton opts out, and (C) the Warriors waive Looney, the team would have a little over $181 million on the books for 2024-25 after filling out their roster. In other words, they’d be above the luxury tax line (est. $171.3 million) and above the first apron (est. $178.7 million), but still below the second apron (est. $189.5 million).

To get under the luxury tax line, Lacob’s stated goal, they would need to trade away one or more players to clear just over $10 million in salary (keep in mind, they’d need to add back at least a minimum salary player to fill out their roster).

If the Warriors were to go that route, Curry and Green presumably wouldn’t be trade options. And obviously the need for a trade would be driven by a desire to keep Thompson and Paul, so they’re not going to figure in either. That would leave the Dubs with the following possibilities:

Trade Andrew Wiggins ($26.3 million in salary for next season); and
Trade some combination of Jonathan Kuminga ($7.6 million), Moses Moody ($5.8 million), Brandin Podziemski ($3.5 million), and Trayce Jackson-Davis ($1.9 million).

None of those options make much sense at all.

Wiggins had a rough season, which I won’t detail here. He’s under contract for 3 more years and has almost $85 million left owed to him. Trading Wiggins now would get off his salary, but it’s impossible to envision the Warriors getting good value for him—in fact, he may be at his lowest value ever. He’s also probably the single best candidate on the roster for improvement next season given the inexplicable fall-off in his level of play; in two prior seasons with the Warriors, Wiggins has been stellar.

Kuminga, Moody, Podziemski, and Jackson-Davis are the Warriors youth. None are perfect players, but they are all meaningful contributors on cost-controlled contracts. Moving on from them now to save salary makes no sense. The Warriors would have virtually no chance of replacing their production at similar cost next season. And if the Warriors were open to trading Kuminga in particular, they could actually see meaningful returns in terms of on-court production (Kuminga is a bit polarizing as a player, but he made huge strides this season and would be coveted by numerous other teams). Why would the Warriors want to send him away in a salary dump?

So What Will the Dubs Do?

Given Joe Lacob’s comments, it’s clear that the Warriors are going to try to find a way to get under the luxury tax. The financial outlays they’ve made in the past just don’t seem justifiable given the current state of their roster, even though a true re-build doesn’t seem to be in the works any time soon.

Moving on from Chris Paul is a no-brainer. His age and declining production aren’t worth $30 million next season, and letting him walk will dramatically increase the Warriors’ flexibility whether they can re-sign Thompson or not.

I would like to see the Warriors re-sign Thompson and keep their historic core together for at least another couple of seasons. I strongly suspect they’re going to make him a competitive offer in the $18-24 million range per season (I’m less confident they will offer him four years given his age and the trajectory of his production). If some team comes in over the top of that, we’ll have to see what Klay wants to do, though there’s no reason to think he’s aiming to leave.

Ultimately, I see Paul leaving and Klay staying. The Warriors (mostly) run it back next season and hope that improved play from Wiggins and the young guys (Kuminga, Moody, and Podziemski especially) can propel them back to the playoffs.

Thanks for reading, and as always, me know what you think!