Finding the Value of NBA Draft Picks

As we head into the NBA season later this month, fans are rightfully focused on how their teams will perform on the court this year. A few significant off-season moves have made things interesting heading into the season. Some of the headliners for me are how DeMar DeRozan fits on court with the Kings, how the new-look Knicks will look with Mikal Bridges and Karl-Anthony Towns, whether the Timberwolves get enough out of Donte DiVincenzo and Naz Reid to not miss KAT, how effective the Warriors off-season moves were in replacing Klay Thompson, and how much growth there will be in OKC and Houston, two of the most fun young teams to watch in my personal view.

At the same time, I also want to stay cognizant of what’s on the horizon (as NBA teams must and some fanbases certainly will be). Next June will see an incredibly talented group of young prospects join the league, led by Duke freshman Cooper Flagg and a couple of Rutgers (!) freshmen, Ace Bailey and Dylan Harper. While these players won’t contribute to a team this season, they’re inevitably going to impact what happens on the floor, especially later in the year as teams jockey for lottery odds and draft position.

With that in mind, let’s jump headfirst into a project I’ve been thinking about for some time: analytically assessing the value of different draft picks.

As NFL draft fans may recognize, this is something that’s been done for quite some time in pro football circles. In the 1990s, then Cowboys head coach Jimmy Johnson developed a trade value chart that has become the most widely known trade value chart in football. The concept was simple—assign a value to each draft pick so that front office personnel could evaluate potential trades more easily. While Johnson’s draft value chart was in a sense pioneering, it is now generally considered outdated due to subsequent CBA changes and it wasn’t obviously based on analytical principles. As a result, many teams have developed their own draft value charts (which aren’t public), and some league observers/advisors have developed more analytically driven charts. For example, Chase Stuart developed a stat-based draft value chart using Pro Football Reference’s “Approximate Value” stat, a relatively blunt all-in-one stat designed to capture a player’s contributions to points scored/allowed. Kevin Meers published a draft value chart based on similar analysis. Jason Fitzgerald and Brad Spielberger also developed a draft value chart based on NFL contract values and performance.

Some NBA watchers have developed draft value charts of their own, though they’re not widely referenced. For example, ESPN’s Kevin Pelton put together an NBA draft value chart based on player performance at various draft pick slots over the course of their four seasons in the NBA (roughly, the player’s rookie contract) and the subsequent five year period using his wins above replacement metric. Others have also developed draft value analyses relying on Basketball Reference’s win shares statistic (for example, here, here, and here). I’ve also seen an analyses using value over replacement player (VORP) from a couple years ago. But for a variety of reasons, I wanted to try to tackle this question using one of my preferred all-in-one metrics, Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus (EPM), which no one has used as far as I can tell.

For starters, EPM is arguably the most accurate modern all-in-one metric in terms of its ability to predict team performance. It’s also not solely reliant upon box score statistics (such as points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, and shooting percentages), which may not be sufficiently detailed. I also wanted to look at pick values based on the outcomes that could have happened rather than focusing solely on who was picked in each slot, as many of the draft value analyses I’ve seen were skewed by a great player somehow falling in the draft (Nikola Jokic getting drafted at #41 overall shouldn’t make that pick decidedly more valuable than pick #40 after all, as the team picking #40 could have picked him). In addition, I was looking for an evaluation methodology that could be carried forward without artificially limiting a player’s production based on semi-artificial windows, like the player’s first four or five years. While those kinds of limitations can be defensible—four years is the length of first round rookie contracts when you include team options, and teams can hold restricted free agency over those players in their fifth year, too—a significant proportion of productive players are going to re-sign with the team that drafted them anyway. This dynamic is especially true for players who show All-NBA or All-Star level productivity early on in their careers, such that the value of those players can be underrated.

With a ton of help from my good friend Alex Takakuwa, whose math and programming experience far surpass mine, I set out to try to pull together a draft value chart.

Just so it’s easier to visualize from the start, I’ve included the draft value chart we developed below. The next few sections of the post will go into (gory) detail on how we created the chart, the rationale for our analytical decisions, and the potential issues with our approach. Then, I’ll follow up with some observations from the chart and our analysis that stood out.

[Figure 1]

Creating the Draft Value Chart

This section details the process we went through to develop the draft value chart above. If anything is unclear or unexplained, feel free to reach out to me for more details.

The Data & Why We Chose EPM

To conduct the analysis, I first needed to identify sources of information for past NBA draft picks and EPM. The draft pick history was easy—Basketball Reference has downloadable spreadsheets with picks by year. EPM, on the other hand, is a relatively new metric developed by Dunks & Threes (dunksandthrees.com) that incorporates possession-based stats derived from play-by-play data and player-tracking stats from stats.NBA.com. That modern data has not always been available, so we could only obtain league-wide EPM data from 2014 through last season (2023-24).

There are, of course, numerous all-in-one metrics available for assessing player performance, such as PER and its derivatives; Box Plus/Minus (BPM) and its derivatives like Value Over Replacement Player (VORP); Win Shares; RAPTOR; and net rating to name some. They all have advantages and disadvantages, but I personally favor EPM for a few reasons: it’s been shown to be the most predictive (as I mentioned), it attempts to account for teammate/opponent quality, it’s not wholly reliant on counting stats that can’t really capture defensive performance with precision, and, subjectively, it seems to have fewer inexplicable outliers than most of the other metrics.

With that said, the major trade-offs for using EPM data for this analysis are several. It is very time-limited (just 11 seasons of data), there’s no easy way for me to completely understand how the metric is determined given it’s based on a proprietary regression model, and a handful of players—especially on the lower minutes end—don’t have EPM data available. I’m also not aware of EPM data existing for playoff games, which is a bummer. Regardless, it’s still worth using in my view. The time limitations aren’t that problematic for this exercise, and it’s not obvious that draft tendencies from 30+ years ago—or even 20+ years ago—are all that relevant. I’m not realistically able to verify every metric anyway, and most other all-in-one metrics have missing data, use different approaches to different time periods, or are subject to major swings for players with few minutes played. Sufficient playoff data is also not going to be available for a huge proportion of players to draw meaningful conclusions, though that problem may not be evenly distributed amongst all types of players. But ultimately we can live with the concerns either way.

Initial Approach & Process

This section describes the process that Alex and I used to create the draft value chart. Where we made significant process decisions, I’ll flag them and explain why. For those that want just a cursory understanding of the process, I’ve bolded the major points below.

First, we chose to convert EPM—which is, in effect, a rate-based efficiency statistic—into a new metric that could be summed. We called these “EPM units” and I’ll describe the process further below. The decision and process for this warrant explanation.

To start, EPM as a metric can be positive or negative. Positive values are generally associated with better players, but because of the way the metric is designed, most players will have a negative value EPM. For example, the median EPM last season—which describes a middle of the pack player—was about -1.7 (Kris Murray or Haywood Highsmith). At the same time, Coby White’s EPM of 0.0 was in the 70th percentile of all players. In other words, you can be a pretty good player and still throw up an EPM that’s around 0 or slightly negative. We wanted to avoid having players with negative EPMs show up as negative contributors, though. This was for two reasons: first, below average players still contribute to a team, and two, roughly half the players on the court at any given time will have a negative EPM by the nature of the stat—yet they are on the court presumably because they are better than whomever potential replacement players are.

The second issue is one that affects all NBA metrics that describe efficiency: EPM does not directly account for how much a player actually plays. Said another way, a guy who plays with high efficiency over just a handful of games can appear to be a “better” player than someone who wasn’t quite as efficient but played 10 seasons in the NBA. For example, Josh Hart (Knicks) played 81 games and 2,707 minutes last season with an EPM of -0.7, putting him in the top 40% of all players last season by EPM. Without considering minutes played, it could appear that Hart had a worse season than looks like he had a worse season than Neemias Queta (Celtics), whose +1.5 EPM was in the 84th percentile of all players last year. But Queta only played in 28 games though, a total of 333 minutes, against mostly backups. Nobody would seriously argue he was “better” than Hart, and we agree! Thus, we wanted to ensure that our analysis captured the performance “value” of players who routinely saw the court and attribute value to their contributions.

Dunks & Threes has a metric called Estimated Wins that attempts to convert EPM into a summable stat. We could’ve relied on it, but we chose not to for a few reasons. There’s no robust public description of how the Estimated Wins metric is derived, so we weren’t sure exactly what it represents. Estimated Wins also can go negative, which is one of the things we wanted to avoid. We also built a quick tool to consider a draft value chart based on Estimated Wins, and the results weren’t as sensible—but I’ll be the first to admit that picking between stats becomes a subjective exercise, and we debated the question.

With that said, by making our EPM units metric positive, we credit some level of contribution to any minute played even if the player is bad. That makes some intuitive sense, as the minute must be played by somebody and if a team thought they could fill the minute with a better player, they had the opportunity to do so in theory. Of course, the consequence is that we mask the possibility that a player is so bad that they’re truly a negative contributor on the court and could easily be replaced, which we can also intuit is a real possibility. Imagine a player who is getting minutes solely for development purposes. The team knows he isn’t good enough to play now, but they want him to play for the potential long-term benefit. That player’s performance could actually be replaced by a better player, but the team is specifically choosing not to do so. Our choice to make EPM units positive hides that possibility somewhat, but the masking effect is mitigated by the likelihood that the player would have a noticeably poor negative EPM, which our calculation methodology will illustrate.

Calculating EPM Units

To calculate EPM units, we started by taking a player’s EPM for a given season, applying a scaling function, and then multiplying the result by the player’s number of minutes played for that year. Although could have used possession data, it’s trickier to obtain reliably and minutes function as a reasonable, consistent proxy. Regardless, for each season, we can calculate a player’s EPM units, and we can find the player’s career EPM units by adding the cumulative total for all seasons played. In simple conceptual terms, you can think of the equation below:

EPM Units for a Season =

(Scaling Function [EPM]) x (Minutes Played) x 1000

[Note: the 1000 is just so we have easier to read numbers—you can basically disregard it from a conceptual standpoint]

Obviously, the scaling function we applied is fundamental to the result, so I’ll explain our approach below.

To determine what scaling function to apply, we decided to look at the general relationship between player performance and player salaries as a guide. The idea here is straightforward: presumably, NBA teams pay players more if they think they’re better performers and playing often enough to be worth the financial commitment, so we could use a similar relationship to scale EPM to our EPM unit metric. While this is probably not a perfect comparison, it seemed more sensible than using an arbitrary scaling relationship that we might otherwise have conceived of.

So, we pulled data on the salary cap charges for all 449 players league-wide for the 2023-24 season from Spotrac and ranked them by percentiles, with the 100th percentile being the highest salary cap charge (we opted for cap charges over cash salaries because they aren’t as likely to fluctuate based on players receiving performance/trade/other bonuses, which could create some odd spikes). We also ranked Dunks & Threes’ EPMs for all players by percentile, again with the 100th percentile being the highest positive EPM. We then plotted these two datasets (salary cap charge vs. EPM) against one another to see what type of relationship there was between them, such as linear or exponential, to inform our scaling approach. You can see the curve below in Figure 2:

[Figure 2]

We plotted the same curves using salary cap charges and EPMs from 2023 and 2022 to make sure that 2024 wasn’t some odd outlier. As you can see from Figure 3 below, the curves look largely similar.

[Figure 3]

A few things stood out from reviewing these curves, keeping in mind the potential effects of the NBA salary cap.

• At the low end, player salaries are clustered around the same values even as EPMs improve. You can see this based illustrated by the relative flatness of the curve between for lower EPMs (roughly in the -10 to -5 range). This is likely due to a few factors:

  • player salary cap charges can’t go below $0 (duh);

  • players on rookie deals have specified salary amounts based on the NBA CBA, which may be artificially low; and

  • A lot of salary cap charges cluster around the two-year veteran’s minimum, which was just over $2 million last season.

• At the top end of the salary range, player salaries are artificially depressed by the CBA, so you see a clear flattening. Generally, no player’s maximum salary can’t exceed 35% of the salary cap (other than for in-contract raises), and whether players are even eligible to receive that maximum 35% depends on how long they’ve been in the league. [Note: 2023 looks a little wonky, but that looks like a spike specifically from Stephen Curry’s new deal before that season.]

• In the middle, there appears to be a roughly exponential curve, with salaries staying relatively flat between EPMs of about -5 and -3 before quickly rising. The exponential nature of the curve is even easier to pick out if you look at the graphs below in Figure 4. The left-hand side shows just the 10th to 90th percentiles of salaries vs. EPMs, which looks like an exponential curve. The right-hand side shows the 5th to 95th percentiles, which starts to show some of the flattening at the top end of salary cap amounts (likely resulting from CBA-imposed maximums).

[Figure 4]

Based on our review of the above charts, we opted to use an exponential scaling function and fit the scaling curve to specific points along the 2024 Cap Charge vs. EPM curve (Figure 2). Use of an exponential scaling function may come as a surprise to those of you familiar with the Wins Above Replacement (WAR) metric often used in baseball and some other win-value metrics, but we found that an exponential function makes more sense for the NBA as it better tracks how teams are valuing players in the open segments of the market (e.g., without as many rule-based boundaries) and results in a more sensible valuation of draft picks, which I’ll discuss more later.

To create the exponential, we fit an exponential curve to the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile points on Figure 2 to avoid the “flattened” areas of the curve that happen at the high- and low-ends of the distribution that were likely due to maximum and minimum salary rules in the CBA. We did not expect those tail results to be relevant to the calculation of EPM units, which aren’t artificially capped at either end.

We also calculated each player’s salary cap charge as a percentage of the total cap allocations across the league (over $4.54 billion in 2024). The players who are the most valuable “accrue” a greater proportion of the value allotted to all players.

Once that was done, we pulled the results for 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile players (by salary cap charge) to fit the scaling function.

We used this function to convert EPM to EPM units for each player drafted from 2013 through 2023 and summed each player’s career EPM units (meaning the sum of the player’s EPM units accrued between the 2013-14 through 2023-24 seasons, the years for which we found complete EPM data).

Building the Draft Chart

To create the draft chart itself, we performed a few different steps.

First, we ranked the players in each draft class in order of career EPM units, best to worst, and we divided the EPM unit totals by the number of seasons that draft class was eligible to be in the NBA (up to a maximum of 11 seasons for the 2013 draft class). That gave us EPM units per season for each player, which was a bit more useful for comparison purposes.

[Note: There is some risk that we lowered the per-year performance of certain players who weren’t able to play the full number of seasons they were eligible for. That could be an issue for some players, such as those who suffered career-ending injuries or missed significant chunks of time due to injury. Given the nature of our project, though, it seems appropriate to knock down the values of players who missed time due to injury, and it’s reasonable to set and outside window around 10-12 years. We’ll have to think further about how to address this as EPM data becomes available over a longer window, however. For example, it would be a bit crazy to expect players to be playing 20+ seasons after they’re drafted.]

Second, we matched players up to their “theoretical” draft slots if they had been drafted in order of best (#1) to worst (#60) as if they’d in fact been drafted in order of ultimate performance. In other words, we slotted the player with the most EPM units in a draft as pick #1, the player with the second most EPM units was slotted as pick #2, and so forth until each of the 60* picks in a given draft year was matched up to a particular EPM unit score. [*The 2022 and 2023 drafts each had only 58 picks, as some picks were forfeited.] I’ll explain why we took this approach in a bit more detail later.

Third, we found the average of EPM units produced per year for each draft slot across the 11 draft classes with complete EPM data and normalized each value to a scale of 1000 (for convenience). To illustrate, let’s look at an example. Between 2013 and 2023, the average best player in a given draft class produced about 1,127 EPM units per season and the average second best player produced about 758 EPM units—about 67.2% of the EPM units produced by the average #1 pick. Accordingly, on our normalized scale, the #1 pick is worth 1,000 points and the #2 pick is worth 672 points.

You can see the full draft value chart (again) below:

[Figure 1 (repeated)]

What Jumps Out?

Let’s start with the draft value chart itself (Figure 1). There are a few things that jump out that are worth flagging, in my view.

The first two picks are incredibly valuable.

Just looking at the chart itself, it’s evident that the first and second pick are tremendously valuable relative to other picks, even other early first round picks. There are a few ways we can see this.

The #1 pick (1000 points) is worth roughly 1.5 times more than the #2 pick (684 points), and the #2 pick in turn is about twice as valuable as the #3 pick (336 points). But the changes in pick values start to smooth out quickly after the second pick. For example, the #3 pick is only about 1.2 times more valuable than the #4 pick (276 points); the #4 pick is only about 1.2 times more valuable than the #5 pick (234 points); and the #5 pick is only about 1.1 times more valuable than the #6 pick (205 points). That general trend remains true through about pick #34 (in the second round), when we finally again start to see bigger changes in pick value as we move down the draft order.

This is illustrated by Figure 5 (below). The bars show, for each pick, how many times more valuable it is than the immediately subsequent pick (e.g., pick #1 is 1.5x the value of pick #2, and pick #2 is 2.0x the value of pick #3, etc.). Bigger bars show bigger changes in value as you move down the draft board.

[Figure 5]

For the most part, there aren’t huge drops in draft pick value when you go down a pick, other than jumping from pick #1 to pick #2 or pick #2 to pick #3. For the bigger changes from pick to pick toward the end of the draft, it’s important to keep in mind that these are small in absolute terms. While pick #54 may appear to be 2.4 times more valuable than pick #55, that’s because the actual values are so very low that small changes can have a big impact. For example, a player who makes an NBA roster and plays 5-10 minutes per game for a few seasons has many times more value than a player who did not even make a roster after being drafted, but in real terms, neither player has a big impact.

You can also see why picks #1 and #2 are so valuable when you look at the data another way. Check out the graph below:

[Figure 6]

Figure 6 shows the range of potential outcomes for the top 5 players in every draft from 2013 through 2023 in terms of EPM units generated per season (like with the draft value chart, I’ve treated the top five players as if they were picked with picks #1 to #5). The curves were generated using ChatGPT to perform a Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) to estimate the distribution of particular picks. The “density” here represents the frequency with which a particular pick value will land at a particular EPM units per season value—the higher the peak, the more likely that pick will land at that value. Alternatively, you can think of the area below the line for any given pick as the distribution of outcomes for that pick.

[Note: If you’re curious, I’m happy to share the KDE method used. I used a Gaussian kernel, a bandwidth spread of 1.0, and boundaries of 0 and 2,840.8 EPM units per season (the maximum EPM units per season generated by any player in our dataset, Nikola Jokic).]

For example, look at the red line for pick #1. Assuming you actually pick the best player in the draft, pick #1’s most likely outcome appears at roughly 600-700 EPM units per season, meaning the team with an average first pick in the draft has a chance to draft a player who generates about 600-700 EPM units per season—a really strong player. But the pick also has another huge benefit: it’s also quite likely to allow the team to draft a player who generates 1,000 EPM units or more per season (up to the bounded maximum of ~2,840). While those 1,000+ EPM unit per season players aren’t common—only 7 of 656 players drafted since 2013 have hit that mark, some in the same draft—having the #1 pick gives a team a reasonably good shot of landing that good of a player.

Let’s look at Pick #2 next. Pick #2 has a similar curve shape to pick #1, but you can see that the distribution of outcomes has a peak somewhere around 450 EPM units per season—quite a bit lower. The distribution also swings heavily toward the lower end of the spectrum, even though there are some outlier instances when the #2 pick ought to be worth 1,000+ EPM units per season. This occurred in drafts like the 2014 draft, where Joel Embiid was extremely productive but still the second most productive player in the draft class on a EPM unit per season basis.

Unfortunately picks #3, #4, and #5 skew much more heavily toward the left of the chart. The players available with those picks (the third, fourth, and fifth best players in a given draft) are likely to be less productive than the best and second-best players, and they are much less likely to generate seriously outsized performances in the 1,000+ EPM unit per season range (none of them have gotten there in the past 11 draft classes).

The combination of these curves helps illustrate why the #1 pick and #2 pick carry so much value in our draft values chart (Figure 1).

If you’re curious about the rest of the lottery picks, I’ve also included that graph below (Figure 7). I’m not going to provide curves for all 60 picks though because it would be visually impossible to decipher.

[Figure 7]

The value of picks in the middle of the first round flattens out quickly and substantially.

Let’s go back to Figure 1 and Figure 5 again.

[Figure 1 (repeated)]

[Figure 5 (repeated)]

Looking at Figure 1, between pick #9 and pick #21, there’s only about a 93-point drop in pick value (from approximately 135 to 41), and the drop-off for each pick slot is never more than about 14 points.

Looking at Figure 5, there’s a noticeable flat trend between picks #7 and #21 for pick value relative to the subsequent draft slot—each pick is worth between about 7% and 15% more than the pick that follows (there’s rounding going on).

If we look again at Figure 7, too, you can see a clustering of the distributions for picks #9 to #14 around the same EPM units per season outcomes.

Taken together, these charts strongly suggest that once teams are picking in the middle of the first round, there probably isn’t a ton of difference moving around in pick location—at least within a few slots. There’s little to suggest that picking the 10th best player in a draft class is meaningfully different than selecting the 12th best player (assuming the “correct” picks are made), so there’s little reason to value those picks much differently from one another.

Second round picks probably don’t have much value—and late second round picks aren’t worth much more than replacement players.

Let’s look at another graph, Figure 8.

[Figure 8]

Figure 8 was actually the basis for the draft value chart itself before we normalized everything to an easier scale. Specifically, Figure 8 shows the average EPM units per season generated by players drafted over the last 11 years (from best to worst). It shows that the average “best” player in a draft produces a little over 1,100 EPM units per season; the average second-best player generates just over 750 EPM units per season; and so forth.

You can see the bars start to get quite small when we’re talking about the 30th to 60th best players in a draft class who could be available at those pick slots. Many of those players essentially produce no value.

There are some jarring facts from the data. On average, the bottom 24 players in each draft class produce less than 5.0 EPM units per season, while a staggering 15 players (!) produce less than 1.0 EPM unit per season. Compare that to the over 1,100 EPM units per season generated by the average best player in a draft class and the 750 EPM units per season generated by the average second best player. Or even the roughly 134 EPM units per season generated by the average 10th best player in a draft, or the nearly 50 EPM units per season generated by the average 20th best player. It’s hard to conclude anything other than those last 15-24 picks are near worthless. Ultimately,, about 40% of the average draft class of 60 players is producing basically no value on the court.

If you map those 40% of players onto draft picks, that means that picks outside the top 36 aren’t worth much in terms of production, and as you get even further in the round (toward picks #50 to #60), those players aren’t likely to produce anything.

Potential Pitfalls

In my view, we took a fair, reasonable approach to our analysis and we followed a good process in creating the draft value chart. With that said, I think it’s important to acknowledge that there are some areas where we made judgment calls and it’s fair to wonder about the impact of those decisions. Let’s go through the most important ones.

#1: Re-Ordering the Draft

As I noted previously, we opted to sort draft pick values based on the best performing player from each class rather than the specific draft slot players were in fact drafted into. The basic rationale is that the team with the #1 overall pick, by definition, has the chance to pick the best player, the team with the #2 overall pick has the chance to pick the second-best player, and so forth. If teams miss their picks, that’s on them.

Of course, there are several real-world problems with this approach. I won’t go through a laundry list, but the most evident issues are that teams won’t always pick the “best” player and players may develop more if the team that drafts them has better coaching/player development or is simply a better fit (on and off the court). Using larger sample sizes and averages can mitigate these concerns, especially if you believe—as I do—that NBA teams tend to do a good job of identifying the best players through scouting.

But the biggest justification for sorting draft pick values based on the best performing player rather than actual draft slot is easier to show than explain with words alone.

Check out the graph below.

[Figure 9]

Figure 9 shows the average EPM Units generated by the 11 players drafted in each draft slot from the 2013 to 2023 drafts as though they were drafted in their actual draft position. In other words, the actual eleven players drafted with #1 picks in the eleven drafts from 2013 to 2023 are all averaged, the actual eleven #2 picks are all averaged, the actual eleven #3 picks are all averaged, etc.

You can see the trend here is quite lumpy and hard to predict. On top of that, some immediate absurdities leap off the screen.

The average #3 pick is about 75% more valuable than the average #1 pick and more than three times as valuable as the average #2 pick. The average #41 pick also appears to be insanely valuable—it’s the third highest pick in terms of average value overall, and over 10 times more valuable than the average pick on either side of it (#40 and #42).

If that seems wild to you, it’s because it probably is.

The chart below of top 3 picks over the last 11 years. Green is the best pick of the three draft slots, yellow is the second best, and red is the worst.

[Figure 10]

Glancing at Figure 10, you couldn’t be faulted for thinking the #1 pick is the best here. It produced the best pick of the three picks in 4 of 11 drafts, and only produced the worst pick two times. But the #3 pick has produced the best player of the three slots five different times, and when you look a bit closer you see that a few guys who were drafted at pick #3 have been truly stellar players.

The home-run picks really distort the numbers in an 11 year sample. Specifically, the outsize performances of Joel Embiid, Luka Doncic, and Jayson Tatum dramatically improve the average value of the #3 pick. Embiid and Doncic have produced by far the most value in terms of overall EPM units among top 3 picks (with the caveat that Embiid is one of the longest tenured players in the sample), and Tatum is only matched by the two of them and Karl-Anthony Towns. Conversely, the lack of outsized performances for #1 picks other than Towns, coupled with the bust picks of Markelle Fultz and Anthony Bennett, really affect the average value of the #1 pick. The #2 pick, meanwhile, hasn’t yielded a truly great player in the last eleven drafts, and several of the better performers from that pick slot have had injuries (Oladipo, Parker, Ball) or other issues (Morant) limit their performance.

We can also easily explain the apparently absurd value of the average #41 pick—it’s basically driven by one guy. Nikola Jokic has generated a staggering 2,840 EPM Units per season since he was drafted with the 41st pick in 2014, despite missing a full year playing overseas. The only other players who even clear 1,000 EPM Units per season are regularly All-NBA contenders like Joel Embiid (~2,129), Giannis Antetokounmpo (~2,098), Luka Doncic (~1,855), Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (~1,590), Rudy Gobert (~1,238), and Jayson Tatum (~1,107).

The mere fact that a later pick ultimately yielded a better player should not make that selection inherently more valuable than an earlier pick. Though Marvin Bailey III was selected #2 ahead of Luka Doncic in 2018, for example, doesn’t mean the #3 pick was actually “better” despite the outcome. The Kings picking at #2 had the opportunity to select Doncic but chose not to, as did the Hawks, who traded out of the #3 pick—that those teams made the wrong selection at the end of the day says little about the pick’s value.

Moreover, when we sort draft position based on player performance—essentially, what should have happened with the benefit of hindsight—you get much more sensible results. Check out the graph below:

[Figure 8 (repeated)]

Figure 8 shows the average EPM Units per season that would have been generated by the #1 pick had the eleven best players in each draft instead been drafted #1 overall, the eleven second-best players been drafted #2 overall, etc. In other words, when you assume that in an average year the best player available is drafted in each slot, this is the curve you get.

While the result here is obviously somewhat artificial, the smoothed curve makes a lot more sense when trying to estimate the value of a given pick compared to the exceptionally spiky chart shown in Figure 8. Thus, we thought this was a much more sensible sorting methodology to use for creating our draft value chart.

#2: No Time Limits On Value Accrual

The number of years you count toward a player’s draft value is also incredibly important. In this exercise, we did not limit the years of value that a draft pick could accrue, so based on our EPM dataset, draft picks could accrue EPM Units for up to 11 seasons. Some of the other analyses I’ve seen have capped the amount of value they credit to a draft pick at 4 or 5 seasons, which is certainly defensible. However, I strongly suspect that 4 and 5 season caps on value dramatically understates the value of getting a top player through the draft, as most elite players will stay with the team that drafted them far beyond the first 4-5 seasons of formal “team control.” For example, out of the five players drafted since 2013 with the highest career EPM Units, four players have spent their careers with the team that drafted them (Nikola Jokic, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Joel Embiid, and Luka Doncic), and the fifth player (Rudy Gobert) spent nine seasons with the team that drafted him before he was eventually traded, garnering additional value for the team. Still, there probably is some value in trying to nail down a more accurate timeframe to use for value accretion of each draft pick, and that’s something we may look at down the road.

#3: Choosing EPM

We chose to use EPM for several reasons that I covered earlier, but it essentially boils down to the fact that I think it’s one of (if not the) most accurate all-in-one metrics available. You could create this type of chart based other all-in-one metrics like Box Plus/Minus (which I may try at some point for comparison), RAPTOR, or other advanced stats, and people have. A draft value chart that incorporates several stats could, in theory, be even better if the other metrics used are also reliable.

We did, however, run a sanity check using another metric, which I describe in the next section.

#4: Exponential Scaling

Picking the scaling function used to calculate EPM units from Dunks & Threes’ EPM stat is, inherently, a subjective exercise. As I discussed above, we chose to use an exponential scaling function based on how NBA salaries go up, but we basically tossed out the high-end and low-end to do so. There are good reasons for that, but we certainly had alternative options. For example, the salary scale curves (figures 2 and 3) actually look a lot like Sigmoid curves when you include the extremes. We think that’s probably attributable to the CBA rules for maximum and minimum salaries rather than a true reflection of market values, so we didn’t use a Sigmoid scaling function, but that hypothesis may not actually be true. We also could have opted to use a linear scaling function, but that doesn’t seem to match with how the NBA distributes salaries as well, either.

As a check, we decided to also develop a rough draft value analysis based on Estimated Wins from Dunks and Threes [Note: it looks like Dunks and Threes recently removed Estimated Wins from its public site, but we had previously downloaded the data for the 2014 through 2024 seasons.] While we don’t have an exact understanding of how Dunks and Threes calculates Estimated Wins, we understand that it’s a function of EPM and playing time (probably in terms of minutes, but possibly based on non-public possession data). Regardless, based on the distribution of Estimated Wins, it appears to scale in a more linear fashion than our EPM units metric. Estimated Wins can also be negative, which introduces some challenges.

Doing this analysis was useful because it yielded results that quickly showed obvious issues.

First, in an average draft year, 23 players were expected to produce negative Estimated Wins. Not only did those players show up as being worse than players who never played, but their negative performance also suggests that more than two-thirds of second round picks in an average draft somehow carried negative value. That doesn’t track with logic or reality, as NBA teams routinely make trades for those picks.

Second, creating draft values based on Estimated Wins led to apparent under-valuation of early first-round picks vis-a-vis middle first-round picks.

For easy comparison, I’ve put side-by-side charts of the normalized values for EPM units and Estimated Wins below (Figure 11) and a graph showing how picks decrease in value using each metric (Figure 12).

[Figure 11]

[Figure 12]

You can see from Figures 11 and 12 is that draft values based on Estimated Wins run negative for pick #38 and higher in an average draft, which doesn’t make any sense.

You can also see the Estimated Wins-based draft values are significantly higher than EPM unit-based draft values for certain picks, specifically in the range of pick #3 to about pick #21. It’s difficult to assess the value of very high picks in the NBA based on past trades, but nonetheless, the Estimated Wins values seem too tightly packed between top picks. For instance, the Estimated Wins draft values suggest that teams should be willing to trade a #1 overall pick for two #5 picks or three #8 picks, both of which are virtually impossible to imagine for normal drafts (not to mention drafts with truly coveted prospects available at pick #1, such as Wembanyama last year or potentially Cooper Flagg in 2025). That said, it is possible that draft values that are more evenly distributed amongst the top picks (as occurs when we used Estimated Wins) would make more sense in an environment where you are less certain which players will be best.

Wrap-Up

That’s it for now! We hope this post was informative and valuable. If you want to see the script we used, feel free to email me and I’ll share it with you (duncan@thesportsappeal.com). Unfortunately, however, I am not going to be able to publish the EPM dataset from Dunks & Threes since they have it behind a paywall (it’s not that pricey). If you can’t find another way to get the data, let me know via email and I can try to point you in the right direction at least.

Also, we’re probably going to play around with some of the future projects like looking at better ways to determine how many years of value to attribute to a given draft pick. I am not sure when but stay tuned if you’re interested.

As always, really appreciate any feedback folks have—so if there’s anything you think we missed or did wrong, please don’t hesitate to let us know! Another special shout-out once again to Alex Takakuwa, who was fundamental to making this analysis possible.

Sacramento Kings: 2024 Off-Season Strategy

Now that it’s mid-May, the NBA playoffs are in full swing and only a handful of teams are still competing. The Kings find themselves on the outside, looking in, after finishing with a 46-36 record and losing their second play-in tournament game to the Pelicans (that loss was their sixth of the season to the Pelicans).

Missing the playoffs is disappointing for any team, but it’s especially tough for a Kings team that finished third in the Western Conference in 2022-23 while breaking a 16-year playoff drought before eventually losing to the Golden State Warriors in seven games.

Last offseason, the Kings’ front office seemed to choose continuity over big changes to follow up their success, as most of the roster changes were really on the fringes. They re-signed forward Harrison Barnes and agreed to an extension with All-NBA center Domantas Sabonis with cap space freed up by trading away backup center Richaun Holmes (along with their 2023 first-round pick). They brought in a handful of rotation players in Sasha Venzenkov, Chris Duarte, and Javale McGee, and made just two second round draft selections in Colby Jones and Jalen Slawson, both of whom played limited minutes this season. They let a handful of back-end rotation and bench players walk through the Holmes trade and departures of Terence Davis, Matthew Dellavedova, Chimezie Metu, Neemias Queta, and PJ Dozier. The theme was clear: run it back with the same core, rely on internal development, and try to make upgrades on the edges.

The strategy from last offseason helped the Kings stay relevant and continue to develop despite late-season injuries to key players like Kevin Huerter (torn labrum on March 18) and Malik Monk (sprained right MCL on March 29). While the Kings finished ninth in the West, they were just 5 wins behind the fourth seeded LA Clippers. They also managed to improve their defensive significantly over the 2022-23 season, jumping up to a defensive rating of 114.4 (14th in the NBA) from a poor defensive rating of 116.0 (24th in the NBA) per NBA.com. That was a meaningful jump defensively, especially given there was a pronounced increase in offensive output league wide. Unfortunately, the Kings’ strides on defense were offset by a bit of a dip offensively, as the Kings fell from 1st in the NBA in offensive rating (118.6) to 13th (116.2). And of course, the Kings won two fewer games in 2023-24 than the previous season even as the Western Conference continued to improve—for context, 10 of the 11 top teams in the West this season improved on their record from 2022-23.

So, things may look very different this time around.

The Kings have some big questions to answer this offseason. The most pressing question is whether the Kings can retain guard Malik Monk, who is set to hit unrestricted free agency. The team also needs to think about how to improve the roster—with an eye toward maintaining the defensive improvements from this past season while getting back to 2022-23 form on offense—with free agency options, a late lottery first round pick, and restrictions on its tradable assets.

I’ll dive into what the Kings should look to do.

The Big Picture

To get a lay of the land, I want to set out the big picture overview. The Kings have eleven full-time players on the roster headed into next season and one two-way player. The team’s core is De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray. As of today, some combination of Harrison Barnes, Kevin Huerter, and Keon Ellis will fill out the starting line-up and be core rotation players, with other returning players like Davion Mitchell, Trey Lyles, Chris Duarte, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones likely to fill out the backend of the rotation. They also have two-way player Mason Jones under contract, though he’s less likely to play meaningful minutes.

The Kings also hold the #13 and #45 overall picks in the upcoming 2024 draft, meaning the team could add two new players to the roster.

On the flip side, some meaningful players from last year will not be on the roster barring some action in free agency. Malik Monk, Javale McGee, and Alex Len are slated to be unrestricted free agents (meaning they can sign elsewhere once free agency starts), while Kessler Edwards and two-way players Jordan Ford and Jalen Slawson will enter restricted free agency (meaning the Kings can potentially match offers they get from other teams).

Based on data from Spotrac, with just the players currently on the roster (excluding two-way contracts), the Kings will have just shy of $151.6 million in salary on the books—about $10.6 million above the projected salary cap of $141.0 million. They will, however, be well shy of Spotrac’s projected luxury tax line (est. $171,315,000) as well as the first apron (est. $178,655,000) and second apron (est. $189,486,000).

As an over the cap team, the Kings will have three ways to add to their roster: (1) signing free agents (or re-signing their own free agents) using cap exceptions, (2) drafting players, or (3) trading for players. But the salary cap and luxury tax rules are going to be play a huge role in how the Kings go about roster construction as they think about next season.

I’ve written extensively before on the NBA salary cap, cap exceptions, and how the luxury tax line and aprons work, so I won’t cover them in detail here. That said, at a high level, teams over the luxury tax line get hit with additional taxes for each dollar they go over line (how much varies based on how far over they are and how often they exceed the luxury tax threshold) while teams under the tax can receive substantial payments. HoopsHype estimates that non-tax teams will receive about $11.8 million in payouts from luxury tax teams after the 2023-24 season, so going over the luxury tax line can be costly directly and indirectly. And teams that go over the first apron (or second apron) face increasingly onerous restrictions on the types of roster moves they can make.

Having won 48 and 46 games the last two years with a roster centered around stars Fox and Sabonis, who are both in their physical primes, the Kings are in position to compete now. But they will be (and should be) cognizant of how any off-season moves they make impacts the team’s salary cap/luxury tax situation, and they’ll undoubtedly also be thinking about any impacts on the team’s financial bottom line. They also will have to think about the long-term impacts of the moves they make now. Even as the team looks to be more competitive in the short-term, they also have to be mindful of the team’s medium-term and long-term future.

What should the Kings do first? I’ll start with the obvious.

Re-Sign the Sixth Man!

Of the Kings’ six free agents, one stands out above the rest. The Kings should do all they can to re-sign sixth man Malik Monk.

Monk has been the soul of the Kings bench unit for his two years in Sacramento. In just 26 minutes per game off the bench, Monk averaged 15.4 points and 5.1 assists per game, both career highs, with a solid shooting slash line of 44.3% / 35.0% / 82.9% (percentages for twos / threes / free throws). He also finished second in Sixth Man of the Year voting despite missing virtually all of the Kings’ last 10 games of the season and both play-in games due to an MCL injury (he might have won the award if he’d stayed healthy).

Monk was also one of the team’s very best ball-handlers and the only player on the roster other than Fox who consistently create shots for himself and others. This was readily apparent toward the end of the season as the Kings often struggled to create offense in the half-court against set defenses, especially without Fox on the court. The Kings sorely missed Monk’s ability to run pick-and-rolls with Sabonis and Len, drive the lane, and create space through step-backs, instead having to rely too much on creation from players who were over-extended. Fox already had a full plate offensively. Sabonis and Murray aren’t yet adept at creating shots for themselves. Barnes couldn’t absorb Monk’s shot-creation volume. Without Monk to bolster the offense, the Kings ended up losing several key games down the stretch because they simply couldn’t score enough despite strong defensive performances. The Kings scored 103 points in the game against Dallas where Monk got hurt, and they scored under 110 points against the Knicks, Celtics, Thunder, Suns, and the play-in game versus New Orleans. They ended up losing all those games.

There’s no real question that the Kings players and coaches want to bring Monk back. Star players De’Aaron Fox and Domantas Sabonis made clear how important they think Monk is to the team’s success at the end of the season. Brown called it a “no brainer” that the Kings try to bring Monk back. But whether he returns will ultimately be a decision for Monk and the team’s front office, and that is going to inevitably come down to dollars and options.

Since the Kings will be over the salary cap this off-season, they need to find a cap exception to re-sign Monk. The best exception they can use to re-sign Monk is one of the “Bird rights” exceptions, which generally allow teams to re-sign their own free agents. There are several kinds of Bird rights—Full Bird rights, Early Bird rights, and Non-Bird rights—and they allow teams to re-sign free agents up to different dollar amounts over the cap (to over-simplify, if a player has been under the same contract with the team for longer, they can offer him more money). Monk is wrapping up a two-year contract with the Kings after signing as a free agent in 2022, so the team holds his Early Bird rights. As a result, even though the Kings are over the salary cap, they can offer Monk a four-year contract with a starting first year salary of up to 175% of his 2023-24 salary with 8% raises per year.

Monk’s 2023-24 salary was about $9.95 million, so the most the Kings can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $78 million total (an average of about $19.5 million per year). [Note: if you’re curious, the actual salary amounts would be 17,405,203 in 2024-25; 18,797,619 in 2025-26, 20,190,035 in 2026-27, and 21,582,451 in 2027-28.]

There’s also no reason Monk and the Kings have to agree to a 4-year deal. The Kings could offer him a two year deal for about $36.2 million or a 2+1 deal (two years plus a player option in year three) for about $56.4 million. These could be attractive for the Kings and Monk, as this sort of deal structure would eventually lead to the Kings having Monk’s Full Bird rights, so they could re-sign him for more money on a future contract, while at the same time giving Monk enough short-term financial security to make a contract renewal palatable. He’d also still be able to re-enter free agency during his prime with either structure. For purposes of this article, I’ll stick with assuming a framework offer from the Kings at 4 years for $78 million because I’m a little skeptical that Monk would forego the certainty of added years.

Making such a big offer for Monk would be a big deal for the Kings. Regardless of whether they do a 4-year deal, a 2-year deal, or 2+1 deal, adding Monk to the 2024-25 roster at $17.4 million would push the Kings’ team salary to about $169.9 million. Combined with the approximately $4.7 million the team will need to sign its first-round pick after the draft, the Kings would be about $3.3 million over the projected luxury tax line of $171.3 million. In that case, the Kings would have to pay almost $5 million in luxury tax. And as a luxury tax payor, the Kings wouldn’t be eligible to receive luxury tax payments from other teams, which in recent years have often been over $10 million. The Kings could effectively end up spending an extra $15 million (or more) in taxes and lost tax revenue to re-sign Monk, on top of Monk’s new salary. In a very real sense, re-signing Monk could cost the team closer to $30 million than Monk’s $17.4 million salary next year.

The Kings could try to avoid the tax by trying to get a smaller deal done with Monk or by trading away another player such as Barnes, Huerter, Lyles, Vezenkov, Duarte, or Mitchell. Either approach involves some risk. If the Kings don’t give Monk the biggest offer they possibly can, they’ll make it more likely he walks in free agency. And if they want to trade away salary, they will have to give up something of value (such as draft capital). By way of example, the Kings had to give up their 2023 first round pick to clear Richaun Holmes’ contract off the books last offseason, creating about $12 million in cap space in the process.

Re-signing Monk could also present issues for the Kings in trying to sign other free agents. As an over-the-cap team, they can only sign free agents with cap exceptions—most notably the midlevel exception (“MLE”) or biannual exception. The MLE, which I’ve written about previously, would allow the Kings to sign players up to about $12.9 million or $5.2 million depending on if the team’s salary is under or above the luxury tax line; the biannual exception, meanwhile, is worth $4.7 million. If re-signing Monk takes the Kings over the luxury tax line, the Kings wouldn’t be able to use the non-taxpayer MLE—they’d be stuck at the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE. And if the Kings use the non-taxpayer MLE or the biannual exception at all, they would trigger the NBA’s hard cap rule, which would restrict them from having a team salary higher than the first apron, which projected to be $178.7 million. That probably doesn’t matter a lot for free agency purposes, but it would affect the Kings’ future trade decisions.

And of course, Monk would have to accept the Kings offer, which isn’t a given.

I’ve seen a lot of NBA free agency watchers claim that it’s unlikely Monk stays, presumably because they think some other team will throw a ton of money at Monk in free agency (this year’s free agency class is generally not considered to be elite). That’s certainly a real possibility, though I think it’s less likely than many people assume, and I want to take a little bit of time to explain why.

Free agency is a two-way market. And while Monk and his agent will certainly shop around for the best deal (as they absolutely should), the market this year is likely not going to have a ton of potential bidders for his services.

According to Spotrac, only seven teams are projected to have cap space this offseason. The other 23 teams, including the Kings, are all probably limited to using salary cap exceptions to sign free agents unless they make major changes to their rosters to create meaningful cap space (and remember, getting salary off the books often comes at a price itself).

For the over-the-cap teams, the biggest cap exception they can use to sign Monk is the Non-taxpayer MLE, which is projected to be about $12.9 million and can be used for contracts up to 4 years, with up to 5% annual raises. In other words, the most such teams can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $55.7 million. That’s substantially less than the Kings can offer him, and it’s even well below what the Kings could offer Monk while staying below the luxury tax. This built-in advantage for the Kings is by design, as the NBA CBA gives teams advantages in re-signing their own free agents in the form of Bird rights. Obviously, teams without cap space could make moves to clear up room to sign Monk, but clearing $15+ million in cap space isn’t all that easy to do and it usually involves giving up valuable draft picks. It’s hard to envision over-the-cap teams making such big swings to sign Monk, who is a really good player but not necessarily a set-it-and-forget-it starter for every team.

What about the other seven teams with cap space? Well, some are obvious potential suitors for Monk—but it’s fewer than you might think for a variety of reasons. We’ll go through each of them below.

Detroit Pistons

[up to $64.4 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Pistons can easily create enough cap room to make an offer to Monk that exceeds 4 years/$78 million, but there’s a serious question as to whether they would make a push for him. To get the space, the Pistons could free up over $50 million in cap space by renouncing some their free agency rights over several players. The Pistons will likely match offers for restricted free agent Simone Fontecchio, and the Pistons may want to hold onto a flier in James Wiseman, who still has potential at just 22 years old despite the very rocky start to his career, but they can easily do both of those things and still free up enough cap space to make a big offer for Monk if they want to.

But fit questions could slow Detroit down. The Pistons have three young guards who need the ball to develop in Cade Cunningham, Jaden Ivey, and Marcus Sasser. While Monk would provide them additional outside shooting, the Pistons wouldn’t be able to develop their young guards and fully utilize Monk’s shot creation and burgeoning pick and roll game. They’re also not particularly close to competing, so paying up for Monk, whose skillset overlaps a lot with guys they need to play a lot, isn’t a particularly effective use of cap space. It’s not obvious that the Pistons would want to use their cap space on a player whose skillset is duplicative of what they already have when they could either keep the space or use on alternative free agency options like wing players or off-ball shooters (there are other free agency options with better three point percentages than Monk like Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., or even Klay Thompson).

Philadephia 76ers

[up to $55.5 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Sixers could theoretically create over $60 million in cap room this offseason by renouncing all of their free agents and making a few ancillary moves. They’d effectively be rolling forward with a roster of just Joel Embiid, Tyrese Maxey, whoever they can sign in free agency, and minimum guys, but it’s certainly possible. The thing is, if the Sixers choose to go that route, they’re also very clearly signaling that they are going after a top tier free agent—the biggest names being Paul George and (theoretically) LeBron James. They’re not clearly that space to target Monk. It’s hard to imagine the Sixers letting all their rotation guys walk with the goal of adding Monk, whose pairing with Maxey is arguably duplicative anyway. The Sixers could split up their cap space among multiple players and go after Monk at $20 million+ per year, but that’s far from an obvious move for them.

Utah Jazz

[up to $38.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Per Spotrac, the Jazz can create about $38 million in cap space, principally by moving on from Kira Lewis Jr. and Talen Horton-Tucker. The real question is why they would clear that space for Monk. The Jazz already have Collin Sexton, Keyonte George, and Jordan Clarkson on the roster, all of whom share similar skillsets with Monk as score-first small guards. The Jazz also need to consider how to save money to pay Lauri Markannen, who will become a free agent after the 2024-25 season if he’s not extended or traded first. Monk doesn’t fill an obvious need for them.

Oklahoma City Thunder

[up to $35.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Thunder are deep into the playoffs and could make the Finals this season, but amazingly they still have a lot of cap flexibility. They can create over $35 million in cap space (per Spotrac) this offseason if they want to without losing any of their core players. But they’re unlikely to be bidders for Monk as they already have capable primary ball handlers in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, plus quality 3-D guards like Lu Dort, Cason Wallace, and Isaiah Joe. If they clear cap space or deal Josh Giddey, the Thunder are likely to target a bigger fish than Monk or someone who can bolster their front court and rebounding, which have been issues for them against the Mavs.

Orlando Magic

[up to $25.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Spotrac projects the Magic to have over $25 million in cap space this offseason, but they can easily push that number up over $35 million by renouncing their free agency rights to non-core rotation players like Markelle Fultz and Gary Harris. They could also free up even more money by letting more important role-players like Jonathan Isaac ($17.4 million), Mo Wagner ($8 million), and Joe Ingles ($11 million) walk. In fact, they can theoretically create over $55 million in cap space if they want to, though it’s pretty unlikely they actually let Isaac in particular move on, so that’s a bit of a fake number. Regardless, it’s meaningful cap space. And the Magic have a clear and obvious need for shooting and ball-handling.

The net result is that the Magic are a serious player in the bidding for Monk next season—and they may be his best bet for a huge contract.

The big questions are how much the Magic want to shake up their roster to create cap space and whether they want to use that cap space to out-bid the Kings for Monk rather than on other free agents. They’ve already been linked to Klay Thompson, who presumably would only leave the Warriors for a significant salary. They also already have Cole Anthony on the roster, who profiles similarly to Monk as a score-first guard with solid-but-not-spectacular shooting, playmaking skills, and below average defense. They could also look at other alternatives to paying up for Monk in free agency, including players who can offer shooting (Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., Malik Beasley), scoring (D’Angelo Russell, Demar Derozan, Alec Burks), and ball handling (Tyus Jones, Monte Morris). And there’s always the trade market.

I could absolutely see the Magic targeting Monk in free agency, and if they want him, they have the firepower to make him a bigger offer than the Kings can. If they throw $20-25 million at Monk per season, that will probably be enough to get him. But given the many options they have on the table, it’s hard to see the Magic dramatically over-paying for Monk’s services—if they’re going to overpay, they’ll probably target somebody higher in the NBA player hierarchy. But they are the team to watch most closely for the Kings.

San Antonio Spurs

[up to $21.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Spurs can also create a meaningful amount of cap space and need to get some help at guard. Assuming they keep their two first round picks this year and let their free agents walk, they would only have about $7.2 million in cap space, but they can free up another $18 million by letting go of Devonte Graham ($12.7 million), Julian Champagnie ($3 million), and Charles Bassey ($2.5 million), which would give them over $25 million in cap space.

The Spurs have a decent pass-first point guard on the roster in Tre Jones, but rumors are swirling that they want to pair phenom Victor Wembanyama with better perimeter play. Monk could certainly be an option for them, but are they really willing to give him a 4-year deal at $20 million+ per year? Certainly Wemby could make up for Monk’s defensive limitations, but the same could be said for superior offensive players who could become available like Trae Young or Anfernee Simons, both of whom could be obtainable on the trade market. The Spurs also have the #4 and #8 picks in the upcoming draft, so they’ll have at least a chance to add a guard like Nikola Topic, Rob Dillingham, or Reed Sheppard if they want to.

While the Spurs could theoretically make a push for Monk, it’s hard to see them paying up for him when they already have Jones on the roster, they have options in the draft this year, and they can go add a star via trade if they want to. They are probably second to the Magic in terms of potential Monk suitors, but they also have a ton of flexibility and don’t need to rush into getting Monk when better players could become available down the line.

Charlotte Hornets

[up to $5.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Hornets are the last team with projected cap space this offseason and they’re basically not in play for Monk. If they keep their free agency rights over Miles Bridges (which seems inevitable, given they didn’t trade him at the deadline this year) and their #6 draft pick, they’ll have only about $8.4 million in cap space—not enough to get into the bidding for Monk. They may even choose to operate as an over-the-cap team, in which case they’d be limited to giving Monk the Non-taxpayer MLE.

Toronto Raptors

The Raptors are likely to operate as an over-the-cap team, but I want to talk about them briefly because they are the only over-the-cap team that could reasonably make enough room to sign Monk to a big deal without having to totally overhaul their roster.

Toronto has $117.7 million in team salary next year. With a $27.8 million cap hold for Gary Trent Jr. and a $12.5 million cap hold for Immanuel Quickley, they are over the cap (they also have a random assortment of other free agent cap holds, but none are really for critical players). In theory, by (A) renouncing their Bird rights for Trent Jr. and their other free agents, excluding Quickley, (B) declining their team option for Bruce Brown Jr. ($23 million in salary), and (C) letting go of Javon Freeman-Liberty ($1.8 million in salary), Toronto can free up about $30 million in cap space. That would be more than enough to sign Monk.

That’s a pretty enormous opportunity cost to sign Monk, whose skillset overlaps with a player Toronto just traded for in Immanuel Quickley. Presumably Toronto likes Quickley more than Monk, otherwise OG Anunoby might be on the Kings right now. Also, giving up Bruce Brown Jr. in particular seems quite costly—Brown can be an effective player on a playoff team (he won a title with Denver in 2023), he’s got an expiring deal, and his salary would be useful as a trade chip and in salary matching if needed. It seems unlikely Toronto would give up all that for Monk when they could find a true point guard or floor spacer elsewhere in the free agency market.

So what does that all mean?

It all boils down to a pretty simple reality: Monk probably won’t have a ton of suitors in free agency. Aside from Sacramento, there’s a good chance only 1 or 2 teams show serious interest in Monk, at least at salaries in the $15-25 million range. If the Magic or Spurs decide to go another direction—and there are lots of options for them in free agency and the trade market—it’s possible Monk doesn’t end up with the frothy free agency market that many people seem to assume. The Kings should know this, Monk’s agent should know this, and other potential bidders like the Magic and the Spurs should know this. As a result, it’s hard to see anyone coming in over the top with a “blow out the competition” style offer.

Of course, if Monk gets an offer above the 4-year/$78 million contract the Kings can offer, there’s a good chance he takes it. Nobody should blame him either—he’s a free agent, and he’s absolutely earned the right to pick his destination and maximize his earnings. But Monk himself has said “I can go somewhere else with a lot more money and be in a worse situation,” so he’s going to think about the decision from at least a few different angles.

There’s one other thing I want to address.

It’s also possible the 4 years/$78 million the Kings can offer as actually above market for a player like Monk. Grayson Allen just signed for 4 years and $70 million to stay with the Suns. You can quibble about which player is better (Monk is the better ball handler and one-on-one scorer, but Allen shoots better from three and is a better defender), but it’s hard to argue that Monk and Allen are in different tiers as players. And while you can never assume one deal sets the market, obviously Allen and his representatives didn’t think he was going to see a ton more money if he hit free agency, otherwise he wouldn’t have signed the deal when he did.

You can also look at the list below of guard contracts/extensions signed in the last couple of years to get a better sense of where Monk’s eventual deal may fall. What jumps out is that only six deals (in red) have average annual salaries higher than the $19.5 million per year the Kings can offer.

• Dejounte Murray - 4 years, $114.1 million (starting in 2024)

• Devin Vassell - 5 years, $135 million (starting in 2024)

• Jalen Brunson - 4 years, $104 million (starting in 2022)

• Anfernee Simons - 4 years, $100 million (starting in 2022)

• Terry Rozier - 4 years, $96.3 million (starting in 2022)

• Josh Hart - 4 years, $80.9 million (starting in 2023)

• [Theoretical Kings Offer for Monk - 4 years, $78 million]

• Marcus Smart - 4 years, $76.5 million (starting in 2022)

• Keldon Johnson - 4 years, $74 million (starting in 2023)

• D’Angelo Russell - 2 years, $36 million (starting in 2023)

• Grayson Allen - 4 years, $70 million (starting in 2024)

• Bogdan Bogdanovic - 4 years, $68 million (starting in 2023)

• Lu Dort - 5 years, $82 million (starting in 2022)

• Caris Lavert - 2 years, $32 million (starting in 2023)

• Max Strus - 4 years, $62.3 million (starting in 2023)

• Kentavious Caldwell-Pope - 2 years, $30.1 million (starting in 2023)

• Tyus Jones - 2 years, $29 million (starting in 2023)

• Jordan Clarkson - 2 years, $28.4 million (starting in 2024)

• Josh Green - 3 years, $41 million (starting in 2024)

• Austin Reaves - 3 years, $53.8 million (starting in 2023)

• Cole Anthony - 3 years, $39.1 million (starting in 2024)

There are different circumstances for each of the contracts above, but the message is pretty clear—a lot of scoring guards on the starter/sixth man line aren’t getting contracts worth $19.5 million per season or that even go 4 years. With a potentially thin list of bidders, you have to wonder how likely it is that Monk ends up getting offers toward the top of the list.

The Kings can negotiate a new deal with Monk starting the day after the NBA Finals (June 24 at the latest). Monk can start negotiating with other teams on June 30. We’ll have to wait and see, but at least for now there’s good vibes.

What About the Other Kings Free Agents?

Of the Kings remaining free agents, Kessler Edwards and Alex Len should warrant a re-signing look, but it depends a lot on cost and what the Kings do elsewhere in free agency and the draft. I also expect the Kings to sign Jalen Slawson to another two-way contract.

The two remaining free agents—Javale McGee and Jordan Ford (two-way)—aren’t as likely to be back with the team. McGee pretty much lost the backup minutes to Len and will turn 37 next year; McGee theoretically could come back on a minimum deal, but there’s a good chance he’s replaced. Ford won’t be eligible for another two-way contract next year because he’ll be past his fourth NBA season, and he’s not likely to make the NBA roster.

Kessler Edwards

Edwards is a restricted free agent, meaning the Kings will have the chance to match competing offers for him from other teams (assuming they give him a small qualifying offer, which is likely). Edwards still has some intriguing upside as a 3-and-D wing. He’s only 23 years old and has great physical attributes (6’8”, 215 pounds, solid athleticism). He’s also flashed quality defense for stretches and posted decent, though slightly below average, three-point shooting numbers (35% last year on limited volume).

If the Kings re-sign Monk, keeping Edwards could get expensive because of the luxury tax. It’s hard to say exactly what he’d be offered by another team, but it’s unlikely to be much—most RFAs never get offer sheets from other teams, and Edwards really hasn’t done enough in the NBA to warrant another team offering him anything substantial. Still, if Monk is back and the Kings are flirting with the second apron, there’s a decent chance Edwards would end up a cap casualty if he’s offered anything much over the minimum by another team.

If the Kings don’t re-sign Monk, they have a bit more leeway. In that case, they could reasonably match offers for Edwards for a bit more money—think something in the $2-5 million range per season, probably on a 2- or 3-year deal. Anything beyond that starts to get expensive for a back-end rotation player that you’re hoping will develop.

Alex Len

There’s no real question at this point what Alex Len’s role in the NBA is—he’s a reasonable backup center option who has limitations on offense and in handling pick and rolls. He’s probably a minimum player, but he can contribute in that role. Regardless of whether the Kings re-sign Monk, someone needs to fill the backup center role on the roster. If the Kings don’t draft a reasonable back-up center option, Len can fill that role fine for his relatively low cost. And because finding a better backup center than Len in free agency is likely an expensive proposition, I wouldn’t expect the Kings to look at pricier options if they do end up re-signing Monk, even though they could theoretically offer free agents contracts worth up to the midlevel exception or bi-annual exception.

Ultimately, I think there’s a good chance Len is back with the Kings next season. He’s unlikely to get big money elsewhere, so unless he’s offered a clearly better opportunity to play elsewhere, the Kings are probably a good fit.

Jalen Slawson

Slawson is one of the Kings’ two second round picks from last season, as he was selected #54 overall out of Furman. He spent the 2023-24 season on a two-way contract with the Kings and spent most of the year playing for the G League Stockton Kings (he only played 37 minutes across 12 games with the NBA squad). Slawson is again eligible for a two-way contract, so it’s likely the Kings bring him back on another deal.

Find Help In the 2024 Draft, But Where Depends on Monk

The 2024 NBA draft will take place on June 27, less than a week after the Finals end and, importantly, after the Kings can start negotiating a new deal with Malik Monk. As a result, the Kings should have at least some indication of whether Monk is likely to re-sign or not by the time draft night rolls around, though they may not know for sure.

The final draft order is now set and the Kings will be picking twice at #13 (first round) and #45 (second round). What the Kings do with those picks—especially the valuable first rounder—will depend heavily on what happens with Monk.

[Note: It’s also worth flagging that the Kings have a cap hold for the #13 pick—basically a CBA-mandated placeholder for the eventual salary the player will earn (there aren’t mandated cap holds for second round picks). So, the Kings will have to carry a cap charge of about $4.7 million until they actually draft and sign the 13th pick. It’ll come up later.]

If Monk Re-Signs, The Kings Should Focus on Forwards at Pick #13

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, the Kings will have credible ball-handling and scoring support for lead-guard De’Aaron Fox in the backcourt already. They’ll also have decent shooting (Kevin Huerter) and defensive versatility (Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell). In that scenario, the Kings biggest need would be to find help at power forward or small forward.

Harrison Barnes has been a reliable starter for the Kings since arriving by trade in 2018, but he will be 32 next season and he is not the perfect fit as the team’s starting power forward. While Barnes is a very strong shooter and capable scorer (including off the dribble), he’s been an imperfect fit with Sabonis on the defensive end. Barnes is undersized as 4 and provides limited rebounding and almost no rim protection. He also doesn’t have the quickness, athleticism, or length to stay with forwards who can play on the perimeter or athletic rim runners. In all, it makes for a tough pairing with Sabonis defensively because they can both struggle with similar types of players and can’t rely too much on the other for help.

Drafting a younger, more athletic player to bolster the power forward slot would be nice for the Kings, whether Barnes comes off the bench or not. Without going into detail on draft prospects, there are several players who could fit the role likely to be available at pick #13 in Tristan Da Silva (Colorado), Tidjane Salaun (France), Tyler Smith (G League Ignite), and DaRon Holmes (Dayton). None of them are perfect prospects, but they’d provide help athletically without totally compromising shooting.

The Kings could also look to draft help on the wing at small forward. Keegan Murray has a firm hold on the starting 3 position, but the Kings could use depth behind him. Fox, Monk, Ellis, and Mitchell are all undersized to truly guard wings, and Huerter, not a particularly strong defensive presence to begin with, too often plays than his 6’7” size. Again, there should be a number of options in the draft for support at pick #13, including Da Silva, his college teammate Cody Williams (Colorado), and Dalton Knecht (Tennessee). There could also be options available at the Kings second round pick, though they may have to move up a bit and it’s always risky to project those players as contributors: for example, Ryan Dunn (Virginia), Dillon Jones (Weber State), Baylor Scheierman (Creighton), Alex Karaban (Connecticut).

If Monk Leaves, the Kings Should Also Look for Perimeter Scoring

Losing Monk would be tough for the Kings offensively, as the end of the season showed pretty clearly. They’re unlikely to find a player who can contribute at Monk’s level right away at pick #13, but there are a handful of players who can provide some scoring punch. While the Kings would still have needs at power forward and small forward (and it would be fair to draft those positions even if Monk leaves), finding more perimeter scoring punch and ball-handling would become a bigger team need without Monk.

By pick #13, I’m assuming that top options like Stephon Castle (Connecticut), Nikola Topic (International), Reed Sheppard (Kentucky), and Rob Dillingham (Kentucky) will be off the board. Obviously one of them could fall (don’t forget Tyrese Haliburton dropped way further than expected in the 2020 draft before the Kings picked him at #12), but I’m not banking on it. Still, several guards should be available that can bring scoring, shooting, or defense at varying levels.

Several freshmen—Jared McCain (Duke), Isaiah Collier (USC), and Ja’Kobe Walter (Baylor)—and junior Devin Carter (Providence) could still be on the board by the time the Kings pick. Each brings a slightly different flavor of player, but they’re all capable scorers. McCain, a Sacramento native, can really shoot the ball and scored effectively for a solid Duke team last year, but he has some size limitations. Collier has scoring chops and stellar physical traits for a point guard (he’s 6’5”, 210 pounds), but his shooting was inconsistent, and he had a fair number of defensive lapses. Walter also has a good physical profile and looks to be a quality scorer, but he was a little inconsistent and doesn’t offer much ball-handling right now. Carter is older than the others, but he was more productive last season and plays hounding defense despite being just 6’3”; but he had an outlier year from 3-point range last year, hitting 37.7% from deep, so it’s unclear whether his shooting will sustain going forward.

All these guys (and a few other options) could be solid picks if Monk is on the team, as they could help take some pressure off of Fox to score and handle the ball. Without Monk on the roster, they’d have a pretty clear role on the team.

Finding Free Agency Fits

The Kings will be looking to the free agency market to bolster the roster, but who they can target will be hugely impacted by whether Monk re-signs or leaves. They’ll also need to consider draft strategy and other re-signings like Len and Kessler Edwards before solidifying a free agency strategy. The trade market is a little distinct, but it’s also going to affect how the Kings address free agency generally.

For this post, I want to focus on strategy and the Kings needs rather than specific free agency targets.

Let’s start with laying out what I see as the most significant team needs (before re-signing any of the Kings own free agents and before the draft). The below are in no particular order:

1. Secondary ball-handling

2. Secondary shot creation / one-on-one scoring

3. Additional wing defense and rebounding

4. Improved rebounding, defense, and rim protection at power forward

5. Backup center minutes

Ideally, the Kings can find all of that without compromising too much shooting.

But what should the Kings’ strategy be? As I’ve mentioned, that largely depends on what happens with Monk.

What If Monk Re-Signs?

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they will basically have addressed their secondary ball-handling and shot creation needs (#1 and #2 from the list above). As I’ve talked about already, this would be financially expensive and likely push the Kings into the luxury tax if they can’t move off another player—but that’s something most teams must do to compete meaningfully in the playoffs.

But re-signing Monk would have a huge impact on how the Kings can play the rest of the free agency market. You have to know some of the cap rules to understand why.

Over-the-cap teams like the Kings can only sign players using cap exceptions. While the Kings can re-sign their own players with Bird rights, the midlevel exception (or MLE) and biannual exception are the two primary ways they can sign other free agents to the roster.

Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Non-taxpayer MLE to sign one or more players to contracts with starting salaries worth up to about $12.9 million (projected) in total. Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Taxpayer MLE, which is similar but projected to worth only about $5.2 million. But whether the Kings are in the luxury tax won’t be assessed until the end of next season. As a result, they can technically still use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE even though re-signing Monk and signing the #13 pick would put their team salary above the projected luxury tax line. If this seems like a loophole, that’s because it is, and it’s one the NBA CBA has already addressed. Thus, under the CBA, if the Kings were to use more than the Taxpayer MLE (e.g., more than $5.2 million) to sign players, they would trigger the hard cap rules, which prohibits the team’s total team salary from exceeding the first apron, projected to be about $178.6 million. Unlike the regular NBA salary cap, there are no exceptions to the hard cap—the Kings wouldn’t be allowed to exceed $178.6 million in team salary.

The bi-annual exception can also be used every other year to sign free agents. It’s a smaller exception, projected to be worth around $4.7 million, and it’s only available to teams below the first apron.

For simplicity, you can refer to the chart below, which lists the exceptions and how the Kings could trigger the hard cap (they could also trigger the hard cap through trades, but that’s not relevant for now):

[Projections from Spotrac]

I’ll also list the salary cap, luxury tax, and aprons for easy reference:

[Projections from Spotrac]

So, the net effect of re-signing Monk would mean the Kings have a few options for other free agents:

• Option 1: Use the Non-taxpayer MLE and/or Biannual Exception to sign free agents, but trigger the hard cap at the first apron, OR

• Option 2: Use only the Taxpayer MLE to sign free agents

Option 1 would give the Kings a chance to bring in better free agents in theory. They’d have a bigger exception to use (up to $12.9 million for a player) and more exceptions available. But because they would be triggering the hard cap, their team salary couldn’t go above $178.7 million, and they’d already be dangerously close with just their current roster, plus Monk at $17.4 million, and their first-round pick—their team salary would be about $173.6 million from those things alone. In other words, even though they would have access to the bigger exceptions, they wouldn’t have a practical way to actually use those exceptions without trading away someone on the roster—potentially important role players Davion Mitchell or Trey Lyles, or even bigger salaries for players like Harrison Barnes or Kevin Huerter. Using Option 1 would also restrict the Kings in other ways. Most meaningfully, they couldn’t take back more than 100% of the salary they send out in a trade—in other words, they couldn’t take advantage of the typical salary matching rules (which I’ve written about before).

Option 2 would be less restrictive, since it wouldn’t trigger the hard cap (the Kings could still theoretically trigger the hard cap with trades), and the Kings probably wouldn’t have to trade any existing players away to maintain flexibility. But the most they could pay a free agent in starting salary would be $5.2 million—probably not enough to lure a significant free agent.

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they are practically going to be stuck with Option 2 unless they also make a salary cutting trade.

Monk would address needs #1 (secondary ball handling) and #2 (secondary shot creation), and they could re-sign Len to address need #5 (backup center). The team could use its draft picks and the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE to try to address issue #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding).

I won’t go into detail on free agency targets for needs #3 and #4, but some players I wouldn’t mind considering that could be available for the Taxpayer MLE are below (unfortunately, none are really game changers):

• Royce O’Neale (he may be too expensive)

• Gordon Hayward

• Jae Crowder

• PJ Tucker

• Kyle Anderson

• Jeff Green

• Taurean Prince

What If Monk Leaves?

Monk leaving in free agency means more needs to fill, but the Kings have a bit more flexibility in who they can target.

Specifically, the Kings will likely be able to use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE and the Biannual exception without worrying about the hard cap. Their team salary would only be about $156.2 million, far enough away from the first apron that triggering the hard cap wouldn’t be a practical concern.

Of course, with Monk out the door, the Kings would have to address all five of the needs I listed before: #1 (secondary ball handling); #2 (secondary shot creation); #3 (wing defense/rebounding); #4 (power forward defense/rebounding); and #5 (backup center). They could still probably re-sign Alex Len to address need #5, but the other four needs would need to be addressed.

With the Biannual exception, the Kings could basically target the same list of players as they could for the Taxpayer MLE. After all, the exceptions are only about $500,000 apart, and most free agent targets in that range won’t have a ton of high-salary options. But they could also try to use the Biannual exception to address other needs like #1 (secondary ball handling) or #2 (secondary shot creation) with players like Reggie Jackson, Spencer Dinwiddie, or Kris Dunn.

The Non-taxpayer MLE would also open up a host of potential free agency options, as the team could look at players who will command much larger starting salaries (up to $12.9 million). This is particularly important to addressing needs #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding), as those needs might be harder to fill in the draft or with the smaller Taxpayer MLE. A couple players who could be get-able with the Non-taxpayer MLE stand out as particularly good fits for the Kings.

Naji Marshall. Marshall is an unrestricted free agent and the Pelicans are looking to tamp down salary, so he probably won’t get a huge offer to return to New Orleans. He’s a good defender who can hold up on the wing and has the size and strength to play minutes at power forward. If his improved shooting (38.7% from three this year, the highest of his career) is real, he would be a solid addition to the Kings’ front court. It’s possible Marshall will sign a deal worth less than the full Non-taxpayer MLE, which would be a nice get.

Obi Toppin. Toppin is a solid modern power forward option. He’s competent defensively and his size/length/athleticism would make him a better defensive alternative to Barnes for rim protection and on the glass. He’s also more switchable. He’s a more proven shooter than Marshall, but he also set a career high this year by hitting 40.3% of his threes—which would be stellar if it sticks. Unlike Marshall, Toppin is a restricted free agent. The Pacers would get 24 hours to match any offer the made to him, which means the Kings would be in limbo for a bit at the start of free agency while they wait and see if the Pacers match. That’s a serious risk, as the Pacers might well consider Toppin good enough to warrant matching a contract worth the full Non-taxpayer MLE or more. I’d love to have him on the Kings, but going after him is a bit risky.

There are also a bunch of other potential free agents who may be get-able with the Non-Taxpayer MLE. These include wing options like Nic Batum, Kelly Oubre, Robert Covington, and Royce O’Neale (who may sign for less); guards like De’Anthony Melton, Markelle Fultz, and Malik Beasley; and even some bigs like Isaiah Hartenstein (probably not worth the cost), Jalen Smith, and Mason Plummer. For the Non-taxpayer MLE, I’d advocate focusing on wings, but the Kings would have options.

Be Opportunistic with Trades

The Kings don’t have the biggest war-chest of any team on the trade market, but they’ve held on to enough future draft assets and tradable contracts that they can throw a competitive bid in if the right deal comes along. The Kings owe the Hawks a top 12-protected first round pick in 2025 (which rolls over to top 10-protected in 2026 if it doesn’t convey), but they otherwise control all their own first rounders. I’ve written in detail about the rules governing trades for first round picks, but the important thing to keep in mind is the Kings can feasibly trade a bunch of first round picks if they need to (there are details they’d have to iron out, but it’s workable).

If the Kings want to target an All-Star or near All-Star level player, they’ve got the assets to do so—but they will need to be careful to avoid hard-capping themselves and making a future trade more difficult. They could still theoretically do a big trade if they re-sign Monk, but it’s going to be more difficult if they do because of the hard cap.

I’ll probably do a separate post looking at potential trade scenarios in more depth, but I want to quickly lay out some thoughts on a few high-profile trade names that have been floating around recently.

Paul George

Paul George is everyone’s favorite potential trade target right now, given he has a player option for 2024-25 and hasn’t yet agreed to an extension with the Clippers. He would be a near-perfect fit for a lot of teams, including the Kings. He can provide scoring, ball-handling, shooting, and quality defense for positions 1 to 4.

But getting George is going to be insanely expensive in trade for exactly that reason, and it would be tough for the Kings to put together a winning trade package. To get close, the Kings would probably have to give up as many first rounders as they can—2024 on draft night, plus future picks in 2027 (which they would have to free up from the Hawks), 2029, and 2031 to even make a competitive offer. They would also need to send out Huerter, Barnes, and another player to make the salary match. It’s also a given that the Clippers would ask for Keegan Murray back, although the Kings shouldn’t be willing to trade him away if they’re also sending meaningful draft pick compensation.

On top of the outgoing picks and players, trading for George is practically going to require giving him a max extension that would cover him into his late thirties. The details of the contract are subject to projections and some nuance based on what George actually wants and something called the Over 38 rule, but most likely the Kings would be signing up to pay George over $200 million for the next four seasons at a minimum (as a 10 year veteran, George can get sign a max contract with a starting salary of up to 35% of the salary cap in the first year, just over $49.3 million). That’s real money, but it’s basically table-stakes to get George interested in a deal—the whole reason he hasn’t re-signed with the Clippers yet is because they haven’t offered him that contractual certainty.

In terms of draft capital and dollars, bringing in a player of George’s caliber could be worth it—especially if it allows the Kings to compete for a championship. But it’s an enormous risk for an aging player, and you have to wonder if George is good enough to make that kind of all-in play worthwhile.

Brandon Ingram

The Pelicans are reportedly putting Brandon Ingram on the market. He’s going into the last year of his current contract and slated to make $36 million in 2024-25, so just like with Paul George, any team looking to acquire him should plan to offer him a lucrative new deal quickly.

Even though he is only 26 years old, Ingram is heading into his eighth season in the NBA. He’s been an All Star once before, and throughout his five seasons in New Orleans, he’s put up near-All Star level numbers. Given his age, one might expect him to draw more trade interest than Paul George, but he’s not quite the same seamless fit as George for most teams (the Kings included). On the offensive end, Ingram is a good scorer who can create his own shots, score at all three levels, and distribute effectively when he needs to. But he’s not the same level of knock-down three point shooter that George is, and at times his shot diet can weight a little too much toward midrange shots and isolations. And defensively, Ingram is just a bit above average—he doesn’t provide the same elite wing defense that a player like George can. Ingram also has a pretty consistent injury track record lately, as he’s played 65 games or more only once in his career as a rookie (for the record, George has had plenty of injuries too).

Still, Ingram is likely to attract a fair amount of interest if he’s really on the trade block, and it won’t be cheap to acquire him. The package of four first round picks that the Kings would need to give up for George would likely be too much for Ingram, but the price could get close. New Orleans may also be unwilling to take back a lot of salary either, since money is part of the reason they’re looking to move on from Ingram. Would they take back both Huerter and Barnes in a deal to make the salaries match, or would they insist on getting a third team involved?

The Kings could probably absorb the hit of draft picks and matching salary needed to bring in Ingram. He would also fill the team’s need for another scorer and ball handler, while offering better defense on the wing than Huerter or Barnes (he may not fare much better at power forward defensively, but Keegan Murray could guard up if needed). But I'm still wary of taking a swing on Ingram because of how hard it would be on the Kings’ salary cap situation. Ingram won’t be eligible for the same maximum salary as George because he’ll only have 9 years of NBA service by the time his free agency rolls around, which means a max contract for him would be capped at 30% of the salary cap at a projected starting salary of $42.3 million. But he can sign a 5-year extension that carries him through the 2028-29 season, too, for a total contract value of over $245 million. While that’s less dollars per year than George, it’s a longer commitment with even more total dollars. Regardless, it has the same practical effect on the Kings’ long-term cap situation: the team would be above the salary cap, in the luxury tax, and potentially above the first apron (or even the second apron) with Fox, Sabonis, and Ingram on the roster for the foreseeable future.

Fox, Sabonis, Ingram, and Murray would be a solid team for sure. The floor spacing offensively would be a bit worrisome and the team wouldn’t really scare anyone defensively either, but they’d have a ton of weapons and varied skillsets. But is it enough to make this the one big shot they take? If they do make a move for Ingram, it’ll basically lock them into the roster, with little ability to improve on the margins and few future draft picks available to supplement the roster.

Ultimately, a trade for Ingram is something the Kings front office will have to consider, but whether it’s worth it depends a lot on the trade cost in particular. Smaller deals could improve the team and maintain more future flexibility, while waiting to take a big swing on a better fit would also be a viable strategy.

Jerami Grant

Portland is in a seriously rough salary cap situation given the fact that their team isn’t all that close to competing for the playoffs yet. They have four players under contract with over $20 million in salary, and two of them—Jerami Grant and Malcolm Brogan—are over 30. Just a year ago, Portland signed Grant to a 5 year, $160 million deal, so they don’t need to trade him immediately, but they may be willing to part with him for the right price.

From the Kings perspective, Grant would bring helpful length, athleticism, and scoring on the wing. Though he’s only slightly above average in scoring efficiency, Grant does have scoring chops (he’s averaged over 19 points per game for the last four seasons) and shoots it well from deep at over 40% for the last two years. He does a good job of drawing fouls, too. With that said, he’s not as talented of a scorer as George and Ingram, and his defensive impact is often less than you’d expect from an athletic wing with Grant’s length. Per Dunks and Threes, Grant was in the 38th percentile of defenders last season in terms of Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, and he’s posted negative numbers in terms of Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus stat for the last five seasons. His rebounding is also surprisingly lacking—in terms of rebounding rate, he’s less effective than incumbent power forward Harrison Barnes on the glass.

Grant comes with a salary cap charge of $29.8 million next year, so if the Kings take him on, they’ll likely be in the luxury tax (especially if they can re-sign Monk). But because the Kings would have to send out matching salary (probably in the form of Barnes and Huerter), they can find ways to avoid the hard cap and stay below the first apron. That makes Grant a bit more attractive as a trade candidate compared to George and Ingram since the lower contract value is useful for the team’s roster construction.

But Grant may not really move the needle much at all. Adding Grant would give the Kings’ secondary scoring and a slight defensive improvement on the wing, but it wouldn’t really help with rebounding or ball handling.

If Portland is looking for a couple first rounders for Grant, the Kings ought to consider whether he’s worth the price. I would personally look to other options for that level of compensation, especially given the Kings would probably have to ship out Barnes and Huerter, but there’s at least a solid argument for snagging Grant at that price. But if Portland has an asking price is any higher, it’s not an obvious win—it would make more sense to hold onto the draft equity for the future.

Wrap Up

That’s all I’ve got for this round. I will try to take a deeper look at individual draft targets, free agency targets, and trade candidates down the line. Let me know if you want to hear about anyone in particular!