Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 3): The Kings’ Current Roster Dictates Potential Deals
[This is part three of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline.]
In the first post from this series, I looked at what areas the Kings have struggled with so far this year that need to be improved upon. Like many observers, I think the biggest issues are the team’s struggles defending the rim and the three point line, but they also need to find ways to generate more offense when De’Aaron Fox sits to rekindle their top-notch offense from last year (while shooting from 2 point range and free throws still need to improve, those issues aren’t as easy to address through trades). Part two of this series looked at what the Kings can send out in potential trades and how the NBA’s rules governing player- and draft-pick trades will affect what the Kings can actually deal, which in turn governs what they’ll be able to potentially get back in a deal.
Now, we’re on to part three, where it’s time to start thinking about the Kings’ own roster situation and what it means for trades they might consider. To do that effectively, I want to think about two things in this post:
What is the Kings salary cap situation right now, and what should they expect in the near- and medium-term?
What are the on-court needs the Kings should be looking to fill?
For simplicity, I’ll go in the order above.
The Kings’ Salary Cap Situation
I wrote about what the Kings have available to trade last week, including draft capital. Those matter to the team’s long-term future, but the Kings are actually in a pretty good position going forward, as they own all but one of their future first round picks and they have plenty of future second rounders. But retaining future cap space and staying under the luxury tax (as well as the first and second aprons) are important considerations.
The CBA Rules: Caps, Taxes, and Contracts
NBA teams always have to think about their roster in terms of the salary cap as well as the NBA’s luxury tax line (and the more restrictive aprons above the luxury tax line, the first apron and the second apron). I’ve explained the basic rules on this before, but since the last post I made got really into the weeds, I will only quickly summarize things here for convenience.
The basic rules of the salary cap are simple: teams can’t sign players above the salary cap unless they find an exception that allows them to do so. Those exceptions cover things like extending players already on the team’s roster, signing players the team drafts, trading for players, and signing free agents at certain specified salary levels. The net result is that teams above the cap are restricted in how they can operate.
The basic luxury tax rules are also pretty simple. If a team’s salary for the year is at or above the luxury tax line, they pay an additional tax per dollar they are over the line, and that tax is redistributed to the teams below the luxury tax line. Those taxes get increasingly onerous as the team moves higher and higher above the luxury tax line or if they are repeatedly paying luxury tax in multiple years.
Teams above the first and second aprons face increasingly restrictive rules about how they manage their roster. For simplicity, suffice it to say that teams generally want to avoid being above the first or second apron so they can continue to make roster moves easily.
In any given season, the salary cap is set by the league based on basketball-related revenue from the prior year, while the luxury tax line, the first apron, and the second apron, are all calculated based on the salary cap. For this season (2023-24), the salary cap is $136.21 million, the luxury tax line is $165.294 million, the first apron is $172.346 million, and the second apron is $182.794 million. It’s impossible to know precisely what each of these thresholds will be in future seasons, but we can expect that these thresholds will increase most years by up to 10% (the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dictates that the salary cap can grow by up to 10% per year, but cannot decrease in any given season).
There are also several player salary levels that have to be calculated based on the salary cap. Simply put, the starting salary that teams can offer to players depends on what kind of contract they offer, and the starting salary amounts of many types of contracts are calculated based on a percentage of the salary cap. This is really important, as it dictates how teams can re-sign their own players, sign free agents above the salary cap, and whether the team can make trades for players whose salaries would put them over the salary cap (or the first or second aprons).
This has huge impacts on the trade market and free agent market.
The key types of contracts that are dictated by the salary cap are listed below, but they fall into a couple buckets: max contracts, rookie extensions, and salary cap exceptions. HoopsRumors has pretty good articles on max contracts and salary cap exceptions if you want extra detail there.
“Max” contracts: Max contracts get complicated and it’s not necessarily worth going into all the detail here, but at a basic level, teams can offer players “max” salary contracts that allow the player to be paid up to a percentage of the salary cap based on the player’s level of NBA experience (or, if greater, up to 105% of their previous season’s salary).
These “max” salaries can be equal to up to 25% of the salary cap for players with less than seven years of experience, 30% of the salary cap for players with seven to nine years of experience, and 35% of the salary cap for players with 10+ years of experience. For the 2023-24 season, this equates to about $34.0 million, $40.8 million, and $47.6 million respectively.
These contracts can be up to five years long and include raises of up to 8% per season for players re-signing with their current team (5% for players signing with a new team).
“Supermax” contracts: In limited situations, teams can also offer players what are informally known as “supermax” contracts (which actually covers a few different “designated veteran” situations).
Simply put, star players who meet certain eligibility and performance criteria can be offered contracts (or contract extensions) of up to six seasons at starting salaries up to 30% or 35% of the cap. Normally, players are only eligible for five year deals, and the max salary can only get to 35% of the cap for players with 10+ years of service.
These supermax contracts are generally only available to players with 7-9 years of experience who haven’t changed teams (with some limited exceptions, including if a player was traded in their first four years).
To be eligible, prior to being offered a supermax, the player also has to meet the following supermax performance criteria:
win an MVP in any of the three preceding seasons;
be named to an All-NBA team or be named Defensive Player of the Year (DPOY) in the immediately preceding season; or
be named to an All-NBA team or be named DPOY in any two of the preceding three seasons.
This is highly relevant for the Kings, as De’Aaron Fox may become eligible for a supermax extension soon. In fact, Fox turned down a “max” extension before the 2023-24 season in the hopes that he will become eligible for a supermax deal before his current contract expires after the 2025-26 season.
Rookie extensions: Certain rookie extensions can function similarly to the supermax (conceptually).
Normally, rookies selected in the first round receive two year deals with team options for the third and fourth year, and they’re only eligible to receive contract extensions after their third season. These extensions get capped at of 25% of the salary cap (or, if greater, 105% of the salaary in the last season of their contract) because they have less than seven years of NBA service.
But rookies who meet the “supermax” performance criteria that I described previously can receive a salary in the first year of their extension of up to 30% of the salary cap.
This probably won’t apply to any of the Kings’ players on their rookie deals.
Non-taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “non-taxpayer MLE”, this exception allows teams above the salary cap, but below the first apron, to sign a player at a first year salary of up to 9.12% of the salary cap—set at $12.4 million for the 2023-24 season. Non-taxpayer MLE contracts can be for up to four years and may include salary raises or decreases of up to 5% per year.
Teams can also split their non-taxpayer MLE to sign multiple players.
The non-taxpayer MLE is only available to teams below the first apron. So if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE (the precise amount of the taxpayer MLE, discussed below), that team will be “hard capped” at the first apron. In other words, if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE in 2023-24, it cannot have its team salary go above the first apron for that season even another exception would normally be available.
Practically speaking, the non-taxpayer MLE often becomes the de facto starting salary “price” for free agent rotation players, as several teams can usually offer it in free agency.
Teams below the salary cap (referred to as having “room”) can’t use the exception because they’re below the cap.
Taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “taxpayer MLE,” this exception is similar to the MLE but less favorable. It is available to teams above the first apron but below the second apron.
Like the non-taxpayer MLE, teams can still split their taxpayer MLE between multiple players and offer salary raises or increases of 5% per year, but the amount available and maximum contract length are lesser. The taxpayer MLE was set at $5 million for the 2023-24 season (even though not set as a percentage of the salary cap for this season, the taxpayer MLE will increase based on the salary cap in future seasons).
Teams can’t use the non-taxpayer MLE and the taxpayer MLE at the same time.
Similar to the non-taxpayer MLE, because the taxpayer MLE is not available to teams above the second apron, if a team uses its taxpayer MLE, it will be hard capped at the second apron.
Bi-annual exception: the “bi-annual exception” is another exception to the salary cap that teams can use . . . wait for it . . . every two years. The bi-annual exception is set as a percentage (3.32%) of the salary cap; for the 2023-24 season, teams could offer starting salaries up to $3.382 million, with the same 5% raises per year, for up to two seasons.
Teams can’t use the bi-annual exception to exceed the first apron.
Room exception: officially titled the “mid-level salary exception for room teams” but better known as the “room exception,” this exception can only be used by teams whose salary falls below the salary cap in a given year—it’s essentially an alternative to the non-taxpayer MLE and taxpayer MLE.
Once a room team uses up its salary cap space, it can use the room exception to sign a player (or multiple players) for a starting salary equal to up to 5.678% of the salary cap, about $7.72 million for the 2023-24 season. In other words, if the team has salary cap space, it can use that space to sign free agents and then get a room exception to sign additional players above the salary cap. Room exception contracts can be up to three seasons long and can include the same 5% raises per year as the other exceptions described above.
Teams can’t use the room exception and any of the non-taxpayer MLE, taxpayer MLE, or bi-annual exception in the same year—so essentially if the team is eligible for the room exception, it’s not eligible for those other exceptions.
There are other exceptions, but they’re not as relevant here and/or not inherently tied to the salary cap’s changes.
How Do Cap & Contract Rules Affect the Kings?
For the 2023-24 season, the Kings already have about $150 million committed in salary and other cap hits (we don’t need to go into detail on dead cap holds and other cap holds, but they combine with the actual roster salary to count against the salary cap). That puts the Kings about $14 million above the salary cap ($136.21 million) and little more than $15 million below the luxury tax line.
As a small market team that can’t rely as much on huge revenues from other sources (concert fees, parking fees, etc. typically get retained by the team), the Kings are likely to try to stay below the luxury tax whenever they can, unless they’re truly in championship contention. Staying below the luxury tax line ensures both that the Kings won’t pay luxury tax and that they are eligible to receive luxury tax distributions, which can be worth over $10 million for each non-tax team. By the same token, the Kings are generally likely to stay below the first apron and second apron in most years, saving them some additional headaches with roster construction and cap compliance.
Regardless, the Kings have to manage their salary cap in future seasons and be mindful of the luxury tax line (and the aprons) from year to year. To do so, they have to be mindful of what contracts they have and how long they run, and what contracts they expect to give out. The team surely has its own internal trackers, but for us members of the public, Spotrac has nifty trackers showing the contract and salary situations for each team—a year by year tracker of the Kings salary cap situation by year is available here.
The Kings are projected to be over the cap in each of 2024-25, 2025-26, and 2026-27. [Note: Spotrac is doing something funky with the cap projections. They project 4.4% growth in the salary cap in the 2024-25 season, which the NBA has projected, but they assume a 10% growth rate in all subsequent seasons. I don’t know how realistic that is (I suspect it over-predicts the rate of cap growth), but I will use it for now.].
The chart below shows the Kings roster count and team salaries by year, compared to the projected salary cap and luxury tax lines using Spotrac’s growth projections, with some assumptions. Specifically, the chart assumes that all team options are exercised and all cap holds get renounced; the chart also excludes all 10-day and two-way player contracts, which are short-term and for negligible sums. Numbers in red show the Kings will be over the salary cap or luxury tax line, as applicable.
[Chart 1]
What jumps out from Chart 1 is that the Kings will be about $7.4 million over the cap next season (2024-25) before filling out their 15-man roster, and they will be just $16.8 million under the cap two seasons from now (2025-26) with just seven players.
Kings Salary Cap in 2024-25
The Kings will be $7.4 million over the cap in 2024-25 with only 10 players on the roster. They would also be able to add only $23.1 million of salary before creeping into the luxury tax. But that total salary doesn’t account for the Kings re-signing Malik Monk, who will be a free agent after this season, nor does it account for any 2024 draft picks the Kings might need to sign or other roster spots they might fill at the veteran’s minimum.
In other words, if the Kings want to re-sign Monk at a starting salary of $17.4 million (which they can offer him), they’re going to be at least $24.8 million over the cap with an 11-man roster. Assuming they fill out the rest of the roster for the veterans minimum of about $2.1 million (this value will also change based on the cap, but we’re fudging here for simplicity), the Kings would be about $33.2 million over the cap. At the same time, they’d push over the luxury tax line by about $3.1 million.
Any trade the Kings make needs to keep this reality in mind. If they make a trade that takes back salary, the team will need to manage the roster so that they can trade players to get under the luxury tax line if needed. If the team is super competitive, ownership may be willing to stay above the luxury tax line for a season or two, but any prospective trade analysis needs to keep a path out of the luxury tax in mind. Players like Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte can all be free agents after the 2024-25 season, meaning there would be some value to keeping one or more of them on the roster as a way to trade out of the luxury tax during the 2024-25 season if it becomes necessary.
Mitchell and Duarte are also both eligible for extension prior to the 2024-25 season, but given they’re not fixtures in the starting line-up, it’s not clear that they will be offered substantial extensions.
De’Aaron Fox also becomes eligible for an extension at the same time, which could be enormous. I’ll talk about that more later.
Kings Salary Cap in 2025-26
Based on Chart 1 (above), the Kings could actually be about $16.8 million under the cap for the 2025-26 season (two years from now), albeit with only seven players under contract (Fox, Sabonis, Barnes, Huerter, Murray, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones). But there are a few qualifiers to keep in mind.
We’ve already covered the first two: the Kings will probably want to re-sign Malik Monk and they need to fill out their roster regardless. Assuming the Kings re-sign Monk, he’s likely to be paid around $18.3 million in 2025-26. But that alone would eat through the $16.8 million of theoretical cap room that the Kings would have.
Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2025-26, the salary cap would be about $156.2 million, the luxury tax line would be about $189.8 million, the first apron would be about $197.9 million, and the second apron would be about $209.9 million. With Monk, the team’s salary would be about $157.7 million; adding seven more players at the veteran’s minimum would bring the team salary to about $173.1 million—over the cap but under the luxury tax.
The other issues are pending free agency for Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte. Trey Lyles will be an unrestricted free agent before the 2025-26 season, so the Kings will need to decide whether to bring him back. Maybe Lyles would come back at the veteran’s minimum, but more likely he’d seek more money elsewhere. Meanwhile, Mitchell and Duarte will be restricted free agents assuming they don’t agree to extensions beforehand. The Kings would need to decide whether to renounce their matching right for any contract that Mitchell and/or Duarte sign with another team (before free agency starts). I suspect that will happen, but if the Kings were to keep their matching rights, the team would then need to decide whether to let them go if an offer sheet gets too rich.
After the 2025-26 season, the Kings will also need to decide whether to offer an extension to Keegan Murray and what that looks like. Given he’s a core player, it’s likely the Kings would agree to a big extension with Murray, but it’s tough to predict exactly what that will look like—it will depend a lot on his growth the rest of this season and in the 2024-25 season. Murray getting an extension worth $35-45 million per year (starting the 2026-27 season) is well within the realm of possibility given his age, elite shooting, defensive potential, and positional flexibility—this would actually be a pretty great scenario for the Kings, as it would mean Murray has continued to develop into something like a top 50 player in the league overall. This won’t affect the team’s salary cap situation much during the 2025-26 season, though, as the team has a $11.1 million option for Murray that they’re going to exercise.
Kings Salary Cap in 2026-27
This is where things get a little wild.
Only two players are technically under contract for 2026-27, Domantas Sabonis and Colby Jones (assuming the Kings exercise his team option), and the team is projected to be about $121.3 million below the cap.
But as I’ve noted, the Kings will probably have re-signed Monk and agreed to extensions with Fox and Murray. Monk’s contract will probably be around $20 million by 2026-27 and Murray (assuming he continues to develop) is likely to be paid around $40 million.
That would put the Kings at $51.3 million below the cap, with just Sabonis, Jones, Monk, and Murray under contract.
But what about the team’s star, De’Aaron Fox? As I noted, Fox turned down a two year, $105 million extension that would have carried his contract through the 2027-28 season in the hopes of becoming eligible for a supermax. If Fox makes an All-NBA team this year or next year, he can sign a five year extension starting in 2026-27. That extension would have a starting salary in 2026-27 worth up to 35% of the cap, which equates to about $60.1 million. If he doesn’t make another All-NBA team, Fox would still be eligible for a four year extension with a 2026-27 salary worth up to 30% of the cap (about $51.5 million).
The net result is that if the Kings extend Fox and Murray and re-sign Monk this off-season, their 2026-27 salary is going to put them at or above the cap with only five players under contract; the team’s salary would be around $180.6 million if Fox makes another All-NBA team, and around $172 million if he doesn’t). They would still need to fill out a roster with 10 more players, which will probably cost another $25-30 million and push the Kings’ roster salary to as much as $210 million.
Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2026-27, the salary cap would be $171.8 million, the luxury tax line would be $208.8 million, the first apron would be $217.7 million, and the second apron would be $230.9 million. That means that if the Kings trade for someone today whose salary is still on the books in 2026-27, the team could be facing extremely steep luxury tax bills and restrictions from passing the first (or even second) apron—if they want to do a trade for a star with 3+ years left on their deal, the team needs to be thinking seriously about how it’s going to cost them in dollars and flexibility down the road.
2027-28 and Beyond
This is four plus years out, so I’m not going to write much about it here since so much can change. By the 2027-28 season, the projected salary cap could be up to $189.0 million, the projected luxury tax line to $229.7 million, the projected first apron to $239.5 million, and the projected second apron to $254.0 million.
Fox and Murray, if extended, would still be on the team, as would Sabonis (whose current deal expires after the 2027-28 season). Every other roster slot is hard to project, as whomever the Kings might sign or trade for, may not be on a deal long enough to make it all the way to 2027-28.
Sabonis’ salary is set for 2027-28 at $51.2 million, but we have to do some projection for Fox and Murray. I’ll assume that Fox made his second All-NBA team before being extended and signs a supermax extension—that would put his salary at about $64.9 million in 2027-28. If Murray’s extension were to start at $40 million per year, by the 2027-28 season, he’d be paid around $42 million. That means the Fox/Sabonis/Murray trio would make over $158 million in 2027-28, hopefully still in their primes with Fox at age 30, Sabonis at age 31, and Murray at age 27.
The Kings’ On-Court Needs
Basketball is a fluid sport, and every player has an impact on both ends of the court. As a result, even after identifying areas for improvement, teams have to think about how adding and subtracting players in trades will impact their performance offensively and defensively.
Which weaknesses have to improve and which can we live with? What kinds of players can address the issues on the floor? Will addressing those flaws create new flaws, or will addressing the big weaknesses allow the team as a whole to clean up other areas too? What strengths can the team take away from to bolster a weakness, without losing so much that it creates a new weakness? These are critical questions that should drive the team’s decision-making, but how they all shake out is hard to pin down with precision.
As I noted in part one, there are three big weaknesses that I think the Kings should look to address—perimeter defense, rim protection, and how to generate offense with Fox off the court—but the Kings don’t necessarily have to address all three to improve meaningfully. On top of that, it’s probably impossible to find a single player, or even two or three players, who can address all three without taking away from what the Kings already do well. You can’t bank on getting back someone who can play strong perimeter defense, protect the rim, and create offense while not taking away from the Kings’ core strengths, Fox and Sabonis—that list is basically made up of Kawhi Leonard or Kevin Durant, and they’re not on the trading block (and Keegan Murray is already on the roster . . . ).
Rather than dream up players who can fill all three holes, one thing I usually try to do is think of player archetypes that could address a couple problem areas without causing too many issues elsewhere. I’m thinking more of a style of player than anyone in particular—for example, traditional passing point guards, rim protecting centers, 3-and-D wings, etc.
Player Types That Fit
What player archetypes make sense to add depends a lot on the players who definitely will play even after any trades. For the Kings, that list is pretty easy. De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray are the team’s core and are exceptionally unlikely to be traded, and Malik Monk is such a pivotal part of the bench unit that they’re unlikely to move him either (Monk is also set to be a free agent next season, so his value to the Kings is probably going to be higher than for teams they’re likely to trade with).
Combined, these four players have a ton of strengths, especially on offense.
The Core: Fox, Sabonis, Murray, and Monk
The Fox/Sabonis/Murray core can create effective offense regardless of who else is on the court, as there is plenty of scoring talent, shot-creation, deep shooting, passing, post-up play, and screening. Fox can create his own shots easily, Sabonis can be the hub of an effective offense when paired with shooters, and Murray’s shot-making and burgeoning midrange game slots in perfectly. Monk is also a good enough offensive player to lead an effective bench, as his shooting pairs well with either Fox or Sabonis (whose minutes are often staggered), and he also has enough shot-creation and passing ability to create offense at times, too.
But there are also some readily identifiable holes defensively. Fox and Monk are both undersized for their position and can be over-powered at times on defense. Although Fox plays effective defense for stretches and does a good job of creating steals, his offensive workload is so high that it’s no surprise you don’t want him guarding the opponent’s best backcourt player. Monk’s calling card isn’t on defense—he gets beat too often off the dribble despite good quickness and his small frame makes it hard for him to defend bigger guards. Murray is becoming a better and better defensive player, so he has been regularly tasked with guarding opposing teams’ best perimeter players, but he’s still learning how to guard a star offensive player and provide effective help defense. As a result, he’s sometimes unable to provide help and close out to top-tier perimeter players without fouling. Meanwhile, Sabonis is a great rebounder, but he offers very little rim protection, and his lack of length sometimes forces him to choose between contesting shots and rebounding position.
Offensive Archetypes
The offensive archetypes that fit with the Kings’ core depends a lot on who is playing. With Fox and Sabonis on the court, the Kings benefit most from having strong perimeter shooters. Fox can attack the paint on his own or with help from a screener like Sabonis, and Sabonis can function as the hub of the offense while Fox waits for opportune times to attack. Adding Murray also provides some bail-out protection if defenses can stop Fox, as he’s started to add mid-range and step-back jumpers to already elite shooting from three point range. When these three are on the court together, the Kings really just need guys who can hit open shots, keep the ball moving on offense, cut, and occasionally slash to the rim or handle the ball on the perimeter.
When Fox sits, though, it’s a different story. In those situations, the Kings tend to rely heavily on three offensive strategies:
Sabonis as the “offensive hub” at the top of the paint/elbow. The Kings run this all the time, even with Fox on the court. Sabonis has the ball in his hands up top to drag bigs away from the basket, and the Kings run good shooters around the perimeter to force defenses to focus on the three point line. Murray, Monk, Harrison Barnes, and especially Kevin Huerter do a great job of playing off of Sabonis in these sets, and they’re good enough shooters that it forces defenses into hard rotations. But the downside is there’s often no real threat to the paint because Sabonis is away from the basket (even though sometimes Sabonis will attack the paint off of the dribble), the Kings’ shooters mostly aren’t great at attacking off the dribble from this look, and the Kings don’t always do a good enough job cutting to the rim to put pressure on the paint.
Sabonis on the block. Sabonis is a good post-up player, especially against smaller frontcourt players who he can overpower. He relies on quick feet and strength to get good looks, as his lack of length doesn’t just allow him to go over guys. Against sturdier, strong bigs, Sabonis post ups aren’t as effective since he’s forced to rely on his quickness alone. On top of that, even though Sabonis is typically an elite passer, he has a tendency to focus on scoring from the low-block. Combined with the Kings’ other players lacking size and preference to shoot threes, when opponents double Sabonis and focus on denying the immediate three point shooters in the corner or at the wing, there’s often no other threat (such as a paint cutter or weakside attack from the opposite wing).
Pick and roll with Sabonis as the screener. The Kings also will run pick and rolls with Sabonis as the screener, but right now, only Monk and Davion Mitchell are really strong enough ball handlers to initiate it (the Kings have tried this with Chris Duarte but it hasn’t worked). Monk is still learning how to play the pick and roll efficiently, as it wasn’t a huge part of his game in previous seasons. He can get to shooting spots effectively and has some incredible underhand passes coming off of the screens, but he also gets too loose with the ball and hasn’t mastered where to go when the roller (Sabonis usually) is covered. Mitchell, for his part, isn’t yet a strong shooter, so defenders just duck under screens when he’s in the game, clogging up the lane and cutting off his biggest strength as a driver.
Shooters work okay for these scenarios obviously, but the Kings would really benefit from having at least one player on the roster who can do things besides provide spacing.
The Kings would benefit tremendously from adding a player who shoots well enough to act as a decent floor-spacer but who also has the size and athleticism to cut to the paint and finish, either when Sabonis is up top/at the elbow or from the weak side when Sabonis is on the low block. This would help the team threaten the paint area more when Fox sits, regardless of what big is on the floor defending Sabonis, and in turn open up shooting opportunities for the rest of the perimeter players. Murray can sometimes serve this role, but he is such a threatening shooter that it would be nice to find someone else who can add that threat while Murray acts as a spacer.
Alternatively, the Kings should find someone to help make the Sabonis pick and roll more effective when Fox is on the bench. There are basically two options here. The first is finding a player who can alternate with Monk as the pick and roll ball handler, which would free Monk up to also operate as an off-ball scorer and outside shooter, where he is really effective (the Kings often use Monk in this way when Fox is in the game), rather than to run so many pick and rolls with Sabonis. The second option letting Monk continue to be the pick and roll ball handler and add a player who can operate as an off-ball attacker and shooter. There is some benefit to this second approach, as it would let Monk continue to develop his pick and roll game.
Defensive Archetypes
The Kings defensive struggles mean there are actually quite a few areas they can stand to improve by adding players ahead of the trade deadline. Per Dunks & Threes, the Kings have just three players with a positive defensive estimated plus minus, which estimates a player’s contribution in points per 100 possessions from defense: Keegan Murray (1.3), Chris Duarte (0.9), and Domantas Sabonis (0.2). Murray and Sabonis are a part of the regular rotation, but Duarte’s playtime has been up and down as a result of struggles shooting the ball.
Most of the team’s defensive issues are apparent watching them.
Frontcourt/Paint Defense
In the frontcourt, the Kings lack shot-blocking and rebounding. Sabonis lacks length for a center and carries such an enormous rebounding burden that he cannot be relied on to block shots. Even though Javale McGee and Alex Len theoretically could provide rim protection, they both play sparingly because they’re somewhat awkward fits for the Kings fast-paced and high-post offense and they’re lack of footspeed contributes to the Kings difficulties defending pick and rolls (admittedly, this happens because the Kings guards get stuck on picks too often, too). The Kings’ other forwards (Murray, Barnes, and Lyles) are better able to handle pick and roll defense as well as guard bigs that like to get out on the perimeter, but they are all undersized to play power forward and aren’t strong rebounders or shotblockers for their positions.
Of course, these kinds of defensive trade-offs aren’t unique to the Kings. Most NBA teams have trouble defending guard-big pick and rolls, and finding frontcourt players that can block shots and rebound effectively is tough (finding someone who can block shots, rebound, and play offense is even tougher—there’s not a team in the NBA that wouldn’t love love to have Bam Adebayo).
The Kings also have to be more mindful of spacing offensively than many teams, as Sabonis largely does not shoot from the perimeter. This really narrows the possibilities, as there are very few rim protectors that can space the floor offensively in the NBA. There are 25 only players this season averaging at least 1.5 blocks per 100 possessions, who shoot at least 2.0 threes per 100 possessions, and who hit 30% or more of their threes. Half of them are guards, and several others are effectively impossible to trade for (Brook Lopez, Chet Holmgren, Anthony Davis, Joel Embiid, Kristaps Porzingis, Jaren Jackson Jr., Scottie Barnes, and Kevin Durant aren’t being dealt any time soon).
Rather than looking for a big who can block shots and shoot, the Kings instead could look for a big who can fill the void when Sabonis is off the floor. This opens up possibilities. Such a player would need to be able to rebound, defend the paint, and handle pick and rolls on defense, but offensively, they can be more limited—setting screens for Fox and Monk, moving the ball, and diving to the basket.
Alternatively, the Kings could look to bolster their perimeter unit with stronger rebounders with length, which would alleviate some of the burden on Sabonis and at least provide some opportunity for more shot contests in the paint and at the rim. None of the Kings current perimeter players (Fox, Monk, Huerter, Duarte, Mitchell) or their forwards (Barnes, Murray, Lyles, Vezenkov) really provides that now due to size limitations.
Perimeter/Backcourt Defense
The Kings also have some significant issues with perimeter defense. This is in part due to the fact that many of the Kings perimeter players are undersized, but there are also times when the Kings’ lack of quickness on defense can hamper them. The Kings give up far too many straight line drives off the dribble, either because someone isn’t quick enough to cut off the drive or gets overpowered. This forces help defenders to bite down (on the strong side) or rotate over to help weakside, which leaves open shooters. Because this happens quite a bit, the Kings help defenders tend to cheat just a bit too far off of shooters so that they can be ready to help, but the result is far too many uncontested threes.
Other than Keegan Murray, the Kings don’t really have any plus one-on-one defenders on the wing. Barnes and Lyles lack the quickness to stay in front of attacking wings, so they can get beat off the dribble too easily and give up drives to the basket, which forces help defenders to come and comprises the defense against shooters. Their lack of quickness, combined with average height/length, also means that they can’t easily play help defense and get back out to shooters when other players get beat. Huerter is quicker and has decent length for his position, but he gets caught too high and flat-footed a lot as both an on-ball defender and in help defense. He also resorts to reaching too often, so he picks up a ton of fouls on defense. This lack of quickness and defensive prowess on the wing leaves the Kings very vulnerable to shooting guards and small forwards who can shoot and drive, which is a problem since so many guys in the Western Conference can rack up points that way (Kevin Durant, Kawhi Leonard and Paul George, Jalen Williams, Luka Doncic, Brandon Ingram, etc.).
At guard, the Kings have a couple players capable of playing better defense, but they have significant size limitations generally and a couple of them are really tough to keep in the line-up due to their offensive limitations. Fox, Mitchell, Duarte, and Monk are all on the small end, and none have great length for their position. Fox can be a solid defender when he’s focused on defense, but he carries such a big responsibility on offense that he rarely locks in defensively all game, and his lack of height and bulk can mean he has trouble handling bigger guards like Anthony Edwards and James Harden. Monk is extremely athletic, but he also lacks size and is too easy for opposing guards to go through on defense. His defensive attention waxes and wanes, he gets caught on screens too often, and his close-outs are frequently too aggressive, so he often gets caught out of position. Duarte and Mitchell are better defensively, but they both struggle so much offensively that it is hard for them to find consistent minutes. Mitchell is also really undersized, which limits how he can be used defensively when Fox and Monk are on the court.
The end result is that the Kings would benefit tremendously from bigger, more athletic defenders at guard and on the wing. In addition to adding size and athleticism, they need to find at least one player who is a strong defender to help Keegan Murray anchor the perimeter defense. There’s little chance that the Kings can resolve their rim protection issues during the Sabonis minutes without a major change at power forward (or a dramatic sacrifice to spacing on offense), so the alternative is to bolster the perimeter defense substantially in the hopes they can put up enough resistance at the point of attack to reduce straight-line drives and the number of difficult help rotations that happen each game.
The Fourth and Final Part Coming Soon!
In the next—and definitely last—part of this series, I’m actually going to look at some of the trade candidates that reporters/pundits say the Kings might pursue. Pascal Siakam and OG Anounoby are off the table sadly, but that’s OK and will hopefully make my life easier. I may also throw in a couple names of players I’d think about, even if they haven’t been talked about.