Kings Offseason Update: DeMar DeRozan

Well, well, well, the Sacramento Kings offseason does have some sizzle!

The Kings made a splashy move on Saturday night by executing a sign-and-trade for Chicago Bulls wing and six-time All-Star DeMar DeRozan. This was huge news for the Kings, as DeRozan is probably the most accomplished free agent to ever join the Kings (all due respect to the Vlade Divac signing all the way back in 1999).

The Kings were hosting a summer league game against China when the deal was announced in the Golden One Center. Needless to say, the vibes were immaculate:

I talked briefly about the possibility of a sign-and-trade for DeRozan in my last post and it looks like the cost of the deal was roughly around what I expected (although the Kings gave up a bit more draft capital than I would’ve liked in an ideal world). Here are the deal terms:

• Sacramento Kings Receive:

  • DeMar DeRozan

    • DeRozan signed a 3 year, $73.7 million contract—the first two years are guaranteed and the third year is guaranteed for just $10 million

• Chicago Bulls Receive:

  • Two second round draft picks (from Sacramento)

  • Chris Duarte

• San Antonio Spurs Receive:

  • Harrison Barnes

  • Swap rights for Kings 2031 first round pick

How Did This Deal Go Down, and What Does It Mean for the Parties?

I’ll explain briefly what’s happened in this trade from each party’s perspective.

DeRozan was a free agent this offseason and the Bulls could not realistically keep him without going deep into the luxury tax, an unpalatable proposition for an aging team that only won 39 games last season. Rather than risk letting DeRozan walk in free agency with nothing to show for it, the Bulls were heavily incentivized to engage in a sign-and-trade so that they could get something back for him.

Entering his age 35 season, DeRozan was facing a rather limited free agency market. As I wrote about previously, only six or seven teams entered the offseason with substantial cap room: Detroit, Philadelphia, Utah, Oklahoma City, Orlando (Charlotte technically had some room and Toronto theoretically could have created room but chose not to). But only a few of those teams were realistic potential destinations for DeRozan, and that pool became even smaller early on in free agency when Philadelphia signed Paul George, Oklahoma City signed Isaiah Hartenstein, and Orlando signed Kentavious Caldwell-Pope. By looking at sign-and-trade scenarios, DeRozan could open up his list of potential destinations to keep his prospective compensation high and avoid having to join teams in the middle of a rebuild.

As an added challenge, the Bulls and DeRozan needed to find a way to do a sign-and-trade for DeRozan while not forcing the Bulls to take back a lot of salary. The Bulls wanted to avoid the luxury tax, but they also signed Jalen Smith in free agency to a 3 year, $27 million deal that hard-capped them at the first apron (because the Bulls gave Smith a starting salary above the Taxpayer MLE, they got hard capped at the first apron).

While the Bulls and DeRozan both wanted to do a sign-and-trade, they needed to find a trade partner and find a way to keep the Bulls from taking back too much salary in the deal. There weren’t many cap room teams interested, as I mentioned, so they had to focus on finding over-the-cap teams to do a deal.

The Kings were just such a team, over-the-cap but interested in adding DeRozan at a salary level he was comfortable with (roughly $20-25 million per year). But under the CBA rules, over-the-cap teams like the Kings must send out “matching salary” in a trade, which the Bulls didn’t want to (and couldn’t) accept. So it had to be a three team deal.

Enter the Spurs. The Spurs had a relatively quiet free agency start despite having cap space. The only move they’d made in free agency was to sign veteran point guard Chris Paul to a 1 year, $11 million deal. But they had more cap space to use and were willing to use it to facilitate a DeRozan sign-and-trade, especially if they could extract something of value out of the deal.

To make the deal work, the Kings and DeRozan first had to iron out contract details that would work for both sides. They landed on 3 years and $73.7 million, with only a partial guarantee in the final year of the deal to protect the team in case DeRozan’s play declines as he ages (DeRozan will be 37 in the last year of the deal).

As an over-the-cap team, the Kings had to comply with the CBA’s salary matching rules to trade for DeRozan. They also had to consider their own luxury tax and cap situation; the Kings were already close to the luxury tax themselves and by executing a sign-and-trade, they would hard cap themselves at the first apron by rule. To match DeRozan’s $23.4 million incoming salary for the 2024-25 cap year (salary estimate from Spotrac), the Kings chose to trade away Harrison Barnes and Chris Duarte, slated for 2024-25 salaries of $18 million and $5.9 million respectively.

Due to the Bulls lack of room below the tax and hard cap situation, they could only take back Duarte’s $5.9 million salary for this year (Duarte is a restricted free agent at the end of next season). In exchange, the Bulls received two second round draft picks from the Kings. That’s pretty close to the market price this offseason for eating $5-6 million in salary, and if the Bulls can turn Duarte’s shooting around, they may realize some upside from his contract too.

The Spurs took on Harrison Barnes’ contract, which is for $18 million this coming season and $19 million in 2025-26. That’s a significant amount of salary to take on, but the Spurs had some cap space to use and Barnes is a productive player. To get enough cap space for the deal to work, the Spurs actually had to trade away a second round pick to dump Devonte Graham’s contract on the Hornets. Barnes also agreed to waive a 10% trade kicker to make the deal possible. Ultimately, for their trouble, the Spurs added Barnes and received the right to swap first round picks with the Kings in 2031.

By adding Barnes, the Spurs get a productive player who can space the floor effectively (Barnes shoots 38% from three for his career), something the Spurs need around Victor Wembanyama and this year’s #4 overall pick Stephon Castle, both of whom can benefit tremendously from floor spacing the Spurs often lacked last year. Barnes will also bring professionalism, maturity, and availability—traits the Kings benefitted from tremendously during his six seasons with the franchise. While Barnes’ defensive limitations and below average rebounding were issues for a relatively undersized Sacramento team, Wembanyama’s presence in San Antonio should mitigate those concerns. And at the very least, Barnes may be a potential trade chip for San Antonio down the line as other teams search for shooting (everyone always needs shooting) or if they need to matching salary in a trade.

The 2031 swap right has the potential to be extremely valuable, but its value is highly variable and exceptionally difficult to predict at this stage. Prudence would suggest assuming something like a 50/50 chance that the swap right is even exercised at all. The teams also have to consider the relative value (and cost) of the potential for moving a short distance between picks (it’s not that valuable to go from pick #17 to #14, for example). I’ve seen a ton of takes that the swap right is super high value, but they’re over-stated. A lot can change in the next seven years, and in order for the swap right to be exceptionally valuable things have to go both poorly in Sacramento and extremely well in San Antonio. For perspective, seven years is enough time to completely turnover rosters. Plus, the current CBA won’t even be in effect in 2031. And I’ve seen exactly zero people acknowledge the possibility that Wembanyama might actually leave San Antonio in free agency before the swap right even rolls around.

From the Kings perspective, by executing the sign-and-trade for DeRozan, they added a talented player they could not have signed in free agency. They also managed to shed salary this year in the deal, giving them slightly more breathing room below the luxury tax and the first apron hard cap. I’ll talk more about how it effects them on the court next.

DeRozan Boosts the Kings’ Talent, But Questions Remain

There’s quite a bit of good content on DeRozan’s fit with the Kings out there, but it’s worth discussing it a bit anyway. I’m quite optimistic about the Kings adding DeRozan, especially offensively. He brings All-Star level scoring from midrange and on the interior (especially by getting to the line), and he’s a willing passer who still takes care of the ball. Last season, Derozan averaged 24.0 points, 5.3 assists, 4.3 rebounds, and just 1.7 turnovers per game respectable shooting numbers, especially from the field and the free throw line (48% from the field / 33.3% from three / 85.3% from the free throw line on 7.7 attempts per game). Those numbers are roughly in-line with his averages over the last decade across three different teams, so it’s not hard to envision DeRozan having similar production in Sacramento.

DeRozan Will Give the Kings More Options Offensively

DeRozan is an elite shotmaker with serious creation chops, which is something the Kings sorely lacked toward the end of last year. He can create offensive for himself and his teammates in isolation, he can effectively run pick-and-rolls, he’s a truly elite midrange shooter, and he’s not afraid to attack the paint to score and create foul opportunities.

DeRozan’s scoring and creation skills will help the Kings take pressure off of Fox and Monk to generate offense. Over the last couple years, the Kings have needed additional shot creation late in games especially, and DeRozan provides that in spades. While the Sabonis-centric offense that the Kings run can be highly effective, it’s too often bogged down late in games against playoff caliber opponents, and that contributed to several critical Kings losses (including, for example, in the 2023 playoffs versus the Warriors). The issue was even more pronounced at the end of last season after Monk got hurt and the Kings struggled mightily to maintain their offensive firepower. Barnes provided a bit of creation at times, but those times were too few and too far between to comfortably rely on. This shows up in the numbers, as the Kings ranked 26th among all teams in isolation possessions and were in the bottom half of teams in terms of efficiency when they did at 0.9 points per possession. While I’m not suggesting the Kings should lean heavily into iso offense, there are times when it’s helpful to have as an option, and DeRozan will help fill that void easily. Per NBA.com, DeRozan was 17th in the NBA in isolation possessions per game and scored 1.10 points per possession (PPP) out of them—roughly comparable to the PPP figures put up by Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Luka Doncic, albeit on less volume.

DeRozan’s pick and roll effectiveness will also help the Kings maintain efficient offense even with Fox off the floor, as DeRozan and Sabonis could make for an elite pick and roll combo with shooters like Murray, Ellis, Monk, Huerter, and Lyles on the floor with them. This is another area of effective offense that the Kings weren’t always able to go to when needed last season. They ran pick and rolls with the third lowest frequency in the NBA and posted a middle-of-the-pack 0.92 points per possession out of those plays per NBA.com. But adding DeRozan will make the pick and roll game a much more robust option offensively. DeRozan ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game (12th in the NBA) and scored 1.05 PPPs in those situations. To put those figures in perspective, Fox ran 8.2 pick and rolls per game and scored 0.97 PPPs while Tyrese Halliburton ran 8.1 pick and rolls per game and scored 1.06 PPPs. Adding options like an effective pick and roll game for when Fox sits will help keep the Kings offense humming throughout games, which was at times an issue last season.

I’m also optimistic about DeRozan’s ability to generate points off drives. He was the 13th most frequent driver in the NBA last season at roughly 14.8 drives per game (just a bit behind Fox’s 10th-ranked 15.2 drives per game), which really bolstered DeRozan’s scoring efficiency as he shot over 60% inside of 8 feet and got the to free throw line at the fourth highest rate in the league. I’m especially excited about the free throw shooting, as the Kings have struggled to get easy points from the line in the past.

DeRozan should be able to fit in well enough with the Kings’ dribble handoff (DHO) offense. That’s important because the Kings ran handoffs more than 50% more often than any other team in the NBA (roughly 11.4 times per game). You can see from the clip below that DeRozan had some opportunities to run similar sets in Chicago, even though the Bulls ran handoffs less than any other team in the NBA. These kinds of plays should be more efficient for DeRozan when done with Sabonis rather than Nikola Vucecic:

There are two primary concerns with adding DeRozan offensively, but I suspect they’ll both be manageable.

The biggest concern is that adding DeRozan and subtracting Barnes does hurt the Kings’ three point shooting prowess. Barnes was a reliable floor spacer, hitting over 38% of his threes in five of six seasons in Sacramento. While DeRozan can hit some threes, it’s definitely not his forte. He’s a low volume three point shooter and well below average by percentage (he did a bit better on corner threes last year, hitting 39.4% per NBA.com, but that might be an outlier). With Fox’s improved shooting, Huerter and Monk back from injury, and the possibility of a bounce-back shooting year from Keegan Murray, I don’t worry too much about the dip in shooting. I also don’t expect DeRozan’s weaker three point shooting to dramatically affect the Kings’ floor spacing overall. DeRozan still commands attention on the perimeter because of his ability to knock down midrange shots and dribble-drive close-outs. While he’s not a prolific three point shooter, DeRozan has hit over 43% of his midrange shots last year per NBA.com and has been upwards of 45% from that distance repeatedly in recent years. In addition, because DeRozan can handle a good amount of on-ball responsibility, there are ways to mitigate his lack of shooting by letting him bring the ball up and initiate offense, including through pick and rolls.

The other concern that folks have raised is about DeRozan’s supposed “stickiness” with the ball. That concern strikes me as dramatically over-stated. DeRozan played in a Chicago offense that was deliberate and methodical (28th in pace), but DeRozan’s average touch lasted just 4.73 seconds, just a touch longer than Fox’s average of 4.68 seconds per touch. While DeRozan will need to move the ball more quickly at times in the Kings offense, he’s become such a willing distributor that there’s no reason to think he can’t do so.

Ultimately, DeRozan will bring more offensive punch to the Kings easily. He’ll give the team more options for shot creation and easy pick and rolls, and he should be another reliable option for one-on-one scoring when needed late in games. While his lack of three point shooting isn’t ideal, it’s mitigated by the fact that the Kings can still put plenty of shooting on the floor even with DeRozan and Sabonis together.

Defensively, the Trade May Be a Wash

The biggest concern with swapping Barnes (and I suppose Duarte) for DeRozan is the impact on defense, and you see a lot of folks expressing concern about the Kings defense in general. I think those concerns are way overstated for two reasons.

While no one claims that DeRozan is a force on defense, the Kings didn’t actually give up much in terms of defensive contribution in the deal.

Let’s start with Duarte for simplicity. While Duarte was an above average defensive player, his offensive struggles kept him from getting on the floor consistently, and he averaged just 12.2 minutes per game as a result. His propensity for fouling also didn’t help him stay on the court. With Keon Ellis emerging, Monk and Huerter both back with the team, and the Kings selecting Devin Carter in the draft, there was no real path for Duarte to contribute meaningfully this coming season (and he is slated to be a free agent after next season regardless).

But what about losing Barnes? I expect there will be some drawbacks, but probably less pronounced than most folks assume.

At 6’8” and 225 pounds, Barnes has slotted in as an undersized power forward for the Kings for years. While he’s been a solid, well-rounded player during that time, Barnes’ defensive limitations have been a significant issue for the Kings for several years, especially paired with a big like Domantas Sabonis who doesn’t offer a ton of rim protection. DeRozan has also played power forward quite a bit for the last few years in Chicago and at times in San Antonio, but he’s a bit smaller than Barnes at 6’6” and 220 pounds. By moving from Barnes to DeRozan, the Kings will give up a bit of height. And even though Barnes was never a stout defender against stronger power forwards, his strength and size were a bit more suited to matching up against guys like Karl-Anthony Towns and Jaren Jackson Jr. than DeRozan will be.

But in the modern NBA, there just aren’t that many power forwards who are offensively capable of overpowering their opponents with strength. Other than Towns and Jackson, it’s hard to think of any examples of Western Conference forwards that Barnes could handle strength-wise that DeRozan cannot. Arguably Zion Williamson fits the description, but Barnes generally wasn’t able to handle him either (I’m not sure many players can 1 vs. 1). Focusing on the Western Conference, the vast majority of modern power forwards are really perimeter players or at best tertiary offensive threats. Towns, Jackson, Kevin Durant, Zion Williamson, Kawhi Leonard, Jalen Williams, Jerami Grant, and Draymond Green all largely play outside-in. Aaron Gordon, PJ Washington, Rui Hachimura, Jeremy Sochan, John Collins, and Jabari Smith aren't big enough offensive threats to really be a concern on the interior other than as lob threats. It’s just not a huge area of concern.

Of course, Barnes’ size would be theoretically more useful against centers than anything DeRozan has to offer, but if you watched the Kings last season for any significant amount of time, you’d be hard-pressed to find examples of Barnes meaningfully slowing down centers when switched on to them. The Kings were wholly dependent on Sabonis (and to a lesser extent Alex Len, Javale McGee, and Trey Lyles) to hold up against opposing centers.

Aside from size concerns (which were an issue with Barnes too), there isn’t much reason to think that the Kings are losing much on the defensive end.

From an advanced numbers perspective, DeRozan actually graded out comparably to Barnes as a defender. Per DunksandThrees.com, DeRozan posted a 50th percentile Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of -0.6, while Barnes ranked in the 49th percentile (DeRozan outperformed Barnes by this metric in 2021-22 and 2022-23 too, if you’re curious). The all-in defensive metric from Basketball Reference, Defensive Box Plus-Minus, also consistently prefers DeRozan to Barnes. In 2023-24, DeRozan posted a Defensive Box Plus-Minus rating of -0.3 compared to Barnes’ rating of -1.2, and DeRozan has rated better than Barnes each of the last five seasons under the metric. From an on/off points perspective, it also looks like close to a wash. Per Cleaning the Glass, the Kings were about 3.0 points per 100 possessions worse defensively with Barnes on the floor while the Bulls were actually better by about 0.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan on the floor. Even comparing their time at power forward tells a similar story: the Bulls gave up 116.4 points per 100 possessions with DeRozan at power forward compared to the Kings giving up 117.0 points per 100 possessions with Barnes at power forward.

The defensive counting stats tell the same basic story. Last year, DeRozan averaged 5.7 rebounds, 1.5 steals, and 0.8 blocks per 100 possessions. Barnes averaged 5.1 rebounds, 1.1 steals, and 0.2 blocks per 100 possessions. DeRozan’s steals and blocks rates have also been better than Barnes’ rates every year for the past five seasons, and DeRozan has posted better defensive rebounding rates than Barnes in three of the last five years, per Basketball Reference.

The other thing to consider is that the Kings’ defensive capabilities were based largely around improving their perimeter defense. Once Monk and Huerter went down, the Kings were forced to play Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell more often. The combination of Ellis, Keegan Murray, and De’Aaron Fox in particular performed exceptionally well in terms of perimeter defense, and helped elevate the Kings defense tremendously. Though the Kings finished 14th in defensive rating last season (114.4), they actually were 9th in the NBA after the All Star break (110.9) and ranked 6th over the last 15 games (108.8). Whether Barnes or DeRozan is at power forward isn’t going to materially affect the perimeter guys, and DeRozan’s offensive contributions may, in fact, let Fox focus more effort night-in and night-out on the defensive end.

Sacramento Is Still Going to Miss Harrison Barnes

As a quick aside, I want to acknowledge that losing Harrison Barnes, AKA the Black Falcon, is bittersweet. He’s been a pillar for the Kings for almost six years now, and he’s been super active in the Sacramento community during that time. I wish him the best in San Antonio and hope he can provide the same level of consistency, poise, professionalism, and leadership there that he provided the Kings as they grew throughout his tenure here. It’s going to be sad never seeing this group together again in the Kings uniform:

The Kings Still Have Ways to Fortify Their Roster Long-Term

If I had to guess, I would bet the Kings are probably done with major moves for this offseason. The rumor mill now has the Kings out on Brandon Ingram, which makes sense given his skillset largely overlaps with DeRozan. And at this point, it’s hard to bank on any of the rumored Lauri Markkanen, Kyle Kuzma, or Jerami Grant trades going down, as none of Utah, Washington, or Portland seems all that pressed to make a trade soon. But none of that means they have to be done, and I expect they’ll still look to make a deal at some point (it may have to wait until the season starts).

Let’s start with the trade assets perspective.

The Kings actually didn’t have to use much in the way of trade assets to execute the trade for DeRozan. They gave up a 2031 first round pick swap, but otherwise, all they really lost was Harrison Barnes (whose trade value didn’t seem to be enormous given the two years left on his contract), Duarte’s matching salary, and some cap space. For future trades, the Kings still have some potentially valuable players and draft capital.

On the player side, I feel comfortable saying that Fox, Sabonis, and Murray aren’t going anywhere, and DeRozan and Monk aren’t tradeable for at least six months (plus, having just signed new deals, it’s unlikely they’re going anywhere). That means that if the Kings are to pursue a potential starting level veteran, they’d likely have to put Kevin Huerter (and his $16.8 million salary) in any deal to get the salary matching to work. Huerter is only 25 years old, and though he had a down year last season, he’s a capable scorer and movement shooter. The Kings also have a few other players on the roster that could draw some trade interest, though they have some drawbacks. For example, Sacramento’s first round pick Devin Carter was highly regarded during the draft process, but he’s undergoing shoulder surgery and it’s not clear when he’ll be back playing. Still, the cost control over his contract is potentially very valuable. Keon Ellis similarly has an extremely valuable contract, as he’s shown strong defensive ability and he’s effectively locked up for two years at the minimum salary. Trey Lyles is a quality backup forward on a reasonable (but expiring) $8 million contract, and he could draw some interest as a result. Otherwise, the Kings roster is mostly back-end rotation guys whose biggest value in a trade would be for salary matching.

The draft pick situation is OK but far from pristine. The Kings owe a top 12 protected pick to the Hawks in 2025, the last payment on the Kevin Huerter trade from a couple years ago. If it doesn’t convey next year, it turns into a top 10 protected pick in 2026. The net result is that the Kings can’t actually trade away one of their first round draft picks until 2028 (the Stepien Rule prevents teams from trading away their first round pick in successive seasons). Because teams can also only deal picks seven years out, the most the Kings can offer in a deal today is two firsts (probably in 2028 and 2030, since they traded swap rights to the 2031 pick in to San Antonio as part of getting DeRozan). If the 2025 first ultimately conveys to the Hawks, the Kings will have more flexibility and could trade their 2026, 2028, 2030, and 2032 first rounders in theory (plus swaps in 2027 and 2029).

I’m not sure whether the Kings have the trade assets to seal a deal for an All Star caliber player like Markkanen right now (I’m going to ignore Ingram). Yes, the Jazz have strong incentives to trade him. They owe a top 10 protected to Oklahoma City, so they would benefit from tanking and securing a good pick in a strong draft class; Markkanen is already 27, but most of the Jazz’s core is either really young or not yet on the roster; Markkanen is about to get a huge pay raise from an ultra-affordable $18 million to closer to $45-50 million per year. But at the same time, there should be a competitive trade market for Markkanen’s services and the Jazz don’t need to make a decision right away. Markkanen hasn’t told Utah he wants to leave (he’s arguably indicated the opposite), and the Jazz have until August 6 to decide if they want to give him a raise and an extension, much like the Kings did with Sabonis last year. Alternatively, the Jazz could let Markkanen hit free agency and try to lure him back with Bird rights or try to execute a sign-and-trade then. But if the Kings can pull off a deal for Markkanen, I’m all for it! And if they can do it before Markannen gets a raise/extension, they might be able to get away with losing just Huerter from their current rotation.

One of the most important questions about trading for a guy like Markkanen besides the cost is how he would fit into the Kings’ salary cap. Fortunately, the Kings’ cap situation over the next few years is quite flexible, so they can afford to add a big money guy like Markkanen and still function. While the Kings are up against the salary cap and hard-capped at the first apron this year, things should get a bit better if the salary cap grows as expected (because the NBA’s massive new TV deals are expected to net roughly three times current revenues, it’s probably fair to assume the salary cap, luxury tax line, and aprons to go up by the maximum 10% per year for the next 4-5 years).

Looking at the Kings cap situation over the next five years, there’s clearly some breathing room below the luxury tax lines and the aprons in particular:

Adding a $40-50 million salary in 2025-26, like Markkanen should get, is absolutely feasible while staying below the luxury tax line. For example, say the Kings traded Huerter and picks for Markkanen this offseason and ultimately re-sign Markkanen for 2025-26 and beyond at a starting salary of $45 million in the first year. That would be roughly $27 million in added salary for the 2025-26 season once you account for Huerter’s salary coming off the books—less than the $30.8 million in room the Kings would have below the first apron. While they would be a taxpayer that season, they’d still be able to get below the tax in theory too. Of course, the Kings also have to consider that long-term deals for De’Aaron Fox and Keegan Murray will kick in during the 2026-27 season, assuming the team can get deals done. But there’s $106.4 million in breathing room below the luxury tax line at that point—even factoring in a big deal for Markkanen, they’d easily have over $55 million below the luxury tax that could go toward deals with Fox and Murray, and they could create more space by either trading away DeRozan in the last year of his deal or waiving him (DeRozan’s contract expires after the 2026-27 season, and it’s only partially guaranteed that year anyway).

The Kings could also target trades for players who aren’t quite as good as Markkanen, which may be possible with relatively few draft assets and Huerter’s contract as matching salary. Here’s a few of the other forwards who might be available and attractive:

• Kyle Kuzma (Wizards). Adding Kuzma would give the Kings even more scoring punch and a bit more size and rebounding in the front court. He’s also on a very reasonable $23.5 million contract that actually descends in value over the next three years, so he’d fit into the Kings cap sheet nicely. Kuzma isn’t known for his defense or outside shooting, though, so he’s not a perfect fit. The Kings will have to be wary about price—unless the Wizards come down a bit on their asking price, I’m not sure Kuzma makes the most sense.

• Jerami Grant (Blazers). Grant has a lot of similarities to Kuzma. He’s a solid offensive threat, and a better outside shooter than Kuzma, but he’s probably over-extended at his current volume. He also used to be a pretty strong defensive presence, though that’s waned in recent seasons as he’s taken on a bigger offensive load. The biggest difference between Kuzma and Grant, though, is the salary. While Kuzma is on a team-friendly deal, Grant is slated to make almost $30 million this season, and his salary is going up each of the following three years. The Kings wouldn’t be able to get Grant with just Huerter to match salaries—they’d need to staple other useful players to the deal such as Trey Lyles. That makes trading for Grant much less appealing. And like Washington, Portland’s asking price for Grant has been on the high side of expectation.

• Cam Johnson (Nets). Similar to Kuzma, Johnson provides some more size in the front court (with a bit less rebounding talent). Though Johnson isn’t quite the creative scorer that Kuzma is, he grades out as a slightly better defender and he’s a knock-down three point shooter. He’s also on a reasonable contract ($23.6 million this coming season) that the Kings could easily absorb. With the Nets re-setting after trading away Mikal Bridges, Johnson should be more readily obtainable than he would’ve been in the past.

• Dorian Finney-Smith (Nets). Finney-Smith is probably the most reliable defender out of this group, but he’s a bit older (age 31) and he’s not very versatile offensively, where he can basically hit threes at a respectable, though not elite, 35% clip. He’s on a really cheap contract at just $14.9 million, so it’s possible the Kings could even get him without sending out Huerter as a matching salary (Jalen McDaniels and another player would have to be involved to keep the Kings under the first apron hard cap).

• Grant Williams (Hornets). Williams is similar to Finney-Smith, but he’s younger and a bit shorter and bulkier. He’s been a bit more volatile in terms of his defensive performance, but he’s a better three point shooter too. He’s only getting paid $13 million this year and he’s locked up for three years.

Of course, there are plenty of other deals the Kings could pursue, but we’ll have to see what else comes up. They can (and in my view, should) continue to see if a big swing for Markkanen can get done, but if that doesn’t materialize, they have several less pricey options that they can pursue before the season starts, or even after.

Reacting to the Kings Draft & Free Agency

With the NBA draft done and the early wave of free agency now over, I wanted to take a quick look at how the Kings have done so far. They sowed up their biggest need early, but there’s been plethora of rumors about potential trades for months now. Those rumors may be warranted, as so far the Kings’ off-season has mostly been about positioning for potential transactions rather than actually making major changes from last season. Let’s check out what’s happened so far!

Key Transactions:

• Re-signed Malik Monk to a 4 year, $78 million contract

• Drafted point guard Devin Carter (Providence) in the first round (pick #13)

• Traded point guard Davion Mitchell, forward Sasha Vezenkov, and two second round picks (#45 this year and Portland’s second round pick in 2025) to the Toronto Raptors in exchange for forward Jalen McDaniels

• Re-signed Alex Len to a 1 year contract for the veteran’s minimum

Monk Comes Back, Answering the Biggest Question Early

The Kings wrapped up their most important piece of off-season business relatively early this year. Ten days before free agency even opened up, ESPN reported that sixth man Malik Monk would return to the team on a 4 year deal worth $78 million, the maximum offer that the Kings could make under the NBA’s CBA (the Kings held Monk’s Early Bird rights, a cap exception that allowed the team to offer Monk up to a 4 year contract with a starting salary of about $17.4 million—equal to 175% of Monk’s $9.95 million salary from last season—and 8% raises per year).

Keeping Monk was by far the Kings’ biggest priority for the off-season, as he’d clearly established himself as a core piece of the roster. Monk’s ability to score and create offense himself was critical for the Kings during the 2023 playoff series against the Warriors, and he’d elevated his play even further during the 2023-24 season by posting career highs in points per game (15.4) and assists per game (5.1). The Kings’ offensive struggles after Monk injured his knee in late March also made his value pretty obvious, as the team averaged just 111.3 points per game in its final 11 games (including two play-in games) despite a season average of 116.6 points per game. On top of that, had Monk left in free agency, the Kings would have had no obvious way of replacing Monk’s microwave scoring off the bench and ball-handling responsibilities. They would have been limited to the #13 draft pick and whatever they could find in free agency—where the team would’ve been limited to using the Non-taxpayer MLE (about $12.8 million) and the Bi-Annual exception (about $4.7 million)—to find replacement scoring.

Kings Snag Top-Tier Guard Depth In Draft

With Monk’s return secured, the Kings headed into the NBA Draft on June 25-26 with the flexibility to fill other needs. Going into the draft, my personal hope was that one of two players from my Five Favorites from this year’s draft might fall to the Kings at pick #13: forward Cody Williams (Colorado) or point guard Devin Carter (Providence). I fully expected both players to be off-the-board by the time the Kings’ pick came around. Fortunately, Carter made it down to pick #13 and the Kings snatched him up!

Although Williams probably would have fit the Kings’ positional needs a bit better (they desperately need help at forward), Devin Carter brings high-level defensive chops, superb length, and elite rebounding skills that should readily compliment De’Aaron Fox and Malik Monk in the Kings’ backcourt. He also showed a knack for scoring and improved three-point shooting in his final season at Providence, which the Kings will hopefully benefit from. I talked about Carter extensively in my Five Favorites post the other week, so I won’t dwell on his talent and fit, but I think he will be a tremendous addition to the Kings’ backcourt and I was happy to see the Kings scoop him up.

I also applaud the Kings decision to draft Carter over some of the younger prospects available, and certainly over reaching for a forward. Carter has the tools to contribute immediately at areas of need, and he’s got enough upside to warrant a high draft pick even though he’s already 22 years old. The younger guard prospects available—Jared McCain (whose game I like a lot), Ja’Kobe Walter, and Bub Carrington—weren’t necessarily better fits. McCain is a younger and a better shooter today than Carter, but he doesn’t have the same physical tools as Carter and lacks the same defensive prowess. With Monk back, Carter’s probably the better fit. Walter and Carrington, meanwhile, both have lots of potential, but it’s subject to a lot of projection. Walter profiles as a strong 3-and-D player, with strong physical tools and a clean stroke, but he didn’t shoot it well during his lone season at Baylor and has a ways to go to develop his handle. Bub Carrington is just 18 years old and did a fantastic job as a freshman in a lead-guard role at Pitt this year, but he’s still growing into his body, he’s not yet a floor spacer (he hit just 32% from three), and his long-term development depends on him having opportunities to play with the ball in his hands. With Fox, Monk, and Sabonis already on the roster, I’m not sure he was going to fit well with this Kings team.

At the same time, by the time the Kings #13 pick rolled around, the draft’s forward depth had already been largely depleted. Cody Williams, Ron Holland, Tidjane Salaun, and Matas Buzelis were already off the board (and I like Carter more as a prospect than several of them anyway). The Kings could’ve gone after older forwards with limited positional size and defensive question like Dalton Knecht, Tristan Da Silva, or Jaylon Tyson, but I’m not sure how that would’ve helped them more than Carter. DaRon Holmes (also one of my Five Favorites) would’ve been a stretch at pick 13. Same for high-potential prospects like Pacome Diadem.

Carter made sense as the pick to me, and I’m happy he fell to the Kings.

Drafting Carter Leads to Immediate Changes

Between re-signing Monk and drafting Carter, the Kings were looking at a team salary that would exceed the luxury tax line. In fact, the Kings were slated for just over $172.3 million in team salary at a minimum, before adding any depth to their front court. That would’ve been about $2.5 million over the NBA’s 2024 luxury tax line of $170.8 million. Obviously, that would' have bene a big deal because, as I’ve written before, luxury tax penalties can be onerous, and teams over the luxury tax aren’t eligible to receive luxury tax distributions from other teams, which can be worth more than $10 million per year. In addition, teams while teams below the luxury tax line can use the Non-taxpayer MLE of about $12.8 million to sign free agents, teams above the luxury tax line can only use the Taxpayer MLE worth under $5.2 million to sign free agents (there are other restrictions, too). Ultimately, getting under the tax line would save the Kings quite a bit of money and make it feasible to add more talent in free agency if they could find targets.

On top of the luxury tax issues, the Kings were staring at a potential log-jam in the backcourt. Presumably, the front office planned for Fox, Monk, Carter, and Ellis to be the main backcourt rotation following the draft, but the Kings also had several other guards returning in Davion Mitchell, Colby Jones, and Chris Duarte (and even though Kevin Huerter is 6’7”, he arguably plays more of a guard-style game).

To alleviate luxury tax concerns and make space for Devin Carter in the backcourt rotation, the Kings made a trade with the Raptors on the second night of the draft that can be accurately described as a “salary dump.” The Kings sent out Davion Mitchell (owed $6.5 million next season), Sasha Vezenkov (owed $6.7 million next season), the #45 pick in the 2024 draft, and a future 2025 second round pick from Portland to the Toronto Raptors in exchange for Jalen McDaniels (owed $4.7 million next season).

By making the deal, the Kings also saved a little under $8.5 million in salary, bringing their team salary number down to just under $164 million (including Devin Carter’s cap hold).

At the time of the deal, I understood the rationale pretty clearly. By drafting Devin Carter, the Kings added a guard who can play defense at a similar level to Davion Mitchell, but with more size, rebounding, and hopefully better offensive production and three-point shooting at a lower cost. Mitchell’s role was likely to shrink (again), and the Kings weren’t likely to bring him back after next season anyway. Similarly, Vezenkov reportedly was unhappy with his role in Sacramento, but his lack of athleticism and quickness on defense meant he wasn’t likely to ever be a significant rotation piece. Both guys were expendable. The cap savings also made it easy for the Kings to re-sign Alex Len at the veteran’s minimum to provide depth at center.

The Kings roster after the trade (and re-signing Len) looks a little more balanced, especially if Kevin Huerter, Chris Duarte, or Colby Jones can fill minutes at small forward:

For better or worse, getting off salary usually requires teams to give up something of value—usually draft picks—so it’s no surprise that the Kings had to give up a couple second rounders to get a small salary dump done. But the price here was a tad high given the Kings shed just under $8.5 million in salary.

Giving up pick #45 in the 2024 draft is fine, but the 2025 Portland second round pick could end up valuable. Portland’s second round pick this year landed at #33, and it’s not obvious they’re going to be much better next season. Jalen McDaniels also has some size and athleticism (he’s the older brother of star Timberwolves defender Jaden McDaniels), but he’s already 26 and just posted by far the worst season of his career, averaging just 3.4 points per game on terrible shooting splits (34.4% / 16.9% / 73.0%). For comparison, the Dallas Mavericks dumped about $11.9 million in salary from Tim Hardaway Jr., about 40% more salary than the Kings dumped, and gave up a 2025 Toronto second rounder plus two 2028 second round picks (Dallas also got Quentin Grimes back, who, like Jalen McDaniels, just posted a career worst season but could be useful in theory). These trades aren’t wildly disparate, but I do think the Kings could have found a way to keep Portland’s 2025 pick given they were already giving up a 2024 second rounder. Though it’s not the end of the world, keeping Portland’s pick would have been nice since the Kings owe a top-12 protected first round pick next year to Atlanta.

I’m also going to miss having Davion on the team in particular. Though his tenure with the Kings was up and down offensively, he brought intensity and effort on defense every time he stepped on the court. His lack of size limited the impact he could actually have defensively at times, but you never questioned his effort. In the right match ups, he was a force defensively—and his dogged effort against Steph Curry in the 2023 playoffs really put him on the map. I hope he can continue to develop his outside shooting to open things up on offense in Toronto. If he can do that, he can be an effective player, especially in a bench role.

What Can the Kings Do Next With the Cap “Flexibility”?

To date, the Kings haven’t made splashy moves with the cap space they created by dumping the salary for Mitchell and Vezenkov, though they did re-sign Len. Accounting for Len’s new deal and Carter’s cap hold, the Kings’ expected team salary should be about $166.1 million, still below the luxury tax line. As a result, the Kings will technically have the full Non-taxpayer MLE available to use to sign free agents if they want to, plus the smaller Bi-Annual exception. But at this point, the best-fitting free agency targets are pretty much all off the table. Some of my preferred free agency targets for the Kings—front court players who can shoot and/or defend reasonably well—have already agreed to deals with other teams:

• Obi Toppin agreed to a big 4 year, $60 million contract to return to the Pacers

• Naji Marshall agreed to a 3 year, $27 million deal with the Mavericks

• Nic Batum agreed to a 2 year, $9.6 million deal with the Clippers

• Jalen Smith signed a 3 year, $27 million contract with the Bulls

• Kelly Oubre signed a 2 year, $16.3 million contract to stay with the Sixers

• Kyle Anderson agreed to a 3 year, $27 million deal with the Warriors

At this point, the front-court free agency market is reed-thin. LeBron James was never actually going to leave LA, and the Kings didn’t have the money to sign him regardless. Miles Bridges is still floating around, but that’s because of off-the-court issues I wouldn’t want to bring into the team anyway. Saddiq Bey is coming off an ACL tear and likely won’t be ready to start next season. Caleb Martin and Haywood Highsmith could be decent fits as defensive wings (Martin more as a perimeter player, Highsmith with more ability to guard power forwards), but they’re probably not worth chasing for more than about $5-6 million per season. Isaac Okoro could be a solid addition in theory, but he’s a restricted free agent and the Cavs could match any offer the Kings extend to him. Simone Fontecchio is also a restricted free agent, but you’ve got to assume Detroit will match any remotely reasonable offer for him given they just traded for him last season.

The net result is that the Kings may not even want to use the Non-taxpayer MLE ($12.82 million) or the Bi-Annual exception ($4.7 million) to sign any of the remaining free agents because doing so would carry them over the luxury tax and hard-cap them at the first apron ($178.1 million). If the Kings use only the smaller Taxpayer MLE ($5.17 million) to add someone, they would only be hard-capped at the second apron ($188.9 million).

The Current Cap Picture

After accounting for drafting Devin Carter re-signing Malik Monk and Alex Len, the Kings will have 13 players on the NBA roster, with an obvious need for more firepower at the small forward and power forward positions.

• PG: De’Aaron Fox, Devin Carter

• SG: Kevin Huerter (SG/SF), Malik Monk, Keon Ellis, Chris Duarte, Colby Jones

• SF: Keegan Murray, Jalen McDaniels

• PF: Harrison Barnes, Trey Lyles

• C: Domantas Sabonis, Alex Len

With this roster, the Kings’ team salary should be just under $167 million when you account for Devin Carter’s expected rookie deal and the $1.3 million in likely incentives that Sabonis can earn in 2024. That’s well over the salary cap and about $3.8 million below the luxury tax line.

[Note that I’m using an estimated $5.63 million for Devin Carter’s salary because he hasn’t yet signed his rookie contract. The NBA has a “rookie scale” that sets salaries for each first round draft slot, but under the CBA, players can sign contracts for up to 120% of that amount—which they typically do (the rookie scale amount for pick #13 is $4.69 million, 120% of that is about $5.63 million). Regardless of what permissible first year salary you assign to Carter, the Kings will be well over the salary cap and safely below the luxury tax line.]

The Kings should also safely below the first apron and the second apron, but it’s a bit complicated. The NBA actually uses different accounting when calculating a team’s “apron salary,” as they require teams to account for even unlikely incentives too. Sabonis and Lyles have $2.5 million in possible unlikely incentives for 2024, so for apron salary purposes, the Kings number will be a tad higher at about $169.5 million. With the current roster, the team will have about $8.6 million of breathing room below the first apron and $19.4 million of room below the second apron.

I’ve tried to lay this all out in an eas(ier) to read chart below:

[Based on data from Spotrac]

Shedding the salaries for Davion Mitchell and Sasha Vezenkov (about $8.5 million salary in total) made sure the Kings were safely below the first apron line—if they hadn’t done that deal, there would be a real risk of the Kings exceeding the first apron. That would’ve prevented them from even having the option to use their Non-taxpayer MLE. It also would’ve brought the Kings closer to the second apron, which comes with additional restrictions.

What Can the Kings Do?

Since the Kings are safely below the first apron, they have some added lee-way to do transactions that might trigger the first apron hard cap, and even more safety to perform transactions that will trigger the second apron hard cap, both this year and going forward. The flexibility is most important when thinking about potential trades, especially if the Kings want to consider trading for some of the marquee names that might be on the market.

If the Kings want to take back more salary in a trade than they send out (which is permitted, subject to certain restrictions, under he NBA’s salary matching rules for trades), they would trigger a hard cap at the first apron—so having some breathing room there is important. This could be relevant for a couple potential trade targets in particular like Brandon Ingram, Kyle Kuzma, or Lauri Markannen.

Ingram will make just over $36 million this year, so the Kings would probably need to trade away both Harrison Barnes ($18 million) and Kevin Huerter ($16.8 million) to make the salary matching work, in addition to whatever draft capital they might send out. Even then, the Kings would be taking back about $1.2 million more salary then they send out, which would trigger the hard cap at the first apron. Having some breathing room makes that feasible—if the Kings were instead right up against the first apron hard cap, the trade would probably need to involve another player (such as Chris Duarte), which would complicate things further.

Kuzma’s salary is $23.5 million. Under the NBA’s trade salary matching rules, the Kings could theoretically send just Kevin Huerter plus draft capital and make the deal work. The Kings would take back an extra $6.7 million in salary (the difference between Kuzma’s salary and Huerter’s salary for next year) and trigger the first apron hard cap, but they could absorb the difference into the $8.6 million in space they have below the first apron.

Markannen will make just over $18 million this season. Sending out Huerter or Barnes plus picks is feasible given the Kings have room below the first apron hard cap. While it’s hard to imagine the Kings winning the bidding war for Markannen (the Jazz’s asking price seems wild at the moment), he’s going to be a free agent at the end of the year and I can see why the Kings want to maintain the ability to deal for him if the price changes over the course of the year.

Other potential trade targets with bigger salaries like Zach Lavine (personally not interested) and Jimmy Butler (very skeptical he moves) would also only be realistically possible if the Kings stay far enough below the first apron to take back more salary than they send out. Lavine will make $43 million this year and Butler will make $48.8 million, but it’s going to be tough for the Kings to get to that kind of outgoing salary—especially if they were already up against the first apron. Barnes + Huerter gets you to about $34.8 million, but the Kings would need to add players like Lyles ($8 million) and/or Duarte ($5.9 million) if they wanted to get high enough to not take back more salary than they send out.

For this off-season and through the upcoming season, the Kings are far enough below the second apron that it probably won’t affect them much. That means they can aggregate salaries in trade, trade cash, and use the Taxpayer MLE if they want to (including during the season). The second apron will eventually become a concern if/when De’Aaron Fox signs a new deal and Keegan Murray gets extended, but they’re pretty safely away from it for now.

What’s Next?

In the short term, I am hoping the Kings find a way to snag some depth at forward in free agency. I’m not looking for them to sign a big name (at this point, there aren’t really any), just someone who can help shore up the rotation behind Keegan Murray and Harrison Barnes, even if they’re coming in at the veteran’s minimum. If you’re curious, here are some names that interest me from who’s left:

• Probably Too Pricey:

  • Isaac Okoro

  • Precious Achiuwa

  • Simone Fontecchio

  • Caleb Martin

• More Realistic Targets:

  • Haywood Highsmith

  • Reggie Bullock

  • Robert Covington

  • Cedi Osman

  • Oshae Brissett

• Maybe They’ve Got Something Left?

  • Jae Crowder

  • Gordon Hayward

  • Markieff Morris

There are a number of trade targets, too. The big names are obvious, but the ones I’d be most excited about—assuming the Kings don’t need to wildly over-pay to get them (a big assumption)—are below:

• Probably Too Pricey:

  • Lauri Markannen (anything short of Keegan seems palatable)

  • Jimmy Butler (he’s not actually moving)

• More Realistic Targets:

  • Brandon Ingram (not my favorite fit and may be better slotted in the “too pricey” category)

  • Kyle Kuzma (two firsts seems like too much?)

  • Jerami Grant (two firsts seems like definitely too much given his contract)

  • Bobby Portis (maybe Milwaukee would move him? I’m skeptical—same thing for Brook Lopez)

  • De’Andre Hunter (probably not available)

  • Tari Eason (sadly, the Rockets ain’t giving him up)

• Smaller Swings, But Do They Move the Needle?

  • Dorian Finney-Smith

  • Cam Johnson

  • Grant Williams

You’ll notice I didn’t list a couple names, most notably Zach Lavine and Demar Derozan. Both Bulls players have been in a lot of rumors lately, and some folks would like the Kings to trade for them. I’m not as interested in Lavine particularly.

Lavine’s contract is too big for his availability and production, plus his skillset overlaps too much with Fox, Monk, and now Devin Carter to make him the highest use of cap space and trade capital. If the team has any concerns about the first or second apron being a hindrance to future deals, Lavine’s contract is going to be an issue. You can swallow that kind of deal for someone like Markannen, who fits a clear need role and is younger and less injury prone, but it’s tough to do for Lavine.

Derozan’s fit would be better since he’s a bit bigger and can (I think?) slot in at small forward in some line-ups. Plus, Derozan’s end of game shot creation in particular is incredibly valuable. But he’ll be 35 at the start of next season, he’s never been a prolific three point shooter, and his defense isn’t particularly notable at this point in his career. He could be a value add to the Kings even with Monk and Fox, though, and because he’d probably only be available in a sign-and-trade, it’s possible he might come cheaply. I’d be happy to add Derozan in a sign-and-trade if he signs a 2-3 year deal worth about $20 million per season, so long as the Kings don’t have to give up a ton to get him (perhaps Huerter and second round draft capital).

That’s it for now! We’ll have to wait and see what the Kings do next—I’m certainly eager to know. Thanks for reading!

Sacramento Kings: 2024 Off-Season Strategy

Now that it’s mid-May, the NBA playoffs are in full swing and only a handful of teams are still competing. The Kings find themselves on the outside, looking in, after finishing with a 46-36 record and losing their second play-in tournament game to the Pelicans (that loss was their sixth of the season to the Pelicans).

Missing the playoffs is disappointing for any team, but it’s especially tough for a Kings team that finished third in the Western Conference in 2022-23 while breaking a 16-year playoff drought before eventually losing to the Golden State Warriors in seven games.

Last offseason, the Kings’ front office seemed to choose continuity over big changes to follow up their success, as most of the roster changes were really on the fringes. They re-signed forward Harrison Barnes and agreed to an extension with All-NBA center Domantas Sabonis with cap space freed up by trading away backup center Richaun Holmes (along with their 2023 first-round pick). They brought in a handful of rotation players in Sasha Venzenkov, Chris Duarte, and Javale McGee, and made just two second round draft selections in Colby Jones and Jalen Slawson, both of whom played limited minutes this season. They let a handful of back-end rotation and bench players walk through the Holmes trade and departures of Terence Davis, Matthew Dellavedova, Chimezie Metu, Neemias Queta, and PJ Dozier. The theme was clear: run it back with the same core, rely on internal development, and try to make upgrades on the edges.

The strategy from last offseason helped the Kings stay relevant and continue to develop despite late-season injuries to key players like Kevin Huerter (torn labrum on March 18) and Malik Monk (sprained right MCL on March 29). While the Kings finished ninth in the West, they were just 5 wins behind the fourth seeded LA Clippers. They also managed to improve their defensive significantly over the 2022-23 season, jumping up to a defensive rating of 114.4 (14th in the NBA) from a poor defensive rating of 116.0 (24th in the NBA) per NBA.com. That was a meaningful jump defensively, especially given there was a pronounced increase in offensive output league wide. Unfortunately, the Kings’ strides on defense were offset by a bit of a dip offensively, as the Kings fell from 1st in the NBA in offensive rating (118.6) to 13th (116.2). And of course, the Kings won two fewer games in 2023-24 than the previous season even as the Western Conference continued to improve—for context, 10 of the 11 top teams in the West this season improved on their record from 2022-23.

So, things may look very different this time around.

The Kings have some big questions to answer this offseason. The most pressing question is whether the Kings can retain guard Malik Monk, who is set to hit unrestricted free agency. The team also needs to think about how to improve the roster—with an eye toward maintaining the defensive improvements from this past season while getting back to 2022-23 form on offense—with free agency options, a late lottery first round pick, and restrictions on its tradable assets.

I’ll dive into what the Kings should look to do.

The Big Picture

To get a lay of the land, I want to set out the big picture overview. The Kings have eleven full-time players on the roster headed into next season and one two-way player. The team’s core is De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray. As of today, some combination of Harrison Barnes, Kevin Huerter, and Keon Ellis will fill out the starting line-up and be core rotation players, with other returning players like Davion Mitchell, Trey Lyles, Chris Duarte, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones likely to fill out the backend of the rotation. They also have two-way player Mason Jones under contract, though he’s less likely to play meaningful minutes.

The Kings also hold the #13 and #45 overall picks in the upcoming 2024 draft, meaning the team could add two new players to the roster.

On the flip side, some meaningful players from last year will not be on the roster barring some action in free agency. Malik Monk, Javale McGee, and Alex Len are slated to be unrestricted free agents (meaning they can sign elsewhere once free agency starts), while Kessler Edwards and two-way players Jordan Ford and Jalen Slawson will enter restricted free agency (meaning the Kings can potentially match offers they get from other teams).

Based on data from Spotrac, with just the players currently on the roster (excluding two-way contracts), the Kings will have just shy of $151.6 million in salary on the books—about $10.6 million above the projected salary cap of $141.0 million. They will, however, be well shy of Spotrac’s projected luxury tax line (est. $171,315,000) as well as the first apron (est. $178,655,000) and second apron (est. $189,486,000).

As an over the cap team, the Kings will have three ways to add to their roster: (1) signing free agents (or re-signing their own free agents) using cap exceptions, (2) drafting players, or (3) trading for players. But the salary cap and luxury tax rules are going to be play a huge role in how the Kings go about roster construction as they think about next season.

I’ve written extensively before on the NBA salary cap, cap exceptions, and how the luxury tax line and aprons work, so I won’t cover them in detail here. That said, at a high level, teams over the luxury tax line get hit with additional taxes for each dollar they go over line (how much varies based on how far over they are and how often they exceed the luxury tax threshold) while teams under the tax can receive substantial payments. HoopsHype estimates that non-tax teams will receive about $11.8 million in payouts from luxury tax teams after the 2023-24 season, so going over the luxury tax line can be costly directly and indirectly. And teams that go over the first apron (or second apron) face increasingly onerous restrictions on the types of roster moves they can make.

Having won 48 and 46 games the last two years with a roster centered around stars Fox and Sabonis, who are both in their physical primes, the Kings are in position to compete now. But they will be (and should be) cognizant of how any off-season moves they make impacts the team’s salary cap/luxury tax situation, and they’ll undoubtedly also be thinking about any impacts on the team’s financial bottom line. They also will have to think about the long-term impacts of the moves they make now. Even as the team looks to be more competitive in the short-term, they also have to be mindful of the team’s medium-term and long-term future.

What should the Kings do first? I’ll start with the obvious.

Re-Sign the Sixth Man!

Of the Kings’ six free agents, one stands out above the rest. The Kings should do all they can to re-sign sixth man Malik Monk.

Monk has been the soul of the Kings bench unit for his two years in Sacramento. In just 26 minutes per game off the bench, Monk averaged 15.4 points and 5.1 assists per game, both career highs, with a solid shooting slash line of 44.3% / 35.0% / 82.9% (percentages for twos / threes / free throws). He also finished second in Sixth Man of the Year voting despite missing virtually all of the Kings’ last 10 games of the season and both play-in games due to an MCL injury (he might have won the award if he’d stayed healthy).

Monk was also one of the team’s very best ball-handlers and the only player on the roster other than Fox who consistently create shots for himself and others. This was readily apparent toward the end of the season as the Kings often struggled to create offense in the half-court against set defenses, especially without Fox on the court. The Kings sorely missed Monk’s ability to run pick-and-rolls with Sabonis and Len, drive the lane, and create space through step-backs, instead having to rely too much on creation from players who were over-extended. Fox already had a full plate offensively. Sabonis and Murray aren’t yet adept at creating shots for themselves. Barnes couldn’t absorb Monk’s shot-creation volume. Without Monk to bolster the offense, the Kings ended up losing several key games down the stretch because they simply couldn’t score enough despite strong defensive performances. The Kings scored 103 points in the game against Dallas where Monk got hurt, and they scored under 110 points against the Knicks, Celtics, Thunder, Suns, and the play-in game versus New Orleans. They ended up losing all those games.

There’s no real question that the Kings players and coaches want to bring Monk back. Star players De’Aaron Fox and Domantas Sabonis made clear how important they think Monk is to the team’s success at the end of the season. Brown called it a “no brainer” that the Kings try to bring Monk back. But whether he returns will ultimately be a decision for Monk and the team’s front office, and that is going to inevitably come down to dollars and options.

Since the Kings will be over the salary cap this off-season, they need to find a cap exception to re-sign Monk. The best exception they can use to re-sign Monk is one of the “Bird rights” exceptions, which generally allow teams to re-sign their own free agents. There are several kinds of Bird rights—Full Bird rights, Early Bird rights, and Non-Bird rights—and they allow teams to re-sign free agents up to different dollar amounts over the cap (to over-simplify, if a player has been under the same contract with the team for longer, they can offer him more money). Monk is wrapping up a two-year contract with the Kings after signing as a free agent in 2022, so the team holds his Early Bird rights. As a result, even though the Kings are over the salary cap, they can offer Monk a four-year contract with a starting first year salary of up to 175% of his 2023-24 salary with 8% raises per year.

Monk’s 2023-24 salary was about $9.95 million, so the most the Kings can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $78 million total (an average of about $19.5 million per year). [Note: if you’re curious, the actual salary amounts would be 17,405,203 in 2024-25; 18,797,619 in 2025-26, 20,190,035 in 2026-27, and 21,582,451 in 2027-28.]

There’s also no reason Monk and the Kings have to agree to a 4-year deal. The Kings could offer him a two year deal for about $36.2 million or a 2+1 deal (two years plus a player option in year three) for about $56.4 million. These could be attractive for the Kings and Monk, as this sort of deal structure would eventually lead to the Kings having Monk’s Full Bird rights, so they could re-sign him for more money on a future contract, while at the same time giving Monk enough short-term financial security to make a contract renewal palatable. He’d also still be able to re-enter free agency during his prime with either structure. For purposes of this article, I’ll stick with assuming a framework offer from the Kings at 4 years for $78 million because I’m a little skeptical that Monk would forego the certainty of added years.

Making such a big offer for Monk would be a big deal for the Kings. Regardless of whether they do a 4-year deal, a 2-year deal, or 2+1 deal, adding Monk to the 2024-25 roster at $17.4 million would push the Kings’ team salary to about $169.9 million. Combined with the approximately $4.7 million the team will need to sign its first-round pick after the draft, the Kings would be about $3.3 million over the projected luxury tax line of $171.3 million. In that case, the Kings would have to pay almost $5 million in luxury tax. And as a luxury tax payor, the Kings wouldn’t be eligible to receive luxury tax payments from other teams, which in recent years have often been over $10 million. The Kings could effectively end up spending an extra $15 million (or more) in taxes and lost tax revenue to re-sign Monk, on top of Monk’s new salary. In a very real sense, re-signing Monk could cost the team closer to $30 million than Monk’s $17.4 million salary next year.

The Kings could try to avoid the tax by trying to get a smaller deal done with Monk or by trading away another player such as Barnes, Huerter, Lyles, Vezenkov, Duarte, or Mitchell. Either approach involves some risk. If the Kings don’t give Monk the biggest offer they possibly can, they’ll make it more likely he walks in free agency. And if they want to trade away salary, they will have to give up something of value (such as draft capital). By way of example, the Kings had to give up their 2023 first round pick to clear Richaun Holmes’ contract off the books last offseason, creating about $12 million in cap space in the process.

Re-signing Monk could also present issues for the Kings in trying to sign other free agents. As an over-the-cap team, they can only sign free agents with cap exceptions—most notably the midlevel exception (“MLE”) or biannual exception. The MLE, which I’ve written about previously, would allow the Kings to sign players up to about $12.9 million or $5.2 million depending on if the team’s salary is under or above the luxury tax line; the biannual exception, meanwhile, is worth $4.7 million. If re-signing Monk takes the Kings over the luxury tax line, the Kings wouldn’t be able to use the non-taxpayer MLE—they’d be stuck at the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE. And if the Kings use the non-taxpayer MLE or the biannual exception at all, they would trigger the NBA’s hard cap rule, which would restrict them from having a team salary higher than the first apron, which projected to be $178.7 million. That probably doesn’t matter a lot for free agency purposes, but it would affect the Kings’ future trade decisions.

And of course, Monk would have to accept the Kings offer, which isn’t a given.

I’ve seen a lot of NBA free agency watchers claim that it’s unlikely Monk stays, presumably because they think some other team will throw a ton of money at Monk in free agency (this year’s free agency class is generally not considered to be elite). That’s certainly a real possibility, though I think it’s less likely than many people assume, and I want to take a little bit of time to explain why.

Free agency is a two-way market. And while Monk and his agent will certainly shop around for the best deal (as they absolutely should), the market this year is likely not going to have a ton of potential bidders for his services.

According to Spotrac, only seven teams are projected to have cap space this offseason. The other 23 teams, including the Kings, are all probably limited to using salary cap exceptions to sign free agents unless they make major changes to their rosters to create meaningful cap space (and remember, getting salary off the books often comes at a price itself).

For the over-the-cap teams, the biggest cap exception they can use to sign Monk is the Non-taxpayer MLE, which is projected to be about $12.9 million and can be used for contracts up to 4 years, with up to 5% annual raises. In other words, the most such teams can offer Monk is a 4-year deal worth about $55.7 million. That’s substantially less than the Kings can offer him, and it’s even well below what the Kings could offer Monk while staying below the luxury tax. This built-in advantage for the Kings is by design, as the NBA CBA gives teams advantages in re-signing their own free agents in the form of Bird rights. Obviously, teams without cap space could make moves to clear up room to sign Monk, but clearing $15+ million in cap space isn’t all that easy to do and it usually involves giving up valuable draft picks. It’s hard to envision over-the-cap teams making such big swings to sign Monk, who is a really good player but not necessarily a set-it-and-forget-it starter for every team.

What about the other seven teams with cap space? Well, some are obvious potential suitors for Monk—but it’s fewer than you might think for a variety of reasons. We’ll go through each of them below.

Detroit Pistons

[up to $64.4 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Pistons can easily create enough cap room to make an offer to Monk that exceeds 4 years/$78 million, but there’s a serious question as to whether they would make a push for him. To get the space, the Pistons could free up over $50 million in cap space by renouncing some their free agency rights over several players. The Pistons will likely match offers for restricted free agent Simone Fontecchio, and the Pistons may want to hold onto a flier in James Wiseman, who still has potential at just 22 years old despite the very rocky start to his career, but they can easily do both of those things and still free up enough cap space to make a big offer for Monk if they want to.

But fit questions could slow Detroit down. The Pistons have three young guards who need the ball to develop in Cade Cunningham, Jaden Ivey, and Marcus Sasser. While Monk would provide them additional outside shooting, the Pistons wouldn’t be able to develop their young guards and fully utilize Monk’s shot creation and burgeoning pick and roll game. They’re also not particularly close to competing, so paying up for Monk, whose skillset overlaps a lot with guys they need to play a lot, isn’t a particularly effective use of cap space. It’s not obvious that the Pistons would want to use their cap space on a player whose skillset is duplicative of what they already have when they could either keep the space or use on alternative free agency options like wing players or off-ball shooters (there are other free agency options with better three point percentages than Monk like Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., or even Klay Thompson).

Philadephia 76ers

[up to $55.5 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Sixers could theoretically create over $60 million in cap room this offseason by renouncing all of their free agents and making a few ancillary moves. They’d effectively be rolling forward with a roster of just Joel Embiid, Tyrese Maxey, whoever they can sign in free agency, and minimum guys, but it’s certainly possible. The thing is, if the Sixers choose to go that route, they’re also very clearly signaling that they are going after a top tier free agent—the biggest names being Paul George and (theoretically) LeBron James. They’re not clearly that space to target Monk. It’s hard to imagine the Sixers letting all their rotation guys walk with the goal of adding Monk, whose pairing with Maxey is arguably duplicative anyway. The Sixers could split up their cap space among multiple players and go after Monk at $20 million+ per year, but that’s far from an obvious move for them.

Utah Jazz

[up to $38.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Per Spotrac, the Jazz can create about $38 million in cap space, principally by moving on from Kira Lewis Jr. and Talen Horton-Tucker. The real question is why they would clear that space for Monk. The Jazz already have Collin Sexton, Keyonte George, and Jordan Clarkson on the roster, all of whom share similar skillsets with Monk as score-first small guards. The Jazz also need to consider how to save money to pay Lauri Markannen, who will become a free agent after the 2024-25 season if he’s not extended or traded first. Monk doesn’t fill an obvious need for them.

Oklahoma City Thunder

[up to $35.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Thunder are deep into the playoffs and could make the Finals this season, but amazingly they still have a lot of cap flexibility. They can create over $35 million in cap space (per Spotrac) this offseason if they want to without losing any of their core players. But they’re unlikely to be bidders for Monk as they already have capable primary ball handlers in Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Jalen Williams, plus quality 3-D guards like Lu Dort, Cason Wallace, and Isaiah Joe. If they clear cap space or deal Josh Giddey, the Thunder are likely to target a bigger fish than Monk or someone who can bolster their front court and rebounding, which have been issues for them against the Mavs.

Orlando Magic

[up to $25.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

Spotrac projects the Magic to have over $25 million in cap space this offseason, but they can easily push that number up over $35 million by renouncing their free agency rights to non-core rotation players like Markelle Fultz and Gary Harris. They could also free up even more money by letting more important role-players like Jonathan Isaac ($17.4 million), Mo Wagner ($8 million), and Joe Ingles ($11 million) walk. In fact, they can theoretically create over $55 million in cap space if they want to, though it’s pretty unlikely they actually let Isaac in particular move on, so that’s a bit of a fake number. Regardless, it’s meaningful cap space. And the Magic have a clear and obvious need for shooting and ball-handling.

The net result is that the Magic are a serious player in the bidding for Monk next season—and they may be his best bet for a huge contract.

The big questions are how much the Magic want to shake up their roster to create cap space and whether they want to use that cap space to out-bid the Kings for Monk rather than on other free agents. They’ve already been linked to Klay Thompson, who presumably would only leave the Warriors for a significant salary. They also already have Cole Anthony on the roster, who profiles similarly to Monk as a score-first guard with solid-but-not-spectacular shooting, playmaking skills, and below average defense. They could also look at other alternatives to paying up for Monk in free agency, including players who can offer shooting (Buddy Hield, Gary Trent Jr., Malik Beasley), scoring (D’Angelo Russell, Demar Derozan, Alec Burks), and ball handling (Tyus Jones, Monte Morris). And there’s always the trade market.

I could absolutely see the Magic targeting Monk in free agency, and if they want him, they have the firepower to make him a bigger offer than the Kings can. If they throw $20-25 million at Monk per season, that will probably be enough to get him. But given the many options they have on the table, it’s hard to see the Magic dramatically over-paying for Monk’s services—if they’re going to overpay, they’ll probably target somebody higher in the NBA player hierarchy. But they are the team to watch most closely for the Kings.

San Antonio Spurs

[up to $21.3 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Spurs can also create a meaningful amount of cap space and need to get some help at guard. Assuming they keep their two first round picks this year and let their free agents walk, they would only have about $7.2 million in cap space, but they can free up another $18 million by letting go of Devonte Graham ($12.7 million), Julian Champagnie ($3 million), and Charles Bassey ($2.5 million), which would give them over $25 million in cap space.

The Spurs have a decent pass-first point guard on the roster in Tre Jones, but rumors are swirling that they want to pair phenom Victor Wembanyama with better perimeter play. Monk could certainly be an option for them, but are they really willing to give him a 4-year deal at $20 million+ per year? Certainly Wemby could make up for Monk’s defensive limitations, but the same could be said for superior offensive players who could become available like Trae Young or Anfernee Simons, both of whom could be obtainable on the trade market. The Spurs also have the #4 and #8 picks in the upcoming draft, so they’ll have at least a chance to add a guard like Nikola Topic, Rob Dillingham, or Reed Sheppard if they want to.

While the Spurs could theoretically make a push for Monk, it’s hard to see them paying up for him when they already have Jones on the roster, they have options in the draft this year, and they can go add a star via trade if they want to. They are probably second to the Magic in terms of potential Monk suitors, but they also have a ton of flexibility and don’t need to rush into getting Monk when better players could become available down the line.

Charlotte Hornets

[up to $5.2 million in projected cap space per Spotrac]

The Hornets are the last team with projected cap space this offseason and they’re basically not in play for Monk. If they keep their free agency rights over Miles Bridges (which seems inevitable, given they didn’t trade him at the deadline this year) and their #6 draft pick, they’ll have only about $8.4 million in cap space—not enough to get into the bidding for Monk. They may even choose to operate as an over-the-cap team, in which case they’d be limited to giving Monk the Non-taxpayer MLE.

Toronto Raptors

The Raptors are likely to operate as an over-the-cap team, but I want to talk about them briefly because they are the only over-the-cap team that could reasonably make enough room to sign Monk to a big deal without having to totally overhaul their roster.

Toronto has $117.7 million in team salary next year. With a $27.8 million cap hold for Gary Trent Jr. and a $12.5 million cap hold for Immanuel Quickley, they are over the cap (they also have a random assortment of other free agent cap holds, but none are really for critical players). In theory, by (A) renouncing their Bird rights for Trent Jr. and their other free agents, excluding Quickley, (B) declining their team option for Bruce Brown Jr. ($23 million in salary), and (C) letting go of Javon Freeman-Liberty ($1.8 million in salary), Toronto can free up about $30 million in cap space. That would be more than enough to sign Monk.

That’s a pretty enormous opportunity cost to sign Monk, whose skillset overlaps with a player Toronto just traded for in Immanuel Quickley. Presumably Toronto likes Quickley more than Monk, otherwise OG Anunoby might be on the Kings right now. Also, giving up Bruce Brown Jr. in particular seems quite costly—Brown can be an effective player on a playoff team (he won a title with Denver in 2023), he’s got an expiring deal, and his salary would be useful as a trade chip and in salary matching if needed. It seems unlikely Toronto would give up all that for Monk when they could find a true point guard or floor spacer elsewhere in the free agency market.

So what does that all mean?

It all boils down to a pretty simple reality: Monk probably won’t have a ton of suitors in free agency. Aside from Sacramento, there’s a good chance only 1 or 2 teams show serious interest in Monk, at least at salaries in the $15-25 million range. If the Magic or Spurs decide to go another direction—and there are lots of options for them in free agency and the trade market—it’s possible Monk doesn’t end up with the frothy free agency market that many people seem to assume. The Kings should know this, Monk’s agent should know this, and other potential bidders like the Magic and the Spurs should know this. As a result, it’s hard to see anyone coming in over the top with a “blow out the competition” style offer.

Of course, if Monk gets an offer above the 4-year/$78 million contract the Kings can offer, there’s a good chance he takes it. Nobody should blame him either—he’s a free agent, and he’s absolutely earned the right to pick his destination and maximize his earnings. But Monk himself has said “I can go somewhere else with a lot more money and be in a worse situation,” so he’s going to think about the decision from at least a few different angles.

There’s one other thing I want to address.

It’s also possible the 4 years/$78 million the Kings can offer as actually above market for a player like Monk. Grayson Allen just signed for 4 years and $70 million to stay with the Suns. You can quibble about which player is better (Monk is the better ball handler and one-on-one scorer, but Allen shoots better from three and is a better defender), but it’s hard to argue that Monk and Allen are in different tiers as players. And while you can never assume one deal sets the market, obviously Allen and his representatives didn’t think he was going to see a ton more money if he hit free agency, otherwise he wouldn’t have signed the deal when he did.

You can also look at the list below of guard contracts/extensions signed in the last couple of years to get a better sense of where Monk’s eventual deal may fall. What jumps out is that only six deals (in red) have average annual salaries higher than the $19.5 million per year the Kings can offer.

• Dejounte Murray - 4 years, $114.1 million (starting in 2024)

• Devin Vassell - 5 years, $135 million (starting in 2024)

• Jalen Brunson - 4 years, $104 million (starting in 2022)

• Anfernee Simons - 4 years, $100 million (starting in 2022)

• Terry Rozier - 4 years, $96.3 million (starting in 2022)

• Josh Hart - 4 years, $80.9 million (starting in 2023)

• [Theoretical Kings Offer for Monk - 4 years, $78 million]

• Marcus Smart - 4 years, $76.5 million (starting in 2022)

• Keldon Johnson - 4 years, $74 million (starting in 2023)

• D’Angelo Russell - 2 years, $36 million (starting in 2023)

• Grayson Allen - 4 years, $70 million (starting in 2024)

• Bogdan Bogdanovic - 4 years, $68 million (starting in 2023)

• Lu Dort - 5 years, $82 million (starting in 2022)

• Caris Lavert - 2 years, $32 million (starting in 2023)

• Max Strus - 4 years, $62.3 million (starting in 2023)

• Kentavious Caldwell-Pope - 2 years, $30.1 million (starting in 2023)

• Tyus Jones - 2 years, $29 million (starting in 2023)

• Jordan Clarkson - 2 years, $28.4 million (starting in 2024)

• Josh Green - 3 years, $41 million (starting in 2024)

• Austin Reaves - 3 years, $53.8 million (starting in 2023)

• Cole Anthony - 3 years, $39.1 million (starting in 2024)

There are different circumstances for each of the contracts above, but the message is pretty clear—a lot of scoring guards on the starter/sixth man line aren’t getting contracts worth $19.5 million per season or that even go 4 years. With a potentially thin list of bidders, you have to wonder how likely it is that Monk ends up getting offers toward the top of the list.

The Kings can negotiate a new deal with Monk starting the day after the NBA Finals (June 24 at the latest). Monk can start negotiating with other teams on June 30. We’ll have to wait and see, but at least for now there’s good vibes.

What About the Other Kings Free Agents?

Of the Kings remaining free agents, Kessler Edwards and Alex Len should warrant a re-signing look, but it depends a lot on cost and what the Kings do elsewhere in free agency and the draft. I also expect the Kings to sign Jalen Slawson to another two-way contract.

The two remaining free agents—Javale McGee and Jordan Ford (two-way)—aren’t as likely to be back with the team. McGee pretty much lost the backup minutes to Len and will turn 37 next year; McGee theoretically could come back on a minimum deal, but there’s a good chance he’s replaced. Ford won’t be eligible for another two-way contract next year because he’ll be past his fourth NBA season, and he’s not likely to make the NBA roster.

Kessler Edwards

Edwards is a restricted free agent, meaning the Kings will have the chance to match competing offers for him from other teams (assuming they give him a small qualifying offer, which is likely). Edwards still has some intriguing upside as a 3-and-D wing. He’s only 23 years old and has great physical attributes (6’8”, 215 pounds, solid athleticism). He’s also flashed quality defense for stretches and posted decent, though slightly below average, three-point shooting numbers (35% last year on limited volume).

If the Kings re-sign Monk, keeping Edwards could get expensive because of the luxury tax. It’s hard to say exactly what he’d be offered by another team, but it’s unlikely to be much—most RFAs never get offer sheets from other teams, and Edwards really hasn’t done enough in the NBA to warrant another team offering him anything substantial. Still, if Monk is back and the Kings are flirting with the second apron, there’s a decent chance Edwards would end up a cap casualty if he’s offered anything much over the minimum by another team.

If the Kings don’t re-sign Monk, they have a bit more leeway. In that case, they could reasonably match offers for Edwards for a bit more money—think something in the $2-5 million range per season, probably on a 2- or 3-year deal. Anything beyond that starts to get expensive for a back-end rotation player that you’re hoping will develop.

Alex Len

There’s no real question at this point what Alex Len’s role in the NBA is—he’s a reasonable backup center option who has limitations on offense and in handling pick and rolls. He’s probably a minimum player, but he can contribute in that role. Regardless of whether the Kings re-sign Monk, someone needs to fill the backup center role on the roster. If the Kings don’t draft a reasonable back-up center option, Len can fill that role fine for his relatively low cost. And because finding a better backup center than Len in free agency is likely an expensive proposition, I wouldn’t expect the Kings to look at pricier options if they do end up re-signing Monk, even though they could theoretically offer free agents contracts worth up to the midlevel exception or bi-annual exception.

Ultimately, I think there’s a good chance Len is back with the Kings next season. He’s unlikely to get big money elsewhere, so unless he’s offered a clearly better opportunity to play elsewhere, the Kings are probably a good fit.

Jalen Slawson

Slawson is one of the Kings’ two second round picks from last season, as he was selected #54 overall out of Furman. He spent the 2023-24 season on a two-way contract with the Kings and spent most of the year playing for the G League Stockton Kings (he only played 37 minutes across 12 games with the NBA squad). Slawson is again eligible for a two-way contract, so it’s likely the Kings bring him back on another deal.

Find Help In the 2024 Draft, But Where Depends on Monk

The 2024 NBA draft will take place on June 27, less than a week after the Finals end and, importantly, after the Kings can start negotiating a new deal with Malik Monk. As a result, the Kings should have at least some indication of whether Monk is likely to re-sign or not by the time draft night rolls around, though they may not know for sure.

The final draft order is now set and the Kings will be picking twice at #13 (first round) and #45 (second round). What the Kings do with those picks—especially the valuable first rounder—will depend heavily on what happens with Monk.

[Note: It’s also worth flagging that the Kings have a cap hold for the #13 pick—basically a CBA-mandated placeholder for the eventual salary the player will earn (there aren’t mandated cap holds for second round picks). So, the Kings will have to carry a cap charge of about $4.7 million until they actually draft and sign the 13th pick. It’ll come up later.]

If Monk Re-Signs, The Kings Should Focus on Forwards at Pick #13

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, the Kings will have credible ball-handling and scoring support for lead-guard De’Aaron Fox in the backcourt already. They’ll also have decent shooting (Kevin Huerter) and defensive versatility (Keon Ellis and Davion Mitchell). In that scenario, the Kings biggest need would be to find help at power forward or small forward.

Harrison Barnes has been a reliable starter for the Kings since arriving by trade in 2018, but he will be 32 next season and he is not the perfect fit as the team’s starting power forward. While Barnes is a very strong shooter and capable scorer (including off the dribble), he’s been an imperfect fit with Sabonis on the defensive end. Barnes is undersized as 4 and provides limited rebounding and almost no rim protection. He also doesn’t have the quickness, athleticism, or length to stay with forwards who can play on the perimeter or athletic rim runners. In all, it makes for a tough pairing with Sabonis defensively because they can both struggle with similar types of players and can’t rely too much on the other for help.

Drafting a younger, more athletic player to bolster the power forward slot would be nice for the Kings, whether Barnes comes off the bench or not. Without going into detail on draft prospects, there are several players who could fit the role likely to be available at pick #13 in Tristan Da Silva (Colorado), Tidjane Salaun (France), Tyler Smith (G League Ignite), and DaRon Holmes (Dayton). None of them are perfect prospects, but they’d provide help athletically without totally compromising shooting.

The Kings could also look to draft help on the wing at small forward. Keegan Murray has a firm hold on the starting 3 position, but the Kings could use depth behind him. Fox, Monk, Ellis, and Mitchell are all undersized to truly guard wings, and Huerter, not a particularly strong defensive presence to begin with, too often plays than his 6’7” size. Again, there should be a number of options in the draft for support at pick #13, including Da Silva, his college teammate Cody Williams (Colorado), and Dalton Knecht (Tennessee). There could also be options available at the Kings second round pick, though they may have to move up a bit and it’s always risky to project those players as contributors: for example, Ryan Dunn (Virginia), Dillon Jones (Weber State), Baylor Scheierman (Creighton), Alex Karaban (Connecticut).

If Monk Leaves, the Kings Should Also Look for Perimeter Scoring

Losing Monk would be tough for the Kings offensively, as the end of the season showed pretty clearly. They’re unlikely to find a player who can contribute at Monk’s level right away at pick #13, but there are a handful of players who can provide some scoring punch. While the Kings would still have needs at power forward and small forward (and it would be fair to draft those positions even if Monk leaves), finding more perimeter scoring punch and ball-handling would become a bigger team need without Monk.

By pick #13, I’m assuming that top options like Stephon Castle (Connecticut), Nikola Topic (International), Reed Sheppard (Kentucky), and Rob Dillingham (Kentucky) will be off the board. Obviously one of them could fall (don’t forget Tyrese Haliburton dropped way further than expected in the 2020 draft before the Kings picked him at #12), but I’m not banking on it. Still, several guards should be available that can bring scoring, shooting, or defense at varying levels.

Several freshmen—Jared McCain (Duke), Isaiah Collier (USC), and Ja’Kobe Walter (Baylor)—and junior Devin Carter (Providence) could still be on the board by the time the Kings pick. Each brings a slightly different flavor of player, but they’re all capable scorers. McCain, a Sacramento native, can really shoot the ball and scored effectively for a solid Duke team last year, but he has some size limitations. Collier has scoring chops and stellar physical traits for a point guard (he’s 6’5”, 210 pounds), but his shooting was inconsistent, and he had a fair number of defensive lapses. Walter also has a good physical profile and looks to be a quality scorer, but he was a little inconsistent and doesn’t offer much ball-handling right now. Carter is older than the others, but he was more productive last season and plays hounding defense despite being just 6’3”; but he had an outlier year from 3-point range last year, hitting 37.7% from deep, so it’s unclear whether his shooting will sustain going forward.

All these guys (and a few other options) could be solid picks if Monk is on the team, as they could help take some pressure off of Fox to score and handle the ball. Without Monk on the roster, they’d have a pretty clear role on the team.

Finding Free Agency Fits

The Kings will be looking to the free agency market to bolster the roster, but who they can target will be hugely impacted by whether Monk re-signs or leaves. They’ll also need to consider draft strategy and other re-signings like Len and Kessler Edwards before solidifying a free agency strategy. The trade market is a little distinct, but it’s also going to affect how the Kings address free agency generally.

For this post, I want to focus on strategy and the Kings needs rather than specific free agency targets.

Let’s start with laying out what I see as the most significant team needs (before re-signing any of the Kings own free agents and before the draft). The below are in no particular order:

1. Secondary ball-handling

2. Secondary shot creation / one-on-one scoring

3. Additional wing defense and rebounding

4. Improved rebounding, defense, and rim protection at power forward

5. Backup center minutes

Ideally, the Kings can find all of that without compromising too much shooting.

But what should the Kings’ strategy be? As I’ve mentioned, that largely depends on what happens with Monk.

What If Monk Re-Signs?

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they will basically have addressed their secondary ball-handling and shot creation needs (#1 and #2 from the list above). As I’ve talked about already, this would be financially expensive and likely push the Kings into the luxury tax if they can’t move off another player—but that’s something most teams must do to compete meaningfully in the playoffs.

But re-signing Monk would have a huge impact on how the Kings can play the rest of the free agency market. You have to know some of the cap rules to understand why.

Over-the-cap teams like the Kings can only sign players using cap exceptions. While the Kings can re-sign their own players with Bird rights, the midlevel exception (or MLE) and biannual exception are the two primary ways they can sign other free agents to the roster.

Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Non-taxpayer MLE to sign one or more players to contracts with starting salaries worth up to about $12.9 million (projected) in total. Teams below the luxury tax line can use the Taxpayer MLE, which is similar but projected to worth only about $5.2 million. But whether the Kings are in the luxury tax won’t be assessed until the end of next season. As a result, they can technically still use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE even though re-signing Monk and signing the #13 pick would put their team salary above the projected luxury tax line. If this seems like a loophole, that’s because it is, and it’s one the NBA CBA has already addressed. Thus, under the CBA, if the Kings were to use more than the Taxpayer MLE (e.g., more than $5.2 million) to sign players, they would trigger the hard cap rules, which prohibits the team’s total team salary from exceeding the first apron, projected to be about $178.6 million. Unlike the regular NBA salary cap, there are no exceptions to the hard cap—the Kings wouldn’t be allowed to exceed $178.6 million in team salary.

The bi-annual exception can also be used every other year to sign free agents. It’s a smaller exception, projected to be worth around $4.7 million, and it’s only available to teams below the first apron.

For simplicity, you can refer to the chart below, which lists the exceptions and how the Kings could trigger the hard cap (they could also trigger the hard cap through trades, but that’s not relevant for now):

[Projections from Spotrac]

I’ll also list the salary cap, luxury tax, and aprons for easy reference:

[Projections from Spotrac]

So, the net effect of re-signing Monk would mean the Kings have a few options for other free agents:

• Option 1: Use the Non-taxpayer MLE and/or Biannual Exception to sign free agents, but trigger the hard cap at the first apron, OR

• Option 2: Use only the Taxpayer MLE to sign free agents

Option 1 would give the Kings a chance to bring in better free agents in theory. They’d have a bigger exception to use (up to $12.9 million for a player) and more exceptions available. But because they would be triggering the hard cap, their team salary couldn’t go above $178.7 million, and they’d already be dangerously close with just their current roster, plus Monk at $17.4 million, and their first-round pick—their team salary would be about $173.6 million from those things alone. In other words, even though they would have access to the bigger exceptions, they wouldn’t have a practical way to actually use those exceptions without trading away someone on the roster—potentially important role players Davion Mitchell or Trey Lyles, or even bigger salaries for players like Harrison Barnes or Kevin Huerter. Using Option 1 would also restrict the Kings in other ways. Most meaningfully, they couldn’t take back more than 100% of the salary they send out in a trade—in other words, they couldn’t take advantage of the typical salary matching rules (which I’ve written about before).

Option 2 would be less restrictive, since it wouldn’t trigger the hard cap (the Kings could still theoretically trigger the hard cap with trades), and the Kings probably wouldn’t have to trade any existing players away to maintain flexibility. But the most they could pay a free agent in starting salary would be $5.2 million—probably not enough to lure a significant free agent.

If the Kings can re-sign Monk, they are practically going to be stuck with Option 2 unless they also make a salary cutting trade.

Monk would address needs #1 (secondary ball handling) and #2 (secondary shot creation), and they could re-sign Len to address need #5 (backup center). The team could use its draft picks and the $5.2 million taxpayer MLE to try to address issue #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding).

I won’t go into detail on free agency targets for needs #3 and #4, but some players I wouldn’t mind considering that could be available for the Taxpayer MLE are below (unfortunately, none are really game changers):

• Royce O’Neale (he may be too expensive)

• Gordon Hayward

• Jae Crowder

• PJ Tucker

• Kyle Anderson

• Jeff Green

• Taurean Prince

What If Monk Leaves?

Monk leaving in free agency means more needs to fill, but the Kings have a bit more flexibility in who they can target.

Specifically, the Kings will likely be able to use the larger Non-taxpayer MLE and the Biannual exception without worrying about the hard cap. Their team salary would only be about $156.2 million, far enough away from the first apron that triggering the hard cap wouldn’t be a practical concern.

Of course, with Monk out the door, the Kings would have to address all five of the needs I listed before: #1 (secondary ball handling); #2 (secondary shot creation); #3 (wing defense/rebounding); #4 (power forward defense/rebounding); and #5 (backup center). They could still probably re-sign Alex Len to address need #5, but the other four needs would need to be addressed.

With the Biannual exception, the Kings could basically target the same list of players as they could for the Taxpayer MLE. After all, the exceptions are only about $500,000 apart, and most free agent targets in that range won’t have a ton of high-salary options. But they could also try to use the Biannual exception to address other needs like #1 (secondary ball handling) or #2 (secondary shot creation) with players like Reggie Jackson, Spencer Dinwiddie, or Kris Dunn.

The Non-taxpayer MLE would also open up a host of potential free agency options, as the team could look at players who will command much larger starting salaries (up to $12.9 million). This is particularly important to addressing needs #3 (wing defense/rebounding) and #4 (power forward defense/rebounding), as those needs might be harder to fill in the draft or with the smaller Taxpayer MLE. A couple players who could be get-able with the Non-taxpayer MLE stand out as particularly good fits for the Kings.

Naji Marshall. Marshall is an unrestricted free agent and the Pelicans are looking to tamp down salary, so he probably won’t get a huge offer to return to New Orleans. He’s a good defender who can hold up on the wing and has the size and strength to play minutes at power forward. If his improved shooting (38.7% from three this year, the highest of his career) is real, he would be a solid addition to the Kings’ front court. It’s possible Marshall will sign a deal worth less than the full Non-taxpayer MLE, which would be a nice get.

Obi Toppin. Toppin is a solid modern power forward option. He’s competent defensively and his size/length/athleticism would make him a better defensive alternative to Barnes for rim protection and on the glass. He’s also more switchable. He’s a more proven shooter than Marshall, but he also set a career high this year by hitting 40.3% of his threes—which would be stellar if it sticks. Unlike Marshall, Toppin is a restricted free agent. The Pacers would get 24 hours to match any offer the made to him, which means the Kings would be in limbo for a bit at the start of free agency while they wait and see if the Pacers match. That’s a serious risk, as the Pacers might well consider Toppin good enough to warrant matching a contract worth the full Non-taxpayer MLE or more. I’d love to have him on the Kings, but going after him is a bit risky.

There are also a bunch of other potential free agents who may be get-able with the Non-Taxpayer MLE. These include wing options like Nic Batum, Kelly Oubre, Robert Covington, and Royce O’Neale (who may sign for less); guards like De’Anthony Melton, Markelle Fultz, and Malik Beasley; and even some bigs like Isaiah Hartenstein (probably not worth the cost), Jalen Smith, and Mason Plummer. For the Non-taxpayer MLE, I’d advocate focusing on wings, but the Kings would have options.

Be Opportunistic with Trades

The Kings don’t have the biggest war-chest of any team on the trade market, but they’ve held on to enough future draft assets and tradable contracts that they can throw a competitive bid in if the right deal comes along. The Kings owe the Hawks a top 12-protected first round pick in 2025 (which rolls over to top 10-protected in 2026 if it doesn’t convey), but they otherwise control all their own first rounders. I’ve written in detail about the rules governing trades for first round picks, but the important thing to keep in mind is the Kings can feasibly trade a bunch of first round picks if they need to (there are details they’d have to iron out, but it’s workable).

If the Kings want to target an All-Star or near All-Star level player, they’ve got the assets to do so—but they will need to be careful to avoid hard-capping themselves and making a future trade more difficult. They could still theoretically do a big trade if they re-sign Monk, but it’s going to be more difficult if they do because of the hard cap.

I’ll probably do a separate post looking at potential trade scenarios in more depth, but I want to quickly lay out some thoughts on a few high-profile trade names that have been floating around recently.

Paul George

Paul George is everyone’s favorite potential trade target right now, given he has a player option for 2024-25 and hasn’t yet agreed to an extension with the Clippers. He would be a near-perfect fit for a lot of teams, including the Kings. He can provide scoring, ball-handling, shooting, and quality defense for positions 1 to 4.

But getting George is going to be insanely expensive in trade for exactly that reason, and it would be tough for the Kings to put together a winning trade package. To get close, the Kings would probably have to give up as many first rounders as they can—2024 on draft night, plus future picks in 2027 (which they would have to free up from the Hawks), 2029, and 2031 to even make a competitive offer. They would also need to send out Huerter, Barnes, and another player to make the salary match. It’s also a given that the Clippers would ask for Keegan Murray back, although the Kings shouldn’t be willing to trade him away if they’re also sending meaningful draft pick compensation.

On top of the outgoing picks and players, trading for George is practically going to require giving him a max extension that would cover him into his late thirties. The details of the contract are subject to projections and some nuance based on what George actually wants and something called the Over 38 rule, but most likely the Kings would be signing up to pay George over $200 million for the next four seasons at a minimum (as a 10 year veteran, George can get sign a max contract with a starting salary of up to 35% of the salary cap in the first year, just over $49.3 million). That’s real money, but it’s basically table-stakes to get George interested in a deal—the whole reason he hasn’t re-signed with the Clippers yet is because they haven’t offered him that contractual certainty.

In terms of draft capital and dollars, bringing in a player of George’s caliber could be worth it—especially if it allows the Kings to compete for a championship. But it’s an enormous risk for an aging player, and you have to wonder if George is good enough to make that kind of all-in play worthwhile.

Brandon Ingram

The Pelicans are reportedly putting Brandon Ingram on the market. He’s going into the last year of his current contract and slated to make $36 million in 2024-25, so just like with Paul George, any team looking to acquire him should plan to offer him a lucrative new deal quickly.

Even though he is only 26 years old, Ingram is heading into his eighth season in the NBA. He’s been an All Star once before, and throughout his five seasons in New Orleans, he’s put up near-All Star level numbers. Given his age, one might expect him to draw more trade interest than Paul George, but he’s not quite the same seamless fit as George for most teams (the Kings included). On the offensive end, Ingram is a good scorer who can create his own shots, score at all three levels, and distribute effectively when he needs to. But he’s not the same level of knock-down three point shooter that George is, and at times his shot diet can weight a little too much toward midrange shots and isolations. And defensively, Ingram is just a bit above average—he doesn’t provide the same elite wing defense that a player like George can. Ingram also has a pretty consistent injury track record lately, as he’s played 65 games or more only once in his career as a rookie (for the record, George has had plenty of injuries too).

Still, Ingram is likely to attract a fair amount of interest if he’s really on the trade block, and it won’t be cheap to acquire him. The package of four first round picks that the Kings would need to give up for George would likely be too much for Ingram, but the price could get close. New Orleans may also be unwilling to take back a lot of salary either, since money is part of the reason they’re looking to move on from Ingram. Would they take back both Huerter and Barnes in a deal to make the salaries match, or would they insist on getting a third team involved?

The Kings could probably absorb the hit of draft picks and matching salary needed to bring in Ingram. He would also fill the team’s need for another scorer and ball handler, while offering better defense on the wing than Huerter or Barnes (he may not fare much better at power forward defensively, but Keegan Murray could guard up if needed). But I'm still wary of taking a swing on Ingram because of how hard it would be on the Kings’ salary cap situation. Ingram won’t be eligible for the same maximum salary as George because he’ll only have 9 years of NBA service by the time his free agency rolls around, which means a max contract for him would be capped at 30% of the salary cap at a projected starting salary of $42.3 million. But he can sign a 5-year extension that carries him through the 2028-29 season, too, for a total contract value of over $245 million. While that’s less dollars per year than George, it’s a longer commitment with even more total dollars. Regardless, it has the same practical effect on the Kings’ long-term cap situation: the team would be above the salary cap, in the luxury tax, and potentially above the first apron (or even the second apron) with Fox, Sabonis, and Ingram on the roster for the foreseeable future.

Fox, Sabonis, Ingram, and Murray would be a solid team for sure. The floor spacing offensively would be a bit worrisome and the team wouldn’t really scare anyone defensively either, but they’d have a ton of weapons and varied skillsets. But is it enough to make this the one big shot they take? If they do make a move for Ingram, it’ll basically lock them into the roster, with little ability to improve on the margins and few future draft picks available to supplement the roster.

Ultimately, a trade for Ingram is something the Kings front office will have to consider, but whether it’s worth it depends a lot on the trade cost in particular. Smaller deals could improve the team and maintain more future flexibility, while waiting to take a big swing on a better fit would also be a viable strategy.

Jerami Grant

Portland is in a seriously rough salary cap situation given the fact that their team isn’t all that close to competing for the playoffs yet. They have four players under contract with over $20 million in salary, and two of them—Jerami Grant and Malcolm Brogan—are over 30. Just a year ago, Portland signed Grant to a 5 year, $160 million deal, so they don’t need to trade him immediately, but they may be willing to part with him for the right price.

From the Kings perspective, Grant would bring helpful length, athleticism, and scoring on the wing. Though he’s only slightly above average in scoring efficiency, Grant does have scoring chops (he’s averaged over 19 points per game for the last four seasons) and shoots it well from deep at over 40% for the last two years. He does a good job of drawing fouls, too. With that said, he’s not as talented of a scorer as George and Ingram, and his defensive impact is often less than you’d expect from an athletic wing with Grant’s length. Per Dunks and Threes, Grant was in the 38th percentile of defenders last season in terms of Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, and he’s posted negative numbers in terms of Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus stat for the last five seasons. His rebounding is also surprisingly lacking—in terms of rebounding rate, he’s less effective than incumbent power forward Harrison Barnes on the glass.

Grant comes with a salary cap charge of $29.8 million next year, so if the Kings take him on, they’ll likely be in the luxury tax (especially if they can re-sign Monk). But because the Kings would have to send out matching salary (probably in the form of Barnes and Huerter), they can find ways to avoid the hard cap and stay below the first apron. That makes Grant a bit more attractive as a trade candidate compared to George and Ingram since the lower contract value is useful for the team’s roster construction.

But Grant may not really move the needle much at all. Adding Grant would give the Kings’ secondary scoring and a slight defensive improvement on the wing, but it wouldn’t really help with rebounding or ball handling.

If Portland is looking for a couple first rounders for Grant, the Kings ought to consider whether he’s worth the price. I would personally look to other options for that level of compensation, especially given the Kings would probably have to ship out Barnes and Huerter, but there’s at least a solid argument for snagging Grant at that price. But if Portland has an asking price is any higher, it’s not an obvious win—it would make more sense to hold onto the draft equity for the future.

Wrap Up

That’s all I’ve got for this round. I will try to take a deeper look at individual draft targets, free agency targets, and trade candidates down the line. Let me know if you want to hear about anyone in particular!

Mitigating the Loss of Monk and Huerter

[Basketball News]

With only 7 games left for the Kings, we’re coming up on the home stretch of the NBA season. The last couple weeks have featured some injury tough breaks for the Kings. After getting injured in a game against the Memphis Grizzlies, news broke last Friday that starting shooting guard Kevin Huerter will undergo season-ending shoulder surgery. Just a few hours later, the anchor of Sacramento’s bench unit and leading candidate for Sixth Man of the Year Malik Monk limped off the court after Luka Doncic awkwardly fell into him. Reports are that Monk will miss 4-6 weeks, meaning the earliest that he could feasibly come back is part-way through the first round of the NBA playoffs.

Spring injuries in the NBA are bad for any team, but they’re particularly consequential for a Kings team that is fighting for a top-6 seed—a task made more difficult by losing twice to the Dallas Mavericks last week (losing Monk early in last Friday’s game was a key reason the Kings lost).

The Monk and Huerter injuries leave the Kings without two critical rotation pieces—Huerter and Monk are 5th and 6th on the team in minutes per game—and with significant questions at guard.

Prior to getting hurt, Monk was in the midst of his best NBA season. According to Basketball Reference, Monk averaged 15.4 points, 5.1 assists, and 2.9 rebounds over 26.0 minutes per game, while posting respectable shooting numbers (44.3% from the field, 35.0% from three, 82.9% from the line). Despite slightly-below-average three point shooting, Monk’s 11.0 three point attempts per 100 possessions made him a critical space generator for the Kings. Monk had also become the team’s de facto backup point guard by developing a more robust passing game and building a strong pick and roll rapport with Kings centers Domantas Sabonis and Alex Len to go along with his penchant for scoring. In fact, amongst players with 100+ minutes played, Monk was second on the team in points per 100 possessions (28.8) and assists per 100 possessions (9.6). While Monk can get a little loose with the ball (2.1 turnovers per game), his ability to serve as a primary ball handler has given the Kings needed offensive versatility, and it has kept Monk on the court in late-game situations, where he ranks second on the team in fourth quarter scoring (behind Fox) and leads the team in clutch net rating per NBA.com.

Huerter has also been an important offensive weapon for the Kings, even though he’s had a down year compared to last season. Before being sidelined, Huerter averaged 10.2 points, 3.5 rebounds, and 2.6 assists in just under per game, with his most important contributions coming as a floor spacer. Among the Kings rotation players, Huerter ranked third in three point attempts per 100 possessions (10.6), just behind Monk and Sasha Vezenkov. While his percentage slipped to just 36.2% from three this year, teams still were wary of Huerter’s three point shooting. Huerter, Monk, and Keegan Murray were also the perimeter players most likely to run dribble handoffs (DHOs) with Sabonis, which has become a staple of the Kings offense over the last two years.

Losing Monk and Huerter at the same time has pretty huge implications for the Kings. If the Kings tried to simply replace Monk’s and Huerter’s contributions, the task would be daunting: they would have to replace over 25 points per game and about 50 minutes played per game, find a way to fill the backup point guard role, find a way to manufacture over 21 threes per 100 possessions, and figure out who will be on the floor in crunch time alongside the regular crew of Fox, Sabonis, Murray, and Harrison Barnes.

That’s basically impossible given the Kings current roster.

But hope isn’t totally lost despite that! Rather than trying to re-create the same kind production that Monk and Huerter provided, the Kings have had to shift their identity. They can’t score as prolifically without Monk and Huerter, so instead they’ve had to lean into a new identity centered around perimeter defense and transition buckets.

So far, the results are encouraging. We’re seeing better defense overall, which has made up for some of the offensive drop-off. Similarly, the Kings’ defensive improvement—particularly with respect to generating turnovers and better shot contests—has allowed them to get out in transition, a good way to mitigate some of the impact from losing Monk and Huerter on the offense. If the Kings can improve their defense on ball screens, they may have a chance to weather losing two of their best guards late in the season.

Dialing Up the Perimeter Defense

Since Kevin Huerter got hurt on March 18, the Kings have dialed up their defensive intensity on the perimeter. During that stretch, the Kings have posted a defensive rating of 110.1 (9th in the NBA), compared to their season-long defensive rating of 115.0 (17th), per NBA.com.

A huge part of that defensive jump comes from swapping Keon Ellis in for Huerter as a starter. Ellis shines on defense. According to Dunks and Threes, Ellis’s Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus (DEPM) of 1.9 ranks in the 93rd percentile across the entire NBA—and tops on the Kings. Compare that to Huerter, whose DEPM was just -1.2 (27th percentile league wide).

With Ellis playing alongside Fox and Murray, the Kings have been able to play above-average defenders at every perimeter position (Fox’s DEPM is 1.3, in the 86th percentile while Murray’s DEPM is 1.4, in the 87th percentile).

Monk’s injury has also led the Kings to play backup point guard Davion Mitchell more over the last few games. Mitchell’s defense hasn’t been as impressive in terms of DEPM this season (his -1.3 DEPM ranks in the 23rd percentile), but historically he has been a strong defensive contributor—especially in terms of on-ball defense. Over the last two seasons, Mitchell has posted DEPMs in the 66th and 76th percentile respectively.

These line-up changes have helped the Kings tremendously in generating turnovers, and it’s helped to cover up the long-time issues with the Kings defense and lack of paint protection. Per NBA.com, over the last eight games, the Kings are generating 8.9 steals per game (4th in the NBA), compared to just 7.6 steals per game for the season (14th in the NBA).

It’s also just helped the Kings be more disruptive in general, as their increased athleticism on the perimeter and confidence that guys will make the right rotations and reads allows players to bend the basic defensive rules, making offensive players hesitate.

You see it watching the Kings play. Watch this play from the Kings-Clippers game on Tuesday.

Murray plays strong on-ball defense on Paul George, but George is confident that he can still get off a reasonable fadeaway from the paint. But Fox bites down hard and gets a hand on the ball from behind. While this sequence depends on great heads up defense by Murray and an awareness by Fox, it’s also made possible by Keon Ellis’ being in the right position. Ellis is in the passing lane between George and Norman Powell, cutting off the easy outlet for a three. He’s also looking directly at James Harden, and will be able to rotate to Harden if Fox cannot recover in time to contest a kick-out to him. That’s high-level defense from all three players, and not something that occurs as often when Huerter or Monk are in the game.

Here’s another play from the same game.

Strong on-ball defense from Ellis, Lyles, and Vezenkov (!) leads to a couple errant passes, but the real gem here is what happens at the end of the play. With only about 4 seconds left on the shot clock, Westbrook has to try to create something off the dribble. Ellis forces Russell Westbrook into the middle of the paint, which allows Fox to step into the key and block off an easy outlet pass to James Harden. Westbrook’s only good options are an outlet to Brandon Boston (a 30% three point shooter) or to shoot a contested floater, which Alex Len summarily rejects. Obviously the highlight here is Len, but the play is made possible by Ellis and Fox correctly playing their responsibilities and having the athleticism to discourage Westbrook from kicking the ball out for a three.

The Kings are also handling defensive rotations and switches much more effectively with Fox, Murray, Ellis, and Mitchell on the floor more often. Swapping Ellis and Mitchell for Monk and Huerter has made this more feasible, as they both have stronger defensive instincts and the athleticism and quickness to make ball-handlers hesitate and still recover to their defensive responsibility.

Two examples:

Here, Mitchell is able to help Fox to stop Paul George from driving and force a kick-out to Westbrook (a subpar shooter). Mitchell recovers quickly enough to prevent Westbrook from driving, instead forcing a pass down to Brandon Boston. Murray gets his hand up and prevents a clean pass, which disrupts any opportunity for Boston to launch a corner three and lets the Kings reset defensively.

But what happens next is just as important. Boston sets an on-ball screen for Westbrook, but Murray and Mitchell switch it effortlessly. There’s nowhere for Westbrook to attack, and Mitchell carries Boston out to the three point line to prevent a quick swing. Seeing this, Westbrook opts to go at Murray, who uses his length to prevent an easy drive and force Westbrook into a contested long two. That’s savvy play for everyone involved! Sabonis also shows in the lane to discourage Westbrook from driving too quickly at Murray, and Fox is hedged inside while staying close(ish) to Paul George to prevent a kick-out three (although ideally you would like to see Fox to get just a bit higher with Boston there to potentially screen for George).

This clip is from the Dallas game last Friday. You can see that Ellis and Barnes expertly switch a double-screen set for Kyrie Irving, and Ellis even gets his hands on the pass back to Tim Hardaway Jr. Mitchell and Len actually switch off on Dante Exum and Derek Lively, which is fine given Lively’s position so far away from the basket. That switch also allows Mitchell to step up and cut off a potential drive by Hardaway Jr. Eventually, Kyrie Irving is forced to take a pull up two—and even though Irving absolutely can make that shot, that is a good defensive possession.

The Kings sort of spoil the strong sequence by allowing a long offensive rebound. Whatever, it happens sometimes. But Mitchell recovers well and runs Hardaway Jr. off of an open three and into a weak drive attempt that gets cut off. Hardaway backs off and outlets to Irving, but Mitchell and Barnes keep the pressure on Irving, forcing a dump off to Lively who actually makes a solid read to find PJ Washington in the corner for three. Fox, however, makes a good effort to contest the shot, which misses.

That’s 27 seconds of good defense! Sure, the Mavs got a couple contested looks, but you can live with that. What stands out is the timely switches and effective rotations. Guys are in the right place and making the right defensive reads. That’s not something that can always be said for the Kings, and a noticeable improvement.

Defense Leads To Transition Points

Obviously it’s better to play good defense than bad defense (duh). But an added benefit is that strong defense—especially steals—helps the Kings get into their transition game much, much more easily. The Kings get into transition at the fifth highest rate in the league per NBA.com’s tracking data. Without Monk and Huerter to bolster the half-court offense, the Kings need to find easy buckets in transition whenever they can.

Strong perimeter has lead the Kings to a number of high-quality opportunities in recent weeks.

Kessler Edwards and Davion Mitchell do a great job passing off a guard-guard screen from Kyrie Irving and Luka Doncic, and when Luka drives, Edwards does a really nice job of aggressively digging at the ball and forcing a turnover that leads to a fast break layup.

Fox and Ellis pair up here to force Kyrie Irving into a bad dribble. Fox plays solid head-up defense, and Ellis biting down off of Dante Exum causes Irving to hesitate. Fox takes advantage by stripping Irving and getting into transition, leading to free throws.

You even see the Kings getting into transition off shot contests more than they have in the past. Here’s my two favorite from recent games:

In both cases, good shot contests lead to blocks, and the Kings are able to get into transition and get open threes for Keegan Murray. That’s strong defense leading to high-quality offense, and it doesn’t depend on having a second shot creator in Monk or a good shooter like Huerter on the floor to make it happen.

Ball Screens Are Still a Problem

Though the Kings have improved their perimeter defense and rotations, they’re still struggling a bit with how to address on-ball screens. Having Ellis, Murray, Fox, and Mitchell in the line-up more often gives them some flexibility and recovery speed, but they still need to find a way to address screens more consistently.

No matter how you look at it, this is a busted defense:

Derek Lively sets a ghost screen for Irving and Sabonis gets caught in no-man’s land. Sabonis doesn’t drop with the screener and doesn’t double hard either—it looks like he’s trying to hedge the screen, but he’s roughly 40 feet away from the basket. The result is that Irving has an easy pass into Lively about 8 feet from the basket. It’s fine to force the ball into Lively’s hands and make him a decision-maker, but this is just way too easy. Lively makes an easy read and hits Tim Hardaway Jr. for an open three.

The Kings also struggled to find the right balance when he laid off the screen. In this next clip, you see the screen gets set in the backcourt. Sabonis drops way back to prevent Doncic from getting downhill too deep, and Murray recovers too slowly back to his man. They don’t communicate well, which results in Sabonis going for a steal and letting Doncic out of the double-team with an easy pass to Dante Exum.

A similar problem happened with Fox and Sabonis just a couple minutes later, though luckily the Kings got out of it.

When Sabonis did try to double off of the screen, he often did so too slowly. Again, this let Doncic (and Irving) off the hook—they made relatively casual passes to open teammates and forced the Kings into an extremely difficult rotation. In the clip below, Keon Ellis has to recover to the corner for the contest through a backside screen by Daniel Gafford. That’s never going to work, and it leads to a wide open three.

Dante Exum’s game winner from Friday night also came off a similar action. Again, Sabonis doesn’t double hard enough, making it far too easy for Doncic to get out of the potential trap. The result is an easy three for Exum.

Obviously that was heartbreaking for the Kings and their fans. And defending Doncic and Irving while they get on-ball screens is hard for any team to defend. But the Kings have to do better.

Get Out of No-Man’s Land

The first thing they can fix is avoiding no-man’s land. The screen defender (most often Sabonis, Barnes, or Len) has to avoid getting caught between a double-team/hedge and drop coverage. If they are not doubling/hedging, but also not dropping to defend the screener as he rolls, they are effectively guarding air. That can’t happen.

Even if you pick up the guard, by the time he’s going downhill, the big is going to get burned. Plays like this have no real place in a good defense.

If You’re Going to Double, Be Quick

The second thing the Kings can clean up is doubling quickly and with intensity. Lackadaisical double-teams are easy for players like Doncic and Irving to get out of—they’ve seen doubles off of screens thousands of times, and if they’re not pressured with intensity, they’re going to pick it apart.

These are good pressures that happen quickly, and they make it much more difficult to pass out:

If you can’t be that quick, get big! Alex Len does a good job of this to make up for his lack of foot speed. Sure, these aren’t ideal—but at least he’s in the way:

There’s obviously significant risk in doubling during an on-ball screen. That’s a strategic decision that the coaching staff will make based on game, circumstance, and personnel. But doing it quickly—or at least being a nuisance—is key to making double teams work (at least sometimes) against elite players like Doncic.

Don’t Fear Drop Coverage

Drop coverage on a screen with players like Doncic and Irving is also risky. You may give them an open look or let them generate speed and get downhill toward the basket, which often results in layups or fouls. But it’s important to mix so that the offense doesn’t see the same look every time.

The Kings used drop coverage a lot against the Jazz in Sunday’s game, relying on their perimeter defenders to fight through screens without giving up too much of an advantage.

In this first clip, Fox simply slips under the screen and Sabonis drops back to the paint. With Walker Kessler (a non-shooter) as the screener, this is a pretty viable strategy—Kessler isn’t going to make anyone pay for leaving him open at the top of the key.

Fox also accomplishes pretty much the same thing by going over the screen a little later:

Obviously, this kind of defensive strategy is tougher when the ball-handler is better or the screener is a more capable shooter. But it can still work in doses. In this last clip, Keegan Murray does a good job fighting through the screen to at least discourage an immediate shot from Doncic:

The Kings will need to figure out the right mix of coverages for on-ball screens, but it’s critical that they get more effective executing their coverages regardless. With more athletes on the perimeter who are better at fighting through screens (with due respect to Monk and Huerter as players, they too often died on screens), they have a decent chance to do so.

That’s It!

I’ll be back with more Kings coverage as we head into the home stretch of the season. Here’s to hoping they can keep up the good defense and continue to improve on screens!

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 4): Trade Targets!

[This is part four of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline. In part one, I looked at the areas on the floor that the Kings should be trying to improve, specifically defense and efficient, reliable offense when Fox sits. In part two, I wrote about what the Kings can send out in potential trades and how the NBA’s rules governing player- and draft-pick trades affect what the Kings can offer. Part three covered the Kings’ roster construction needs, diving deep into future contracts the Kings will want to offer to De’Aaron Fox, Malik Monk, and Keegan Murray, as well as reviewing what on-court roles the Kings will look to fill ahead of the deadline.]

We’re finally here at the most exciting part of the post—who are the potential trade targets for the Kings ahead of the trade deadline and does it make sense to go after them?

There are obviously a lot of rumors about potential trades that make the rounds this time of year. I’m not going to weigh in on how true those rumors are or which players are truly on the trade block. Shams, Woj, and dozens of other reporters (shout out to Sam Amick for reporting on the Kings) will give the best intel on that. But I will look at players that have frequently come up in reporting or the rumor mill that may be of interest to the Kings. For each player, I’ll try to talk about the player’s talents, how they would fit on the Kings, what the Kings would sacrifice by making a deal, and whether I think a deal makes sense.

I’m going to organize this summary by team since there are a number of teams that are could be sellers at the deadline. The Bulls, Hornets, Raptors, Blazers, and Wizards all come to mind as obvious candidates—I cover all of them and more below. Other teams might consider one-off deals that make sense, even if they’re not full-on “sellers,” so I’ll look at those possibilities individually (plus Detroit, which only has one trade candidate that should even draw remote interest from the Kings in my view).

Just so folks know how this is organized, I cover the following players in the below order. The order is just how I started writing things, so don’t think too hard about how it doesn’t make sense, I concede that’s true.

• Chicago Bulls

  • Zach Lavine

  • Alex Caruso

• Atlanta Hawks

  • Dejounte Murray

  • De’Andre Hunter / Saddiq Bey / Bogdan Bogdanovic

    • [I combined these three for convenience]

• Utah Jazz

  • Lauri Markkanen

  • John Collins

  • Kris Dunn

• Brooklyn Nets

  • Mikal Bridges / Cam Johnson

    • [I combined these two because, realistically, the Nets aren’t going to deal them anyway]

  • Dorian Finney-Smith

  • Royce O’Neal / Lonnie Walker IV / Spencer Dinwiddie / Nic Claxton

    • [I combined these guys for convenience. Even though they’re different styles of players, the thinking is comparable.]

• Portland Trailblazers

  • Jerami Grant

  • Malcolm Brogdon

  • Matisse Thybulle

• Washington Wizards

  • Kyle Kuzma

  • Tyus Jones

• Charlotte Hornets

  • Miles Bridges

  • PJ Washington

• Toronto Raptors

  • Gary Trent Jr.

  • Bruce Brown

• Miscellaneous

  • Naji Marshall

  • Bojan Bogdanovic (Detroit version—how’d we get two Bogdanovic’s?)

  • Andrew Wiggins

Let me know in the comments if there are other players you want me to look at, or if there’s other details you want to know about any of these prospective deals.

Bulls Trade Targets

The Bulls are sitting in 9th in the East but their roster is way too old and way too expensive for the production they’re getting. It feels like they’ve stagnated over the last couple years without Lonzo Ball. One of their best players, Demar Derozan, is about to hit free agency and their highest recent draft pick, Pat Williams, is about to get a pay bump as a restricted free agent (even though his on-court production hasn’t been anything to write home about). This team should be looking to re-tool, but what they’re going to look for in doing so is harder to predict.

Zach Lavine

As most basketball fans know already, the Bulls are trying their best to ship Zach Lavine to anyone who will take him, but they still want to get at least something of value back.

Only 28 years old, Lavine is still a high-level scorer who can create for himself and knock down shots, but there are lots of questions about what else he brings to the table.

Lavine’s numbers have historically looked pretty good. During the five seasons from 2018 to 2023, Lavine scored more than 23.5 points per game each year, always shooting above 45% from the field and over 37% from three, and put up 4.0+ assists and 4.5+ rebounds per game, all while playing heavy minutes (34.5+ minutes per game). Those are impressive numbers, and proved out that Lavine is capable of generating quality offense with relative efficiency.

Lavine also has a good combination of size (he’s 6’5”), length, and athleticism, which allows him to create space against most defenders and get to the rim when he wants to attack. He pairs these skills with solid ball-handling and strong perimeter shooting. He doesn’t need a lot of help to get quality offense, as he largely lives off of a strong pull up game these days. But he can also run pick and rolls when he needs to, with decent efficiency—Lavine runs about 6.2 pick and rolls per game this year, which generate about 0.94 points per possession, a tick down from 8.1 pick and rolls per game and 0.93 points per possession last season.

Lavine has always had a “score first” game, so he’s never excelled at creating offense for others. He’s not a black hole on offense at all, but he’s not always quick to move off the ball—for example, at 42.5 passes per game, he’s moving the ball at about the same rate as Tyler Herro. This could make for a bit of an awkward pairing with the Kings style and De’Aaron Fox in particular, who is also a score-first guard (though a better overall distributor than Lavine). There’s only so much room for players with a score-first approach in Kings’ line-ups, as they rely heavily on ball movement. That said, issue can be can be mitigated by staggering when Lavine and Fox are on the court, especially since generating offense when Fox sits is one of the things the Kings need to improve (as I wrote about in part one of this series). [Just as a quick aside—staggering minutes isn’t always the “best” use of players. Staggering minutes is nice, but it also generally means that the team’s ceiling is lower since the best players aren’t functioning perfectly together in late-game situations, especially in the playoffs.]

In addition, Lavine’s strong shooting and ability to get up efficient shots could work nicely when the Kings run their offense through Domantas Sabonis, which they often do in non-Fox minutes. Lavine is an expert shooter with the ability to pull up from all over the court, so having him work off of Sabonis—who creates tons of space for shooters with dribble hand-offs and screens—could work wonderfully. Adding Lavine would also let the Kings to keep at least one elite scorer on the floor with Sabonis at all times. Monk, and to a lesser extent Kevin Huerter, fill that role now, yet there’s no doubt that Lavine packs more of an offensive punch.

Still, there are glaring questions that come with Lavine.

Health has been an issue for Lavine throughout his career. Now in his tenth season, Lavine has played 65+ games just four times, and over halfway through this season, Lavine has only played in just 25 games.

Lavine has also never been part of a winning NBA team, raising questions about whether his game contributes to winning. He’s been on just one team with a .500 record or better in his NBA career, despite the Bulls attempting to build a championship contender around him. Of course it isn’t fair to put this on Lavine alone, and it doesn’t detract from his skill as a player, but it does raise red flags.

One of the reasons Lavine’s teams have struggled to win is that Lavine has never been a strong defender himself, despite having the physical tools to be one. That’s obviously an acute concern for a Kings team that desperately needs help defensively. Given Lavine’s offensive talent, his defensive limitations aren’t fatal. Plus, just because Lavine isn’t great defensively doesn’t make him a complete zero. In fact, several advanced metrics paint Lavine as just slightly below average on defense, which is probably sufficient. For example, Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus, which estimates the points per 100 possessions a player contributes above league average, rates Lavine is at -0.5 this year and -0.7 last year, while Dunks and Threes Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, a similar stat, rates Lavine at 0.2 the last two years (a little above average defensively). With that said, Lavine has rarely (never?) been part of a good defensive teams. His effort defensively can come and go, and the defensive stats one might look at to see effort (like steals, blocks, and deflections) don’t stand out at all. There’s also a little bit of Rockets James Harden to his game defensively, where he appears to sometimes lose track of his assignment inexplicably.

The net result is that while Lavine would help the Kings offensively, they can’t expect him to bring much more to the table on defense beyond slightly improved rebounding.

Trading for Lavine would probably help the Kings this season, but Lavine’s injury history and limitations on defense make that a risky bet in a vacuum. There’s also no guarantee that adding would help in the playoffs. Lavine has no real prior playoff successes himself, and it’s not clear how much of a benefit he would provide overall when rotations start to tighten and teams buckle down. And if there are struggles playing him alongside Fox and Monk, whether because of overlapping offensive skillsets or defensive limitations, adding Lavine may not add as much to the team’s playoff ceiling.

We also haven’t talked about Lavine’s contract yet, which may be the poison pill that ultimately kills the possibility of the Kings trading for him.

Lavine signed a 5 year, $215 million contract in 2022 that pays him $40 million this year, $43 million in 2024-25, $46 million in 2025-26, and gives him a player option for $49 million in 2026-27. He’s pretty likely to pick up that player option, so he’s effectively got four years and almost $180 million left on his deal.

Lavine’s future salary would be high for any player, and if Lavine can’t stay healthy or help deliver playoff success, they’re completely absurd for a team like the Kings to trade for.

Take a look at the chart below showing the projected salaries for the Kings core plus Lavine, compared to the projected salary cap and luxury tax line.

[For simplicity, I’ve assumed Fox signs an extension for a max contract, not the super max he could become eligible for if he makes another All-NBA team this year or next. I’ve also assumed that Murray signs an extension with a starting salary of $30 million in 2026-27, but you could imagine the extension ranging from $25-40 million depending on how well he plays. Those estimated salaries are shown in green.]

As you can see from the chart, even before trading for Lavine, the Kings core of Fox, Sabonis, and Murray is going to get expensive. Combined, the trio will make over $85 million in 2024-25, over $93 million in 2025-26, and could top $129 million in 2026-27. If Fox makes another All NBA team this year or next, or if Murray continues to develop, they could easily push the trio’s combined salary to almost $150 million before adding Lavine or filling out the roster.

Adding Lavine’s salary would be tough even before extensions the Fox and Murray kick in, as it would push the combined salary for just four players (Lavine plus Fox/Sabonis/Murray) to $128.5 million in 2024-25 and $139.2 million in 2025-26. That’s inching close to the cap in both seasons, and would leave little room for the Kings to maneuver elsewhere. They’d be limited in re-signing players, signing free agents, or trading for new talent without pushing toward the luxury tax line.

The 2026-27 season is where things could get really ugly from a cap standpoint, as extensions for Fox and Murray would likely put the Kings over the cap with just Lavine + Fox/Sabonis/Murray. Filling out the rest of the roster would likely put the Kings into the luxury tax—though the tax aprons probably wouldn’t be a huge issue (the Kings would still have about $39 million under the projected first apron and about $52 million under the projected second apron to operate). The Kings could theoretically try to find ways out of the luxury tax at that point by moving off Lavine’s contract in the last year, but getting off contracts always comes with its own challenges. Teams are often happy to take on expiring contracts but they usually want something valuable stapled to it like a future draft pick, and that ask would be comparatively high to eat a salary over $40 million (the imposition of a higher salary floor in the 2023 CBA could change market dynamics on this, as teams might be more willing to absorb big expiring contracts).

On top of thinking through future cap issues, the Kings also need to think about how to match Lavine’s salary in a trade. Complying with the trade salary matching rules for a $40+ million contract is, almost by definition, expensive—especially for a Kings team whose only big salaries are for meaningful rotation players.

Lavine’s $40.1 million salary this year means the Kings would have to send out about $31.9 million or more in any potential deal. There is simply no way for the Kings to piece together that much salary for a trade without raiding their current rotation. To get to $31.9 million in outgoing salary, the Kings would have to trade at least two or three players at a minimum. That would most likely be Barnes ($17 million) and Huerter ($15.7 million), or one of those two plus some combination of Monk ($9.9 million), Lyles ($8 million), Vezenkov ($6.3 million), Mitchell ($5.1 million), and Duarte ($4.1 million). Dealing Huerter and Monk might make the most sense given their skillsets overlap with Lavine’s the most, but that would be quite painful in terms of depth. For that kind of outlay to make sense, the Kings would have to be absolutely convinced that Lavine will seriously outperform Monk. That’s certainly possible, but it’s not a guarantee by any means.

Taking on Lavine’s huge salary and sending out multiple rotation players is tough to swallow given Lavine’s injury history, lack of playoff success, defensive limitations, and imperfect fit with Fox. This simply isn’t the most natural roster fit for Lavine. On top of that, the Bulls, somewhat surprisingly seem to be asking for first round draft pick compensation back from any team that wants Lavine, which further complicates things. Nobody appears all that ready to dish out picks to get Lavine—the consensus around the league appears to be that the Bulls should probably be willing to give away picks just to get Lavine’s salary off their own books . . .

Verdict: Hard pass on Lavine. Lavine is a good player, but it is hard to envision a trade for him making sense for the Kings. The contract issues, health questions, lack of defensive impact, and lack of playoff success make the price too much to absorb.

Alex Caruso

Even though Lavine isn’t a good fit, Chicago does have another very attractive trade target for the Kings: Alex Caruso.

Caruso isn’t a big household name. He’s played in relative obscurity on a mediocre Bulls team for the last three seasons and at a glance, his numbers aren’t eye-catching. He averages 10.1 points, 3.5 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in just under 26 minutes per game. He is, however, relatively efficient offensively: he shoots 49.1% from the floor and 41.5% from three and he rarely gives the ball away.

But Caruso really shines on defense, and his impact on that end of the floor shows up all over the place. Caruso is averages 1.3 steals and 1.0 blocks per game, which are both stellar numbers for a 6’5” guard. He’s also top-10 in the NBA in Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus (10th) and Dunks and Threes’ Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus (8th). The Bulls, too, benefit enormously defensively with Caruso on the floor, as they give up about 5.5 fewer points per 100 possessions when he’s in the game according to PBP Stats.

Caruso’s impact defensively is obvious watching the Bulls play and it earned him All-Defensive NBA First Team honors last year. It’s also not new—he’s basically done the same thing his entire career, even dating back to his days at Texas A&M where he was on the All SEC Defensive team.

Caruso brings the kind of defensive presence the Kings are sorely missing on the perimeter. He’s big enough to take on guards that are too big and powerful for Fox or Monk to handle and agile enough to stick on guards that are too quick for Kevin Huerter. Caruso defending opposing guards would also free up Keegan Murray’s defensive responsibilities a bit. Murray is being asked to cover players like Steph Curry too often in the Kings’ current lineups, and while he typically does an admirable job, Murray is much better suited to guarding wings that he doesn’t need to chase as much.

At the same time, Caruso brings enough on offense that he would fit well with the Kings’ core. He shoots well enough from deep to maintain spacing (averaging 37.6% from three for his career), he moves well without the ball, and he’s a willing cutter, which plays well with Sabonis.

Caruso is basically a plug-and-play add that would raise the Kings’ floor defensively instantly.

The only real downsides to trading for Caruso are his age and the cost to get him. Caruso will turn 30 next month, so he’s probably in the back half of his defensive prime, though still young enough that it shouldn’t be a major concern. He also is an ideal fit for lots of playoff teams that could use a perimeter defender of his caliber. The Bucks, Sixers, Pacers, Nuggets, Suns, and Mavs would all benefit tremendously from adding a player like Caruso. Many of those teams have little to offer the Bulls in a trade, but it’s enough of a market that any deal for Caruso isn’t going to come cheaply. The Bulls haven’t shown a lot of interest in dealing Caruso to date, but given their current roster situation, it’s hard to see why they wouldn’t deal him for a solid offer.

Despite Caruso’s age and a potentially hot market, the Kings would be wise to consider giving up meaningful future draft capital to get him. He would give the Kings enough juice on the defensive perimeter to meaningfully improve their overall prospects, even if he doesn’t provide a ton offensively. Being able to roll out line-ups with two strong perimeter defenders would go a long way to improving the Kings defense generally, hopefully with an effect similar to what the Knicks got after adding an elite perimeter defender in OG Anounoby (though less dramatic). Getting Caruso shouldn’t be nearly as expensive as prying Anounoby away from the Raptors was, and Caruso’s $9-10 million salary over this year and next is a bargain compared to the $30+ million that Anounoby is likely to receive. It’s also easier than trying to add rim protection alongside Sabonis, which could really compromise the Kings’ offense.

The Kings could potentially get Caruso with just a small outgoing salary like Davion Mitchell’s ($5.1 million) plus future draft picks. That would give the Kings flexibility to play stronger defensive line-ups with Caruso, but keep the option to bring more offensive firepower off the bench with Huerter and Monk. Alternatively, the Kings could send Huerter ($15.7 million) to Chicago for Caruso and a smaller, expendable contract like Andre Drummond’s ($3.4 million). That would cost the Kings a bit more in terms of offensive firepower, but it might mitigate the amount of future draft capital that the Kings would need to send out. The Bulls could use shooting (they rank 20th in three point percentage), and Huerter is still young and has a favorable contract for the next three seasons.

There’s also a funky (and far-fetched) alternative the Kings could offer if the Bulls want to get off of Lonzo Ball, who hasn’t played a game since January 2022 due to a career threatening knee injury. Ball just got cleared to run this month, and it’s possible he will never play again—yet he is on the books for $20.5 million this year and has a player option for $21.4 million next season that he is assuredly going to exercise. The Bulls have paid Ball to not play for two years and could be looking at another one (the Bulls could try to stretch Ball’s salary to save themselves the salary cap hit, but they’re still paying for no on court production if they do). The Kings could send Huerter ($15.7 million) + Mitchell ($5.1 million) + Duarte ($4.1 million) and a future first to the Bulls in exchange for Caruso ($9.5 million) and Ball ($20.5 million). There’s risk to the Kings here, as they’d be sending out Huerter and a pick, plus absorbing a year of Ball’s contract, but the deal could work out well for the Kings if Ball can return to playing (he’s a good distributor, shooter, and defender when he plays) and the down-side of carrying Ball’s $21.4 million contract next season is palatable for the Kings, since it would end before extensions for Fox and Murray kick in. Meanwhile the Bulls would get shooting they need on a movable contract in Huerter, plus free looks at Mitchell and Duarte.

Verdict: This is the guy this trade season the Kings should want (given we couldn’t get a deal done for OG)! I really like the idea of the Kings trading for Caruso, so long as they don’t have to sell the farm in terms of draft picks to get him (giving up multiple first rounders gets to be too pricey without big protections on the picks). Obviously, the Kings can’t overpay dramatically—but giving up a little more than Caruso’s actually worth because of his limited offense is still fine given his defensive prowess. He’s a clear floor raiser that could hopefully transform the team’s identity on defense from middling to hounding, and adding him would let Fox and Murray guard guys they’re more naturally suited to. The Kings are right to bet on their core, but adding Caruso is the type of incremental move that can actually enable that growth to happen smoothly.

Hawks Trade Targets

The Hawks are in a weird spot. They’re hanging on by a thread to a spot in the play in at 10th in the East, but this season has largely been forgettable. They’re certainly not as good as they envisioned when they gave up three first round picks and a first round swap right to add Dejounte Murray a year and a half ago. There’s a lot of smoke around the Hawks shedding pieces that don’t fit well together, so there is a ripe chance for the Kings to make a deal.

Dejounte Murray

Before trading for Dejounte Murray, the Hawks had a high-usage, deep shooting scorer in Trae Young who couldn’t play defense. To shore up their squad, the Hawks traded an absolute haul to the Spurs for Murray, a lanky and athletic 6’5” point guard, in the hopes that he would bring excellent defense, downhill scoring, and strong ball distribution.

His last season in San Antonio, Murray averaged 21.1 points, 9.2 assists, 8.3 rebounds, and 2.0 steals per game, and he brought an athletic, attacking style that put a ton of pressure on defenses. Murray would run right at guys to get them in backpedals and either get to the rim, pull up for short jumpers and midrange shots, or kick the ball to open shooters. Fitting that game alongside Trae Young made some sense on paper.

But that hypothesis hasn’t worked out at all like the Hawks hoped.

Offensively, the Murray-Young pairing has been like oil and water. Far too often, they end up playing an undesirable brand of “your turn, my turn” basketball, where neither player really does anything to help the other succeed. Teams like the Dallas Mavericks have done that in the past, but Doncic and Irving are transcendent offensive talents who still had to learn to play more complimentary basketball to start winning games more often.

Since joining Atlanta, Murray’s offensive efficiency has stayed pretty solid, but he’s had to change his game a bit too. It’s not clear that it’s really an improvement. As Murray’s usage rate has dropped, his assist rate has plummeted to 22.2% this year, down from 40.6% his last year with the Spurs. He’s also shifted to a more perimeter-oriented game, which shows up in the numbers. Murray now shoots 6.2 threes per game compared to just 4.3 per game in his last year in San Antonio. Though he’s hitting threes at a career high clip—38.7% from three this year compared to a career average of 34.6%—he’s also not getting downhill nearly as often. Murray is shooting a lower proportion of his shots from inside 10 feet, making fewer trips to the line, and getting offensive rebounds less frequently, all of which indicate his game is moving farther and farther away from the basket. That’s normal as a player ages, but Murray is still just 27 years old and in his athletic prime. While there’s nothing inherently wrong with Murray’s move outward (it does create more space on the interior), it’s not quite what the Hawks envisioned when they traded for Murray, and they don’t have other players who’ve stepped up to put downhill pressure on defenses and score in the paint.

At the same time, Murray hasn’t been the elite defensive weapon that many thought he might turn into based on his time with the Spurs. Murray’s steals rate has dropped each of the past two years, from 2.8% his last year as a Spur to 1.8% this year. Per Dunks and Threes, his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has also dropped too; he was in the 81st percentile of defenders his last year with the Spurs, but he’s dropped to the 53rd percentile this year. While Murray’s defensive reputation was probably a little overblown, he’s still had a meaningful drop-off on that end of the floor. That may be on Murray or it may be on the Hawks as a team, but it’s been an issue for them trying to pair Young and Murray regardless.

The net result has been the Hawks failing to live up to their own expectations, and it seems like they’re ready to get off of Murray. The Hawks have also overpaid several players on their roster, such that they’re already within $10 million of the luxury tax line this year and projected to be about $9 million below the luxury tax next year, so they have a clear incentive to get out of Murray’s contract if they want to create more operating space to adjust their roster. That presents an opportunity for the Kings to get Murray or someone else off the Hawks roster.

Fitting Murray on the Kings does raise some of the same issues that have come up for the Hawks in the Trae Young-Dejounte Murray pairing.

Offensively, it’s a cautionary tale of sorts for a potential Fox-Murray backcourt. Fox is one of just nine players in the league with a higher usage rate than Trae Young, so there’s a concern that he and Murray could end up playing “your turn, my turn” offense too. And Fox and Murray both seem to be moving their games out toward the perimeter and away from the paint, which might be too much of the same thing. But there are a few things that I think would make adding Murray to the Kings more feasible.

One point of adding Murray is to solidify the Kings’ offense when Fox sits, which minimizes some of the risk that they have overlapping skillsets. During those minutes, the Kings try to run offense through Sabonis. Murray’s pull-up shooting and quickness should work well off of Sabonis in the high post, and Murray is athletic enough to serve as a capable cutter off actions where Sabonis starts with the ball (though Murray doesn’t cut often enough now). Murray is also an experienced pick and roll initiator, running 7.3 pick and rolls per game, which would be an effective half-court tool for Murray-Sabonis lineups. Murray’s ball-handling and knack for avoiding turnovers would also be a big benefit to the Kings. While Fox does a good job taking care of the ball, the Kings’ other primary ball-handlers (Sabonis and Monk) turn the ball over too often. Finally, Murray’s improved three point shooting has really shorn up what was previously a weakness. Murray is an effective spot up shooter, scoring about 1.18 points per possession on those shots, and he’s managed to push out his range beyond the three point line. If he can keep that up, he would be an effective floor spacer that can also attack close outs (much like Monk, and to a lesser extent Barnes, already do for the Kings), which puts a lot of pressure on defenses to collapse to the paint and opens up other shooters.

On the defensive end, even the Hawks version of Murray would be an upgrade for the Kings’ perimeter defense. He’s bigger and lankier than Fox and Monk, and quicker on his feet than Huerter or Keegan Murray, which would provide some benefit against scoring guards. He also has active hands defensively to generate steals and deflections (3.0 deflections per game, tied for 10th in the NBA), which would be a nice addition. If it does turn out that the Spurs defense version of Murray is still there, the upgrade is even more obvious.

Let’s turn to the contract situation. Murray signed a four year, $120 million extension this off-season, but his salary this year is just $18.2 million, which makes salary matching a bit easier. The Kings would have options of who to send out, but the Hawks roster is in such a transition state that it’s hard to know what they would want back. Presumably, players with contracts cheaper than Dejounte Murray’s going forward like Barnes and Huerter would have some appeal to the Hawks, as they could get them another $7.5-10 million in cap relief next season. But those guys probably don’t add much for the Hawks on the court. A three-way deal could make more sense, as Huerter or Barnes could be more useful to a playoff contender. The Hawks have a big trade exception of over $23 million from the John Collins trade with Utah that could be used to facilitate such a three way deal so they don’t have to take back $45 million or more in long term salary, as they would have to do if they accepted Barnes or Huerter.

The real prize for the Hawks in a Dejounte Murray deal with the Kings would be draft picks and salary cap relief. The Hawks already have Sacramento’s 2024 first round pick (top 14 protected), but they are still pretty short on draft equity from 2025 to 2027. They might jump at the chance to get another future first rounder from the Kings, plus whatever could come from a third team for Huerter or Barnes. The Hawks aren’t going to recover the three first rounders and a pick swap they gave to get Murray, but if they can get back 70% of that, it might be worth cutting bait.

The cap relief benefit for the Hawks is also real. They’re almost $24 million over the cap this year, and the problem gets worse in the next two years. If the Hawks do nothing, Dejounte Murray’s extension will kick in next season, and they also have to decide what to do with restricted free agents Jalen Johnson (2025) and Saddiq Bey (2024). The Hawks could deal Bey at the deadline, but extending Johnson is a must. The Hawks are also probably stuck overpaying a bit for Trae Young ($40-50 million) and De’Andre Hunter ($20-25 million) each year through 2026-27, and they likely want to hold on to quality players on reasonable, tradable contracts like Bogdan Bogdanovic (making $16-19 million on a declining contract through 2026-27) and Onyeka Okongwu (making $14-17 million through 2027-28). The Hawks are in a tough cap situation, so they’re going to have to let someone go below market value. Trading Murray would probably get them the cap relief they need and allow them to get back reasonable valuable in terms of future assets.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Ultimately, I think a Kings trade for Dejounte Murray would be super interesting, but it’s high risk. If Murray can’t play with Fox effectively, as he’s struggled to do with Trae Young in Atlanta, the Kings could be looking at moving him on from him relatively quickly. That said, the Hawks are in a precarious cap situation without an obvious way out, so it’s possible that the Kings could nab a clear talent on a reasonable contract without giving up a ton of on-court talent. I’d be comfortable letting Huerter head back to Atlanta, giving up a future first rounder, and adding perhaps some additional draft capital (second rounders or a first swap, perhaps) to get a deal done, but not much more than that.

De’Andre Hunter / Saddiq Bey / Bogdan Bogdonavic

I mentioned De’Andre Hunter, Saddiq Bey, and Bogdan Bogdanovic in the Dejounte Murray section. These guys are all different players and in totally different contract situations, but they could also make for appealing trade targets. I’ll go quickly here.

De’Andre Hunter is the most interesting, but he’s also totally confounding. Hunter is a 6’8” wing that sports incredible length and athleticism. He can also shoot well from distance and he’s young, only 26 years old. He was drafted as a prototypical 3-and-D player who could cover four positions, and he looks like he should be exactly that. Hell, the Hawks gave him a 4 year, $95 million extension because they thought that’s what he is.

But the on-court production has been consistently underwhelming, and it’s hard to figure out exactly why. Hunter is scoring 15 points per game on a slash line of 46% from the field, 40.4% from three, and 90.7% from the line, but it still feels disappointing. Despite the solid offensive numbers, his impact on games is hard to see unless you squint. You don’t see him making plays that pop as a scorer or a passer, and he offers way less than he should as a rebounder given his physical profile. Hunter also hasn’t lived up to his prospects as a defender, and you rarely see him pop on that end of the court either. Advanced metrics show him to be a bit of a paper tiger defensively too—his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of -1.1 is in the 26th percentile of all players.

Hunter’s profile and shooting ability makes him an intriguing target, but his marginal impact on games in four of his five seasons in the league makes it hard buy into the next four years and $95 million of his contract. Given that, it’s hard to see the Kings swinging a deal for him unless they believe he’s got a leap in him. Trading for Hunter would require sending out Barnes or Huerter plus another player, and he just hasn’t produced enough to warrant that and taking on more salary at the same time. I would love for the Kings to add a player with his physical profile on defense to add length on the perimeter, but it’s hard to justify at $20-25 million a year.

Saddiq Bey is another player whose early prospects looked more promising than his actual NBA performance. Bey is only 24 years old and is a bit of a SF/PF tweener, but he can get points and rebound reasonably well at a low usage rate, though he’s not particularly efficient. He’s sort of like a less consistent Harrison Barnes, but he brings better rebounding and worse shooting. He might be useful to shore up the Kings rotation, but he’s not going to meaningfully improve the roster in the near term. He is also on the last year of his contract, so he will be a free agent next year even if the Kings trade for him—but his $4.6 million salary is easy to match this year and the Kings may be able to get him cheaply.

Kings fans know and love Bogdanovic. He’s pretty good at a lot of things (scoring, passing, defense), and he’s on a totally reasonable contract that pays him between $16-19 million through the 2026-27 season, the last year being a team option to boot. That said, Bogdanovic doesn’t truly excel at any one thing and probably wouldn’t be a big upgrade for the Kings (plus, the the Kings already picked Huerter over Bogdanovic in a way, and it’s not like it hasn’t worked out). He doesn’t shoot better than Monk or Huerter, he isn’t a stellar ball handler or offensive organizer, and he has similar defensive limitations that the Kings have lived through before. I love the guy, but he doesn’t make sense as an addition this season, though it’s possible he’ll be traded off the Hawks.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Of the three, Hunter and Bey are probably the most interesting, but I wouldn’t give up a future first to take either of them. Hunter for Huerter and a second rounder or Bey for a second rounder plus Kessler Edwards or Chris Duarte would be reasonable, but there’s no reason to break the bank to get these guys.

Jazz Trade Targets

The Jazz don’t need to make a trade this year, but they’ve shown a willingness to deal players (even very good ones) in order to build up a long term championship roster. They’re playing well right now, which could mean they’re less likely to make a move—although a surprisingly strong showing last season didn’t stop them from dealing Mike Conley to the Timberwolves. The Jazz currently sit 10th in the West and are playing well, but they’ve bounced in and out of the play in so far.

Lauri Markkanen

A Kings trade for Lauri Markkanen is a huge long-shot given his talent and the likely cost to get him, but man, would it be fun to watch! It’s the kind of big swing trade that can really raise the team’s ceiling, without having to bet on a player that may be past his prime.

Just 26 years old, Markannen is the type of offensive force that can fit onto basically any team. At seven feet tall, Markkanen is an elite scorer (24.0 points per game) that can space the floor with ease (he’s shooting over 39% from three the last two seasons on heavy volume), and he rarely turns the ball over (1.7 turnovers per game this year). Markkanen scores effectively off of catch and shoots, in transition, off offensive rebounds, and as a cutter, and he’s also able to get downhill to pressure the basket despite not being an particularly good ballhandler. He doesn’t need the ball much to be effective, as he’s getting 12+ shots up per game on touches of under two seconds and hitting over 50% of them.

Even though Markkanen was drafted as a floor-spacing big, during the last two seasons in Utah, he’s also developing into a very good interior scorer. Prior to joining the Jazz, Markkanen scored about 5-6 points in the paint per game, but last season he upped that to 10.2 paint points per game according to NBA.com (he’s holding pretty steady this year at 8.7 paint points per game and keeping his overall scoring numbers up).

Adding Markkanen to the Kings would be an enormous boon offensively, where his scoring prowess would essentially eliminate concerns about the King’s offense struggling when De’Aaron Fox sits. Markkanen’s strong shooting, quick trigger, and ability to score off cuts would make him a fantastic fit with Sabonis, and he’s big enough to play as a pick and roll partner with Fox or Monk when Sabonis sits (even though he hasn’t done that much in Utah). You can even imagine some funky big-big plays where Markkanen plays off of Sabonis dribble hand-offs or runs inverted pick and rolls with him, which would be wild to watch and totally throw off lots of NBA defenses.

Defensively, Markkanen isn’t a ceiling raiser, though he would still probably help the Kings a bit. He has much more size than current forwards Harrison Barnes and Trey Lyles, which would let the Kings add desperately needed length at the rim and rebounding. A starting front line made up of Sabonis, Markkanen, and Keegan Murray would bring a ton of size and rebounding that could be tough for some undersized Western Conference teams like the Clippers and Thunder to deal with.

Obviously everyone knows Markkanen is good, he was an All-Star last year, so the toughest part about getting a deal done for him would be the cost to acquire him. While his age, offensive game, and adaptability would fit perfectly on the Kings, those same factors also make him an attractive player for Utah to build around and for other teams to target, so Utah can wait for a Godfather offer or choose not to move him at all. The Jazz have also historically demanded enormous hauls to trade away players of Markkanen’s caliber: the Donovan Mitchell trade netted the Jazz three young players (Markkanen, Collin Sexton, Ochai Agbaji), three future first rounders, and two first round pick swaps, while the Rudy Gobert trade similarly resulted in the Jazz getting young players (Walker Kessler, Jared Vanderbilt, and Leandro Bolmaro), two veterans (Malik Beasley and Patrick Beverley), three first round picks, and two first round pick swaps.

To get Markkanen, the Kings would have to put together a huge offer. That means they would probably have to give up all of the first round picks they can feasibly make available. To do so, the Kings would have to free up restrictions on the 2024 first round pick owed to the Hawks so that the Kings could trade three first round picks (2026, 2028, and 2030), and they would also potentially have to give the Jazz pick swap rights for some of the years the Kings retain their first rounders (2025, 2027, and 2029).

In addition, to match Markkanen’s $17.3 million salary, the Kings would need to send out at least $9.8 million in salary, which would probably mean trading away either (A) Harrison Barnes, (B) Kevin Huerter, (C) Davion Mitchell and another player, or (D) perhaps most realistically, whatever Utah asks for (within reason). Still, because Markkanen’s salary is relatively low compared to players like Zach Lavine, salary matching alone wouldn’t force the Kings to raid their depth as much.

If the Kings were to deal for Markkanen, they’d be locking in a young, elite offensive core (Markkanen is 26, Fox is 26, Sabonis is 27, and Murray is 23). But the Kings would also probably be limited to this core, and would potentially face steep cap restrictions and luxury tax bills down the line.

Markkanen is on the books for 2024-25 at $18.0 million, but signing him to an extension could easily cost upwards of $40 million per season. The 2024-25 season would be fine: Fox, Markannen, Sabonis, and Murray would combine to have a salary of just under $103.5 million (the salary cap should be around $142 million), but things could get really tight after that—much like with a potential trade for Zach Lavine (discussed above).

If Markkanen were to be extended with a first year starting salary of $45 million, a four player core of Fox/Sabonis/Murray/Markkanen would make about $138.1 million in 2025-26, $176.8 million in 2026-27, and $186.4 million in 2027-28—again, assuming Fox is extended to a max deal (not a supermax) and Murray is extended starting at $30 million. Those figures would be about $9 million higher if Fox signed a supermax, and it’s possible Murray could sign for more than $30 million too.

In other words, with just four players, in 2025-26 the Kings would have only about $18 million in cap room to fill out their roster, although they’d be about $51 million under the luxury tax line. In 2026-27, those four players would put them about $5 million over the cap, with just under $32 million of room below the luxury tax line. In 2027-28, the team would be about $2 million below the cap, with about $43.3 million in luxury tax room. [You can see the projected cap and tax levels in Part 3.]

Those kind of salary cap/luxury tax issues would probably be worthwhile if things panned out with Markkanen and Murray, so it’s hard to fuss too much. Unlike with the Lavine trade, the Kings would also get a chance to see how a core of Fox/Sabonis/Markkanen/Murray functions before they have to commit to any extensions for Fox, Markkanen, and Murray. Putting aside Markkanen’s better fit with the Kings roster, that’s a massive distinction between a trade for Markkanen and Lavine, as the Kings have time to figure out potential cap issues along the way, and they could always unwind a Markkanen deal if it didn’t work out.

Verdict: Only if the price is right, but man it would be fun! I think this one is far-fetched given what the Jazz are likely to ask for in return, but I’d be excited about it if it did happen—this kind of deal could make the Kings the best offensive team in the league. The defense might struggle but hey, how many teams can put up 150? If the Jazz demanded three future firsts and swaps, as they probably will, this doesn’t make sense—but if the price comes down? I’d go for it.

John Collins

It’s much more plausible that the Jazz trade forward John Collins. Collins, now 26 years old, is a 6’9” power forward who the Hawks traded to the Jazz last year in exchange for Rudy Gay and a future second round pick after things didn’t work out in Atlanta. The Hawks wanted to get out of Collins’ contract, which pays him a little over $26 million a year through 2025-26 assuming he exercises his player option in the last year of the deal.

Collins is a bit polarizing as a player and in recent years he hasn’t quite played to his ceiling. He is talented, athletic, and has the ability to score at the rim, get to the line, hit threes, rebound, and contest shots. Although Collins doesn’t really create a ton of offense for himself and he’s not a great distributor, he excels at finishing at the basket (he’s a career 75%+ shooter from within 3 feet according to Basketball Reference) and has been a solid floor spacer most years, even if he’s not an elite shooter like Markkanen. He’s a career 35.6% three point shooter on relatively low volume (about 3 to 3.5 threes per game)—he’s managed to pull his shooting back up to his career average after dropping to under 30% last season, which may have been attributable to an ugly finger injury.

Collins has some attributes that would be helpful aside from his scoring. He’s pretty good on the glass, sporting a career rebounding rate is 14.9%, though that has waned a bit in recent years as he’s become less active on the offensive glass in particular. And even though he’s not a true rim protector, Collins does provide some shot blocking, averaging more than 1.0 blocks per game each year of his career but one. Early in his career, Collins also graded out as a reasonable defensive player. According to Dunks and Threes, Collins posted defensive EPMs between -0.4 and 1.3 for his first five years in the league. But this year, he’s dropped off dramatically, to the point where it’s a significant concern. His defensive EPM per Dunks and Threes has dropped to -2.1 and his defensive rating has dropped all the way to 121.3 per NBA.com.

Overall, Collins could bring scoring, rebounding, and athleticism to the Kings’ front court, though the team would take a step back in terms of shooting and passing. At this year’s defensive performance levels, Collins would be a step backward, but I do think there’s a good chance he can recover his form since this year’s defensive numbers are an outlier for him.

Given the Jazz got Collins for peanuts just last year (basically a second round pick), it’s doubtful that the Kings would have to pay a ton of draft capital to obtain him—perhaps as little as a protected first or a couple second rounders. To match Collins’ $25.3 million salary this year, though, the Kings would also have to be willing to deal players. Likely, the Kings would send out Harrison Barnes ($17 million) and another player with some untapped potential like Davion Mitchell ($6.4 million) or another back-end player like Chris Duarte ($4.1 million). Such a trade would net the Jazz some pick equity, a flier on Mitchell, and some cap flexibility in 2025-26. The Kings would lose some cap flexibility and lineup versatility at guard in particular, but they’d still have the ability to go after other trade targets, too. Alternatively, the Kings could try to send out Huerter ($15.7 million) instead of Barnes.

I think trading for Collins would be a smart shot to take, although it’s not a “must” by any means. He’s not an obvious part of Utah’s future plans because he overlaps positionally with Markkanen, Utah’s best player, and they have Walker Kessler at center. As a result, the price to get Collins could be pretty reasonable if Utah doesn’t see him as part of its future. His game should work well with Fox and Sabonis, and he would provide the Kings with better size, athleticism, and rebounding, and could provide some defensive help inside as well. But the Kings need to believe he will continue to rebound well and recover some of his defensive form, otherwise a deal doesn’t make sense. You can’t pay $25-26 million for the next three years for Collins if he’s going to play bottom-of-the-league level defense.

Giving up Barnes or Huerter would hurt a bit, but Mitchell and Duarte barely play, and sacrificing a protected first or some second round picks to raise the team’s ceiling seems worthwhile. At the same time, the Kings would only be adding about $2 million in salary in 2024-25 and $7.6 million in 2025-26, but those seasons will be before extensions for Fox and Murray would kick in anyway. Plus, even though Collins would be overpaid, he’ll still be in his prime and his contract isn’t so big that there would be no market for him if the Kings need to get out of the deal down the road.

The Kings could make a trade for Collins even more desirable by trying to add Kris Dunn to the deal. I’ll discuss Dunn more below.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Barnes + Duarte + a protected future first rounder (or various seconds) seems like a fine deal, and the Kings could even go up a bit from there if needed. If the Jazz demand Mitchell, I’d want to also try to get Kris Dunn in the deal to keep some defense, even though that could add to the price.

Kris Dunn

Dunn is a 29 year old point guard known for his defensive prowess. Dunn never developed into a strong offensive player and his shooting is pretty suspect, but he offers very good perimeter defense. Although only about 6’3”, Dunn has very good length and he’s physically strong enough to hold up at the point of attack against most guards. For the Kings, this would pair well with Fox and Monk, who can struggle with more powerful guards. Dunn would provide the defensive help that the team hoped to get from Davion Mitchell, but in a bigger package that more readily compliments Fox in particular on defense.

Offensively, Dunn really wouldn’t provide much help. He’s essentially a non-factor from the perimeter, as he takes just over 1.5 threes per game this season and he is a career 32% shooter from three. He’s also doesn’t break down defenses off the dribble or provide significant playmaking, though thankfully he doesn’t hold on to the ball too much either. Still, because the Kings run so much of their offense through Fox, Sabonis, and Monk, the Kings wouldn’t be asking him to create offense—the only real compromise would be to spacing, which the Kings already have to give up when they play Duarte or Mitchell anyway.

Dunn is on the last year of his contract and his salary for this year is just $2.5 million, so he’s not likely to be a long-term answer for the Kings and they shouldn’t give up a ton to get him. But he would help improve the defense and offer alternate line-ups against teams with attacking guards that are too big for Fox (for example, the Timberwolves, Thunder, and Clippers). The Jazz have Keyonte George, Collin Sexton, Jordan Clarkson, and Ochai Agbaji on longer contracts, so they don’t have much reason to hold onto Dunn past the deadline, so the cost to acquire him or add him to a deal for John Collins shouldn’t be high.

Verdict: Do it (assuming the Kings can’t get Caruso or Finney-Smith)! A small deal for Dunn or a combo deal for Collins and Dunn would both help the Kings improve in the near term and set them up well for the next couple of seasons.

Nets Trade Targets

The Nets have fallen into a hole. Since the start of December, they’re 7-18 and have dropped out of the play in, which would counsel in favor of a reset. But they don’t control most of their own first round picks as a result of the James Harden trade two years ago, so they don’t have a strong incentive to strip the roster down to the studs and hope for a better draft pick. They don’t seem desperate to do deadline deals even though they perhaps should be more willing to consider offers.

Mikal Bridges / Cam Johnson

The prime trade target on the Nets is undoubtedly Mikal Bridges, but all indications are that he isn’t likely to be available based on recent reports. I won’t spend a ton of time on Bridges, but he would be a pretty stellar get for the Kings as he is only 27 years old and offers high-quality perimeter defense and strong shooting at a pretty reasonable contract price—$23.3 million next season and $24.9 million in 2025-26. He’s over-extended as a lead scorer in Brooklyn, as reflected by his dip in efficiency and their inability to win games, but he would be a great fit alongside Fox, Sabonis, and Murray because he would offer better scoring than Huerter, similar shooting capability, and dramatically improved defense. Alas, the Nets probably won’t trade him, and the Kings would probably have to move a Markkanen level package to get him anyway. But we can always dream!

Cam Johnson would also be a great trade target for the Kings, although less appealing than Bridges. Johnson is also 27 years old and on a reasonable 4 year, $94.5 million contract. He’s a little bigger than Bridges, and though he is a solid defender, he’s not as versatile defending the perimeter. But Johnson can absolutely stroke it from three point range, where he’s a career 39.3% shooter, so he can find minutes on any roster. Johnson would be able to replace Barnes in the starting line up and offer a bit better defense at the power forward position. Given Brooklyn just signed Johnson to an extension and has given no indication they want to move him, he’s also a pretty far-fetched trade target and not worth spending a lot of time on. But if the Kings could get him for a deal centered around a future first round pick, a trade would be worth considering.

Verdict: Only if the price is right (and it probably won’t be).

Dorian Finney-Smith

Even though the Nets probably won’t deal Bridges or Johnson, there’s been smoke about teams inquiring about the availability of Dorian Finney-Smith (including the Kings).

Finney-Smith is a relatively unheralded player, but he’s a popular trade target for teams ahead of the deadline this year. At 6’8” and 220 pounds, Finney-Smith plays high-quality defense, is versatile enough to guard wings and power forwards effectively, and knocks down threes at a solid clip (37.8% this year and 35.9% for his career). Each of the past six seasons, Finney-Smith has posted Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus scores of at least 0.6 per Dunks and Threes, which confirms what you see on film: Finney-Smith is good at defense.

Because he plays solid defense and hit threes, Finney-Smith is the type of player who can find a role on any team. Adding Finney-Smith would give the Kings two plus perimeter defenders (with Keegan Murray), and provide a lot of versatility and pick-and-roll switchability on defense, which is extremely valuable in the postseason. Finney-Smith won’t provide much in terms of offense, but he’s a good enough shooter that he wouldn’t compromise the Kings’ floor spacing the way that a player like Kris Dunn would.

The contract situation for Finney-Smith is also pretty reasonable. He’s got three years left in his deal (the last of which is a player option) at $13.9 million this year, $14.9 million next year, and $15.4 million in 2025-26—not exactly a bargain basement prices, but definitely favorable. The Kings could do a deal for Finney-Smith by sending out draft compensation and one of Harrison Barnes ($17 million), Kevin Huerter ($15.7 million), or Trey Lyles ($8 million). Sending out just Lyles and a draft pick would let the Kings improve on the floor defensively and only sacrifice some size in backup line-ups; the Nets, meanwhile, would save money and get pick compensation.

Verdict: Do it (if no Caruso deal), and be willing to overpay a little! A Finney-Smith trade is pretty appealing given his reasonable contract and defensive capabilities. He would give the Kings a second plus defender with versatility, which would allow them to improve their perimeter defense and expand the ways they can play in the playoffs, all at a reasonable cost. If the Kings can get Finney-Smith for Lyles and some second round picks, I’d be ecstatic. I’d be willing to send out a first round pick too, but would want to add some protections. Getting much beyond that starts to get too pricey though, given Finney-Smith isn’t an All-Defense level player like Caruso and his offense is pretty limited.

Royce O’Neal / Lonnie Walker IV / Spencer Dinwiddie / Nic Claxton

The Nets also have a few other players who might be helpful to the Kings ahead of the trade deadline. None of them are likely to dramatically change the Kings’ playoff prospects on their own, but they could be part of a trade package that brings some defense and bench depth to the Kings. These are solid players who have roles on a functional NBA roster, but they’re only worth pursuing if they can be obtained at a reasonable price.

There have been a handful of rumors about the Kings being interested in Royce O’Neal, alongside Finney-Smith. O’Neal is solid defender, but at just 6’6”, he’s on the smaller side for a forward. On top of that, he is already 30 years old, a pending free agent, and offensively doesn’t offer much but hitting open threes (he’s a career 38% three point shooter). On his own, O’Neal probably doesn’t warrant a trade for much. That said, O’Neal has a $9.5 million salary for a contract that expires this off-season, so the Kings might be able to snag him for little more than a salary match and a second rounder, or add him to a potential trade for another Nets player. He would offer the Kings some defensive versatility, but I don’t think he’s good enough to get too excited about on his own.

In a lot of ways, Lonnie Walker IV is presents a similar trade scenario to Royce O’Neal. He’s also on an expiring deal, though at a salary of only $2 million. Walker IV is a better shooter and scorer than O’Neal, but he’s more of a traditional guard and offers pretty average defense overall. He’s not a player the Kings should target as a stand-alone, but if they do a deal with the Nets, he could be an interesting piece to pull into the deal to help bolster the Kings bench without incurring a big expense.

Spencer Dinwiddie is the best offensive player of this bunch, but he’s having a bit of an odd season overall. On the one hand, he’s a 30 year old guard who has never established a clear identity as a point guard or shooting guard. His shooting has also been awful (just 39.7% from the field and 33.2% from three this season). On the other hand, the Nets are about 3 points better with Dinwiddie on the court this season (per PBP Stats) and advanced metrics suggest he’s an above average player on both offense and defense. At the end of the day, Dinwiddie offers some reasonable scoring ability and shot creation (even if it’s inefficient at times) and decent perimeter defense. He’s also on an expiring contract and the Nets probably aren’t in a rush to bring him back given his age and positional ambiguity, so he can probably be had for cheap. The Kings would have to send out at least $13.8 million in salary to get Dinwiddie, and because they don’t have have that much in expiring salary (other than Malik Monk) that the Nets might want, they would probably ending up sending Brooklyn draft picks to get a deal done. Sending picks out for Dinwiddie is a little hard to swallow given the Kings needs, so presumably a deal for him won’t happen unless it’s part of a bigger trade. He would bring the ability to stabilize the Kings offense when Fox sits, though, so it’s OK to keep him on the radar.

Nic Claxton would be an interesting add for the Kings, although it’s pretty unlikely the Nets would actually part ways with him and he would be a short-term rental given he is in the last year of his cotract. Claxton is a 24 year old, 6’11” center, and he brings strong rim protection and shot blocking, effective rebounding, and a solid offensive game predicated on transition offense and rim-running. Claxton’s athleticism would make him a viable part of the Kings’ transition offense, but he’s a non-shooter, so it’s hard to envision how he would play with Sabonis right now. That, combined with the pending expiration of Claxton’s contract, makes him an imperfect fit for the Kings this year. The Nets also haven’t given any reason to think they want to deal Claxton, so he’s probably staying put anyway.

Verdict: Small deals for O’Neal or Walker IV would be good, but pass on Dinwiddie and Claxton unless it’s a bargain.

Blazers Trade Targets

Whether they acknowledge it or not, the Blazers went into rebuilding mode when they traded Damian Lillard this past offseason. Their record reflects that, as their 13-33 record is fifth worst in the NBA. They’ve retained some veteran players anyway in the hopes for a quick turnaround, but given the age of their future core and performance on the court so far, that’s probably wishful thinking. This team is probably 2-3 years away from competing meaningfully, but you wouldn’t know that looking at how they’ve allocated their resources. They should be looking to make deals to get future assets and young players, and to get off of some of their higher-priced vets.

Jerami Grant

Jerami Grant is a perplexing player to me. He’s an athletic forward with great size and length (standing 6’7” with a huge 7’3” wingspan), he can score, he moves well defensively, and he fills up the stat sheet. He’s averaging 21.1 points, 3.6 rebounds, 2.6 assists, 0.7 steals, and 0.8 blocks per game with good shooting numbers: 45.9% from the field, 41.0% from three, and 79.8 from the line. He can score at all three levels and has the length, athleticism, and quickness to guard a range of positions defensively.

But his impact on the game too often feels too marginal. He’s not quite a looter in a riot, but Grant’s lofty numbers have come during four straight seasons on completely uncompetitive teams. Advanced metrics don’t paint a particularly rosy picture for Grant either. Now in his tenth season, Grant’s career Box Plus/Minus (per Basketball Reference) is just -0.4, and he’s never posted a BPM over 1.2; Dunks and Threes Estimated Plus-Minus tells a similar story, as Grant routinely grades out as an above average player, but nowhere near a star.

But Grant is certainly paid a lot like a star, in fact he just signed a 5 year, $160 million contract this off-season—borderline All-Star money. He’s never really lived up to that billing.

Still, Grant has some skills that would definitely help the Kings roster, and he wouldn’t have to be the best player on the team (he’s been miscast as a lead scorer in Detroit and Portland, although in fairness that is because he chose that purposefully).

Offensively, Grant is a versatile scorer who can knock down threes (36.3% from three for his career) and get to the rim, and he does a good job of getting to the free throw line (5.3 free throws per game). Although Grant can be a little sticky with the ball, he’s a substantially better scorer than Barnes, and he can get to his shots in a variety of different ways. Playing with Sabonis and Fox, it’s also likely that Grant’s efficiency would improve—he’s a little stifled on a Portland team that lacks consistent offensive threats and outside shooting.

Defensively, Grant would add a ton of length to the Kings’ front court. His 7’3” wingspan is enormous and he’s athletic enough to make a good impact defensively. These are things the Kings would benefit from in particular, as Keegan Murray is the only guy they have on defense with size, length, and the ability to defend out on the perimeter.

Unfortunately, Grant’s defensive performance can disappear at times and he’s not going to be a defensive tone-setter. It’s hard to blame him too much, as he’s played the past for years in Detroit and Portland, where defense is more of an option that an objective. Still, Grant has the tools to be an effective defender and he flashes it at times. The Kings would need Grant to lock in consistently on defense and bring intensity there on every possession, which he hasn’t done regularly since his early years in Oklahoma City. They would also need him to improve his rebounding, which has been a weakness in recent years despite Grant’s impressive physical ability.

Grant’s new contract has a few important effects on any potential trade. First, it means that Portland just recently decided they wanted to keep him for the long term, so getting a deal done might be challenging. Second, it makes salary matching difficult. Grant is getting paid just under $27.6 million this year, which means the Kings would need to send back about $20.1 million in salary to effectuate a trade. Doing so would require the Kings to give up either Barnes ($17 million) or Huerter ($15.7 million), plus another player like Mitchell, Duarte, or Lyles. That’s OK, and giving up Huerter or Barnes would mitigate the impact of taking back Grant’s substantial contract, but the team needs to keep in mind that Grant is already 29 years old—his current deal is going to take him into age 34 (assuming he exercises his player option in the last year of the deal, which he probably will).

Grant’s contract was probably a bit of an overpay the moment he signed it due to his age and come-and-go defense. But Portland probably won’t see it that way; the Blazers aren’t looking to get off Grant’s salary, so they will demand draft picks on top of whatever players come back in a trade. That makes doing a deal tricky, since Grant doesn’t live up to his defensive capabilities consistently enough to warrant giving up a lot of future draft capital.

Verdict: Only if the price is right (it probably won’t be).

Malcom Brogdon

Malcolm Brogdon plays ugly basketball, and I love it. He’s kind of slow, a little bit ground-bound, and plays a herky-jerky style that doesn’t look super great on film, but he can hoop!

Brogdon is a 31 year old point guard that plays an efficient, if not particularly appealing brand of basketball. At about 6’5” and 220 pounds, he uses his size effectively to bully his way to his spots offensively, even if it’s not particularly fast. He can drive reasonably well and is a knock-down shooter from distance, hitting 42.2% of his threes this season and 39.1% for his career. Brogdon also can run a reasonable NBA offense in most situations. He’s a good distributor who averages 5.3 assists per game and just 1.5 turnovers, and he has the ability to get to pick and rolls if all else fails offensively, although it’s not something he should do all the time.

Defensively, Brogdon does a good job of using his strength to stay in front of defenders. He lacks foot speed, so he can get beat by the league’s faster guards, but he has enough size and savvy to do a solid job defensively. Per Dunks and Threes, Brodgon’s been a slightly above average defender for his career—and he’s carrying a slightly above average 0.1 Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus this year (that’s in the 61st percentile of defenders).

Brogdon is in the first year of a two-year deal that pays him $45 million. While that salary is reasonable, the situation in Portland isn’t. Brogdon makes virtually no sense on the Blazers given their team’s timeline and the need for Scoot Henderson to develop as a playmaker and lead ball handler. He’s expensive veteran leadership, but he is also taking away minutes from the young players that the Blazers need to develop. The Blazers ought to be looking to deal him.

That presents an opportunity for the Kings. Sacramento could offer Huerter, who is also on a reasonable 4 year, $65 million dollar deal. Huerter is younger than Brogdon at just 25, so he’s more in line with the Blazer’s overall timeline. Plus, Huerter plays a complimentary offensive role that benefit the Blazers by allowing Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe to play with the ball in their hands. They’d be taking on more salary overall, but that’s a good thing given the Blazers aren’t likely to be competitive this year or next regardless.

For the Kings, Brogdon would provide better ball-handling and a reasonable back-up point guard option to Fox. There are too many times that the Kings offense gets sloppy with Fox out of the game in particular, and Brogdon’s methodical, careful style would be a good way to calm those situations down and take pressure off of Malik Monk and Sabonis to run all of the offense when Fox sits. And because Brogdon is a good shooter, swapping him for Huerter wouldn’t hurt the Kings much from a floor-spacing perspective.

Defensively, adding Brogdon would give the Kings another option to deal with bigger guards that can be tough for Fox, Monk, or Davion Mitchell to handle (a theme of this post). No one is going to confuse Brogdon for a defensive stopper at this point in his career, but he’d still offer some improvement in on-ball defense over Huerter, who gets beat on far too many straight line drives. It’s not a cure, but it would be an improvement.

Verdict: Worth it at a bargain price. If the Kings can get Brogdon for Huerter, perhaps adding a second round pick, it would improve their prospects this year. There’s a legitimate question of whether the improvement would be big enough for the Kings to make a run in the playoffs, but it would shore up their ability to get to the postseason and give them more lineup options. Other deals that don’t require giving up Huerter to bolster the team’s defense may be better long-term though, so this wouldn’t be my first choice.

Matisse Thybulle

Thybulle is definitely a defensive stopper. Although he’s only 6’5”, he has great length, strength, and athleticism, and he plays a hyper-intelligent game on defense. He gets his hands in passing lanes, always seems to play his help responsibilities correctly, and can effectively guard almost any 1 through 3 in the NBA without resorting to fouling. Four of out five seasons in the NBA, Thybulle has graded out as a 95th percentile or better defender according to Dunks and Threes, which is absolutely consistent with what you see watching him play (this year is a bit of an anomaly, as Thybulle’s defense rates in the 77th percentile).

The problem is on offense, where Thybulle offers almost nothing. As good as he’s been defensively, Thybulle’s offense has consistently ranked in the bottom quartile of players per Dunks and Threes. He doesn’t attack the basket, he doesn’t drive, he doesn’t cut, and he’s not a particularly adept passer, so it’s not like he keeps the offense moving all the time. He only really shoots when he’s wide open, but at least he’s managed to up his three point percentage in the last couple of years to 37.3% this year and 38.8% last year (he shoots 34.3% for his career). That’s made him more playable on offense, as he can at least provide some spacing, but it’s not like he’s turned himself into a threat as a floor spacer.

At age 26, Thybulle is still in his prime. There’s a chance he continues to develop his jumper, but at the moment he doesn’t fit well with Portland, which has a bevy of young guards and small forwards that need to get time on the floor. I’ve already mentioned Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe, but Portland also drafted 19 year old Rayan Rupert hoping he’d be a defensive stopper in the future, and Kris Murray should get time given the success his brother Keegan has had too. They should be willing to part with Thybulle for a reasonable cost.

Thybulle is on a 3 year, just under $33.1 million deal that runs through 2025-26 if he exercises his player option in the last year. That’s a pretty fair contract that the Kings could carry with their core. Thybulle won’t provide anything on the offensive end that the team doesn’t already have, but he could fill the role of “break glass when needed” defensive stopper much more effectively than Chris Duarte and Kessler Edwards do, without much difference on the offensive end. Thybulle probably wouldn’t see huge minutes on the Kings, but for the handful of stretches per game when the Kings absolutely need stops, he would be a great option to have available.

Thybulle’s $10.5 million salary this year means the Kings could send out a small salary like Davion Mitchell’s or Chris Duarte’s, plus Kessler Edwards and a future second rounder (or slightly more) to get him. That would be absolutely worth it in my mind.

Verdict: Do it (if there’s no deal for Caruso or Finney-Smith). The Kings should make a run at Thybulle, especially if they can’t get Alex Caruso from the Bulls or Dorian Finney-Smith from the Nets. The Kings could trade any two of Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, and Kessler Edwards, plus a future second, and probably get this done. That would improve their roster options for this year without sacrificing players that are going to be around long term (I would miss absolutely Davion and try to avoid dealing him, for the record). They could also try to target both Brogdon and Thybulle, but getting salaries to match would be a bit tricky there—the Kings would need to send out Huerter or Barnes plus a couple other players just to make it work, which is probably too much.

Wizards Trade Targets

The Wizards are struggggggling. They’re not fun to watch, they don’t really compete, and they have only one player on the team that I would be excited about having on the team long-term, rookie Bilal Coulibaly (Deni Avdija also has some talent and will probably also be part of the long-term squad). They have a couple veterans on the roster that could contribute to other teams and the Wizards should be looking to deal them for whatever they can.

Kyle Kuzma

Kyle Kuzma has been linked to the Kings for quite a while at this point; there were rumors the team wanted to sign him in free agency, and several years ago, the Kings almost sent Buddy Hield to the Lakers for Kuzma.

I’ve never been a huge Kuzma fan (he feels too much like empty calories, but that might be my anti-Laker bias), but he offers some definite upgrades for the Kings. Kuzma is a 28 year old, 6’9” stretch power forward who is averaging 22 points, 6.5 rebounds, and 4.4 assists per game, which are good numbers. Kuzma flashes a ton of talent on offense, as he can create his own shots, attack the paint against slower forwards, spread the floor, and move the ball, and his numbers reflect that. But at the same time, imagining Kuzma as a key part of a good team offensively requires some projection. Kuzma’s shooting numbers are just OK (45.7% from the floor, 33.3% from three, and 78.9% from the line) and he can get a little loose with the ball on offense. He also takes his fair share of ill-advised shots and he can be prone to watching the action when he’s off the ball. Those are fixable issues, but they’ve shown up often in Kuzma’s seven year career.

On the defensive end, Kuzma is athletic and stout enough to guard fours and some fives, but other than a surprise showing last year, he’s typically been about average defensively. Dunks and Threes rates his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus at just -1.7 this year, but that’s down from a career high 1.4 last year, and even down from previous years where he graded out around the middle of the league. Advanced metrics aside, Kuzma’s effort is rarely consistent defensively, and no one is going to confuse him for a stalwart on that end of the floor.

Yet for the Kings, Kuzma offers a clear ceiling-raising opportunity. He’s got enough offensive talent that he can provide meaningful firepower and play with either Fox or Sabonis on the floor. If the Kings were to unlock his willingness to move without the ball and cut to the basket, and get him to be more selective in the shots he takes, there’s a good chance his shooting numbers could improve significantly. He also brings more size and rebounding than the Kings’ current options at power forward (Barnes and Lyles), while shooting well enough to keep the floor spaced. If Kuzma can regain last year’s defensive form, he’d provide a significant improvement over Barnes and Lyles, too.

Kuzma’s talent and favorable contract means that the Kings will have to give up a hefty sum to get him. Kuzma’s getting paid $25.6 million this year during the first year of a four year, $90 million deal that declines year over year. That makes Kuzma’s contract quite valuable; by the last year of Kuzma’s contract, he will be 31 years old and be getting paid just $19.4 million, a very reasonable sum.

Just to make a deal for Kuzma work, the Kings would need to send the Wizards at least $18.1 million in salary. Practically speaking, this would mean trading away either Barnes or Huerter and a back-end rotation player like Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, or Sasha Vezenkov (there’s a world in which the Kings could trade Monk too, but that seems unlikely and probably not worth it for anyone involved). The Kings would also probably have to send at least one first round pick to the Wizards given that Huerter or Barnes won’t actually save them salary or give them a long-term piece they covet.

Verdict: Reluctant yes, if the price is right. I would personally be a little sad if the Kings traded Barnes, Davion Mitchell, and a future first for Kuzma—I like rooting for Dave, and Barnes brings a calm veteran presence that Kuzma won’t replicate. But I can’t dispute that adding Kuzma would improve the team’s potential and raise the heights they could get to in the playoffs. And Kuzma’s favorable contract structure also brings solid value going forward. That said, Washington isn’t going to be forced into a deal here given they just re-signed Kuzma, so they may try to demand a lot of draft capital in a deal. I would be super wary of that. Giving up multiple first rounders for Kuzma seems like an overpay that the Kings should avoid.

Tyus Jones

Tyus Jones is the type of veteran point guard that announcers love and teams often covet. There will definitely be interest in Jones from numerous playoff contenders as we head toward the trade deadline. But he’s also a pending free agent in the second year of a two year, $29 million deal, which caps how much the Wizards could get back for him in a trade.

Jones is undersized at around 6’1”, and he’s not a premier athlete. But he plays a very controlled and efficient offensive game centered on making the right decision all of the time, without fail, that can fit in well on almost any roster. He’s a good passer and ball handler, he rarely turns the ball over, and he has turned himself into a strong shooter (he’s over 50% from the floor and hitting a career high 41.4% of his threes). Jones isn’t going to burn people off of the dribble or attack the rim, but he does make the right reads and can run an efficient offense.

Defensively, Jones’ lack of size and athleticism really limits his potential. He doesn’t make a lot of mistakes on defense, but he doesn’t have the physical tools to really bother talented guards. He can be shot over and beaten off the dribble, and he’s not quite strong enough to hold up against big guards/forwards. The net result is Jones provides average to slightly below average defense, consistent with his career Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus, which has been between -1.8 and 0.7 for his career.

Jones would offer the Kings a reliable backup point guard to handle the minutes that Fox sits. Adding him would keep shooting on the floor and let Malik Monk give up some on-ball responsibility, which can be important during the occasional stretches where Monk starts to get wild with the ball. Jones could also work with Sabonis to get to an effective pick and roll offense when nothing else is working—Jones runs about 4.6 pick and rolls a game and generates 1.06 points per possession as the ball handler per NBA.com.

Jones is paid $14 million this season, so to get him the Kings would probably need to send out either Huerter, Monk, or Davion Mitchell + another player. Given Jones’ pending free agency, the return doesn’t seem worth sending Monk or Huerter out the door, so a deal involving Mitchell + Chris Duarte/Kessler Edwards/Javale McGee/Alex Len seems far more appealing for the Kings. But that would cost the Kings quite a bit on the defensive end and would limit the types of line-ups they could roll out in the playoffs. Plus, other than maybe Mitchell, it’s hard to see the Wizards really valuing any of those players in return. Thus, given there probably will be a solid market for Jones at the deadline, the Kings would likely have to give up a future pick (probably a second) to get a deal done.

Verdict: Pass on Jones. The Kings would have to give up too much to get Jones, including players that matter to the team’s line-up flexibility this year. Adding Jones would help settle the Kings down offensively when Fox sits, but Jones probably isn’t good enough to make the Kings’ late game line-ups, and it would cost the Kings in terms of defensive flexibility. I like Jones as a player, but this one doesn’t make a ton of sense.

Hornets Trade Targets

The Hornets are one of the NBA’s most forgotten teams. They’re not as bad as the Pistons or Wizards, so nobody really harps on them. They’ve also suffered from a ton of injuries, including to their only star player LaMelo Ball, so they’re not that interesting to watch either. Ball led the Hornets to 43 wins just a couple seasons ago, and young players like Brandon Miller and Mark Williams (if he can stay healthy) look like they can form part of a healthy core going forward. Everybody else should be tradeable, as the Hornets showed last week by dealing Terry Rozier to the Heat for Kyle Lowry (who probably won’t play for them) and a protected first rounder.

Miles Bridges

I’m going to preface this by saying Miles Bridges has been accused of several heinous acts of domestic violence and pleaded no contest to felony domestic violence charges in 2022. He missed the entirety of last season and was given a 30 game suspension by the NBA as a result (he was credited with 20 games for missing last year and missed another 10 games to start this season). He’s also been recently arrested just last October for allegedly violating a protection order, threatening his ex-girlfriend, and throwing pool balls at her car with children in the vehicle. That hasn’t been adjudicated yet, but the allegations are bad.

As a defense lawyer by trade, I’m generally in favor of second chances, but I am not in favor of trading for Bridges based on his off-the-court behavior alone. I’ll reserve judgement on the latest arrest warrant, but it is absolutely something to be concerned about. The repeat nature of the domestic violence allegations and Bridges’ lack of public contrition are dealbreakers for me (even though I understand why he isn’t talking about these issues publicly). I want to state that up front.

I’ll go through the on-court piece quickly. At 25 years old, Bridges has all the tools to be a hugely productive SF/PF in the modern NBA. He’s just 6’7” but he has a powerful, 225+ pound frame; he’s a better athlete than the vast majority of NBA players; he’s an effective three-level scorer; he rebounds at a high level for his position; he keeps the ball moving on offense. Advanced metrics paint him as an above average defender, too. Dunks and Threes gives him a Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus of about 0.0, which is the 64th percentile, and you could imagine that figure improving if he were on a more competitive team and gave more consistent effort.

Bridges is the kind of on-court player that the Kings would really benefit from adding, as his skill set would improve their defense and rebounding without sacrifice much offensively. But it’s impossible to ignore that the only reason Bridges is theoretically available is because of his off-court actions. Players like him don’t normally become available at age 25 otherwise.

Bridges’ off-court issues have also put him into a difficult contract situation that makes trading for him very challenging even if the Kings were willing to give him a second chance. Bridges signed a 1 year, $7.9 million contract this off-season following his no contest plea, missed season, and lengthy suspension. We don’t need to cover all of the rules surrounding one-year deals, but there are a few important points that stem from Bridges signing that deal:

• Bridges can veto trades;

• Bridges’ Bird rights won’t travel to any team that trades for him (the details of Bird rights aren’t important here, but I described the concept in part two already); and

• Because teams trading for Bridges will not have Bird rights, they would only be able to re-sign him using cap space or a cap exception—for example, the largest available cap exception is the non-taxpayer midlevel exception (which I discussed in part three), which was only $12.4 million this season.

These factors combined would make it very hard for the Kings to pull off a deal for Bridges even if they wanted to. The Kings are already over the cap next season, so they’d be limited to re-signing Bridges with a cap exception. The most they could even theoretically offer Bridges is a contract with a starting salary of about $12.4 million (the non-taxpayer MLE should go up slightly next season) and 5% annual raises. It’s hard to know what the market for Bridges will be like as a free agent given his off-court issues, but that is probably the floor of what Bridges will seek in free agency (he was looking at a contract worth upwards of $25 million a year before the domestic violence issues came to light).

In all likelihood, Bridges wouldn’t agree to a trade to a team with no cap space like the Kings. Even if Bridges didn’t veto a deal, the Kings wouldn’t have any way to ensure they could re-sign him next season, which significantly limits how much the Kings could justify giving up in a trade. Add to that the off-the-court issues and PR nightmare that would result from dealing for Bridges, and there’s just no way to make a trade for Bridges make sense.

Verdict: Don’t even think about it.

PJ Washington

Charlotte does have a more desirable trade target on its roster in 25 year old, 6’7” power forward PJ Washington. He’s on the short side for his position, but he’s a good athlete who can play with force on offense and defense, though he needs to bring that force much more consistently.

Washington brings solid versatility on the offensive end. He’s a decent three point shooter (just 34.8% this year, but he shoots 36.3% from three for his career) and knows that he needs to shoot from distance to be at his most valuable, so he focuses on those shots. He’s strong and athletic for his size, so he can hit a high percentage on shots inside 10 feet and threaten on the offensive glass. But he lacks the handle and creativity to really get quality interior shots on his own, and he doesn’t have a back-to-the-basket game to lean on to otherwise generate consistent interior scoring himself.

Defensively, Washington has the strength to hold up against most forwards and be an adequate rebounder for his position. He doesn’t offer a ton of rim protection, but he still posts decent block rates and he does a reasonable job of keeping his hands active and generating steals. Most years, he’s graded out well as a defender, though it is notable that this season his Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has dropped to below average this year at just -1.2, per Dunks and Threes.

Washington signed a 3 year, $46.5 million contract this off-season that actually declines year over year. That’s a pretty favorable contract that offers a good value opportunity if Washington can return to his defensive form from previous seasons. To acquire Washington, the Kings could send out either Barnes or Huerter, whose salaries come pretty close to matching Washington’s $16.9 million salary for this season. Barnes doesn’t really make sense for Charlotte, but they might benefit from adding a floor spacer like Huerter. There are a few other salary matching alternatives given the Kings would only need to send out about $9.35 million in salary. The Kings could trade some combination of Trey Lyles ($8 million), Sasha Vezenkov ($6.3 million), Javale McGee ($5.7 million), Davion Mitchell ($5.1 million), and Chris Duarte ($4.1 million) and the deal could work.

Charlotte would presumably seek draft compensation back too. The Hornets don’t need to trade Washington and his contract is not massive, so they’re probably going to want meaningful draft compensation—like a first round pick or multiple seconds—regardless of what players come back to them in a deal. How much draft capital they’d be willing to take will depend on how much interest Washington draws ahead of the deadline, whether the salary they get back is expiring (e.g., McGee), and whether they think younger players they get back like Mitchell or Duarte have future value. Given Charlotte probably will end up keeping Bridges next year (they’re the only team that has already taken the PR hit from having him on the roster and the only one that has Bird rights), they will have a good amount of front court depth already, and might be willing to part with Washington in favor of finding guards to supplemental Ball, Miller, and maybe Nick Smith Jr., also a first round pick this year.

Verdict: Only if it’s a bargain—and don’t give up anything unprotected! I think Washington would be a better defensive fit for the Kings than current starter Harrison Barnes. While he suffers from some of the same flaws defensively as Barnes (lack of size/length and little rim protection), he is a better athlete and rebounder. Washington can hold up a little better than Barnes against quicker forwards, he does a better job of handling pick and roll defense, and he offers a little bit more as a rebounder. There would definitely be a step-back in shooting, but Washington is good enough as a shooter and active enough on offense to hopefully mitigate the impact. That said, this isn’t a home run deal, and getting a trade done probably means the Kings would end up with two undersized forwards: Washington and Barnes. Thus, a trade only really makes sense if you can work out the right deal and not overpay in terms of future draft equity. If the Kings could send out Trey Lyles, Chris Duarte, and multiple second rounders, a deal could make sense as a “diet” version of a trade for Kyle Kuzma.

Raptors Trade Targets

The Raptors have gone into sale mode already, as they’ve already moved on from two of their best players in OG Anounoby and Pascal Siakam. They still have a couple players on the roster who are pretty obvious trade candidates, so there’s a good chance they do at least one more deal. They’ve shown at least some preference for on-court fits, but they did take picks back for Siakam. Either way, their best trade candidates have either already been traded or are effectively untouchable (Scottie Barnes and Immanuel Quickley ain’t going anywhere).

Gary Trent Jr.

Gary Trent Jr. is the most obvious next trade candidate for Toronto given he’s a pending free agent.

Trent Jr. is a 6’5” shooting guard whose calling card is his three point shooting. He’s a career 38.7% three point shooter on good volume (the last four seasons, he’s taken between 10.5 and 11.6 threes per 100 possessions), and most teams can find a place for that kind of floor spacer. Trent plays to his strengths and stays within himself. He understands that his job is to create space, play off of more prolific scorers, and not turn the ball over—he plays that role well.

Trent Jr. is also capable of playing effective defense, though he’s slipped a bit this season. He’s never been elite on defense, but when Trent Jr. locks in, he does a good job of chasing shooters, closing out, and staying engaged. In past years, he’s done well generating steals, although that’s dropped off some this year. A relative lack of length and so-so NBA athleticism means that he can get beat at times on dribble-drives, and he’s not tall enough to bother every perimeter shooter. That’s usually fine since only a handful of players can do that consistently.

That said, there’s some reason to be concerned that Trent Jr.’s defensive performance has dropped off a bit this year. I’ve already mentioned his drop in steal rate, but multiple other defensive metrics also point to a small drop off. For example, Trent Jr.’s Defensive Estimated Plus-Minus has dropped from 0.2 to -1.3 per Dunks and Threes and his Defensive Box Plus/Minus has dropped from 0.0 to -1.3 per Basketball Reference. The Raptors are also giving up about 5.2 points per 100 possessions more with Trent Jr. on the floor this season, which is up from previous years. He’s also getting fewer deflections and contesting fewer shots compared to the last two years, which is only partly explained by him playing fewer minutes. Per NBA.com, Trent Jr. is getting about 1.7 deflections and contesting 1.3 shots per game this season, down from 2.7 deflections and 2.3 shot contests per game last season and 3.4 deflections and 2.9 shot contests per game in 2021-22.

Still, Trent Jr.’s age (25) and shooting ability are enough to get the Raptors back something of value in a trade. Teams always need shooting, and there’s at least a chance that his defense improves back to where it was the last couple of seasons.

Trading for Trent Jr. is where challenges come up for the Kings. Trent Jr.’s salary this season is just under $18.6 million, so the Kings would need to put together about $11.1 million in salary to have a workable deal. The easiest way to get there is trading Huerter, but that would see the Kings basically dealing a shooter for a shooter. Sure, Trent Jr. has a chance at being better defensively than Huerter, but that hasn’t really been on display this year, he would have to regain his previous defensive form to do so. Huerter also has two years left under contract after this season, whereas Trent Jr. may just end up a short-term rental. Unfortunately, there also isn’t really another good option to match salary. The Kings could compile a bunch of miscellaneous salaries under $6 million (McGee, Mitchell, Duarte, Len, and Edwards) and hope to get to the minimum of $11.1 million, but it’s not clear why Toronto would want to take back so many players that they can’t even roster, especially when some of them will carry extra salary into next season when Toronto will have to pay Immanuel Quickley a raise. If the deal were Trent Jr. for Huerter, it’s possible Toronto would say yes without asking for any draft capital—but for a mishmash of back end rotation players, they’d probably demand at least a second round pick. That’s not unreasonable, but the Kings might be better able to put those resources to use on targeting a player with stronger perimeter defensive skills—shooting hasn’t really been the issue in Sacramento.

Verdict: Pass on Trent Jr. Even though Trent Jr. would be a nice addition, he’s no guarantee to stay with the team and his salary situation makes designing a deal for him challenging. He would probably bring better defense than Huerter, but he’s not a strong enough defender to warrant trading away a similar offensive player on a medium-term, manageable contract in Huerter.

Bruce Brown

Bruce Brown (27) would probably be a better trade target for the Kings. Brown has a bit of a unique role in the NBA—he’s one of a handful of 6’5” and under players who basically play like power forwards.

Brown made his way into the NBA as a non-shooting guard, so he had to make his money by hustling, playing defense, rebounding at a high level for his position, and generally being a pest on the floor. It’s a useful role for any team, and Brown fills it perfectly.

In the last couple of years, Brown has evolved to at least become a passable three point shooter. Last year, he hit 35.8% of his threes and took about 3.2 threes per game. That helped him secure a two year, $45 million deal this past off-season (there is a club option for the second year, which is valuable flexibility for teams). Those numbers have dipped a bit this year to 32.7% from three on 3.0 threes per game, but that’s still within the realm of “expected” for Brown. He’s still got the same motor, and he’s still operating as a effort glue guy on offense.

Defensively, Brown has always been good though short of elite. He's always active, bull-strong, and he isn’t afraid to guard anyone (though at 6’4”, he can be at a significant height disadvantage at times). He’s not a defensive stopper, but he will do all of the little things that teams need—rebounding, getting to loose balls, getting his hands in passing lanes, and just generally pestering opponents.

Brown has been with Toronto for less than two weeks; he arrived as part of the Raptors trade sending Siakam to Indiana. He’s not attached to the team and they haven’t really integrated him into their roster. There’s a good chance the Raptors deal Brown this season they would need to shell out $23 million next season to pick up Brown’s team option on top of having to pay Quickley.

As with Trent Jr., the tough part about the Kings trading for Brown is who they’d have to give up. To match Brown’s $22 million salary, the Kings could trade Barnes or Huerter. Trading Barnes would be tough to do, as it would make the Kings even smaller in the front court than they already are. Trading Huerter could work, but there’s a question whether Brown is a big enough improvement over Huerter to justify paying an extra $6-7 million in salary next season and giving up a contract year in 2025-26. The Kings could again try to piece together back-end roster pieces to get to the requisite $14.5 million in outgoing salary, but that’s going to be even harder to do than getting to $11.1 million for Trent Jr.—I’m not sure Toronto would want to play ball.

Verdict: Only if the Kings can’t swing other trades for defenders. Ultimately, I think it would take too much to get a deal for Brown to work. I like Brown’s game, and swapping Huerter for him could help the Kings enough on defense to justify the deal, but there are probably better trades options available that either yield bigger improvements or less disruption to the current roster. The Kings could give up a little more draft equity than they would have to give up for Brown and bring back better defensive fits like Alex Caruso or Dorian Finney-Smith. They could also look at smaller deals for guys who can add to the defense, like Kris Dunn or Matisse Thybulle, yet wouldn’t force the Kings to send out starters/rotation pieces like Huerter and Barnes.

Other Possible Targets

Naji Marshall

I really like Naji Marshall’s game. He’s on the back end of the Pelicans rotation, but when he comes in, he plays hard on defense and bugs the hell out of everyone on the court. He’s got size and he uses it well to play hard-nosed defense. He plays a bit like a bigger Bruce Brown, although not quite as impactful. He’s not a great offensive player, though he can do just enough to stay relevant. He’s willing to mix it up on the offensive glass and he’s upped his shooting this year to 37.6% from three, which would be enough to keep defenses honest if he can sustain it (that could be a bit of a mirage, he doesn’t take a ton of threes).

Because the Pelicans have crazy depth on the wing, the 26 year old Marshall doesn’t see a ton of minutes, only about 18 per game. He’s a free agent next year too, and it’s pretty unlikely the Pelicans can bring him back—they’re already paying $119 million to Zion Williamson, Brandon Ingram, CJ McCollum, and Herb Jones combined, and they need to think about re-signing Jonas Valanciunas this off-season and extending Trey Murphy III after next year. So he’s ripe for a trade.

Marshall’s salary is tiny by NBA standards at just $1.9 million, so there’s no real salary match concerns. The biggest question is whether the Pelicans would let him walk to a competitor this year (although the Pels have owned the Kings so far this year, so maybe they don’t care).

Verdict: Do it! If the Kings can snag Marshall for a second round pick, they should do it. At the very least, he’s a defensive option the Kings can go to when they need to muddy up games.

Bojan Bogdanovic

I feel obliged to at least mention Bojan Bogdanovic. He’s a good player on a bad team in Detroit, and his name comes up more often than maybe anyones in trade discussions.

I don’t think he’s a good target for the Kings. Bogdanovic is a good scorer and very strong perimeter shooter, but he offers little on defense, where the Kings need to improve the most. He’s also on a salary that would presumably require the Kings to send back Barnes or Huerter in a deal, and that doesn’t seem worth it given Detroit is probably going to ask for at least a first rounder to send Bogdanovic anywhere. I would concede that he’s probably a better player than Huerter or Barnes in a vacuum, but swapping Huerter for him would make the Kings perimeter defense slower and swapping him for Barnes would actually hurt the Kings rebounding.

Verdict: Not worth it.

Andrew Wiggins

This one is fascinating. The Warriors are 19-24 and sitting in 12th place in the Western Conference—over halfway through the season, it’s not clear whether they’re going to even make the play in. Obviously, the Warriors have rebounded from subpar seasons before, but there’s a glaring issue this time on top of their age. According to Spotrac, the Warriors’ payroll for this season is just over $206.9 million and they are facing a luxury tax bill of $186.3 million. In other words, the Warriors are going to have a roster that costs over $393 million just to maybe miss the play-in. That would be an ignominious record to hold, and presumably something that the Warriors’ ownership isn’t thrilled about.

Things would naturally improve for the Warriors next year if they let Klay Thompson walk in free agency, but they may not want to do that. While Thompson isn’t the player he used to be, he’s still one of the franchises greatest players, so they probably don’t want to push him out the door if they can avoid it.

Assuming they do want to keep Thompson, the Warriors have limited options. The three obvious ones are:

• Try to improve the current roster. This path could be really hard, as the Warriors have a lot of salary already on the roster and a limited about of young players and future draft picks to send out in a trade. It’s also an uphill battle given the Warriors’ current seeding.

• Trade Chris Paul. Paul is under contract through 2024-25 at a salary of $30 million, so sending him out the door would give the Warriors the ability to pay Thompson without going too far back into the luxury tax.

• Trade Andrew Wiggins. This is the scenario the Kings care about. Wiggins is under contract through the 2025-26 season and has a player option in 2026-27 at a salary of $30.2 million. He’s being paid $24.3 million this year.

Wiggins is a 6’7” wing with tremendous physical ability. He’s got great size, length, and athleticism, and during the 2022 season and playoff run, he put together a remarkable stretch of defensive play that helped lead the Warriors to an NBA championship. He always had the physical tools, but it appeared that Wiggins had finally unlocked his defensive potential. At the same time, he was also improving his three point shooting, hitting a then-career high 39.3% of his threes on 5.5 threes per game in 2022. Combined with a versatile offensive skillset, it looked like Wiggins was coming into his own and becoming a really good wing player.

Wiggins played similarly in 2022-23, though with a slight decrease in efficiency. That didn’t seem like a huge deal at the time—he was dealing with undisclosed off-the-court personal matters, and he was still playing effectively enough. But this year, Wiggins has run into a brick wall. To put it bluntly, he’s been awful.

Wiggins has regressed in virtually every aspect of his game. His scoring is down, his shooting has been poor from the field, three point range, and the free throw line, he’s rebounding less, he’s dishing out fewer assists, he’s turning the ball over more often, and he’s getting fewer steals and blocks than he has in his previous two seasons with the Warriors. This drop off is perhaps best encapsulated by a precipitous fall in is Estimated Plus-Minus, which has gone from a career high 1.5 in 2022-23 to a career low -4.2 this season according to Dunks and Threes (Basketball Reference’s Box Plus/Minus stat tells a similar story: Wiggins has gone from 0.4 in 2021-22 to -5.2 this season).

You see the drop-off watching Wiggins play this year. He’s missing shots regardless of how open he is, he’s playing timidly on offense, and he’s barely exerting any influence on games defensively. Wiggins has played well in maybe a half-dozen games on the season (one happened to be against Sacramento in November, but luckily the Kings won), which is a minuscule number for a starter, much less a guy getting paid upwards of $25 million per year.

Wiggins has always been demure on the court, but over the past few seasons, he’d really found his footing as a player. Now, it’s like he’s reverted to how he played his rookie season—it’s baffling.

So why might he be of interest to the Kings?

At his best, Wiggins offers quality shooting, some one-on-one scoring ability, and enough size and quickness to put pressure on the rim from cuts. He also is capable of being a strong head-up defender, and he has the sort of length and quickness to offer really strong help defense, even offering respectable rim protection as a weak side helper despite not being a natural power forward. Combining Wiggins’ length and perimeter defense (when he’s right) with Keegan Murray would go extremely far in solving the Kings’ difficulties defending the perimeter, and he could even offer reasonable interior defense against forwards.

The Kings have to be curious if this year’s version of Wiggins is a fluke. The Warriors are wondering that too. That ambiguity makes it pretty hard to decipher whether the Warriors will ultimately move Wiggins but their cap situation is going to force them to think about it.

If Wiggins does come available, the Warriors would presumably be looking for salary cap relief first. They probably won’t, and shouldn’t, look to rebuild while Steph Curry is still playing at an All-NBA level, so they may be interested in taking back players who can provide on-court help (at least compared to Wiggins’ production this year) at a lower salary, even if they have to give up the potential that Wiggins returns to form.

Because Wiggins has a salary of just over $24.3 million this year, salary matching will be a bit tricky for the Kings—they would most likely have to include either Harrison Barnes or Huerter in a deal. The Kings could offer (1) Barnes plus light draft assets (think second rounders or a protected first) or (2) Huerter plus a back-end rotation player like Chris Duarte or Kessler Edwards, perhaps again with light draft assets.

Those offers, objectively, don’t give amazing return for the Warriors, but it would get them the cap relief they need and bring back at least one player that can contribute right away in Barnes or Huerter, and both of them have been better than Wiggins this year anyway.

Verdict: Only if the price is right. Ultimately, if Wiggins becomes available, the Kings should check in on it. They can make an offer that would be useful, but there’s definitely a solid chance other teams would top it. That said, the Kings shouldn’t go crazy trying to get Wiggins. Wiggins has been shockingly bad this year, but if that is the new reality for him (he was bad at the start of his career too), he’s going to be a salary cap problem for several years, as he has at least another three years under contract—probably four if he is really this bad, as he would pick up his player option for 2026-27. Trading for Wiggins would be such a high risk/reward play that the Kings shouldn’t pay handsomely to do it.

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 3): The Kings’ Current Roster Dictates Potential Deals

[This is part three of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline.]

In the first post from this series, I looked at what areas the Kings have struggled with so far this year that need to be improved upon. Like many observers, I think the biggest issues are the team’s struggles defending the rim and the three point line, but they also need to find ways to generate more offense when De’Aaron Fox sits to rekindle their top-notch offense from last year (while shooting from 2 point range and free throws still need to improve, those issues aren’t as easy to address through trades). Part two of this series looked at what the Kings can send out in potential trades and how the NBA’s rules governing player- and draft-pick trades will affect what the Kings can actually deal, which in turn governs what they’ll be able to potentially get back in a deal.

Now, we’re on to part three, where it’s time to start thinking about the Kings’ own roster situation and what it means for trades they might consider. To do that effectively, I want to think about two things in this post:

1. What is the Kings salary cap situation right now, and what should they expect in the near- and medium-term?

2. What are the on-court needs the Kings should be looking to fill?

For simplicity, I’ll go in the order above.

The Kings’ Salary Cap Situation

I wrote about what the Kings have available to trade last week, including draft capital. Those matter to the team’s long-term future, but the Kings are actually in a pretty good position going forward, as they own all but one of their future first round picks and they have plenty of future second rounders. But retaining future cap space and staying under the luxury tax (as well as the first and second aprons) are important considerations.

The CBA Rules: Caps, Taxes, and Contracts

NBA teams always have to think about their roster in terms of the salary cap as well as the NBA’s luxury tax line (and the more restrictive aprons above the luxury tax line, the first apron and the second apron). I’ve explained the basic rules on this before, but since the last post I made got really into the weeds, I will only quickly summarize things here for convenience.

The basic rules of the salary cap are simple: teams can’t sign players above the salary cap unless they find an exception that allows them to do so. Those exceptions cover things like extending players already on the team’s roster, signing players the team drafts, trading for players, and signing free agents at certain specified salary levels. The net result is that teams above the cap are restricted in how they can operate.

The basic luxury tax rules are also pretty simple. If a team’s salary for the year is at or above the luxury tax line, they pay an additional tax per dollar they are over the line, and that tax is redistributed to the teams below the luxury tax line. Those taxes get increasingly onerous as the team moves higher and higher above the luxury tax line or if they are repeatedly paying luxury tax in multiple years.

Teams above the first and second aprons face increasingly restrictive rules about how they manage their roster. For simplicity, suffice it to say that teams generally want to avoid being above the first or second apron so they can continue to make roster moves easily.

In any given season, the salary cap is set by the league based on basketball-related revenue from the prior year, while the luxury tax line, the first apron, and the second apron, are all calculated based on the salary cap. For this season (2023-24), the salary cap is $136.21 million, the luxury tax line is $165.294 million, the first apron is $172.346 million, and the second apron is $182.794 million. It’s impossible to know precisely what each of these thresholds will be in future seasons, but we can expect that these thresholds will increase most years by up to 10% (the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dictates that the salary cap can grow by up to 10% per year, but cannot decrease in any given season).

There are also several player salary levels that have to be calculated based on the salary cap. Simply put, the starting salary that teams can offer to players depends on what kind of contract they offer, and the starting salary amounts of many types of contracts are calculated based on a percentage of the salary cap. This is really important, as it dictates how teams can re-sign their own players, sign free agents above the salary cap, and whether the team can make trades for players whose salaries would put them over the salary cap (or the first or second aprons).

This has huge impacts on the trade market and free agent market.

The key types of contracts that are dictated by the salary cap are listed below, but they fall into a couple buckets: max contracts, rookie extensions, and salary cap exceptions. HoopsRumors has pretty good articles on max contracts and salary cap exceptions if you want extra detail there.

• “Max” contracts: Max contracts get complicated and it’s not necessarily worth going into all the detail here, but at a basic level, teams can offer players “max” salary contracts that allow the player to be paid up to a percentage of the salary cap based on the player’s level of NBA experience (or, if greater, up to 105% of their previous season’s salary).

  These “max” salaries can be equal to up to 25% of the salary cap for players with less than seven years of experience, 30% of the salary cap for players with seven to nine years of experience, and 35% of the salary cap for players with 10+ years of experience. For the 2023-24 season, this equates to about $34.0 million, $40.8 million, and $47.6 million respectively.

  These contracts can be up to five years long and include raises of up to 8% per season for players re-signing with their current team (5% for players signing with a new team).

• “Supermax” contracts: In limited situations, teams can also offer players what are informally known as “supermax” contracts (which actually covers a few different “designated veteran” situations).

  Simply put, star players who meet certain eligibility and performance criteria can be offered contracts (or contract extensions) of up to six seasons at starting salaries up to 30% or 35% of the cap. Normally, players are only eligible for five year deals, and the max salary can only get to 35% of the cap for players with 10+ years of service.

  These supermax contracts are generally only available to players with 7-9 years of experience who haven’t changed teams (with some limited exceptions, including if a player was traded in their first four years).

  To be eligible, prior to being offered a supermax, the player also has to meet the following supermax performance criteria:

  • win an MVP in any of the three preceding seasons;

  • be named to an All-NBA team or be named Defensive Player of the Year (DPOY) in the immediately preceding season; or

  • be named to an All-NBA team or be named DPOY in any two of the preceding three seasons.

  This is highly relevant for the Kings, as De’Aaron Fox may become eligible for a supermax extension soon. In fact, Fox turned down a “max” extension before the 2023-24 season in the hopes that he will become eligible for a supermax deal before his current contract expires after the 2025-26 season.

• Rookie extensions: Certain rookie extensions can function similarly to the supermax (conceptually).

  Normally, rookies selected in the first round receive two year deals with team options for the third and fourth year, and they’re only eligible to receive contract extensions after their third season. These extensions get capped at of 25% of the salary cap (or, if greater, 105% of the salaary in the last season of their contract) because they have less than seven years of NBA service.

  But rookies who meet the “supermax” performance criteria that I described previously can receive a salary in the first year of their extension of up to 30% of the salary cap.

  This probably won’t apply to any of the Kings’ players on their rookie deals.

• Non-taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “non-taxpayer MLE”, this exception allows teams above the salary cap, but below the first apron, to sign a player at a first year salary of up to 9.12% of the salary cap—set at $12.4 million for the 2023-24 season. Non-taxpayer MLE contracts can be for up to four years and may include salary raises or decreases of up to 5% per year.

  Teams can also split their non-taxpayer MLE to sign multiple players.

  The non-taxpayer MLE is only available to teams below the first apron. So if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE (the precise amount of the taxpayer MLE, discussed below), that team will be “hard capped” at the first apron. In other words, if a team uses more than $5 million of its non-taxpayer MLE in 2023-24, it cannot have its team salary go above the first apron for that season even another exception would normally be available.

  Practically speaking, the non-taxpayer MLE often becomes the de facto starting salary “price” for free agent rotation players, as several teams can usually offer it in free agency.

  Teams below the salary cap (referred to as having “room”) can’t use the exception because they’re below the cap.

• Taxpayer mid-level exception: referred to here as the “taxpayer MLE,” this exception is similar to the MLE but less favorable. It is available to teams above the first apron but below the second apron.

  Like the non-taxpayer MLE, teams can still split their taxpayer MLE between multiple players and offer salary raises or increases of 5% per year, but the amount available and maximum contract length are lesser. The taxpayer MLE was set at $5 million for the 2023-24 season (even though not set as a percentage of the salary cap for this season, the taxpayer MLE will increase based on the salary cap in future seasons).

  Teams can’t use the non-taxpayer MLE and the taxpayer MLE at the same time.

  Similar to the non-taxpayer MLE, because the taxpayer MLE is not available to teams above the second apron, if a team uses its taxpayer MLE, it will be hard capped at the second apron.

• Bi-annual exception: the “bi-annual exception” is another exception to the salary cap that teams can use . . . wait for it . . . every two years. The bi-annual exception is set as a percentage (3.32%) of the salary cap; for the 2023-24 season, teams could offer starting salaries up to $3.382 million, with the same 5% raises per year, for up to two seasons.

  Teams can’t use the bi-annual exception to exceed the first apron.

• Room exception: officially titled the “mid-level salary exception for room teams” but better known as the “room exception,” this exception can only be used by teams whose salary falls below the salary cap in a given year—it’s essentially an alternative to the non-taxpayer MLE and taxpayer MLE.

  Once a room team uses up its salary cap space, it can use the room exception to sign a player (or multiple players) for a starting salary equal to up to 5.678% of the salary cap, about $7.72 million for the 2023-24 season. In other words, if the team has salary cap space, it can use that space to sign free agents and then get a room exception to sign additional players above the salary cap. Room exception contracts can be up to three seasons long and can include the same 5% raises per year as the other exceptions described above.

  Teams can’t use the room exception and any of the non-taxpayer MLE, taxpayer MLE, or bi-annual exception in the same year—so essentially if the team is eligible for the room exception, it’s not eligible for those other exceptions.

• There are other exceptions, but they’re not as relevant here and/or not inherently tied to the salary cap’s changes.

How Do Cap & Contract Rules Affect the Kings?

For the 2023-24 season, the Kings already have about $150 million committed in salary and other cap hits (we don’t need to go into detail on dead cap holds and other cap holds, but they combine with the actual roster salary to count against the salary cap). That puts the Kings about $14 million above the salary cap ($136.21 million) and little more than $15 million below the luxury tax line.

As a small market team that can’t rely as much on huge revenues from other sources (concert fees, parking fees, etc. typically get retained by the team), the Kings are likely to try to stay below the luxury tax whenever they can, unless they’re truly in championship contention. Staying below the luxury tax line ensures both that the Kings won’t pay luxury tax and that they are eligible to receive luxury tax distributions, which can be worth over $10 million for each non-tax team. By the same token, the Kings are generally likely to stay below the first apron and second apron in most years, saving them some additional headaches with roster construction and cap compliance.

Regardless, the Kings have to manage their salary cap in future seasons and be mindful of the luxury tax line (and the aprons) from year to year. To do so, they have to be mindful of what contracts they have and how long they run, and what contracts they expect to give out. The team surely has its own internal trackers, but for us members of the public, Spotrac has nifty trackers showing the contract and salary situations for each team—a year by year tracker of the Kings salary cap situation by year is available here.

The Kings are projected to be over the cap in each of 2024-25, 2025-26, and 2026-27. [Note: Spotrac is doing something funky with the cap projections. They project 4.4% growth in the salary cap in the 2024-25 season, which the NBA has projected, but they assume a 10% growth rate in all subsequent seasons. I don’t know how realistic that is (I suspect it over-predicts the rate of cap growth), but I will use it for now.].

The chart below shows the Kings roster count and team salaries by year, compared to the projected salary cap and luxury tax lines using Spotrac’s growth projections, with some assumptions. Specifically, the chart assumes that all team options are exercised and all cap holds get renounced; the chart also excludes all 10-day and two-way player contracts, which are short-term and for negligible sums. Numbers in red show the Kings will be over the salary cap or luxury tax line, as applicable.

[Chart 1]

What jumps out from Chart 1 is that the Kings will be about $7.4 million over the cap next season (2024-25) before filling out their 15-man roster, and they will be just $16.8 million under the cap two seasons from now (2025-26) with just seven players.

Kings Salary Cap in 2024-25

The Kings will be $7.4 million over the cap in 2024-25 with only 10 players on the roster. They would also be able to add only $23.1 million of salary before creeping into the luxury tax. But that total salary doesn’t account for the Kings re-signing Malik Monk, who will be a free agent after this season, nor does it account for any 2024 draft picks the Kings might need to sign or other roster spots they might fill at the veteran’s minimum.

In other words, if the Kings want to re-sign Monk at a starting salary of $17.4 million (which they can offer him), they’re going to be at least $24.8 million over the cap with an 11-man roster. Assuming they fill out the rest of the roster for the veterans minimum of about $2.1 million (this value will also change based on the cap, but we’re fudging here for simplicity), the Kings would be about $33.2 million over the cap. At the same time, they’d push over the luxury tax line by about $3.1 million.

Any trade the Kings make needs to keep this reality in mind. If they make a trade that takes back salary, the team will need to manage the roster so that they can trade players to get under the luxury tax line if needed. If the team is super competitive, ownership may be willing to stay above the luxury tax line for a season or two, but any prospective trade analysis needs to keep a path out of the luxury tax in mind. Players like Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte can all be free agents after the 2024-25 season, meaning there would be some value to keeping one or more of them on the roster as a way to trade out of the luxury tax during the 2024-25 season if it becomes necessary.

Mitchell and Duarte are also both eligible for extension prior to the 2024-25 season, but given they’re not fixtures in the starting line-up, it’s not clear that they will be offered substantial extensions.

De’Aaron Fox also becomes eligible for an extension at the same time, which could be enormous. I’ll talk about that more later.

Kings Salary Cap in 2025-26

Based on Chart 1 (above), the Kings could actually be about $16.8 million under the cap for the 2025-26 season (two years from now), albeit with only seven players under contract (Fox, Sabonis, Barnes, Huerter, Murray, Sasha Vezenkov, and Colby Jones). But there are a few qualifiers to keep in mind.

We’ve already covered the first two: the Kings will probably want to re-sign Malik Monk and they need to fill out their roster regardless. Assuming the Kings re-sign Monk, he’s likely to be paid around $18.3 million in 2025-26. But that alone would eat through the $16.8 million of theoretical cap room that the Kings would have.

Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2025-26, the salary cap would be about $156.2 million, the luxury tax line would be about $189.8 million, the first apron would be about $197.9 million, and the second apron would be about $209.9 million. With Monk, the team’s salary would be about $157.7 million; adding seven more players at the veteran’s minimum would bring the team salary to about $173.1 million—over the cap but under the luxury tax.

The other issues are pending free agency for Trey Lyles, Davion Mitchell, and Chris Duarte. Trey Lyles will be an unrestricted free agent before the 2025-26 season, so the Kings will need to decide whether to bring him back. Maybe Lyles would come back at the veteran’s minimum, but more likely he’d seek more money elsewhere. Meanwhile, Mitchell and Duarte will be restricted free agents assuming they don’t agree to extensions beforehand. The Kings would need to decide whether to renounce their matching right for any contract that Mitchell and/or Duarte sign with another team (before free agency starts). I suspect that will happen, but if the Kings were to keep their matching rights, the team would then need to decide whether to let them go if an offer sheet gets too rich.

After the 2025-26 season, the Kings will also need to decide whether to offer an extension to Keegan Murray and what that looks like. Given he’s a core player, it’s likely the Kings would agree to a big extension with Murray, but it’s tough to predict exactly what that will look like—it will depend a lot on his growth the rest of this season and in the 2024-25 season. Murray getting an extension worth $35-45 million per year (starting the 2026-27 season) is well within the realm of possibility given his age, elite shooting, defensive potential, and positional flexibility—this would actually be a pretty great scenario for the Kings, as it would mean Murray has continued to develop into something like a top 50 player in the league overall. This won’t affect the team’s salary cap situation much during the 2025-26 season, though, as the team has a $11.1 million option for Murray that they’re going to exercise.

Kings Salary Cap in 2026-27

This is where things get a little wild.

Only two players are technically under contract for 2026-27, Domantas Sabonis and Colby Jones (assuming the Kings exercise his team option), and the team is projected to be about $121.3 million below the cap.

But as I’ve noted, the Kings will probably have re-signed Monk and agreed to extensions with Fox and Murray. Monk’s contract will probably be around $20 million by 2026-27 and Murray (assuming he continues to develop) is likely to be paid around $40 million.

That would put the Kings at $51.3 million below the cap, with just Sabonis, Jones, Monk, and Murray under contract.

But what about the team’s star, De’Aaron Fox? As I noted, Fox turned down a two year, $105 million extension that would have carried his contract through the 2027-28 season in the hopes of becoming eligible for a supermax. If Fox makes an All-NBA team this year or next year, he can sign a five year extension starting in 2026-27. That extension would have a starting salary in 2026-27 worth up to 35% of the cap, which equates to about $60.1 million. If he doesn’t make another All-NBA team, Fox would still be eligible for a four year extension with a 2026-27 salary worth up to 30% of the cap (about $51.5 million).

The net result is that if the Kings extend Fox and Murray and re-sign Monk this off-season, their 2026-27 salary is going to put them at or above the cap with only five players under contract; the team’s salary would be around $180.6 million if Fox makes another All-NBA team, and around $172 million if he doesn’t). They would still need to fill out a roster with 10 more players, which will probably cost another $25-30 million and push the Kings’ roster salary to as much as $210 million.

Using Spotrac’s projected growth rates, in 2026-27, the salary cap would be $171.8 million, the luxury tax line would be $208.8 million, the first apron would be $217.7 million, and the second apron would be $230.9 million. That means that if the Kings trade for someone today whose salary is still on the books in 2026-27, the team could be facing extremely steep luxury tax bills and restrictions from passing the first (or even second) apron—if they want to do a trade for a star with 3+ years left on their deal, the team needs to be thinking seriously about how it’s going to cost them in dollars and flexibility down the road.

2027-28 and Beyond

This is four plus years out, so I’m not going to write much about it here since so much can change. By the 2027-28 season, the projected salary cap could be up to $189.0 million, the projected luxury tax line to $229.7 million, the projected first apron to $239.5 million, and the projected second apron to $254.0 million.

Fox and Murray, if extended, would still be on the team, as would Sabonis (whose current deal expires after the 2027-28 season). Every other roster slot is hard to project, as whomever the Kings might sign or trade for, may not be on a deal long enough to make it all the way to 2027-28.

Sabonis’ salary is set for 2027-28 at $51.2 million, but we have to do some projection for Fox and Murray. I’ll assume that Fox made his second All-NBA team before being extended and signs a supermax extension—that would put his salary at about $64.9 million in 2027-28. If Murray’s extension were to start at $40 million per year, by the 2027-28 season, he’d be paid around $42 million. That means the Fox/Sabonis/Murray trio would make over $158 million in 2027-28, hopefully still in their primes with Fox at age 30, Sabonis at age 31, and Murray at age 27.

The Kings’ On-Court Needs

Basketball is a fluid sport, and every player has an impact on both ends of the court. As a result, even after identifying areas for improvement, teams have to think about how adding and subtracting players in trades will impact their performance offensively and defensively.

Which weaknesses have to improve and which can we live with? What kinds of players can address the issues on the floor? Will addressing those flaws create new flaws, or will addressing the big weaknesses allow the team as a whole to clean up other areas too? What strengths can the team take away from to bolster a weakness, without losing so much that it creates a new weakness? These are critical questions that should drive the team’s decision-making, but how they all shake out is hard to pin down with precision.

As I noted in part one, there are three big weaknesses that I think the Kings should look to address—perimeter defense, rim protection, and how to generate offense with Fox off the court—but the Kings don’t necessarily have to address all three to improve meaningfully. On top of that, it’s probably impossible to find a single player, or even two or three players, who can address all three without taking away from what the Kings already do well. You can’t bank on getting back someone who can play strong perimeter defense, protect the rim, and create offense while not taking away from the Kings’ core strengths, Fox and Sabonis—that list is basically made up of Kawhi Leonard or Kevin Durant, and they’re not on the trading block (and Keegan Murray is already on the roster . . . ).

Rather than dream up players who can fill all three holes, one thing I usually try to do is think of player archetypes that could address a couple problem areas without causing too many issues elsewhere. I’m thinking more of a style of player than anyone in particular—for example, traditional passing point guards, rim protecting centers, 3-and-D wings, etc.

Player Types That Fit

What player archetypes make sense to add depends a lot on the players who definitely will play even after any trades. For the Kings, that list is pretty easy. De’Aaron Fox, Domantas Sabonis, and Keegan Murray are the team’s core and are exceptionally unlikely to be traded, and Malik Monk is such a pivotal part of the bench unit that they’re unlikely to move him either (Monk is also set to be a free agent next season, so his value to the Kings is probably going to be higher than for teams they’re likely to trade with).

Combined, these four players have a ton of strengths, especially on offense.

The Core: Fox, Sabonis, Murray, and Monk

The Fox/Sabonis/Murray core can create effective offense regardless of who else is on the court, as there is plenty of scoring talent, shot-creation, deep shooting, passing, post-up play, and screening. Fox can create his own shots easily, Sabonis can be the hub of an effective offense when paired with shooters, and Murray’s shot-making and burgeoning midrange game slots in perfectly. Monk is also a good enough offensive player to lead an effective bench, as his shooting pairs well with either Fox or Sabonis (whose minutes are often staggered), and he also has enough shot-creation and passing ability to create offense at times, too.

But there are also some readily identifiable holes defensively. Fox and Monk are both undersized for their position and can be over-powered at times on defense. Although Fox plays effective defense for stretches and does a good job of creating steals, his offensive workload is so high that it’s no surprise you don’t want him guarding the opponent’s best backcourt player. Monk’s calling card isn’t on defense—he gets beat too often off the dribble despite good quickness and his small frame makes it hard for him to defend bigger guards. Murray is becoming a better and better defensive player, so he has been regularly tasked with guarding opposing teams’ best perimeter players, but he’s still learning how to guard a star offensive player and provide effective help defense. As a result, he’s sometimes unable to provide help and close out to top-tier perimeter players without fouling. Meanwhile, Sabonis is a great rebounder, but he offers very little rim protection, and his lack of length sometimes forces him to choose between contesting shots and rebounding position.

Offensive Archetypes

The offensive archetypes that fit with the Kings’ core depends a lot on who is playing. With Fox and Sabonis on the court, the Kings benefit most from having strong perimeter shooters. Fox can attack the paint on his own or with help from a screener like Sabonis, and Sabonis can function as the hub of the offense while Fox waits for opportune times to attack. Adding Murray also provides some bail-out protection if defenses can stop Fox, as he’s started to add mid-range and step-back jumpers to already elite shooting from three point range. When these three are on the court together, the Kings really just need guys who can hit open shots, keep the ball moving on offense, cut, and occasionally slash to the rim or handle the ball on the perimeter.

When Fox sits, though, it’s a different story. In those situations, the Kings tend to rely heavily on three offensive strategies:

1. Sabonis as the “offensive hub” at the top of the paint/elbow. The Kings run this all the time, even with Fox on the court. Sabonis has the ball in his hands up top to drag bigs away from the basket, and the Kings run good shooters around the perimeter to force defenses to focus on the three point line. Murray, Monk, Harrison Barnes, and especially Kevin Huerter do a great job of playing off of Sabonis in these sets, and they’re good enough shooters that it forces defenses into hard rotations. But the downside is there’s often no real threat to the paint because Sabonis is away from the basket (even though sometimes Sabonis will attack the paint off of the dribble), the Kings’ shooters mostly aren’t great at attacking off the dribble from this look, and the Kings don’t always do a good enough job cutting to the rim to put pressure on the paint.

2. Sabonis on the block. Sabonis is a good post-up player, especially against smaller frontcourt players who he can overpower. He relies on quick feet and strength to get good looks, as his lack of length doesn’t just allow him to go over guys. Against sturdier, strong bigs, Sabonis post ups aren’t as effective since he’s forced to rely on his quickness alone. On top of that, even though Sabonis is typically an elite passer, he has a tendency to focus on scoring from the low-block. Combined with the Kings’ other players lacking size and preference to shoot threes, when opponents double Sabonis and focus on denying the immediate three point shooters in the corner or at the wing, there’s often no other threat (such as a paint cutter or weakside attack from the opposite wing).

3. Pick and roll with Sabonis as the screener. The Kings also will run pick and rolls with Sabonis as the screener, but right now, only Monk and Davion Mitchell are really strong enough ball handlers to initiate it (the Kings have tried this with Chris Duarte but it hasn’t worked). Monk is still learning how to play the pick and roll efficiently, as it wasn’t a huge part of his game in previous seasons. He can get to shooting spots effectively and has some incredible underhand passes coming off of the screens, but he also gets too loose with the ball and hasn’t mastered where to go when the roller (Sabonis usually) is covered. Mitchell, for his part, isn’t yet a strong shooter, so defenders just duck under screens when he’s in the game, clogging up the lane and cutting off his biggest strength as a driver.

Shooters work okay for these scenarios obviously, but the Kings would really benefit from having at least one player on the roster who can do things besides provide spacing.

The Kings would benefit tremendously from adding a player who shoots well enough to act as a decent floor-spacer but who also has the size and athleticism to cut to the paint and finish, either when Sabonis is up top/at the elbow or from the weak side when Sabonis is on the low block. This would help the team threaten the paint area more when Fox sits, regardless of what big is on the floor defending Sabonis, and in turn open up shooting opportunities for the rest of the perimeter players. Murray can sometimes serve this role, but he is such a threatening shooter that it would be nice to find someone else who can add that threat while Murray acts as a spacer.

Alternatively, the Kings should find someone to help make the Sabonis pick and roll more effective when Fox is on the bench. There are basically two options here. The first is finding a player who can alternate with Monk as the pick and roll ball handler, which would free Monk up to also operate as an off-ball scorer and outside shooter, where he is really effective (the Kings often use Monk in this way when Fox is in the game), rather than to run so many pick and rolls with Sabonis. The second option letting Monk continue to be the pick and roll ball handler and add a player who can operate as an off-ball attacker and shooter. There is some benefit to this second approach, as it would let Monk continue to develop his pick and roll game.

Defensive Archetypes

The Kings defensive struggles mean there are actually quite a few areas they can stand to improve by adding players ahead of the trade deadline. Per Dunks & Threes, the Kings have just three players with a positive defensive estimated plus minus, which estimates a player’s contribution in points per 100 possessions from defense: Keegan Murray (1.3), Chris Duarte (0.9), and Domantas Sabonis (0.2). Murray and Sabonis are a part of the regular rotation, but Duarte’s playtime has been up and down as a result of struggles shooting the ball.

Most of the team’s defensive issues are apparent watching them.

Frontcourt/Paint Defense

In the frontcourt, the Kings lack shot-blocking and rebounding. Sabonis lacks length for a center and carries such an enormous rebounding burden that he cannot be relied on to block shots. Even though Javale McGee and Alex Len theoretically could provide rim protection, they both play sparingly because they’re somewhat awkward fits for the Kings fast-paced and high-post offense and they’re lack of footspeed contributes to the Kings difficulties defending pick and rolls (admittedly, this happens because the Kings guards get stuck on picks too often, too). The Kings’ other forwards (Murray, Barnes, and Lyles) are better able to handle pick and roll defense as well as guard bigs that like to get out on the perimeter, but they are all undersized to play power forward and aren’t strong rebounders or shotblockers for their positions.

Of course, these kinds of defensive trade-offs aren’t unique to the Kings. Most NBA teams have trouble defending guard-big pick and rolls, and finding frontcourt players that can block shots and rebound effectively is tough (finding someone who can block shots, rebound, and play offense is even tougher—there’s not a team in the NBA that wouldn’t love love to have Bam Adebayo).

The Kings also have to be more mindful of spacing offensively than many teams, as Sabonis largely does not shoot from the perimeter. This really narrows the possibilities, as there are very few rim protectors that can space the floor offensively in the NBA. There are 25 only players this season averaging at least 1.5 blocks per 100 possessions, who shoot at least 2.0 threes per 100 possessions, and who hit 30% or more of their threes. Half of them are guards, and several others are effectively impossible to trade for (Brook Lopez, Chet Holmgren, Anthony Davis, Joel Embiid, Kristaps Porzingis, Jaren Jackson Jr., Scottie Barnes, and Kevin Durant aren’t being dealt any time soon).

Rather than looking for a big who can block shots and shoot, the Kings instead could look for a big who can fill the void when Sabonis is off the floor. This opens up possibilities. Such a player would need to be able to rebound, defend the paint, and handle pick and rolls on defense, but offensively, they can be more limited—setting screens for Fox and Monk, moving the ball, and diving to the basket.

Alternatively, the Kings could look to bolster their perimeter unit with stronger rebounders with length, which would alleviate some of the burden on Sabonis and at least provide some opportunity for more shot contests in the paint and at the rim. None of the Kings current perimeter players (Fox, Monk, Huerter, Duarte, Mitchell) or their forwards (Barnes, Murray, Lyles, Vezenkov) really provides that now due to size limitations.

Perimeter/Backcourt Defense

The Kings also have some significant issues with perimeter defense. This is in part due to the fact that many of the Kings perimeter players are undersized, but there are also times when the Kings’ lack of quickness on defense can hamper them. The Kings give up far too many straight line drives off the dribble, either because someone isn’t quick enough to cut off the drive or gets overpowered. This forces help defenders to bite down (on the strong side) or rotate over to help weakside, which leaves open shooters. Because this happens quite a bit, the Kings help defenders tend to cheat just a bit too far off of shooters so that they can be ready to help, but the result is far too many uncontested threes.

Other than Keegan Murray, the Kings don’t really have any plus one-on-one defenders on the wing. Barnes and Lyles lack the quickness to stay in front of attacking wings, so they can get beat off the dribble too easily and give up drives to the basket, which forces help defenders to come and comprises the defense against shooters. Their lack of quickness, combined with average height/length, also means that they can’t easily play help defense and get back out to shooters when other players get beat. Huerter is quicker and has decent length for his position, but he gets caught too high and flat-footed a lot as both an on-ball defender and in help defense. He also resorts to reaching too often, so he picks up a ton of fouls on defense. This lack of quickness and defensive prowess on the wing leaves the Kings very vulnerable to shooting guards and small forwards who can shoot and drive, which is a problem since so many guys in the Western Conference can rack up points that way (Kevin Durant, Kawhi Leonard and Paul George, Jalen Williams, Luka Doncic, Brandon Ingram, etc.).

At guard, the Kings have a couple players capable of playing better defense, but they have significant size limitations generally and a couple of them are really tough to keep in the line-up due to their offensive limitations. Fox, Mitchell, Duarte, and Monk are all on the small end, and none have great length for their position. Fox can be a solid defender when he’s focused on defense, but he carries such a big responsibility on offense that he rarely locks in defensively all game, and his lack of height and bulk can mean he has trouble handling bigger guards like Anthony Edwards and James Harden. Monk is extremely athletic, but he also lacks size and is too easy for opposing guards to go through on defense. His defensive attention waxes and wanes, he gets caught on screens too often, and his close-outs are frequently too aggressive, so he often gets caught out of position. Duarte and Mitchell are better defensively, but they both struggle so much offensively that it is hard for them to find consistent minutes. Mitchell is also really undersized, which limits how he can be used defensively when Fox and Monk are on the court.

The end result is that the Kings would benefit tremendously from bigger, more athletic defenders at guard and on the wing. In addition to adding size and athleticism, they need to find at least one player who is a strong defender to help Keegan Murray anchor the perimeter defense. There’s little chance that the Kings can resolve their rim protection issues during the Sabonis minutes without a major change at power forward (or a dramatic sacrifice to spacing on offense), so the alternative is to bolster the perimeter defense substantially in the hopes they can put up enough resistance at the point of attack to reduce straight-line drives and the number of difficult help rotations that happen each game.

The Fourth and Final Part Coming Soon!

In the next—and definitely last—part of this series, I’m actually going to look at some of the trade candidates that reporters/pundits say the Kings might pursue. Pascal Siakam and OG Anounoby are off the table sadly, but that’s OK and will hopefully make my life easier. I may also throw in a couple names of players I’d think about, even if they haven’t been talked about.

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 2): In the Weeds On Trade Chips and Rules For Deals

[This is part two of a series of posts on the Kings ahead of the February 8 trade deadline. In part one, I wrote about some of the key issues that have crept up for the Kings so far this season, including issues on offense when De’Aaron Fox sits and on defense protecting the paint and three point line.]

The most exciting part about the trade deadline is imaging who your team might go get. Trade rumors, whispers about which players may want out, and hypothetical trades are all over the place this time of year, so it’s easy to get excited and jump right into playing with trade machines to build out your own hypos.

And honestly, who can blame you? Trade machines these days are pretty good! They’ll do most of the hard work for you. They have already listed out each player and their contract, identified draft assets held by each team, and figured out how to match salaries, all of which is critical to making any NBA trade work. Yet they still don’t do the harder work of figuring out how teams can protect against downside risk, address future cap issues, deal with looming contract decisions, and ensure roster flexibility. That part is still quite a slog.

Here, I’m going to go over what the Kings have to offer on the trade market, specifically current players and future draft picks, and I’ll try to flag the core, nitty-gritty issues that impact what can get done in a deal and the value of players and future picks.

So What Can the Kings Offer In a Trade?

The first thing that any team has to look at is what it has in the cupboard. Broadly speaking for basketball, there are two primary buckets: players on your roster and future draft picks.

The Players

On the player-side, the Kings have 14 players on the current roster, one player on a 10-day contract (Juan Toscano-Anderson), and three players on two-way deals so they can split time with the G-League Stockton Kings (Jordan Ford, Keon Ellis, and Jalen Slawson).

You can see a pretty comprehensive break-down of the Kings player contracts on Spotrac, but for convenience, the chart below shows the team’s player contracts (excluding 10-day contracts, two-way deals, and dead cap hits, which are pretty marginal and not worth charting for simplicity):

The Kings have two All-NBA caliber players under contract long-term in Fox and Sabonis, and there’s been no indication the team would even consider moving them. The team has also repeatedly shot down any notion of trading second-year player Keegan Murray, even in exchange for all-stars Pascal Siakam and Lauri Markkanen. That leaves the Kings with 12 roster players they can trade (plus one 10-day player, Juan Toscano-Anderson, and two-way players Keon Ellis, Jalen Slawson, and Jordan Ford).

Realistically, opposing teams are most likely to be interested in a handful of players—Murray (who the Kings refuse to trade), Harrison Barnes, Kevin Huerter, pending free agent Malik Monk, and Davion Mitchell—or future draft picks. The other players on the Kings roster could still be fit into a deal, either because someone wants to trade or to make salaries match, but their names don’t come up in trade rumors often because they’re not as appealing to other teams.

But we can’t just stop at listing the players the Kings might trade. We also have to look at a handful of key issues that influence who can be traded where as well as the value they have in a deal. The most important of these issues is salary matching, but I’ll also talk briefly about contract restrictions that could impact the trade value of players the Kings could consider dealing.

[The below sections on Salary Matching and Contract Restrictions are pretty granular. If you’re not interested, you can skip it, but I do want folks to understand two concepts: (1) the NBA’s CBA has detailed rules governing how trades can be constructed, which can significantly impact which players are included in trades, and (2) the CBA also has rules governing re-signing players and player extensions that can impact how much value they have in a deal.]

Salary Matching

Player-for-player trades in the NBA require "salary matching.” This can get complicated, but the basic idea is that if a team wants to trade a player, they can only receive back players with salaries inside of a certain band (or specified amount).

The amount of salary that a team can receive back in a trade depends on a few factors, the most important of which are the amount of the outgoing player’s salary and the team’s overall salary cap position. [HoopsRumors has a solid summary if you want to get into the details more, but I’ve tried to simplify things below. Relatively speaking.]

Let’s start with the team’s salary cap position to get familiar with some of the terms that will help with understanding the salary matching rules.

• The NBA’s salary cap is specified each year by the league based on a pre-set formula outlined in the league’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). For the 2023-24 season, the NBA set the salary cap at $136,021,000—teams can thus operate below the cap, at the cap, or above the cap, and different rules can apply to them as a consequence. That said, there generally aren’t many restrictions for teams simply being at or above the cap.

  [In case you’re wondering, the NBA has a “soft” salary cap—meaning there are various ways to go over the cap. These exceptions cover trades, re-signing players that were already under contract with the team the previous season, signing draft picks, signing new players at the veteran’s minimum salary, and signing players using various other specified salary cap exceptions. As a result, most competitive teams end up operating above the cap in any given season.]

• The NBA also has a luxury tax threshold, which is based on the cap and set at $165,294,000 for the 2023-24 season. Luxury tax teams have to pay an additional luxury tax for any salary paid at or above the luxury tax threshold. For example, if a team’s 2023-24 salary is $170,000,000, in addition to paying their salary out to the players, they have to pay an additional $4,706,000 in luxury taxes to the league, which in turn gets distributed to the other teams who aren’t luxury tax payers.

  The amount of luxury tax is based on the amount by which a team exceeds the luxury tax threshold, and it gets increasingly onerous as a team spends more and more beyond the luxury tax threshold. I’ve included an explanation below, but note that all of the underlined amounts will increase in the 2025-26 seasons and beyond, per the CBA.

  • Between $0 and $4,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $1.25 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $5 million and $9,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $1.75 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $10 million and $14,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $2.50 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  • Between $15 million and $19,999,999 above the luxury tax, teams pay $3.25 in luxury tax per dollar they go over the luxury tax threshold.

  [Teams that repeatedly have salaries above the luxury tax threshold (based on CBA-specified formulas) can also be charged additional amounts as “repeater” tax. It’s the same concept as outlined above, but the prices get even higher.]

  The practical effect of the luxury tax is that as a team spends more and more above the luxury tax threshold, their roster becomes more and more expensive—and they effectively give more and more money to their competitors who stay below the luxury tax threshold.

  This can have a huge effect on the trade market, because teams that can afford to spend (think big market teams like the Warriors or the Knicks) are more willing/able to pay a tax on salary, while other teams often prefer to stay below the luxury tax threshold so they can get money back.

• The NBA also sets two salary cap thresholds above the luxury tax threshold called the “first apron” and the “second apron.” For 2023-24, the first apron is $172,346,000 and the second apron is $182,794,000.

  Teams with salaries at or above these two thresholds are subject to a variety of restrictions this season, and will be subject to additional penalties in future years of the current CBA. We don’t need to go into the details other than to keep in mind a couple concepts:

  • Next year, teams are going to face increasingly stiff restrictions and/or penalties for having team salaries above the first apron and the second apron;

  • Specifically at issue here, teams above the first apron (and of course the second apron) have to comply with stricter trade rules; and

  • Teams generally don’t want to exceed the first apron or the second apron unless they need to, as they will face significantly reduced roster flexibility once the rules take effect next season.

• Lastly, there is a minimum team salary threshold—often referred to as the salary floor. For the 2023-24 season, the salary floor is $122,418,000. The salary floor is an issue far less frequently than the salary cap and luxury tax threshold, and gets less attention than the first and second aprons, but the basic idea is pretty simple. Teams have to have team salaries above the salary floor, and if they don’t, they get penalized. Those penalties come in the form of having to pay up to the salary floor anyway (for example, players on the team will get paid more even though they signed contracts for less); the team will be subject to “cap holds” that prevent the team from taking advantage salary cap space below the salary floor; and the team will get 50% less money in distributions from teams paying luxury tax (this will go down to no money starting in 2025-26).

  The details here aren’t so important for our purposes. What is important is to understand that there is no real benefit to teams going below the salary floor, and they can suffer penalties for doing so.

With that out of the way, let’s talk about the salary matching requirement.

The amount of salary a team can get back in a trade depends on the outgoing player salary this season and the team’s overall salary (specifically, whether the team is above the first apron). For teams below the first apron, the following salary matching rules apply:

1. For outgoing salaries up to $7.5 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals 200% of the outgoing player salary + $250k.

2. For outgoing salaries above $7.5 million up to $29 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals outgoing player salary + $7.5 million.

3. For outgoing salaries above $29 million, the team can receive back a player whose salary equals 125% of the outgoing player salary + $250k.

To help understand the concept, think about a few simplified examples.

• A team wants to trade away a player whose salary is $5 million, which falls under Category #1 above. The player they receive back can only be paid a salary that is up to $10.25 million.

  2 x $5 million + $0.25 million = $10.25 million

• A team wants to trade for a player that makes $25.5 million. The player they trade away must be paid a salary of at least $18 million—this is Category #2 above.

  $18 million + $7.5 million = $25.5 million

• A team wants to trade away a player who makes $30 million. The most they can take back in salary is $37.75 million—see Category #3 above.

  1.25 x $30 million + $0.25 million = $37.75 million

The rules are simpler, but more restrictive for teams at or above the first apron. For first apron teams, they can only take back a player whose salary is up to 110% of the outgoing salary no matter what the outgoing salary is. In practice, this means that teams at or above the first apron have less wiggle room in trades and have to match salaries more closely—they can’t take players who earn more than 10% of the players they’re sending out in a deal. This will go down to 100% starting next season.

Right now, teams generally can also aggregate salaries of multiple players in trades. Put simply, this means that teams can combine the salaries of more than one player for salary matching purposes in trades. For example, if a team wants to trade two players for three players, the salary matching rules described above still apply—the “outgoing salaries” would be the combined salaries of the two players the team is trading away, and the incoming salaries would be the combined salaries of the three players coming back in the trade.

Here’s a simplified example:

The Spurs want to trade Players A and B to the Wizards in exchange for Players X, Y, and Z. Player A has a $20 million salary and Player B has a $12 million salary.

Meanwhile, Player X has a $18 million salary, Player Y has a $8 million salary, and Player Z has a $7 million salary.

The trade is allowed, regardless of whether either team is a first apron team, because it meets all the salary matching requirements.

$20 million (Player A) + $12 million (Player B) = $32 million in outgoing salary

$18 million (Player X) + $8 million (Player Y) + $7 million (Player Z) = $33 million

General rule (non first apron teams): 1.25 x $32 million = $40 million, which is greater than the $33 million in incoming salary to the Spurs

First Apron Rule: 1.10 x $32 million = $35.2 million, which is also greater than the $33 million in incoming salary to the Spurs.

Both rules would also obviously be satisfied from the Wizards' perspective, as their $33 million of outgoing salary is greater than the returning $32 million in salary they are getting back.

Following the 2023-24 season, teams above the first apron and second apron will start to face more and more restrictions on the salary they can take back in trades and whether they can aggregate salaries for trades. Among other things, teams at or above the first apron won’t be able to take back more than the amount of salary they send out in a trade, and teams at or above the second apron won’t be able to aggregate salaries for trades (aggregation of salaries is described more below).

Teams can also send out a limited amount of cash per year in trades and/or include future draft picks in trades (which have no value for salary matching purposes).

There are a number of other minor salary matching rules that can apply in limited cases, but hopefully that covers the meat of it!

Contract Restrictions

There are a bunch of rules governing NBA contracts that are largely driven by how much time the player has served in the NBA, most of which don’t really impact trade considerations. For example, veteran players typically have fewer restrictions (although there can be exceptions and weird things like no-trade clauses exist sometimes, but they’re pretty rare).

Most of the Kings players have standard NBA deals, so there aren’t really special considerations for teams to look at when trading for them. But a few are worth flagging:

• Malik Monk is scheduled to be a free agent this off-season, and either the Kings (or any team they trade Monk to) would have his “Early Bird rights.” I won’t go into detail on Bird rights, but the gist is that Bird rights let a team re-sign its own players and exceed the salary cap. “Early Bird rights” rights are a more limited version of Bird rights, but they limit how much the team can pay the player in the first year of a new contract. In Monk’s case, if he were traded, a team would be able to offer him a contract for the 2024-25 season and beyond with a starting salary at about $17.4 million and also go over the salary cap.

  This could ultimately limit Monk’s trade value if teams think that Monk would be offered substantially more than $17.4 million as a free agent (which is certainly possible if not likely). This is because the team trading for Monk would be limited to offering him a below market starting salary if his contract would push the team’s salary above the cap, which in turn would make it less likely that Monk actually re-ups with them.

• Separately, a number of Kings players have contracts with team options: Keegan Murray and Sasha Vezenkov in 2025-26, and Colby Jones in 2027-28. This gives teams the right to choose whether to keep the player under contract during the option year, which gives the team added control and flexibility with the player’s future contract. This is generally seen as positive for the team and bolsters trade value—especially on (comparatively) low salary deals that may prove to be below market for the player.

• Keegan Murray, Davion Mitchell, Chris Duarte, and Kessler Edwards are also still on their rookie contracts, so they are slated to eventually hit "restricted free agency” rather than “unrestricted free agency” (like the rest of the Kings players) in different years. Without going into detail, unrestricted free agents can generally sign wherever they like, but the team gets the chance to match any deal a restricted free agent signs with another team—conceptually like a right of first refusal. This is generally favorable for the team, as it gives them more leverage in negotiations for players that out-perform their rookie deals in particular.

  As first round picks, Murray, Mitchell, and Duarte can also be offered extensions of their contracts for up to five years (by the Kings or an acquiring team).

Draft Picks

Everyone knows that future draft picks, especially first round picks, are extremely valuable in trades. Often, teams trading away players ahead of the trade deadline are trying to turn their focus to the future, so getting back future draft picks for current players is a natural strategy.

The chart below shows the draft picks that the Kings own (in black) and the draft picks they’ve traded away (in red).

The Kings Future Picks

* Sacramento owes its 2024 first round pick to Atlanta, but it is protected for the top 14 picks. If the pick does not convey to Atlanta in 2024, it rolls over to 2025, where it is protected for the top 12 picks. If the pick does not convey to Atlanta in 2025, it rolls over to 2026, where it is protected for the top 10 picks. If the Kings pick is in the top 10 in 2026, then Atlanta loses the right to receive a first round pick and instead will receive the Kings’ second round picks in 2026 and 2027.

The CBA Restricts Trading Future Picks

As you can see from the chart above, the Kings have all of their first round picks through 2030, except for a protected pick in 2024 that they owe to the Hawks (part of the trade for Kevin Huerter almost two years ago). That’s a good war chest for trades, as they have a number of picks that they can send out in exchange for players now.

But there are a few key rules to keep in mind that restrict what the Kings can trade away.

First, per the CBA, teams can only trade draft picks up to seven years in the future, hence why the chart above only goes out to 2030. Next year, teams will be permitted to trade picks out to 2031.

Second, there’s something called the Stepien Rule, which requires that teams have a future first round pick in every other draft. In effect, this means that a team can’t trade its first round picks in successive years. Generally speaking, this is pretty simple to figure out: if a team has traded away its pick in 2024, it cannot trade its 2025 pick, the team would only be able to trade its pick in 2026 and beyond. [The Stepien Rule only applies to first round picks because the perception is that a team trading all of its first round picks could really hamstring it in the future. Second round picks aren’t seen as quite so important.]

The combination of the two rules above means that a hypothetical team today could trade, at most, four of its future first round picks: 2024, 2026, 2028, and 2030.

Third, teams can place protections on the picks they send out. Pick protections are often structured so that they pick doesn’t convey if it falls in a particular draft slot. For example, the Kings 2024 first round pick will go to the Atlanta Hawks so long as it does not fall in the top 14 picks. If the pick falls anywhere between 15 and 30, the Hawks get the pick for the 2024 draft, otherwise the Kings keep it.

Trading a future unprotected first round pick will usually net way more back in a trade than trading a top 20 protected first round pick, for example. The unprotected pick has more opportunity to convey and of course has the chance to be higher in the draft, so it carries way more value to the team trading for it. Teams often use these protections heavily as a way to change the value of their picks so that each side to a deal gets appropriate value. Pick protections can bridge the gap between a team trading for a player who is not quite worth a future first round pick, but is better than a second round pick, and the counterparty who isn’t interested in getting multiple second round picks.

Teams have a lot of flexibility to negotiate protections on picks, so long as the pick conveys within seven years at most, if at all (there are other rules, but they’re not really relevant to pick value). In other words, the protection has to be structured so that the pick either goes to the other team within seven years or the obligation to give the pick extinguishes, or alternatively turns into some other kind of trade value (like multiple second round picks that convey right away). As you can probably guess, how much protection gets placed on a particular pick has an ENORMOUS impact on that pick’s value in a trade.

All together, this can really make trading future first round picks complicated.

Let’s look at the Kings 2024 first round pick set to be traded to the Hawks. As I noted above, that pick is top 14 protected in 2024, but if it doesn’t convey to the Hawks in 2024, it gets converted to a top 12 protected pick in 2025. Same thing if it doesn’t convey in 2025, it converts to a top 10 protected pick in 2026. And, just to add some more complexity, if the pick hasn’t conveyed and Kings are picking in the top 10 in 2026, the Hawks would instead get two second round picks in 2026 and 2027. The three rules listed above conspire to really limit what the Kings can trade right now.

Because the Kings have agreed to trade their 2024 first rounder, they can’t trade their first rounder in 2025 because of the Stepien Rule. But, because the Kings placed protections on their 2024 pick, there is no guarantee that it will actually convey to the Hawks in 2024—instead, the Kings let that pick effectively roll over to 2025. Because of that, the Kings also can’t trade their first round pick in 2026, as it’s theoretically possible they would have already traded away their 2025 pick. The same situation would apply for their 2026 first round pick: because the Hawks could theoretically receive the Kings 2026 first round pick, the Kings can’t trade their 2027 first round pick under the Stepien Rule.

[1/16/24 addition: There is one caveat that I should add for completeness. The Kings can theoretically trade their 2026 first round pick if they structure the pick to be conditional on the Kings 2024 first round pick actually being conveyed to the Hawks. In such a situation, the team that trades for the Kings 2026 first round pick would only be able to get that pick if the Kings 2024 first round pick actually falls outside the top 14, and thus is conveyed to the Hawks. Otherwise, the team trading for the Kings 2026 first rounder would have to get something else (such as second round picks, a later year first round pick, etc.) or nothing.]

So What Draft Picks Can the Kings Actually Trade?

This is something that I see lots of people mix up when talking about what future the Kings have available to trade.

As of today, for their first round picks, the Kings can either trade (A) two first rounders in 2028 and 2030 or (B) one first rounder in 2029. They cannot trade their first round picks in 2025, 2026, or 2027, even though they most likely will end up owning those picks, as a result of the current deal they have with the Hawks. All of the second round picks the Kings have, however, can be traded (other than the 2030 pick they owe to Indiana).

But that’s not the end of the story!

The Kings can, in theory, remove the protections on the 2024 first round pick they owe to Atlanta to ensure that it actually conveys in 2024. Doing so would allow the Kings to open up additional first round picks for trade, such that they could make up to three first rounders available (in 2026, 2028, and 2030).

There are two things that must be accounted for, though, before the Kings remove protection from the 2024 first round pick owed to the Hawks.

The first is obvious: removing protections is the same thing as giving away value. If the Kings were to remove the protections on the pick they owe to Atlanta, it would be the same as giving additional value in the form of a better pick in 2024—so, whatever potential trade for a player this year would have to take that into account.

The second issue is that the Kings can’t unilaterally change their deal with Atlanta. Instead, the two sides have to reach another deal to change the protections. What if the Hawks think that the 2024 draft is terrible, but the 2025 draft is great? If they think that, the Hawks may not want to remove the protections on the Kings’ 2024 pick because they think it is unlikely to convey (basically meaning they think the Kings won’t make the playoffs) and they’d rather take a shot at getting a first round pick in 2025. It’s unlikely the Hawks are betting on that now, with the Kings sitting at 5th in the West, but the 2024 draft isn’t very highly rated so they may want to gamble. Regardless, the real point is that the Kings may have to give up something to take the protections off of the 2024 first rounder they owe to the Hawks so that they can be more flexible trading first round picks this year.

[1/16/24 addition: I should also flag that the Kings can trade the unprotected portions of the first round picks they’ve conveyed to the Hawks, although they won’t have as much value as a stand-alone first round pick. The Kings retain the rights over their 2024 first round pick if it lands in the top 14 (same for the top 12 picks in 2025 and top 10 picks in 2026)—essentially the inverse of what they’ve traded away from the Hawks—so they can trade those pieces. In other words, even without changing the protections on the first round picks owed to the Hawks, the Kings are allowed to trade their 2024 first round pick protected for picks 16-30, and they could add on roll-over years like they did with the Hawks deal. First round picks with these kinds of protections can be hard to value, but a Kings trade partner could essentially bet against the Kings making the playoffs in 2024 (with rollovers to 2025 and 2026, for example) by taking the lottery-protected portion of the first round pick the Kings have already traded away.

It’s also worth noting that NBA teams also can do pick swaps. This isn’t the same as trading a pick, but teams can essentially trade away the option to swap picks with another team. In such a situation, the Kings would give another team the right to choose, after the draft order is set and before the draft, between the more favorable of the Kings pick and their own. This has much less value than a pick itself, as the trade counter-party has to send back their own first round pick if they elect to swap, but these swap rights do have trade value.]

Cash

Teams can also include cash consideration in trades. Cash consideration is often used for smaller deals to make sense, as sometimes a team wants to get off of a player’s contract because they don’t play much and aren’t in the team’s future plans. Unsurprisingly, there are rules in the CBA governing how much cash can be included to avoid rich teams throwing money at less wealthy teams for their best players, but because these are usually just used for smaller deals, they don’t come up a lot. I’m talking about them here primarily to acknowledge that these rules exist and have a small part to play in deadline deals of all sizes.

For the 2023-24 seasons, teams are limited to paying cash considerations to a total of $7.05 million for the season. Theoretically, this can be split up among several trades or included in one trade. The practical effect of this limit is that cash considerations are usually only relevant for small deals involving a player or two with relatively small salaries (at least by NBA standards), otherwise it ends up not making much sense. For example, cash considerations were part of the Kings-Nets deal last year that brought in Kessler Edwards—the Nets sent Kessler Edwards and cash to the Kings so that they didn’t have to pay his salary and lower their luxury tax bill.

Part Three Coming Soon!

In the next (and probably? hopefully? last) part of this series, I’m going to look at some of the trade candidates that reporters and pundits are suggesting the Kings might pursue. I’m hoping to look at these potential trade targets from a few angles: What areas of need would they help address (PLEASE DEFENSE!)? Who would the Kings likely have to send out the door in order to get them? And, what do the Kings need to think about with respect to future draft picks and salary cap space before actually making a trade?

Kings NBA Trade Deadline (Part 1): The Kings Have to Find a Way to Get Better

[This is Part 1 of a multi-part series of posts on how the Kings need to look to improve ahead of the NBA’s looming trade deadline; how their assets and cap space will influence who they can target in the trade market (if anyone); and whether any of the hot trade target names make sense]

The NBA trade deadline is February 8th, a little less than one month away. Just under halfway through the season, the Kings are sitting as the fifth seed in the Western Conference at 21-14, barely ahead of the sixth-place Mavericks (22-15) and seventh-place Pelicans (22-15).

Going into back-to-back games on the road against Detroit (tonight) and Charlotte (tomorrow), by the most important measure, the Kings are already doing slightly better than last year. Last year’s team went 20-15 to start the season before ultimately winning 48 games and finishing as the 3-seed in the West.

That said, there’s no real question the Western Conference has continued to improve overall this year. The Nuggets continue to perform, Timberwolves and Thunder are gelling, the Clippers have been healthy and near-flawless after a slow start following the addition of James Harden, the Mavs and Pelicans have been effective, the Rockets finally appear to be turning things around, and the Suns are finally healthy. Only three teams in the West won 48 games or more last year, but there are seven teams in the Conference on pace to hit that mark this season (as of today). A “slight” improvement on last year may not cut it as a result.

On top of increased competition in the conference, there are some headline issues that should raise concern for the Kings and their fans.

• This year’s Kings team has a negative point differential so far, scoring 0.3 points less than opponents per game. That’s 10th in the West and 18th in the NBA, and it looks more like what you would expect from a .500 team than a team with a 21-14 record.

• The offense has taken a small step back, especially compared to the rest of the league. The Kings are scoring 117.7 points per game (8th in NBA), down from 120.7 last season (1st in NBA). Similarly, their offensive rating has also dropped from a league-leading 118.6 (1st overall) to 116.0 (14th overall).

• The defense, which the team hoped to improve from last season, hasn’t made significant strides forward. Last year’s team had a defensive rating of 116.0 (23rd overall) and this year’s team has a defensive rating of 116.1 (21st overall).

Overall, the top-line stats above are suggestive of a team that hasn’t been able to generate enough offense to make up for its deficiencies on defense. Looking closer, though, is illuminating. The Kings have three big issues that they’re facing offensively—two of which may resolve themselves without changes to the roster. On defense, the same issues that have beleaguered them in the past are showing up, suggesting roster moves might make a difference.

Let’s jump in.

The Kings Offense Comes Back to the Pack

I am focusing on three offensive issues that have showed up consistently so far this season. These are issues that I’ve noticed watching (literally) every game so far this season, and the stats show they help explain some of the Kings’ offensive backslide, as the team has fallen from a record-setting offense to one that is just pretty good. Given the current roster, the Kings could look to improve their overall play by getting their offense back in shape without re-inventing themselves.

The Offense Craters Without Fox

The number one issue facing the Kings right now is what to do when Fox is out of the game. Every team is going to suffer when you take its best player off the court, but the Kings have tanked offensively when De’Aaron Fox is on the bench. When Fox sits, the Kings drops from 120.8 points per 100 possessions to just 111.8 based on data from PBP Stats.

Fox is also carrying the biggest offensive load of his career, which has allowed the Kings to maintain a top 10 offense overall. He’s averaging 28.3 points, 6.0 assists, and 4.4 rebounds in just over 35 minutes per game while shooting 47.0% from the field and 39.2% from three, and his usage rate is a career-high 32.4%. His numbers have dipped slightly in recent weeks in part because of the massive load he’s carrying.

While the Kings offense often runs through Sabonis at the top of the key whether Fox is in the game or not, there’s no question Fox is the driving the ship. Fox has been the team’s most prolific three point shooter this year, especially as other shooters have struggled. Keegan Murray struggled from deep early (although he’s recovering his percentages from last year). Kevin Huerter’s shooting has cratered to 34.1% from 40.2% last season, which has hurt spacing and rendered previously effective offensive plays like the Sabonis-Huerter dribble handoff ineffective. On top of his three point shooting, Fox is also the team’s most effective and frequent driver. Fox drives 16.7 times per game—the next closest on the team is Malik Monk at 11.9, per NBA.com. That penetration has opened up shots and driving lanes for the rest of the team, most of whom aren’t best hunting shots on their own.

Mike Brown has tried to mitigate the impact of sitting Fox by staggering his minutes with Sabonis—Fox typically comes out of the game with about six minutes left in the first quarter while Sabonis keeps playing, then comes back in when Sabonis rests—but that hasn’t solved the problem. Again per PBP Stats, when Fox and Sabonis share the floor, the Kings offensive rating is 120.0 and their net rating is 2.72, but even when Sabonis is in the game while Fox sits, that plummets to an offensive rating of 111.1 and a net rating of -6.54. With Fox in the game and Sabonis sitting, the Kings are still able to get by on the strength of Fox’s offense, as the team’s offensive rating jumps to 122.6 and the net rating stays at a respectable 1.59.

Having Malik Monk play with Sabonis has helped, but it’s not a cure. With Monk and Sabonis, and no Fox, the Kings have posted an offensive rating of 116.1 and a net rating of 0.74. Those line-ups rely heavily on two actions, Sabonis in the high-post (a staple for the Kings the last two years) and the Monk/Sabonis pick and roll. The Sabonis high-post game has been effective in the past, but Monk isn’t yet efficient as a pick and roll initiator despite his knack for making some electric passes. When Monk is the pick and roll ball handler, the Kings are scoring just 0.84 points per play and have a turnover frequency of 21.9% per NBA.com (the Kings don’t run pick and roll super efficiently even with Fox, but for comparison, when Fox is the pick and roll ball handler, they’re scoring 1.00 points per play with a turnover frequency of just 12.7%). Finding more efficiency out of the pick and roll when Fox is on the bench, whether from improved play by Monk (he’s still learning what passes are best as the pick and roll initiator) or through a trade addition, would go a long way in bolstering the Kings offense during the minutes he sits.

In the limited time the Kings roll with Sabonis and no Fox or Monk, the offensive is effectively non-existent. Lineups with Sabonis and no Fox or Monk are getting killed, with an offensive rating of 103.9 and a net rating of -14.9 (per PBP Stats).

Stats from PBP Stats

There isn’t a clear answer on the roster for the non-Fox minutes, either. Keon Ellis’ minutes without Fox on the floor have been productive, but they’ve been heavily influenced by low-leverage minutes. It’s tough to expect Ellis to takeover backup minutes for an All-NBA player in his first full season out of the G-League.

Stats from PBP Stats

The Kings need to find a way to prop up the offense when Fox sits. Monk has been solid, but adding another ball-handler (or pick and roll partner for Sabonis) could alleviate the pressure on Monk to create offense through pick and rolls, not his most effective tool, when things stagnate.

Trouble Shooting From Two

Even though the Kings mostly took high quality shots last year, they’ve still managed to improve their shot diet this year. Compared to last season, they’re taking more threes and fewer long-range twos. This year, the Kings are shooting threes at the third-highest rate in the NBA, 40.7 threes per 100 possessions (up from 36.9 per 100 possessions last season), and their three point shooting has held steady at around 37% (they’re shooting 37.2% this year versus 36.9% last year). A whopping 45.2% of their shots come from three point range, up an already healthy 42.3% last season. They’ve also dropped the percentage of their shots that are long twos—only 11.9% of the team’s shots are taken between 10+ feet from the basket but inside the 3 point line (compared to 13% last season).

All of that is great news! But that improved shot diet has been off-set by the team’s shooting troubles from two point range, where their shooting has dropped off meaningfully from basically everywhere.

Overall, the Kings’ two point shooting has fallen to 55.8% (9th in the NBA) from a league-leading 58.6% last year. That’s a big drop, even if it would be hard to match last year’s figure.

The drop-off has been even more noticeable (and problematic) in the paint, as those are shots that the team has hit with high frequency on the backs of Domantas Sabonis and De’Aaron Fox. The Kings are shooting a good-but-not-great 66.9% from the restricted area, good for 12th and 23rd in the NBA respectively, but down from a stellar 69.5% on 26.6 shots per game last year (per NBA.com). They’re also shooting 46.6% from the paint outside the restricted area, down from last year’s 47.7%. NBA.com also provides data by distance, which shoes that the team’s shooting from the midrange has been worse too. On shots between 10-19 feet (roughly, midrange twos), the Kings shooting has dropped to just 41.0% from 43.8% last season.

The Kings have several players shooting worse than last year from two point range. Fox and Sabonis are both down from last year, and so are Huerter and Monk. There is some hope that the two point shooting returns to last’s years form, but that is hard to bank on, as last year’s league-leading two point shooting percentage would be difficult to replicate under any circumstances without adding paint scorers or creating more space for Fox and Sabonis. Given the Kings’ issues keeping the offense afloat when Fox sits, adding a paint scorer could be the more effective answer.

Struggles With Free Throws

There’s no need to dig deeply on this one, the Kings’ free throw shooting has been plainly bad this year. They are dead last in the NBA shooting 72.9% from the line, falling from last year’s mid-pack free throw percentage of 79.0%. Fox and Sabonis dominate free throw trips for the Kings, but each is shooting worse than last year from the line. From the line, Fox is shooting 72.1% on 6.9 FT attempts per game (FTA), down from 78% on 6.0 FTAs last season; Sabonis is shooting just 65.4% on 5.4 FTAs, down from 74.2% on 5.5 FTAs last season (per Basketball Reference).

But the Kings are also drawing less fouls regardless. They were fourth-best in the league last year at drawing fouls (20.9 per game), but that’s dropped all the way to 19th (19.3 per game). This is partly the natural result of shooting more threes, but it has meant fewer trips to the foul line for easier scoring chances. With Fox’s FTAs going up and Sabonis’ FTAs staying stagnant, it’s meant that the rest of the team—generally stronger free throw shooters—have shot 3.6 less free throws per game overall compared to last year. Even if those players shot just 75% from the free throw line, that would be an additional 2.7 points per game—which has to be made up elsewhere.

Obviously the simplest way to improve at the line is for Fox and Sabonis to shoot better. Having another strong shooter who can handle the ball and draw fouls could help, but that would take the ball out of the hands of the team’s two best players. Given the team is asking its role players to shoot more threes, too, it’s hard to expect a dramatic improvement in their free throw rate, but those players have got to get to the line more nonetheless.

(Mostly) More of the Same on Defense

Top-Line Stats Say the Defense Hasn’t Changed From Last Year

The Kings have well-documented defensive issues dating back to last season (or longer depending on who you ask . . . but the team was also totally different). Last season, the Kings gave up 118.1 points per game (26th overall) with a defensive rating of 116.0 (24th overall). Despite another year under the tutelage of Head Coach Mike Brown, who is known for his defensive prowess, this year’s Kings defense is in most ways unchanged: they give up 118.0 points per game (22nd overall) with a defensive rating of 116.1 (20th overall).

A league-wide uptick in scoring does mask that the Kings have made some improvements on the defensive end. These improvements have come largely in the form of slightly more blocks, steals, and fewer offensive rebounds—but they’re small improvements at best. You can see from the chart below how some of the team’s key defensive metrics have stayed flat or regressed slightly, with the exception of opponent offensive rebounds and a slight uptick in blocks.

Stats from Basketball Reference

Still No Paint Protection

It’s never been a huge surprise that protecting the paint isn’t a strength for the Kings. Sabonis is on the smaller side of centers (perfect heights/wingspans aren’t available, but he’s listed at 6’10” with a 6’10.5” wingspan); Harrison Barnes, Keegan Murray, Trey Lyles, and Sasha Vezenkov are definitely on the small side for NBA 4’s; and Javale McGee and Alex Len don’t get enough minutes to defend the paint most of the game. Combined with perimeter players who lack ideal length—Fox, Monk, and Davion Mitchell are smaller, and Huerter, Chris Duarte, and Keon Ellis aren’t exactly pterodactyls—the Kings have to move their feet and nail rotations to defend the paint well.

There’s no denying that the Kings are once again struggling to defend the paint. Even though Sabonis in particular is a stellar big overall and has been pretty effective this year defensively (he ranks 17th overall in Basketball Reference’s Defensive Box Plus/Minus, above defensive stalwarts Rudy Gobert, Chet Holmgren, Evan Mobley, Jarrett Allen, and Walker Kessler), that hasn’t fixed the paint issues. They don’t block shots, they aren’t particularly adept at getting steals, and they don’t get a ton of deflections, as noted above.

They have improved their defense at the rim somewhat. Opponents last year shot 73.3% on shots between zero and three feet (25th in the NBA), which they’ve improved to 69.8% this year per Basketball Reference. Yet whatever improvement they’ve made at the rim has been given back to opposing offenses in the form of short jumpers and runners. On shots between 3 and 10 feet, the Kings are allowing opponents to shoot 50.3% (27th in the NBA), up from 47.5% last year.

Simply adding a big to cover the paint probably can’t solve the issue. The Kings tried this last off-season when they added Javale McGee last year in free agency, hoping to help assuage some of the rim- and paint-defense issues. McGee hasn’t been able to improve the defense overall, as the team’s defensive rating is 2.5 points worse per 100 possessions with McGee on the court versus on the bench. McGee’s length has meant that opponents shoot about 7% worse at the rim with him on the floor, but that benefit gets eaten up by the fact that opponents end up shooting 5% better from three due to McGee’s difficulties switching onto perimeter players and the Kings’ general troubles with perimeter defense.

Bigs who can protect the paint and hold their own on the perimeter are kind of like unicorns, so finding one on the trade market would be difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, adding perimeter players who can more effectively bite down on paint shots and still defend three point shooters and dribble drives is likely an easier path to address the issue.

Still Can’t Defend the Three

The Kings are also still struggling to effectively defend the three point line. They’re once again in the bottom tier of the league, allowing opponents to shoot 38.5% from three point range, a tick worse than last year’s 37.3% mark. Watching Kings games regularly, it’s hard to avoid noticing the number of missed rotations that result in wide-open threes.

One of the biggest issues remains that they give up too many corner threes, a shot that most teams try to hunt, far too easily, even though they’ve improved slightly in that department from last season. This year, their opponents shoot 24.2% of their total threes from the corners (19th in the NBA) and they hit a robust 41.1% percent of them (20th in the NBA) per Basketball Reference. That’s in line with last year’s marks of 26.0% of threes coming from the corner (24th) and 39.5% shooting (19th).

As a team, the Kings are contesting just 15.8 threes per game, tied for 24th in the NBA. Other teams around them either do a better job of contesting shots generally, like Minnesota and Milwaukee, or play at a slower pace, like the Heat and Sixers. The Kings also don’t get their hands on many passes (13.5 deflections per game, 26th in the NBA), which would be another way to mitigate the threat of open shooters.

As with protecting the paint, adding a perimeter defender could help address these issues quite a bit.

Still Need More Hustle

When it comes to hustle plays, the Kings need to do a better job. While admittedly anecdotal, too often, games this season have slipped away because opposing teams have ramped up the intensity and the Kings haven’t. Especially when they don’t shoot well, the lack of energy and infrequency of true hustle plays has a dramatic deflating effect on the team. It’s let some opponents go on big runs and has contributed to the Kings frequently getting blown out in losses (7 of their 14 losses has been by 15 points or more). While the Kings don’t have defensive stars like some other teams, they can still do a better job with getting their hands up in passing lanes, swiping at balls without fouling, taking charges, and generally making opponents uncomfortable, especially when they’re not hitting shots, to keep opponents from going on runs.

The stats say the same thing. The Kings are 18th in offensive rebounding, tied for 18th in steals, 27th in blocks, 26th in deflections, tied for 17th in loose ball recoveries, 18th in charges drawn, 25th in shot contests, 18th in the percentage of offensive rebounds they box out on, and 13th in the percentage of defensive rebounds they box out on. These rankings aren’t all bad, and they’re certainly based on more than pure effort, but they are areas that the Kings can improve internally or by adding defense-minded players at the deadline.

Part Two Coming Soon!

In the next part of this series, I’m going to look at what the Kings have to trade and how the salary cap this season and beyond should influence their thinking ahead of the trade deadline.